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Jones v. United States
726 A.2d 186
D.C.
1999
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*1 un- payment obligated to make District was agreement in order to the settlement

der See of interest owed.6

compute the amount Associates, (holding at 312

Pierce appropriate for determination

that remand is ac- began interest

of the date on which

crue). proceedings.

Remanded for further JONES, Appellant, R.

Elton STATES, Appellee.

UNITED

No. 96-CM-1220. Appeals. of Columbia Court of

District

Argued 1998. March March 1999.

Decided issue, agreement or at some later of the settlement reach this Since the trial court did not was obli- we do not decide whether the District time. immediately gated payment upon execu- máke

one-way ap- street. As the three officers car, they proached appellant in the scout saw drop ziplock bags at his feet. Officer two quickly the car all stopped Groomes and' officers, armed, in full uniform and alighted approached group and sidewalk. officers, appellant

At the approach of the appeared panic; picked up he a beer and mouth. bottle moved it to his One of the (each picked up ziplock bags rock) contained a white and handed them Groomes who ordered the two men standing appellant next to cross to the other side of the street. Groomes, Officer asked motions Lamar, G. Christian Public Defender Ser- leave,” if replied: court “free

vice, with whom Klein James and Sarnia [I] believe at that time he knew he was —I Fam, Service, Public Defender on were officers, mean there’s three and I mean he brief, appellant. for going anywhere. wasn’t go We were Nellor, A. Susan Assistant United States him, around free so he wasn’t to leave— Attorney, Mary Leary, with whom L'ou Unit- saying he’s panicking that all he —he Attorney ed States at the time the brief was he pick up, does is drink. seen us it When filed, Fisher, and John R. and Thomas C. he’s like all I do is drink. Black, Attorneys, Assistant States The three officers surrounded brief, on appellee. for wagon called for a unit to conduct a REID, test. Before field Officer Groomes continued: SCHWELB and Associate MACK, Judges, Judge. Senior then in And the meantime as we were test, waiting for I think the field then we MACK, Senior Judge: asking questions, you started him like court, appellant In this challenges know, knew, know, you if he where he possession his conviction on one count of a from, brought it he it who from. (in controlled substance violation of D.C.Code you say any- But he want to know didn’t 541(d)), § and the denial his motion to 33— thing about that. suppress statements him made while in íjí sj: t|« ‡ "k' custody and before been he had advised of like, rights. agree know, his Miranda1 might you We with his have asked and, therefore, contentions reverse. ID everything. and his name and test, waiting for field we were

While he asking kind of him if wanted to volun- I. brought teer information on who Briefly, facts summarized as from, stuff like that. follows: At the hearing pre- on suppress, government trial motion to At the cross-examination beginning of Groomes, counsel, interrupt- called Officer Diane court who testified defense the motions p.m., that 9:30 to make observation that evening, a November ed the initial driving (along repeat throughout pre- she a scout car it was with two would —that patrolmen) they foot saw to find that pared (whom (and two other men the officer had indicated as Groomes knew “real well”) much). standing on the of a sidewalk narrow Arizona, 1. See Miranda 16 L.Ed.2d 694 Thereafter, that, 291, 300-01, appellant testified follow- U.S. (1980):

ing repeated representations by the officers go would let him if he told We conclude Miranda safe- got drugs, got from where he “I scared” guards play person come into whenever a got guys and said it “from the across subjected express to either *3 the street.” questioning junctional equivalent. or its say, “interrogation” That is to the term hearing After arguments, oral the motions only under express Miranda refers not to court ruled that denying appellant’s questioning, any but also to or ivords ac- (1) suppress, concluding: motion to ap- (other part police tions on the of than pellant custody at the time he made normally those attendant to arrest and (2) statements, alleged that no Miranda custody) police that the should know are warnings time, given prior had been to this reasonably likely incriminating to elicit an (3) but it did “credit” that the state- response suspect. [Emphasis (that by appellant ments made he hold- supplied; footnotes omitted.] else) ing drugs sponta- for someone The court further that “[interrogation noted (presumably) neous and therefore admissible. ... must reflect compulsion a measure of (and conviction) A bench trial followed imme- beyond above custody that inherent diately. 300, itself.” Id. at 100 S.Ct. 1682. See also trial, At beginning of Elstad, 298, the court Oregon advised v. 105 S.Ct. 1285, counsel that there repeat was no need to (motion) testimony. prosecutor ap- used govern rule also is clear. The (that pellant’s holding admission he was statements, ment cannot use whether excul street) bags guys” for the “two across the patory inculpatory, stemming or from custo possession convict of drugs. of interrogation dial of the defendant unless it procedural demonstrates the use of safe guards effective privilege to secure the II. against self-incrimination. It is likewise young As our professionals are fond of clear that in the instant case Mr. Jones was “[Tjhis repeating, basically is straight- case custody by when he was surrounded forward.” the officers What did to Mr. uniformed armed law enforcement officers procedur- constituted a violation of the under circumstances where a per safeguards al 1966, of the Miranda rule. In son would never have believed he was free to Supreme thought Court this rule to be leave. necessary protect a defendant’s Fifth construing In “functional Innis privilege against Amendment compulsory equivalent questioning” prong, we have self-incrimination during interroga- custodial “interrogation requires noted that ... an tion; requires taking that an officer objective normally evaluation of the foresee suspect into person must inform that conduct], able police effect officer’s [the silent, “that right he has the to remain ... objective purpose which turns on the anything says against can be used him in Derrington manifested [the officer].” v. law, a court right that he has the (D.C. States, presence attorney, of an and that if he cannot 1985). evaluation, making objective attorney afford an one will be appointed for primarily we must percep “focus[] any prior questioning if he so de- subject tions of the in order to ‘reflect (em- sires.” 384 U.S. at 86 S.Ct. 1602 fact that safeguards the Miranda were de added). phasis signed suspect to vest a an with Despite present-day interpreta- protection debated added measure of coercive tions, the rule prophylactic remains as police practices, regard objective without ” it was in 1966. Thus in proof underlying police.’ intent of the Court, examining scope Innis, of custodial inter- (quoting supra, Id. 446 U.S. at Island, 1682). rogation, words, said in Rhode In other “whether (3) police reasonably place words or as the actions remains street; likely incriminating response to elicit an order across the the other two men (4) primarily measured the intent of the bags officers see and retrieve the (each rock) police, but action would rea how of which a white inches contains sonably perceived by him; the suspect.” Mor from surround feet and (D.C. (5) ris v. United drug the officers for a identification send 1983). unit; If the identify should have known the ask himself reasonably suspect perceive would that their and to tell them from whom had (6) instigate incriminating conduct would an drugs; re answers that he sponse, equivalent ques holding drugs guys for the across (i.e., tioning” “interrogation”) has taken the street.

place. supra, See Derrington, 488 A.2d at If these officers have known that *4 sequence likely this of events would have applied

We have equivalent compelled inculpatory exculpatory or state- of questioning” prong convict, to various factual situ- appel- ments used to incriminate and ations, (1) including: questions by rhetorical compulsion, lant has of been the victim and (In E.G., officers re 482 A.2d 1248 interrogation” thus the “custodial and the (D.C.1984) (holding ques- officer’s rhetorical statements were inadmissible at trial. tion, is,” gun “I money wonder where the and aware, acutely gov We are and the subsequent legal reasonably to frisk like- us, reviewing ernment an reminds (2) ly to elicit an incriminating response)); appeal sup of a motion to denial questions victim, directed to the but over- press, scope our is Brown v. United limited. by States, heard (Spann defendant v. United (D.C.1991). States, 590 A.2d 1020 We (D.C.1988) 551 A.2d (holding 1350-51 a must sup review the evidence offered at a victim’s unforeseeably accusatory loud and pression hearing light most to a favorable response question to an officer’s made in prevailing party, and we must draw all proximity close to defendant was not reason- party’s inferences in favor. ably likely incriminating to elicit an re- States, Peay v. United 597 A.2d (3) sponse)); by an answers officer in re- (D.C.1991). However, whether evidence sponse to questions continued defendant’s establishes that statements were v. United Wilson taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment (D.C.1982)(holding ques- officers’ answers to rights is a which we of law consider tions by initiated reasonably defendant were Brown, de supra. novo. See likely to elicit incriminating an response, where exchange part police of offi- Our de novo review of the motions (4) cers’ deliberate strategy)); exchanges and application findings court’s its to of Innis’ (Morris, of place common greetings supra, standard, legal subsequent ap denial of and (holding police at 438 detective pellant’s suppress incriminating motion to could not that a exchange have foreseen brief statements, leads us to a different conclusion of commonplace greetings prompt would de- than the believe the trial court. officers’ statements)). fendant to inculpatory make equiva conduct constituted the “functional case, questioning” we must lent of as defined Innis. decide whether police Specifically, have officers have appel- known the three should reasonably likely lant was to in approaching offer incrimina- known that their and actions statements; examine, ting only isolating retrieving plastic must the two appellant, we events, immediately individual drug bags, asking appellant a but series events. and (1) Here police likely compel uniformed for identification would an ex officers quickly ownership drugs. exit a cruiser of the they planation regarding marked when Moreover, entirety, observe other the offi and two men viewed in their street; (2) one-way beyond “normally sidewalk of a cers’ conduct narrow actions went custody.” approach observe attendant to arrest su and 300-01, 100 drop ziplock bags appear panic; two at S.Ct. 1682. pra, U.S. However, in case the spontaneity. free leave this Mr. was not (and closely officers’ more allies with conduct three armed isolated surrounded affirmative actions associated with experienced) had apparently officers who than equivalent questioning,” “functional drop containing ziplock bags seen conduct passive with the and incidental given the white He should have been rocks. permits As spontaneity. phrase warnings. The “custodial noted 1985: Court design aptly interrogation” definition and by the necessity warning use prohibits a rule The Fifth Amendment describes only com- protect right prosecution in its in chief in order constitutional case very testimony. simple pelled The Failure administer self-incrimination. rule, presumption recitation, warnings a required by poses no Miranda creates compulsion. Consequently, unwarned hardship on the law enforcement officers who voluntary statements that otherwise a freedom of have reason curtail citizen’s meaning Fifth Amend- within movement. from ment nevertheless be excluded must us, arguments reflecting before ex- evidence under Miranda. research, prompt haustive nevertheless us to Elstad, 306-07, supra, 470 appeal remind that is an from convic- Accordingly, (emphasis original).3 following government, there- trial. we fore, placed position in the unenviable *5 Reverse. reminding “although us that we bound findings,” accept trial we the court’s factual SCHWELB, Judge, concurring Associate reject finding nevertheless the that judgment: in the custody appellant interrogated. was in when However, on this record we cannot do so. agree inculpatory that Jones’ statements I facts, developed government’s analysis, The the suppressed. My should have been speak however, own witness for The set- majority’s themselves. in some differs from the ting compel the circumstances the con- respects. interrogation.” po- clusion of “custodial The First, requires I not sure that this case am appellant custody, lice that in the kneiv was application of the Rhode Is the doctrine that in kneiv kneiv was land v. 446 U.S. S.Ct. unequivocally custody, and the trial court (1980), 64 L.Ed.2d 297 in which the custody held that was in when in- a police conduct Court addressed vis-a-vis terrogated, given Mi- and had not been the to the “functional suspect which amounts warnings. randa conduct was officer’s id. equivalent” express questioning. See equivalent” express ques- 300-01, S.Ct. Officer Groomes at 1682. tioning, brought forth that a statement directly questioned testified that Jones was prosecutor the used to convict asking guilt: his were kind of “[W]e about possession of at In ca- narcotics trial.2 our on if he to volunteer information wanted novo, pacity apply the law de we find that from, that.” stuff like who[m] rule the Miranda was violated. not my opinion, interrogation, this In decision, If making recognize equivalent.

In the its Jones we functional custody, difficulty present ascribing this was a blatant Miranda1 that the cases violation, point regard the without to Innis issues. a continuum between coercion statement, notwithstanding police ob- may that the 2. tells us that "no distinction be Miranda statement, inculpatory reasoning and state- pre-Miranda drawn between statements that a tained alleged merely exculpatory. If a ments be voluntary and not unwarned statement was truly exculpatory made in fact statement Here, however, not vol- coerced. did course, would, prosecu- never used statement, following post-Miranda a unteer 476-77, tion." 1602. S.Ct. pre-Miranda coerced statement. holding 3. also note that our recent Davis v. Arizona, Miranda v. 1998) (D.C. 724 A.2d 1163 is dis tinguishable Specifically, case. admissibility upheld post-Miranda Davis of a

IQI beyond Terry stop rip- Turning proceeded the inter- had a whether custodial, rogation my ened arrest at the time that review to a formal government record satisfies me that the has Jones made his admissions. court, point.

waived the trial Finally, noting the I think it worth obvi- prosecutor objection judge no made holding ous: Our that Jones’ statement repeatedly that stated Jones was suppressed does not affect should have been Indeed, judge purposes. him, remainder of evidence attorney: prepared declared to Jones’ “I’m testimony including that Officer Groomes’ to find that based on [Jones] ground. dropped drugs testimony you’ve already gotten,” precludes Nothing in this court’s decision she declined to entertain further defense evi- suppressed retrial without the of Jones state- point. prosecutor dence on the re- Indeed, ment. a new trial be unneces- silent, implicitly acquiescing mained thus in a sary judge, excluding if the trial after ruling which limited the on the custo- record calculus, her statement from nevertheless dy Subsequently, during argument, issue. beyond a doubt satisfied of Jones’ prosecutor effectively conceded that guilt. custody: Jones was in reasons, foregoing For I concur in the government’s position It’s the these judgment. suppressible statements are not because they were made in response

interrogation. The officer stated that she any

was sure she did not elicit re-

sponse for the defendant while he ivas in custody..

their added.)

(Emphasis

“Parties theory not assert one at trial theory and another on appeal.” Haches v. SILVER, Appellant, Salome

Haches, (D.C.1982) (cita 396, 446 A.2d omitted). “Points asserted with suf v. precision ficient distinctly to indicate STATES, Appellee. UNITED party’s normally spurned thesis will appeal.” v. Hunter United 606 A.2d Anderson, Appellant, Keith (D.C.) (citations quota and internal omitted), denied, tion marks cert. L.Ed.2d States, Appellee. principles apply rigorously “These 95-CM-490, Nos. 95-CM-585. government as do to a criminal defen dant who liberty.” faces loss of his Appeals. District of Columbia Court Porter, United States v. 642 n. 25, 1999. Submitted Feb. (D.C.1992). 18, 1999. Decided March my opinion, government’s effective concession in trial court that Jones was unnecessary makes to decide issue, I see no reason do so. government,

Without waiver easy would not be an one for me. E.A.H., held in In re 838- (D.C.1992) stop a Terry does not

implicate rights. The record be- judge’s

fore us is truncated on account sure,

unopposed ruling, and I am not record,

basis seizure

Case Details

Case Name: Jones v. United States
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Mar 4, 1999
Citation: 726 A.2d 186
Docket Number: 96-CM-1220
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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