Jones v. United States

appellant’s waiver was ness of sufficient. factually

This case is much closer to the one JONES, Appellant, Michael A. the court in ex rel. before United States Vincent, STATES, (2d Appellee. Konigsberg v. 526 F.2d 131 Cir. UNITED 1975), our case of Hsu. As that No. 11918. observed, “a case where defend- [the] District of Appeals. Columbia Court of vehemently asserting right ant self-representation truly a case of Argued April 1979. right; waiver of a constitutional it is a Decided Feb. right decision to assert one constitutional Opinion Vacated on Grant Rehearing instead of anоther. At least this is true in April 22, 1980. En Banc a situation . . . where defend- [the pressure forego was under no ant]

assistance of counsel” where de- part strategic fendant’s “decision was in

ploy.” Konigsberg United ex rel. States

Vincent, supra Appellant at 133-34. was

well aware “that there are technical rules trial,

governing the conduct of a and that

presenting simple defense is not a matter v. Meach telling story.”9 Maynard one’s

um, (1st 1976). As F.2d Cir. Meachum, Maynard “it proper presume this rec- [from repre- the defense counsel who

ord] [7V¡ eight

sented the defendant for months all relevant as-

months had discussed here]

pects A of the case with him.” full Hsu necessary

inquiry was not on these facts.

The trial court had sufficient evidence be- appellant’s pro ap-

fore it to se rule that

pearance compromise would not his Sixth rights.

Amendment

Affirmed. appellant’s Appellant aрparently the in- Ms. Kravetz believed that waiver concedes that “satisfactory,” minimally, quiry intelligent voluntary. was however respect to voluntariness. reason, 9.Apparently for this left ‍​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‍by appellant allegation that his 8. There is no complex pretrial motion more voluntary, knowing or intelli- waiver was Attorney Kravetz. only gent. nothing is that there is assertion made showing appellant or in the record indefinitely Eliza- committed Jones to St. Hospital. report- In our first beths (1978), we A.2d 183 D.C.App., ed at Jones’ he is enti- rejected contention that tled, to equal protection, a as matter upon expiration Elizabeths St. could period for which he maximum govern- unless the imprisoned have been at a proving carries ment he is still civil commitment that mentally dangerous ill self or others. 1973, 21-545(b). spe- More D.C.Code assuming validity of Jones’ cifically, hearing” confinement after “release here), is (which is we held there uncontested requirement appel- that no constitutiоnal civilly lant be committed released imprisonment the end of the maximum period, period for bears no relation- appel- ship unchallenged to the basis for hospital he is lant’s confinement: ill, mentally dangerous or oth- to self ers, and receive until he should treatment [Jones, supra enough is well for release. at 184.] reconsideration, first we vacate our After may that an order. conclude pursuant not be confined for treatment 24-301(d) beyond period the maximum Wasserstrom, J. Defender Silas Public impris- he could have been for which or she Service, C., Washington, appointed D. charge. underlying for the oned court, appellant. end to release at the An entitled Cheryl M. Long, Atty., Asst. U. Wash- S. government ob- period of that unless C., Silbert, ington, D. U. with whom Earl J. be- Accordingly, civil tains a commitment. C., S.Atty., Washington, D. at the time has year of one cause filed, was A. Alt- Terry, brief John Oscar here, re- appellant Jones shall be expired Goldman, shuler, and W. Asst. U. S. Richard civilly unless сommitted forthwith. leased C., Attys., Washington, D. were on brief, appellee. I. FERREN, MACK, KELLY, opinion analysis

Before Central legal premise, based Judges. following Associate Herold, Baxstrom v. FERREN, Judge: Associate (1966): if commitment 15 L.Ed.2d 620 “re- 24-301(d)(2) after a guilty A. Elizabeths Michael Jones was found St. equal protec- hearing” is to survive larceny insanity. There- lease petit by reason challenge, not be hearing” it after, a tion court held “release words, 1973, 24-301(d), the commitment respect.1 other pursuant to D.C.Code Baxstrom, jury commit- prisoner review to the a accorded other held that a 1. In the Court Baxstrom, upheld Since Court at the end tees. who was committed insane equal protection challenges individu- equal protection other was denied of by through statutory deprived procedure who enter mental health facilities which him als wholly acquitees than procedure must be rehabilitative— dures afforded civil commi- wholly tees; men- finding someone neces- does not tаlly dangerous ill others. self or make sarily unconstitutional Consequently, at 188 & n.7.2 confining acquitees; initially as a means for appellant's we concluded that failure constitutionality price but challenge 24-301(d) hearing” the “release § or end of release civil commitment at the procedure meant term, hypothetical the presumed agree that must be be longest since that is the an can based, even in confinement a de- confined for reasons without considеrations; part, on punitive other- equal of the protection nial of laws. wise, it would be under unconstitutional Appellant argument primarily derives his Cady, see v. supra; Humphrey U.S.App. 155 from United States v. 504, 510-11, 1048, 92 405 U.S. 1052- S.Ct. 402, 407-08, 606, 478 F.2d 611-12 D.C. 53, (1972); 31 394 .. . L.Ed.2d (1973), in of which the United States Court Jacobs, 281, U.S.App.D.C. Waite v. Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit the 285-86, 392, (1973) . . . 475 F.2d 396-97 pu- acknowledged upheld partially Therefore, as to explanation absent —and —a the 24- underpinning nitive former § why the re- release 301(d) procedure. Specifically, the Brown in quality findings sults lesser of illness instruction, upheld based on Bolton 21-545(b) an and than dangerousness a § 1, Harris, U.S.App.D.C. F.2d 642 hearing,

civil commitment we must con- v. findings legally clude the the (1968), are the burden government that the had [Jones, supra (emphasis same. respon- hearing” proving of at a “release added).]3 pre- mentally dangerous by a dent ill and evidence, further ponderance of the and petition rehearing, appellant In his for that this would not violate held instruction premise. argues, in questiоns legal He government, equal protection even if the effect, the “release hear- the bur- proceeding, a civil commitment had ing” procedure punitive, is to some extent less-protective proce- proof beyond of a reasonable doubt.4 by as evidenced den Indiana, ous, result, each, process. has confined See and as a been criminal Jackson protection society, well as of self or 406 U.S. 92 S.Ct. 32 L.Ed.2d for treatment, (1972) (equal prоtection pro- punishment. state for The termina- violated period provide commit- is thus cedures which more lenient tion of the maximum sentence stringent acquitees; more ter- ment standards and of irrelevant the status similarity found situa- standards for those defendants of mination does not alter civilly incompetent confinement) (after acquitees trial those to stand than for tion between committed); Humphrey Cady, (footnote [Jones, supra commitees.” omitted).] (remand (1972) 31 L.Ed.2d 394 еvidentiary hearing protec- for on claim that tions were not afforded those committed therefore, court, dealing with Brown 4.The crimes extended to those committed under sex 24-301(d) procedure. the earlier § act). post-1970 present case deal the bur- has scheme which way, Put still if is consti- another preponderance ‍​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‍proving, evi- of den dence, tutional, merely equally val- it must be another sanity. See that he has recovered his finding id route the same derived from Jones, supra at 185. civil commitment under D.C.Code Nelson, D.C.App., In re The recent case of Jones, 21-545(b). n.7. at 188 (1979), proper indicated that the 408 A.2d 1233 concluded, proof accordingly, should be there was burden of in civil commitments 3. We convincing appellant’s that his “clear and evidence” rather “no room contention for. “beyond light (subject proof hospital of a reasonable doubt” must cease Texas, Addington commitment) at the end of the maximum The level of confined to 60 L.Ed.2d 323 which he could have been pro- government’s prison. Although in civil commitment the confinement burden here, commitees, analysis ceedings however, affect our the status does not differ group burden remains is the same: since the of each after confinement danger- mentally government. ill and each been found foregoing implications of majority this lesser The clear The Brown proof of in the criminal commitment however, burden Baxstrom, require, analysis, and following way: in de- the individual has been that when The difference between the classes [ac- time, period for a tention considerable purposes quitees and commitees] vel non should be continued detention proof, possi- is in the extent of governed by the same standard of burden If bility consequence of error. there applies to civil commitments. proof ill- is error in a determination of mental calls for sound The extent of that commitment, in a civil ness results discretion, g., into account e. would take person may deprived liberty al- not), (violent of the crime nature though posed any he never harm socie- response given of treatment nature ty. If is a similar error in confine- there generally not exceed person, would individual, insanity-acquitted ment of an course, should, of never only already years, there is the of harm five not fact done, prospect but the substantial sentence for the exceed the maximum error, ascribing quality the the of same offense, mandatory less release time. a mental disease to less extreme devi- [Brown, supra at 612 at F.2d ance, exculpation legal resulted in a (footnote omitted).] legal where should re- there have been summary, argues that he In for the sponsibility antisocial action. by had led down the road the United been The now being matter discussed is suf- Brown, to supra, of in Appeals States Court the broad fused with consideration that thought point beyond a which he he would defense, insanity modern standards of the seriously a chal- be taken in constitutional not restricted to those who do not know right wrong, acquittal call for the lenge 24-301(d).5 That court had told to § persons “may meaningful who have ele- essence, him, challenging not to bother in ments of And over and responsibility.” release-hearing but instead procedure the difficulty above where the situations commit- partially-punitive assume that a responsibility the of mental is issuе Baxstrom, Thus, supra. ment valid under is doubtful, ignore wholly we cannot the civil right he the to release or asserted danger insanity of calculated abuse of the as of end of the maximum commitment the defense, Lynch referred to in v. Overhol society’s point where prison term —at the [, ser on right any punitive gloss (1962)]. supra, [Brown, L.Ed.2d opin- Accordingly, says, ends. he U.S.App.D.C. 478 F.2d at 611 attack ion case viewed his failure to in this (footnote omitted).] unfairly by incorrectly — —and Appellant points out that Brown went on one only have concluding that it could Baxstrom, suggest, supra, on the basis of reha- wholly of a meaning: acceptance tacit pro quid quo that there is a for this weaker the underpinning to commitment bilitative standard, insanity namely, be- justifies confinement procedure, which constitutionally entitled that an prison sentence.6 yond the maximum prison term of the maximum end worst, argument. or, turn this to release to civil commitment: preclude confining acknowledge, tionally Appellant presumably would however, protective supra, post-reorga- accorded as a less those decision, “based, binding on the nization court. if such confinement were commitees Ryan, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 310 part, M.A.P. considerations.” on even Thus, if were at 189. wholly as a rehabilitative valid confinement, acceptance assumption appellant’s Our com from a civil difference implied agree- 24-301(d) necessarily of § 21-545(b) could determination under mitment wholly rehаbilitative ment that the e., evidentiary grounds; only justified i. was based on our view that commitment, ‘re- “the with a civil contrast Humphrey Cady, (1972), would constitu- L.Ed.2d reasoning

II. she has Their reflects recovered. justification the an extension of the reconsidering appellant’s assump First, period. apropos of observation tion, solely argument, for the sake of evidentiary note that emphasis, courts 24-301(d) valid, put ques must sus- initiated and once has. perspective by outlining tion in the differ proving insanity, tained ences the civil criminal com between prospective whereas commitee Appellant, acqui mitment schemes. as an yet conclusively not so manifested mental tee, proving carried the burden of his insan Thus, dangerousness. pre- illness and charged a ity by time of the offense sumption acquitee’s insanity contin- preponderance of the evidence. He had the Second, that, ues. these courts conclude right Upon a jury if he had wanted one. beyond has found a rea- because trier insanity, verdict of guilty not reason of acquitee has commit- sonable doubt that the states, District, many con permits like charged she (although ted the offense he or rela prescribed, tinued confinement for morally responsible not rationally tively brief of observation.7 act), society, confinement, it is unreasonable for not courts have self-protection, matter as a to demand required which is of civil comm сases itment,8 acquitee receive treatment grounds. least two on at Some jus- can be continuing mental illness. Such treatment presumption have stressed the long for at as the maximum tified least insanity acquitee— once established possible prison he or she would have See, term evidentiary emphasis. g., an e. In re received, 465, carry the Franklin, 126, 136, unless the can 7 Cal.3d 496 P.2d an 470, 553, banc). demonstrating burden of earlier recov- (1972)(en Cal.Rptr. 101 558 accordingly perceive The a situ- ery. courts emphasized dangerousness Others have the and acquitees ational difference between by insanity, inherent in excused the offense jus- constitutionally commitees sufficient public the protection need for of the tify keeping proof of the burden psychiatric place— while observation takes Franklin, See, former but not the latter. arguably g., See punitive emphasis. a e. 138, 476, 101 supra, 7 at 496 P.2d at Kearns, 132, (Me. Cal.3d 278 135 Chase A.2d “excep- Cal.Rptr. (acquitees at are an 1971)(en 560 banc). class”); Chase, (same). supra 138 tional at courts, moreover, commonly These same cases, reviewing numerous we con- After justify statutory beyond the if, typically that the mix eviden- pro- clude courts observation after a review (akin punitive justifying ceeding 24-301(d)(2) tiary and rationales in to a “release § of at hearing”), comprehensive the review the fails to sustain less or is persuading hearings” of the that he “release afforded ‍​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‍1973, 143, Franklin, acquitee pre- 24-301(d). supra hearing’ procedure lease at § an 563, sumably Cal.Rptr. because at the court can be somewhat abbreviated 496 P.2d approved 101 at predictive 90-day period determina- value initial a California. dangerousness insanity months, tions of at Model Penal allows six ALI Mod- Code (Proposed criminal trial.” at 189. Because Draft el Penal Code 4.08 Official § see, authority analysis, g., In e. there for such 1962). Franklin, 465, 101 re Cal.Rptr. 7 Cal.3d 496 P.2d (1972) (en banc), interpreted we 553 Columbia, per- example, For in the District of 8. appellant’s acceptance un- of his confinement public private sons be at detained acceptance purely evi- der dentiary justification of a § hospital emergency up ob- to 48 hours be- for the differences by upon application diagnosis an servation pro- tween the criminal and civil commitment authority appropriate and certification justification presuming equally val- cedures—а id 21-521, psychiatrist. -522. §§ D.C.Code findings dangerousness mental illness and 48 A detained must be released after individual Jones, 21-545(b) 24-301(d). See §§ hours, however, a court is obtain- unless order supra at 188 n.7. ed. D.C.Code 21-523. Williams § Meredith, D.C.App., 407 A.2d 569 Columbia, con- In the automatic 7. District days, finement cannot exceed D.C.Code (1972); 31 L.Ed.2d proceedings.9 In view commitees at such appel- Brown, 409-10, supra, we at precedent, agree U.S.App.D.C. must J., constitu- willingness dissenting); to assume the (Wright, lant’s F.2d at 613-14 cannot, Waite, 24-301(d)(2) 285-86, supra, validity tional at U.S.App.D.C. fairness, imply or, be said to a concession 396-97;11 at 475 F.2d procedure aspects all of that are (but perhaps justifi- (3) partially it is urges, evidentiary (and nonpunitive) solely on thus outset, in which case punitive at ably) grounds.10 lawfully confined for acquitee, although (or awhile, arguably must be released III. committed) end of the no later than the that we are Now confronted prison acqui- for which maximum possibility that have sentenced.12 tee could been can, extent, to somе U.S.App.D.C. constitutional, yet we reconsider must F.2d at nature of a confinement. Assuming validity constitutional we possibilities, not two as There are three 24-301(d), we must choose between (1) perceived: wholly rehabil originally it is to decide the and third alternatives first e., (/. not at all in which punitive), itative by. If con- appellant.13 issue raised acquitee can be indefi case an committed assumed —that 24- previously clude —as regard hypothetical without to a nitely, rehabilitative, then 301(d) wholly sentence, subject only to If, opinion and will stand. how- order periodic review civil commi afforded ever, in some we conclude that § Jones, 190; or, tees, see punitive, appellant’s argu- then respects extreme, (2) inherently punitive, it is other may have merit. ment hearing procedure which case su Confronting the that we see unconstitutional, question dealt itself is pra; Humphrey Cady, only in our first hypothetically 510- with State, 752, See, insanity acquittal. g., promptly 755-57 after the See Bol- 9. Mills v. 256 A.2d e. ton, proce (Del.1969) (upholding supra. release using superior jury with dure regular rationales); proof acquitee; burden of on both argu- appellant to base his 12. We understand Allen, 752, (Iowa 1969) State v. 166 758 N.W.2d hypothetical prison ment on required regained (acquitees prove be to acquitee the simply himself could be term to which sentenced, doubt; evidentiary sanity beyond a reasonable not the maximum sen- on Shackford, rationales); punitive and 262 State involved, particular for the crime without tence 359, (Me.1970) (same; punitive 366 A.2d history. acquitee’s regard own criminal to rationale); Superintendent, Daniels v. 34 Md. however, not, question do resolve We 180, 1064, 173, (Ct.Spec. App. 366 A.2d 1069 here. (acquitees carry App.1976) required to can be rationale); proof; evidentiary State burden of question Appellant constitu- 13. declines 323, 877, Taylor, 881 158Mont. 491 P.2d agree tionality we that this denied, (1971),cert. advisory opinion not on court should issue an (1972) (same; punitive ration 32 677 L.Ed.2d hаnd, appellant subject. On the other Lee, 999, 1000, ale); App.Div.2d 362 In re assuming validity 24-301(d), §of said that attorney (1974) (district 636-37 N.Y.S.2d opinion— not be held—as in our he should hearing; acquitee’s may participate in respect punitive, that it in since to assume no rationale). punitive respectable’ legal precedent for there is release-hearing procedures can be view that Accordingly, in our we statement retract the punitive. partially We while constitutional agree. “appellant presumed opinion be first to must Therefore, if, examining 24—§ after based, agree that this confinement is, extent, 301(d), it to some we conclude that considerations; part, other even in on properly punitive, we can refrain evaluat- Bax it would be unconstitutional wise and, instead, constitutionality ing can make its strom, Cady Humphrey supra; . . .” see analysis determining whether such a narrower punitive at imposed for an in- can be period. definite case, be entitled 11. In this an would proceedings to civil commitment release or acquitee’s purpose view that an men- to the for which the classification is reject we Accord, Bolton, dangerousness (citation omitted). at the time of tal illness and made” powerful consistently the offense are such supra, U.S.App.D.C. at F.2d at dangerousness illness and later evidence of partially punitive 651. On the basis (i. e., hearing”) at the time of the “release for the criminal rationale they presumption continuing raise earlier, set forth see text and cases scheme Brown, insanity every in case. at supra, note 9 the criminal commitment at 409-10, J., (Wright, 478 F.2d at 613-14 dis might protection scru- equal scheme survive Bolton, senting); supra, U.S.App.D.C. Baxstrom, supra, though even tiny under Thus, contrary at 395 F.2d at 649. to the confining civil commitees assumption underlying our first greater protection for the individu- provides crimi- conclude that difference between (the right jury to a al at the outset procedures14 nal and civil commitment can- proof government). burden of on the purely evidentiary not be on however, agree appellant, that there therefore, grounds. follows, It that if socie- acquitee under confining no basis for greater ty legitimately place can length hypo- beyond the confine- to avoid continued term, since that thetical maximum places prospective civil ment than it on a society’s claim on term marks the end commitee, justified by must that burden punishment. kind of that individual greater protection public’s interest longer depend, must con- Any likely receive sub- than it would be stitutionally, on a de novo civil commit- jecting acquitees the civil commitment supra, 405 at Humphrey, ment. See U.S. Furthermore, process. because § 510-11, 1052-53; Baxstrom, su- at S.Ct. premised, part, an earlier criminal 762; 110-11, pra, 383 might offense —a confinement which U.S.App.D.C. government had the have occurred if the F.2d at 612.15 proof jury a new burden of before —this is, release-heаring procedure to some ex- tent, “punitive.” IV. is, public’s safety interest because' Accordingly, we hold that course, acquitee’s right limited possible prison the maximum equal protection. Assuming case the best have which Michael Jones could 24-301(d), constitutionality ap- for the of § expired, he is entitled been incarcerated has pellant argues partially punitive its Hospital, sub to release from Elizabeths St. dictates, matter of character at least as a right seek civil ject government’s to the commitees, equal protection vis-a-vis civil opinion judgment commitment. The (or be released com- are therefore vacated. heretofore filed mitted) no later than the end of maxi- government days from the shall have 30 they could have received

mum pursuant date of the mandate issued agree. criminally if convicted. We today’s order in this case to initiate civil proceedings against appellant. commitment According initiated, proceedings those have been protec Once “[e]qual S.Ct. confined, all, if in accordance persons be he shall be require tion does not that all with Title 21 of the District of Columbia identically, require dealt with but it does some relevance In the event that does that a distinction made have Code. term, long Compare with no matter how be. § D.C.Code 21-545(b). perceive view no basis for the Brown court’s punitive justification for § important if the 24- 15. It is to stress may expire short of the maximum sentence assumed, valid, 301(d) as years”). (and generally “would not exceed five despite partially punitive underpinning, our Id at 478 F.2d at 612. holding permits confinement under applicable prison to the end of ‍​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‍the maximum subject of civil become he during 30-day period,

proceedings given his freedom.

shall ordered.

So

MACK, concurring: Judge, Associate our 396 A.2d

I concurred in (1978), because I not construe did com- holding

analysis

mitment of D.C.Code pass against 24-301 would muster equal protection procedural

challenge on Indi- grounds, citing Jackson v.

due

ana, 32 L.Ed.2d holding concur I in the instant that I held the serious rеservations

because proce- constitutionality of such

about choosing erased to man-

dures are our that an must be released

date at the of the maxi- expiration

incarceration possible imprisonment

mum charge, govern- subject

the criminal to the right to seek

ment’s civil commitment.

KELLY, dissenting: Judge, Associate original decision

I would adhere (Jones appeal the order on v. United

affirm

States, (1978)) D.C.App., A.2d 183 rehearing. this opinion so dissent from Ross, C., ap- D. Washington, M. Robert court, whom Glenn H. by this

pointed C., Carlson, Washington, was on the D. brief, appellant. Farrell, Atty., W. Asst. U. S.

Michael C., S. Washington, D. with whom Carl C., Rauh, at the Atty., Washington, D. U. S. Terry, filed, John A. time brief BROWN, Appellant, E. Harold Ellen, Hausler, Margaret W. Richard C.,D. were Attys., Washington, Asst. U. S. brief, appellee. STATES, Appellee. UNITED KELLY, NEBEKER, No. 79-426. FER- Before REN, Judges. Associate Appeals. of Columbia ‍​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​‌​​‌​​​​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‍District Court CURIAM: PER Argued Jan. the trial Brown appeals E. Harold

Decided Feb. for reconsidera- his motion denial of court’s untimely filed under of sentence tion 35(a). agree with the Super.Ct.Cr.R. properly it con- could not trial merits; we affirm. motion sider the

Case Details

Case Name: Jones v. United States

Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Date Published: Apr 22, 1980

Citation: 411 A.2d 624

Docket Number: 11918

Court Abbreviation: D.C.