*1 presentation and the of the Office of circumstances, JONES, Planning. Under the we Irving Appellant, J. no “substantial doubt ... whether harbor agency made the same ulti would have STATES, Appellee. UNITED finding the error removed.” Ar mate with Ex v. District Columbia Nurses’ thur No. 84-315. (D.C. Board, amining Appeals. District of Columbia Court 1983). non Consequently, any error was prejudicial. Id. Argued Oct. 22, 1986. Decided Oct.
Petitioner assails the Commission Planning to allowing the Office project, present testimony on behalf of parties’ all of the
and later summarize Capitol
positions for the Commission. Zoning Com Society v.
Hill Restoration (D.C.1977),
mission, As grounds, on other Citizens
overruled Zoning Georgetown v. Com
sociation of Columbia, 392
mission District of (D.C.1978), con this court pattern,
fronted an identical fact aggravating fact that the meet
additional Planning and the between the Office Al public. closed to the
Commission was
though expressed misgivings we about there,
procedure as we do once more re
garding the less offensive circumstances of case, found of due we no violation
process of the District of Ad Columbia
ministrative Procedure Act. procedur-
Neither the substantive nor the challenges petitioner
al in this mounts
peal justify reversal. Commission’s
findings are of fact and conclusions of law
supported by the record and are in accord- decline to
ance with law. We substitute judgment
our for that of the Commission. Neighborhood League, East
Rock Creek Zoning District Com-
Inc. v. Columbia mission, 388 A.2d
Affirmed. *2 Walthall, Washington, D.C.,
Timothy B. court, appointed by appellant. Hall, Atty., Curtis E. Asst. U.S. diGenova, Joseph Atty., E. whom Tourish, Farrell, Jr., Michael W. Thomas J. Agee, Attys., Asst. U.S. Edward J. D.C., brief, Washington, appel- lee. PRYOR, Judge, and BEL-
Before Chief BURGESS, SON, Judge, Associate As- Judge, Superior sociate Court of the Dis- leather After wallet. Briscoe had searched trict of Columbia.1 belongings, Jackson’s wallet and he de- give manded that Jackson him and
PRYOR, Judge: Chief gold lant three chains that Jackson was wearing around his neck. Jackson refused trial, After jury was convict- appellant punched him in the face. ed of armed in violation of D.C. *3 Jackson then broke free from the robbers 22-2901, (1981 Code -3202 & 1985 §§ ran nearby and toward the Seven-Eleven. Supp.), and sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment term of eighteen of six to store, As Jackson ran toward the years. appeal, appellant On claims that the away lant ran down the street and from the limiting erred in cross-examina- pro- scene. Leonard then Briscoe government witness, admitting Brown, ceeded to rob Michelle James testimony corroborating out-of-court identi- Moore, Bray, and Charlene who had re- appellant by fications of made several com- stop turned to the bus from the Seven-Elev- witnesses, plaining refusing to limit the appellant away. en as ran use, government’s impeachment pur- Meanwhile, Forrest Jackson and Charles poses, convictions, appellant’s prior and Price had run into the Seven-Eleven and limiting closing argu- defense counsel’s Bell, working told Donald who was behind Finding ment. these claims to be without counter, Bell, robbery. about the an merit, we affirm. off-duty Metropolitan Officer, Police tele- phoned police. hearing gun- After
I shot, Bell drew his service revolver and On shortly March before 4:00 walked out of the Seven-Eleven toward the a.m., Forrest standing Jackson was near a stop, bus where he Leonard saw Briscoe stop bus located at the kneeling Brown, corner of 8th and H in front of Michelle James Streets, N.E., just Moore, in front of a Bray Seven-Elev- Charlene and the other bus en convenience patrons. store. Michelle Brown and Bell ordered Briscoe to “freeze” Moore, James along with several other indi- Briscoe him if fire but turned toward as viduals, sitting on a weapon. bench inside the his Bell then fired his service sheltered bus stop, revolver, hitting and Charles Price and Briscoe in the neck and Bray Charlene exchanged were inside the Seven-Elev- Briscoe fled as the two men en store. gunfire. a.m., Street,
At approximately 8th, 4:00 On G 7th and Leon- between up walked against portion to Jackson and him if he fell asked ard Briscoe the rear any four-door, knew “where marijuana light-colored, was.” When Chevrolet auto- Jackson responded negatively, appellant parked alley. in front of an Bell mobile away. walked people Jackson testified that he noticed that there were two inside immediately Chevrolet, recognized appellant, helped one of whom Leonard who wearing beige jacket shirt, and into the car. After Bris- a blue Briscoe Leonard entered, he away because had “seen him” on at a three or four coe Chevrolet drove prior high occasions. speed. rate of Bell returned to the Seven-Eleven, reported description and later, man, Several minutes another later police. to the of the car identified as up Leonard Briscoe walked pointed Jackson and pistol a silver at him. Police Officer Frederick Lewis heard a Brown, Moore, As Michelle and “lookout” for a four-door Chevrolet auto- James watched, Price occupied by robbery suspects Charles mobile three behind, proached shortly Upon hearing Jackson from after 4:00 reached a.m. pants pocket, lookout, Hospi- Capitol into his Lewis drove to Hill removed blue ll-707(a) Sitting by designation pursuant § to D.C.Code who, along Briscoe, et with Leonard had anybody tal on 8th Street to see if had been robbed Jackson. gunshot Upon ar- admitted with a wound.
riving, Lewis found a four-door Chevrolet II parked in front of the entrance
automobile emergency to the noticed a room. Lewis Appellant’s appeal first claim on is that large amount of on the rear seat and blood rights under the his confrontation Sixth floorboard of the car and a trail blood ruling Amendment were violated leading emergency from car to the judge limiting cross-examination began to room entrance. As Lewis follow of Forrest Jackson on the issue bias. blood, the trail of two disagree. We men— Briscoe, brother Maurice Leonard Briscoe’s During of Forrest cross-examination appellant’s codefendant—came out of Jackson, appellant’s counsel asked Jackson pace.” After hospital at a “hurried gain- marijuana. Upon if he ever smoked questioning, appellant Maurice brief had, ing an defense coun- admission that *4 placed Briscoe were under arrest. asked, that on sel then “And it’s also a fact you marijuana, isn’t occasion have also sold and Ser- Police Officer Michael McGraw objected prosecutor The that correct?” Metropolitan geant Bailey of the Charles question, ensuing con- and at an bench Capitol Hill Department Police arrived ference, defense counsel to the court asked Hospital minutes later. The offi- several The fol- proffer question. a for the basis beige jacket lying a on the back cers found lowing colloquy occurred: pocket seat of the Chevrolet. Inside the Honor, Your DEFENSE COUNSEL: jacket Jackson’s was Forrest blue question is that good faith of that basis had leather wallet and a card that Mr. Jackson has Mr. told me that Jones Also inside the wallet taken from Jackson. occasions marijuana previous him sold duf- found the car were Jackson’s blue is motive for he and that that is a flebag, containing clothing, toiletry his Honor. testifying. It is Your items, photographs. A .32 cali- and several ber Smith and Wesson revolver was found [*] # [*] [*] [*] [*] Street, approximately in the of 8th middle occasions, many THE COURT: How hospital.2 hundred feet from the two what, what, a transac- why would such mean, I even provide a motive? Appellant and Maurice Briscoe were true, why that assuming it was would brought back to the scene of the robberies make him biased? “show-up” a series of identifications As I understand COUNSEL: DEFENSE None of the witnesses were conducted. it, Honor, something that there was Your identified Maurice Briscoe. At the show- time, something was point in there at one however, up, positively Forrest Jackson I one of the transactions. wrong with identified as the man who had And only one transaction. think it was punched him in the taken his wallet it. dissatisfied with Mr. Jackson was face. Michelle Brown and James Moore it from Mr. Jones. way I understand both stated that like” “look[ed] Well, asking you’re THE COURT: one of the two men who had robbed Jack- sold it. That Mr. Jackson had whether son, Bray and Charlene stated that dissatisfied he is not a doesn’t—I mean height as the man who lant was the same if is a seller. purchaser he scene out had run from the as she walked No, he dis- trial, was At both Forrest DEFENSE COUNSEL: Seven-Eleven. transaction, Your Hon- positively Price identi- satisfied with Jackson and Charles beige jack- or. fied as the man trial, pistol Briscoe had pearance to the that Leonard and James Moore
2. At Forrest Jackson during being used the robberies. identified the revolver as similar in States, 461 judge erred also Hawkins v. United claims see Appellant sustaining prosecutor’s objection (D.C.1983), denied, cert. questioning. 1052, 104 this line of L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 464 U.S. States, supra, (1984); Flecker right cross-examine at 324. in a government’s witnesses is inherent right con Sixth Amendment defendant’s appeal, appellant explains that On Alaska, Davis v. 415 U.S. frontation. sought pursue he theory of bias 1105, 1109-10, 315-16, 39 L.Ed.2d 94 S.Ct. questioning of Forrest Jackson recognized While is against him wanted retaliate “Jackson extent of cross-examination [of “[The] for transaction respect appropriate to an witness] paid.” support, appellant *5 (D.C.1978) fer, explained (quoting v. United defense counsel never that Hyman 43, States, (D.C.1975)); marijuana 342 A.2d 44 see sold appellant had Jackson States, Rather, v. 87 U.S. paid. also coun Villaroman he had which 240, 241, 261, (1950) 184 App.D.C. F.2d 262 obliquely point, at one only stated “that sel (bias relevant”); “always is of witness of something wrong with one the was there Tompkins States, A.2d v. United I think it was one trans transactions. (D.C.1967)(same). Still, cross-examina And Mr. Jackson was dissatisfied action. government tion of a on the sub witness proffered Defense never it.” counsel ject proceed must of bias in accordance any explaining facts Jackson how evidentiary proce with established rules of alleged transac “dissatisfied” with Mississippi, 410 dure. Chambers v. any as to explanation how Cf. tion. Absent 93 S.Ct. resulted drug may transaction have in (1973). Thus, objec L.Ed.2d 297 to survive Jackson, appellant’s part of on the Mr. bias tion, questioner proffer “some must his discre judge the trial abused claim that genuine support facts belief” which questioning precluding line of in this assert is biased the manner witness fails.3 Fowler, U.S.App. ed. United States conclusion, reaching we rec In this (1972); see 465 F.2d D.C. proffer is not exhaustive ognize “[a]n States, also Hazel v. United for initiation normally requirement a strict (D.C.1974)(attorney ques may not ask Best v. a line of cross-examination.” of “totally ground tions of witness are 382; States, supra, A.2d at see addition, prof less”). attorney In must also Moss permit judge fer sufficient to the trial facts Nevertheless, we ob 1135 n. question the proposed evaluate whether in oth proffers found sufficient serve that probative of bias. See Best v. United present- more ample are than er cases could, course, resulting drug with witness re- from transaction counsel of Defense quested a brief recess to further informa- obtain Jackson. his client on of the bias tion from the nature ed here. supra, Finally, Best United client. interaction de- example, at defendant scribed—a transaction in arresting wanted to cross-examine his offi- buyer lant was the reasonably be —could alleged resulting cer on bias from an alter- probative viewed as of less bias than following cation his arrest. The court police alleged in brutality Thus, Best. we questioned the relevancy of line Best, support find no supra, for appel- questioning, proffer and invited a to ex- proffer lant’s claim that the in this case plain purpose. proffer its was as fol- adequate.4 See also Smith v. United lows: (D.C.1978) (court restricting erred in honor, cross-examina-
Your day the incident tion of proffer witness where put officer struck Mr. Best him clearly indicated that witness hospital and he taken to the government informant). hospital evening. There is evidence police brutality and it admissible to part show bias on the offi- Ill cer. It’s perfectly ... admissible to trial, At Joseph Detective Kacklik re- show bias. counted the out-of-court identifications erroneously Id. at 380. After concluding appellant made several witnesses imme- following that an altercation the defend- robbery.5 diately appeal, ap- after the On ant’s arrest and search could not be rele- pellant claims that Detective Kacklik’s tes- precluded vant to trial timony hearsay constitutes inadmissible be- questioning. appeal, On we re- cause several of the identifications recount- versed, finding judge’s conclusion ed himby definitive. We law, to be as error a matter of and the disagree. proffer sufficient. It is well established that “extra view, distinguishable, Best is in our be- judicial testimony identification is admissi specific cause the in that case was independent ble as involved, substantive evidence transpired, as who was what long as identity as the out-of-court declar- and when and where resulting the events *6 Moreover, ant is at bias occurred. available cross-examination the nature of the States, beating Harley trial.” v. alleged incident—an United clearly —was (D.C.1984); probative contrast, of the of see v. By issue bias. Warren Unit States, proffer the specific this ed case was as who to v. description involved. The of Morris United transpired approved what court transaction over This has —a which there was pretrial of de dissatisfaction —was mani- the “admission a victim’s festly vague. addition, explanation through In no scription of a defendant the ... officer,” was offered as when alleged drug testimony to the Harley of a Indeed, transaction occurred. States, supra, counsel 471 A.2d at explain should have been able required to to the the has not out-of-court court the proposed inquiry how absolutely declarant be certain of his extra relevant to judicial should have been able in order for the identification testi to find out more mony about the matter from to at his be admitted. See id. Through analysis 4. our of Best United that Forrest Jack- Detective Kacklik testified supra, suggest appellant positively we do not to as intend that counsel son the man identified what, "who, wallet, required specify to and when” in who his that Michelle Brown and took Rather, proffers attempt only of all bias. as we to James Moore both identified “look- robbers, articulate the basis for our view that the like" one of that Charlene adequate supra, Bray found in Best v. United indicated that same ample presented height was more than that for review as the man she had seen run from robbery. here. scene of the Here, prosecutor, colloquy at (testimony pistol to at a shown witness case, size, government’s indicated during of “was similar scene gun by to used intended to use a conviction shape and color” of admitted). Moreover, possession prohibited weapon a properly we robber credibility if impeach appellant’s he testi made it clear out-of-court identifi- have prosecutor even fied in his own defense. testimony cation admissible when government’s intention is unable to make an in-court further stated the witness him ‘gun’ term 437 “to when asks identification. Rice v. use curiam). prior op (D.C.1981) convictions ... as (per about those mentioning possession merely posed just case, In all the out-of-court this conceding weapon.” While prohibited of a “show-up” identifications declarants whose im conviction could be used for that the by Kacklik recounted Detective testi were purposes, appellant peachment maintains Consequently, fied at trial. Detective impact from prejudicial that the mention extrajudicial testi Kacklik’s identification gun outweighed probative its value. indepen admitted as mony properly Appellant appeal asserts on that the error appellant’s evidence of dent substantive it influenced was reversible because identity. Appellant’s claim that this evi light testify. of the clear decision not is, hearsay dence constituted inadmissible authorizing language use of statutory therefore, merit. without pur prior impeachment convictions for however, judge’s trial broad
poses, and the scope control the of cross-ex authority to IV amination, find no abuse discretion we Next, permitting argues that in ruling.6 the court’s impeach prosecutor prior him with y possession pro- unlawful conviction for weapon, abused his hibited argues that Finally, appellant allowing discretion ruled, during defense court when it erred specify charge earlier that the involved closing argument, that certain counsel’s gun. Again, disagree. we comments made summation counsel’s any- “totally range outside (1981), 14-305(b)(2) D.C.Code § claim thing jury to consider.” This for the prior use of defendant’s sanctions the is without merit. impeachment purposes convictions for repeatedly stated We trial. made it clear that under We have personal express their be may provision, takes the counsel when defendant opinions the existence stand, prosecu liefs or about permit “must court *7 or other particular of a fact credibility by non-existence tor to his or her intro attack in jury to summation. “testify” the wise ducing prior for felonies recent convictions States, A.2d 357 United involving dishonesty or See and other crimes Villacres 423, 426-28 States false statement.” Hill v. United 164-65, Bell, 506 denied, U.S.App.D.C. (D.C.1981), 165 429 cert. 434 case, de In this 102 71 F.2d U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 454 closing ar in his attempted, (1982). Moreover, fense counsel control over the testimony of discredit the gument, to examination is proper scope witness by arguing that testimo his Charles Price the sound discretion of the committed to by Jack Forrest ny orchestrated had been court. Middleton See son, witness: (D.C.1979). another improper impeachment the claim of review See Luce v. United abo conviction, testi- (1984) (under prior defendant must with a L.Ed.2d Fed.R. S.Ct. fy”). preserve 609(a), order "to and Evid. in raise Price, As for you’re Mr. when beyond consider- cannot find the error harmless testimony, doubt, his keep in mind that Mr. reasonable I must vote to reverse. Price when police, he first talked to proffered Defense counsel to the trial mind, when incident was fresh his witness, court the complaining Forrest police asking questions him Jackson, against was biased his client on saw, about what he did police not tell the prior account aof transaction in which good that his friend Forrest Jackson had drugs appellant. Jackson sold to When been robbed. He left that out. He did information, asked the source of his coun- tell recognized not that he replied sel that the source was his client. they back, man who had brought complainant When asked would be accused, being then who was he knew biased, replied counsel that because “some- quite well he being accused of thing wrong” transaction, with the robbing his friend Forrest Jackson. complainant was “dissatisfied.” The trial Now, you, gentlemen I ask ladies and court of questioning excluded the line be- jury, does that sense? make Of cause it was “much too thin to constitute course, it doesn’t. It make sense would arising ... bias from the situation [in] help him, friend wants to he [if] [ ] allegedly the witness sold.” going to try police every- tell the government argues first that de- thing first, he regarding saw friend fense “adequately explain” counsel did not anything then happened. else that But question. basis of his majority, he robbery gunman starts with the of the view, rightly my does not base its deci- by girl. his—himself with the guard against sion on To reasoning. this actually happened, ladies What danger “highly that counsel will ask gentlemen, was Mr. Price was down prejudicial questions of witnesses with the nearby, subsequent the scene saw the knowledge almost certain that the insinua- occurrences, get did see Mr. Jackson false,” Pugh, tions are United States v. robbed, as he described in this state- [it] U.S.App.D.C. 436 F.2d police. ment And later then on (1970), our courts have established stan- said, Mr. Jackson to him and didn’t came ascertaining dards for whether or not coun- you robbed, see get you me must have good sel has a faith basis for a line of getme seen [Emphasis robbed. added.] cross-examination in a criminal trial. Where counsel has no foundation fact Significantly, no evidence had been intro- question, for the the basis must be a “well- suggesting duced that Price had not seen suspicion”, merely reasoned “an im- robbery suggested or that Jackson had probable flight fancy.” Id. at to him. state Given this 225; F.2d at record, Collins v. reasonably perceive the court could present counsel, part, defense at least in as at- case, however, rely did not counsel tempting to as to testify jury facts suspicion; possessed foun- factual Consequently, not in evidence. dation in information from his own client. did not its court abuse discretion inter- That information sufficient to estab- rupting portion argument, closing good lish a faith basis unless instructing disregard jury it. false”, “known counsel or “inher- to be Accordingly, appeal the conviction on *8 States, ently incredible.” v. Hazel United Affirmed. 136, (D.C.1974). 319 A.2d 139 The record does not show that counsel his infor- knew BURGESS, Judge, dissenting: Associate “inherently is mation to be false. Nor seller, seller, drug any I am unable to find a that a or sustainable basis incredible” excluding proposed for the bias cross-exam- will be with a transaction and dissatisfied arising Accordingly, develop hostility buyer ination this case. because I a toward
521 Accordingly, pay payment, out of transaction. failure or coun- insufficient Thus, among did I sup- sel “some facts which other reasons. believe that ported] explore genuine sought pos- a that the witness counsel belief” situation Fowler, potential sessed As biased. United States v. 151 for bias. stated 79, 81, U.S.App.D.C. 664, BeRGER, & 465 F.2d 666 3 J. M. Weinstein’s Weinstein (1982): ¶ 607[3], 30, 32 Evidence party Relationships between a and a The government argues that defense always showing to a witness are relevant explained counsel have how should and relationship of bias whether the is based why the seller was dissatisfied. This af- family, on ties sex—heterosexual or firmative on burden defense counsel business, employment, why predicate demonstrate is sound is homosexual— enmity friendship, [Emphasis fear. or good inconsistent with the rule that faith added.] predicate, if a known established not to be false, is “inherently not incredible.” however, argued, It is that defense coun- adequate proffer sel did not make an government argues, also and relevance because he did not tell the trial majority agrees, that the defense did not why court or seller how was dissat- adequately demonstrate the relevance “ isfied, and when where transaction proposed cross-examination. ‘Bias is place. argument again took This places always subject proper of cross-examina ” great too a burden on defense At counsel. States, tion.’ Springer v. United 388 States, least since v. United 282 (D.C.1978)(quoting Hyman 855 Alford 687, 692, 218, 219, 51 U.S. S.Ct. 75 L.Ed. States, (D.C. 342 44 Ünited (1931), Supreme recog- 624 Court has 1975)). The test for relevance is whether “ nized that proposed ‘pos evidence to be elicited often cannot know advance potential connoting [c]ounsel for bias’ ”. sesses] pertinent may what be facts elicited Flecker v. United 324 cross-examination. For reason it is (D.C.), denied, cert. 97 U.S. S.Ct. necessarily exploratory.... (1976) (quoting L.Ed.2d 585 Austin U.S.App.D.C. jurisdiction The courts in this have likewise (1969)). Here, F.2d emphasized aspect of cross-examina- proposed questioning po had that Pugh, U.S.App.D.C. tion. at 71 n. tential. 3; 225 n. F.2d at Best v. United n.
The defense wanted to show that Jack-
animosity
son
an
not
may
harbored
toward
We
assume that counsel did
arising
lant
out of dissatisfaction with a
know
the witness had become
how
and, therefore,
prior drug
dissatisfied,
prof-
transaction.
could not
Johnson United
(D.C.1980),
court.
de-
fer the reason
recognizes the
may
relevance of bias cross-ex-
fendant
have known
reason
buyer
amination
in a
it to
Or
where
trans-
not transmitted
counsel.
defend-
develops hostility
may
perceived
action
toward the seller
ant
the dissatisfaction
drugs.
because he has been sold
But
understood the reason
it. But
bad
goods
only
not the
if
bad
are
source
dissat-
even the cause
dissatisfaction was
transactions,
counsel,
isfaction in
curtailment of
commercial
known to defense
buyers
parties
may
justified.
who
are not
the examination was not
Counsel
might
always
become dissatisfied. A seller
tell
court
advance the
be-
cannot
exploratory
come
cross-examination
dissatisfied with a transaction and
facts that
develop
hostility
buyer
bring
light.1 All
may
into bias
well
toward
noteworthy
preclu-
1. A
error
trial court’s
illustration of this
Smith v.
found reversible
in the
Illinois,
748, 749,
designed to
88 S.Ct.
sion of cross-examination
true name and address of a
learn
(1968),
Supreme
L.Ed.2d
Court
witness.
*9
potential
good
counsel need show is the
for bias.
faith basis than about the relevance
questioning.
of the line of
important way
demonstrating
of
“[A]n
showing
possibility
witness’ bias is
of
Recognizing
importance
explorato-
of
hostility stemming
previous
from a
conflict
cross-examination,
ry
our court has several
par-
between
witness and the adverse
rejected arguments
times
that the defense
ty.” Staton v. United
466 A.2d
inadequate proffer
made an
to show the
(D.C.1983)
added).
(emphasis
Best,
of
relevance
bias cross-examination.
3;
show-up Appellee. and in-court identifications. More- UNITED over, the only he was witness who could No. 84-1797. itself, describe in detail the robbery was the witness who claimed to know District of of Appeals. Columbia Court appellant. Argued April 22, 1986. government strong also cir- offered Decided Oct. 1986. Appellant’s cumstantial evidence. admit- As Amended Oct. presence ted part the car was of that evidence, important but more were Jack-
son’s beige jacket, credit cards government argued appellant’s. was
However, only descriptive evidence
linking appellant jacket testimo-
ny by friend, Jackson Price. Jack- testimony
son’s cannot be considered in error analysis harmless and Price’s
must be discounted because relation- of his
ship provide to Jackson and his failure to description
an on-the-scene or identifica-
tion. reasoned at trial that beige jacket must have appellant’s seat,
because it was found the front sat; because Bris- Leonard
coe, drove, his; jacket who said the not it, jacket,
and because the with no on blood
could not gun- have been the wounded evidence, however,
man’s. This was also
disputed. A officer testified that the
jacket was found the back seat. He said
there was on blood both it and a blue
jacket, just parked found outside the car.
Leonard Briscoe testified that blue, wearing beige jacket.
Viewing all the evidence summarized foregoing
in the paragraphs, leaving
credibility to the jury, say issues I cannot
beyond jury a reasonable doubt that the
would have convicted without testimony. testimony
Jackson’s Jackson’s cumulative, merely and the other
evidence, subject to doubt various
grounds, overwhelming. was not Accord-
ingly, respectfully I must vote to reverse. notes never inquiry is sound dis subject of within the recognized has this court that wit- court,” cretion of the trial Alford paid drugs sold to failure to be ness’ 282 U.S. 51 S.Ct. potential is a source of witness defendant (1931); In re see also L.Ed.2d States, 418 bias. See Johnson v. United C.B.N., 499 A.2d Flecker v. United Appellant’s argument unavailing, (D.C.), denied, 429 S.Ct. cert. however, insuffi because his (1976); re L.Ed.2d 585 we have permit to evaluate cient to prop peatedly always stated “bias proposed questioning Spring whether subject er of cross-examination.” Indeed, prof in his probative bias. er v.