Jones v. ThomasJones v. Thomas
The legal issue in this case is whether an injured employee‘s compensation remedy against his employer is the exclusive remedy when the employee‘s injury is caused by the intentional act of a coemployee under circumstances which would cause the employer to be vicariously liable if the injured person had been a third person who had no employment relationship with the employer. The trial court answered the question in the affirmative by maintaining the employer‘s exception of no cause of action and dismissing the employee‘s suit. The court of appeal affirmed. 413 So.2d 180. We granted the employee‘s application for certiorari to review these rulings. 420 So.2d 162.
According to the allegations of the employee‘s petition (which must be accepted as true for the purpose of an exception of no cause of action), plaintiff-employee‘s coemployee intentionally struck plaintiff in the head during working hours and caused the injuries which are at issue in this litigation.
Citing LaBrane v. Lewis, 292 So.2d 216 (La.1974), plaintiff contends that an employer is vicariously liable for the intentional (as well as the negligent) acts of an employee when the conduct causing the injury is so closely connected in time, place and causation to the employment duties that the conduct must be regarded as a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer‘s business. On the other hand, defendant-employer argues that the employer did not expressly or implicitly authorize the injury-causing conduct and did not benefit from it, nor was the action taken by the employee in furtherance of the employer‘s interest so as to make the employer vicariously liable for the consequences of the employee‘s conduct.
However, since this matter is before us on an exception of no cause of action, we are not as concerned with the question of whether the employer may be held vicariously liable for the particular conduct of the employee under the facts alleged in the petition (or even the facts which may be alleged in an amended petition and proved at trial) as we are with the question of whether the employer can ever be held vicariously liable, under any facts and circumstances, for the employee‘s intentional act when the victim of the intentional act is also an employee of the employer. This issue has been brought into focus since the 1976 amendment to
Prior to the 1976 amendment, an injured employee, although not entitled to maintain a tort action against his employer for injuries incurred in a work-related incident, was entitled to maintain a tort action against his coemployees, and the courts entertained many tort actions in which the injury resulted from a breach of responsibility owed by an executive officer. See Adams v. Fidelity and Cas. Co., 107 So.2d 496 (La.App. 1st Cir.1958); Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716 (La.1973). The 1976 legislation was designed to close the “executive officer” loophole in the exclusiveness of the compensation remedy and to extend tort immunity not only to employers, but also to principals (who had previously enjoyed only a jurisprudentially established immunity) and to employees of employers and principals, except for “liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an intentional act“.2 This court has held, in accordance with our perception of legislative intent, that the exception should be confined to those cases involving intentional torts as traditionally defined. See Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475 (La.1981).
The particular question presented by the instant case is whether the 1976 amendment‘s general grant of tort immunity should be withheld from an employer because of the intentional act exception, when the coemployee‘s intentional act is one for which the employer would be vicariously liable to a third party. The court of appeal adopted the views of the treatise commentators, who have pointed out that the intentional act exception is based on personal moral culpability and should apply only to personal (as opposed to vicarious) liability.3 However, in Rennier v. Johnson, 410 So.2d 1149 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982), cert. denied, 412 So.2d 1115, the court of appeal for that circuit, interpreting as ambiguous the provision of
We note that
Finally, the interpretation advocated by the plaintiff (that only nonintentionally injured employees are relegated to compensation benefits) would also provide clarity and consistency. If the injury is caused accidentally, whether by the employer or by a coemployee, then the injured employee can sue only for compensation benefits; but if the injury is caused intentionally, whether by the employer or by a coemployee, then the injured employee can sue in tort.
We conclude that since the first paragraph of
Accordingly, the judgments of the lower courts dismissing the City of New Orleans, the Audubon Park Commission and Puritan Insurance Company are reversed, the exception of no cause of action and the motion for summary judgment are overruled, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.6
BLANCHE, J., dissents.
MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
DENNIS, J., dissents with reasons.
MARCUS, Justice (dissenting).
I consider that under the statute in question an employee‘s exclusive remedy against his employer is for workmen‘s compensation except for liability resulting from the employer‘s intentional act. To permit an employee to recover against his employer for the “intentional act” of a co-employee is contrary to the letter and intendment of the statute. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
DENNIS, Justice, dissenting.
I reluctantly dissent.
Although I am not certain the majority has reached an incorrect result, it appears that it has incorrectly pretermitted at least two questions crucial to a disciplined analysis of the exception of no cause of action. I believe that it is necessary to decide and declare under what circumstances an employer shall be held liable for the intentional tort of his employee and to determine whether it can be inferred that such circumstances exist in this case from the allegations of the petitioner. Although I think
Even if it were determined that the exception of no cause of action was properly sustained, however, I would permit an amendment of the pleadings to cure the deficiency.
ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
On application for rehearing by Puritan Insurance Company, we clarify footnote 6 and reserve to Puritan the right to raise, in the trial court on remand, all appropriate coverage issues.
Notes
As amended in 1976,
“The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on account of an injury, or compensable sickness or disease for which he is entitled to compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or relations, against his employer, or any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner or employee of such employer or principal, for said injury, or compensable sickness or disease. For purposes of this Section, the word `principal\’ shall be defined as any person who undertakes to execute any work which is a part of his trade, business or occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the injury, or which he had contracted to perform and contracts with any person for the execution thereof.
“Nothing in this Chapter shall affect the liability of the employer, or any officer, director, stockholder, partner or employee of such employer or principal to a fine or penalty under any other statute or the liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an intentional act.
“The immunity from civil liability provided by this Section shall not extend to: 1) any officer, director, stockholder, partner or employee of such employer or principal who is not engaged at the time of the injury in the normal course and scope of his employment; and 2) to the liability of any partner in a partnership which has been formed for the purpose of evading any of the provisions of this Section.”
Statutes from other jurisdictions which similarly do not refer expressly to vicarious liability have been generally interpreted as not excepting an employer from tort immunity except for personal willful acts. See Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215, 425 A.2d 1263 (1979); Sands v. Union Camp Corporation, 559 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir.1977); Gallegos v. Chastain, 95 N.M. 551, 624 P.2d 60 (1981). However, at least one state has an explicit statutory pronouncement on the problem:
“The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an employee or for the death of an employee is the exclusive remedy against the employer or any co-employee acting in the scope of his employment, and against the employer‘s workmen‘s compensation insurance carrier or administrative service representative, except as provided by § 23-906, and except that if the injury is caused by the employer‘s wilful misconduct, or in the case of a co-employee by the co-employee‘s wilful misconduct, and the act causing the injury is the personal act of the employer, or in the case of a co-employee the personal act of the co-employee, or if the employer is a partnership, on the part of a partner, or if a corporation, on the part of an elective officer of the corporation, and the act indicates a wilful disregard of the life, limb or bodily safety of employees, the injured employee may either claim compensation or maintain an action at law for damages against the person or entity alleged to have engaged in the wilful misconduct.” (Emphasis supplied.)