JONES v. THE CITY OF GREENSBOROJONES v. THE CITY OF GREENSBORO
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
This is an action by Plaintiff Dustin Robert Jones against his former employer, Defendant the City of Greensboro (the “City“), asserting several claims pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
The court sets out the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties in the cross-motions for summary judgment.
A. Factual Background
Jones is a U.S. Navy veteran who served as a firefighter with the Greensboro Fire Department (“GFD“) for more than 16 years, achieving the rank of captain. (Doc. 11 ¶¶ 5-6.) The GFD is a paramilitary organization with approximately 27 fire stations and 600 members, around 120 of whom are captains. (Doc. 59-2 at 4, 11, 15.) Captains represent the “middle management” of the GFD. (Id. at 10.) Thus, their responsibilities require that they lead, supervise, and discipline their crews, manage their fire stations, and foster public relations and community engagement. (Doc. 59-6 ¶ 4.)
In 2021, Jones began a series of posts on his Facebook page that resulted in attempts at corrective action by his leadership and, ultimately, his termination. First, in March 2021, Jones responded to a structure fire at a private residence with hoarding conditions. (Doc. 59-8 at 2; Doc. 60-24 at 39-40.) He posted a photograph of the interior of the private residence and noted, “Just an example of some of our ‘working conditions’ . . . . . from our job last night.” (See Doc. 68-5.)
In November 2022, Jones reposted a Facebook video of Guilford County Sheriff Danny Rogers dancing at the North Carolina A&T State University homecoming parade, on which Jones commented, “This is the clown in charge of keeping you safe. Freaking Joke.” (See Doc. 59-11.) The original poster had previously commented, “When yo[ur] Sherrif [sic] is black.” (Id.) Then, on another repost of the same video, Jones added the comment, “I can‘t reply. I might get my hand smacked.” (Doc. 59-10 at 3.) This comment was in response to another person who questioned whether Sheriff Rogers was “pandering to” North Carolina A&T State University and “showing preferential support” for its students and alumni.1 (Id.) Sheriff Rogers was up for reelection at the time. (Doc. 11 at 23.)
City personnel became aware of these posts involving Sheriff Rogers from a citizen‘s report (see Doc. 59-10 at 8-9), and GFD Deputy Chief Dwayne Church met with Jones, along with Maria Hicks-
In February 2023, following the killing of Tyre Nichols by Memphis police, Jones shared the headline of a related FOX8 WGHP news article and commented, “will we see another George Floyd reaction? Will city‘s [sic] burn??? ALL LIVES MATTER.”2 (See Doc. 59-13.) This time, GFD Chief Jim Robinson met with Jones. (Doc. 65-1 at 1.) Chief Robinson explained that the reports of Jones‘s postings were making their way to him as chief, told Jones that he thought he “had a target on his back,” and cautioned Jones to “just be careful” as the chief “had a lot invested in [Jones].” (Doc. 65-31 at 16.) Chief Robinson told Jones that his posts were “borderline,” and the chief‘s handwritten notes from the date of the meeting indicate that he told Jones that the post had been “just within policy,” based on guidance he received from legal counsel. (Doc. 60-14 at 2.) Moreover, Chief Robinson‘s notes indicate that he “ask[ed] [Jones] to stop with the post[s] that
Over the next several months, Jones continued posting controversial material to his Facebook page. These posts included the following:
- A photograph of a keychain stating, “IF I‘VE EVER OFFENDED YOU, I‘M SORRY . . . THAT YOU‘RE A LITTLE BITCH,” with Jones adding, “[‘]Bout right . . . . .” (Doc. 59-18 at 6 (first and third alterations in original).)
- “Straight Pride. it‘s Natural, it‘s Worked for Thousands of years, and you Can Make Babies.” (Id. at 5.)
- “IF THIS IS A WOMAN,” (superimposed on a photograph of Rachel Levine, United States Assistant Secretary for Health during the COVID-19 pandemic) “THIS IS A FISHING POLE” (superimposed on a photograph of an assault rifle). (Id. at 4.)
“You know what‘s insane . . . . A white person can paint their [sic] face black and be accused of being a racist. Yet a man can dress as a woman and be called a hero . . . . . .“; this post, dated April 25, 2023, was accompanied by a definition of blackface from Wikipedia. (Id. at 3 (alterations in original).) - “I identify as invisible. I‘m TRANSparent . . . . . My pronouns are who/where?” This post was also made on April 25, 2023. (Id. at 2 (alterations in original).)
Members of the GFD knew of and discussed Jones‘s posts. (Doc. 59-15 ¶ 4; Doc. 59-16 ¶ 4.) Moreover, at least some members of the GFD knew that Jones had been coached by GFD leadership to stop this type of posting on social media. (Doc. 59-15 ¶ 4; Doc. 59-6 ¶ 11.)
On May 12, 2023, Chief Robinson and Deputy Chief Church met with Jones and terminated his employment. (Doc. 59-2 at 18-19; see Doc. 65-1 at 1-2.) The termination letter, presented to Jones during the meeting, noted that his “posts ha[d] become increasingly offensive and discriminatory” and that Chief Robinson had determined his conduct “to be egregious to the point that it erode[d] public trust and negatively impact[ed] or interfere[d] with the day to day operations of the Fire Department.” (Doc. 65-1 at 2.) Chief Robinson attests that he had never terminated another firefighter for his or her social media posts. (Doc. 68-
Jones appealed to Taiwo Jaiyeoba, Greensboro City Manager. (See Doc. 65-2.) City Manager Jaiyeoba affirmed Chief Robinson‘s decision on May 26, 2023, finding Jones‘s dismissal appropriate because his “misuse of social media and disrespectful treatment of others continued despite repeated coaching sessions and opportunities to improve.” (Doc. 65-3 at 1.) He further noted that “[t]he net effect” of Jones‘s posts was “to dehumanize, delegitimize, disparage and disrespect those who are different from [Jones].” (Id. at 3.) According to City Manager Jaiyeoba, the City “simply cannot tolerate this type of behavior from a leader of this organization.” (Id.)
After his termination, Jones received text messages of support from several GFD firefighters. (See Doc. 65-19 at 3-6; Doc. 65-20 at 3-4; Doc. 65-23 at 3.) Moreover, on June 6, 2023, several firefighters and members of the public addressed Jones‘s termination at the Greensboro City Council‘s bimonthly meeting. Meeting Agenda City Council, City of Greensboro, https://pub-greensboro-nc.escribemeetings.com/Meeting.aspx?Id=91d17686-0485-46f7-9224-0872d227a951&Agenda=Agenda&lang=English (last visited Aug. 10, 2026).3 Thirteen citizens noted their support for Jones‘s termination, while four spoke in opposition. (Id.) Those citizens
B. Procedural Background
On May 9, 2024, Jones filed this lawsuit in North Carolina state court. (Doc. 4.) Defendants timely removed the case to this court (Doc. 1), and Jones filed an amended complaint pursuant to
Following discovery, the parties brought the present motions. First, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Jones‘s claims for First Amendment retaliation (First Cause of Action) and violation of the North Carolina Constitution (Second Cause of Action). (Docs. 45, 46.) Second, the City moves for summary judgment on Jones‘s wrongful termination claim (Fourth
Pursuant to Local Rule 5.4(c) and the court‘s Order on the parties’ Joint Motion for Entry of Amended L.R. 5.5 Order (Doc. 48), the City also filed a motion to seal certain personnel records of current or former GFD employees other than Jones, along with information derived from these records and “otherwise sensitive personal information.” (Doc. 71 at 2.) Jones filed a response in opposition to some portions of the City‘s motion to seal (Doc. 72), and the City replied (Doc. 73).
All pending motions are fully briefed and ready for decision.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
1. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
While the movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, once that burden has been met, the non-moving party must demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to circumvent summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.“); see also Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that there is an affirmative duty for “the trial judge to prevent ‘factually unsupported claims and defenses’ from proceeding to trial” (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986))). Instead, the nonmoving party must convince the court that, upon the record taken as a whole, the rational trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. Trial is unnecessary only if “the facts are undisputed, or if disputed, the dispute is of no consequence to the dispositive question.” Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (4th Cir. 1993).
The standard of review on cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ from the standard applied when only one party files a motion. See Desmond, 630 F.3d at 354. Thus, the court must “consider ‘each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.‘” Bacon v. City of Richmond, 475 F.3d 633, 638 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003)). “When considering each individual motion, the court must take care to ‘resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable’ to the party opposing that motion.” Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 523 (quoting Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996)).
The City argues that governmental immunity bars Jones‘s wrongful termination claim. (Doc. 59 at 14.) As noted, neither Jones‘s response in opposition nor his own motion for summary judgment addresses the wrongful termination claim. (See generally Docs. 60, 65.)
Governmental immunity “shields ‘units of local government from suit for acts committed in their governmental capacity.‘” Est. of Graham v. Lambert, 898 S.E.2d 888, 895 (N.C. 2024) (quoting Providence Volunteer Fire Dep‘t, Inc. v. Town of Weddington, 876 S.E.2d 453, 462 (N.C. 2022)). North Carolina courts have repeatedly held that the termination of a public employee constitutes a governmental function. Oleyar v. County of Durham, 336 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (first citing Phillips v. Gray, 592 S.E.2d 229, 232 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); and then citing Paquette v. County of Durham, 573 S.E.2d 715, 717 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)). A governmental entity “may, however, waive such immunity through the purchase of liability insurance.” Dawes v. Nash County, 584 S.E.2d 760, 763 (N.C. 2003) (quoting Doe v. Jenkins, 547 S.E.2d 124, 126 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)).
Here, Jones has produced no evidence that the City has waived governmental immunity. By contrast, the City has produced an affidavit from Teresa Johnston, the Executive Director of the Guilford City/County Insurance Advisory Committee, to demonstrate
3. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
“The First Amendment ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.‘” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). Public employees do “not relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government employment,” id. at 140, and the court must “ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government,” id. at 147. “That being said, precedent makes clear that courts must also consider ‘the government‘s countervailing interest in controlling the operation of its workplaces.‘” Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, 789 F.3d 389, 396 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 236 (2014)). Thus, a public employee “by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). To maintain a claim pursuant to the First
(1) that he was a “public employee . . . speaking as a citizen upon a matter of public concern [rather than] as an employee about a matter of personal interest;” (2) that his “interest in speaking upon the matter of public concern outweighed the government‘s interest in providing effective and efficient services to the public;” and (3) that his “speech was a substantial factor in the employer‘s termination decision.”
Grutzmacher v. Howard County, 851 F.3d 332, 342 (4th Cir. 2017) (alterations in original) (quoting McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1998)).
The parties agree that Jones‘s claim brought pursuant to the North Carolina Constitution rises or falls with his First Amendment retaliation claim. (See Doc. 21 at 28 n.8.) Moreover, in this court‘s previous ruling, it found that several of Jones‘s posts implicated matters of public concern. (Id. at 11.) Accordingly, the court now turns to whether Jones‘s interest in speaking on matters of public concern outweighed the City‘s interest in providing effective and efficient services to the public. See McVey, 157 F.3d at 277; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the City contends that Jones‘s posts created potential and actual disruption both within the GFD and between the GFD and the community. (Doc. 59 at 19, 21-28.) The City also asserts that Jones‘s conduct amounted to insubordination, damaging Jones‘s ability to enforce GFD policies and threatening the paramilitary hierarchy of the GFD. (Id. at 19-20, 28-31.)
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Jones argues that the City failed to consider his First Amendment rights when it terminated his employment. (Doc. 65 at 22-23.) He further asserts that his commentary on matters of public concern drew on particular knowledge he possessed as an experienced firefighter. For example, he points to his frequent interaction with the Guilford County Sheriff‘s Office, which he contends made him “specially situated” to evaluate Sheriff Rogers‘s ability to keep the public safe. (Id. at 24.) He also highlights his experience addressing fires caused by hoarding and rioting, in reference to his posts depicting a private residence and the news article on the Tyre Nichols killing. (Id.) Finally, he argues that the City falsely assumed his insubordination “to craft a narrative” of defiance, and he references several statements and text messages from firefighters who opposed his termination. (Id. at 24-25.)
The Pickering/McVey “balancing test is a ‘particularized’
Factors relevant to this inquiry include whether a public employee‘s speech (1) impaired the maintenance of discipline by supervisors; (2) impaired harmony among coworkers; (3) damaged close personal relationships; (4) impeded the performance of the public employee‘s duties; (5) interfered with the operation of the institution; (6) undermined the mission of the institution; (7) was communicated to the public or to coworkers in private; (8) conflicted with the responsibilities of the employee within the institution; and (9) abused the authority and public accountability that the employee‘s role entailed.
Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 317 (4th Cir. 2006). Further, “in this balancing test, ‘the government bears the burden of justifying the discharge on legitimate grounds.‘” Lawson v. Union Cnty. Clerk of Ct., 828 F.3d 239, 252 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation modified) (quoting Gilchrist, 749 F.3d at 309). However, “to demonstrate that an employee‘s speech impaired efficiency, a government employer need not ‘prove that the employee‘s speech actually disrupted efficiency, but only that an adverse effect was reasonably to be apprehended.‘” Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 348 (citation modified) (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 1992)). “Whether the employee‘s
“‘[F]ire companies have a strong interest in the promotion of camaraderie and efficiency’ as well as ‘internal harmony [and] trust.‘” Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 345 (alterations in original) (quoting Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 355). Courts thus “accord ‘substantial weight’ to a fire department‘s interest in limiting dissension and discord.” Id. (quoting Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 355). Nevertheless, as the Fourth Circuit has cautioned, “a fire department‘s interest in maintaining efficiency will not always outweigh the interests of an employee in speaking on matters of public concern.” Id. at 348. “A social media platform amplifies the distribution of the speaker‘s message – which favors the employee‘s free speech interests – but also increases the potential, in some cases exponentially, for departmental disruption, thereby favoring the employer‘s interest in efficiency.” Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 407 (4th Cir. 2016).
As the City contends, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit‘s decision in Grutzmacher guides this case. (Doc. 59 at 33-34; Doc. 61 at 13-15.) In Grutzmacher, a county fire department fired a battalion chief after he posted to his Facebook page, “My aide had an outstanding idea . . lets [sic] all kill someone with a liberal . . . then maybe we can get them
The Fourth Circuit concluded that at least some of the battalion chief‘s Facebook activity implicated matters of public concern. Id. at 344. However, the court held that the fire department‘s interest outweighed the battalion chief‘s interest in speech, and thus it affirmed summary judgment in favor of the fire department on the battalion chief‘s First Amendment retaliation claim. Id. at 348. Specifically, the court noted that his speech resulted in numerous difficult conversations between at least one other battalion chief and lower-level employees, in addition to one African American employee‘s expressed desire not to work for the battalion chief anymore because of a lack of trust. Id. at
Here, like the fire department in Grutzmacher, the City reasonably perceived Jones‘s continued posting as insubordinate. “A public employee‘s interest in speaking on matters of public concern ‘does not require that a public employer tolerate associated behavior that it reasonably believed was disruptive and insubordinate.‘” Id. at 347 (citation modified) (quoting Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 194 (4th Cir. 1989)). The record demonstrates that Jones received three coaching sessions in which supervisors expressed disapproval of his posts. (See, e.g., Docs. 59-8, 59-12, 59-14.) Though his post regarding Tyre Nichols was “just within policy,” Chief Robinson cautioned Jones at the third session to “be careful.”5 (Doc. 59-2 at 28-29.) Chief Robinson‘s handwritten notes from this meeting further indicate that he “ask[ed] [Jones] to stop with the post[s] that could be viewed as offensive.” (Doc. 60-14 at 2.) Indeed, Jones himself understood
Per Chief Robinson, Jones‘s disregard of the coaching he received “was a known fact among parts of the GFD.” (Doc. 59-6 ¶ 11.) Similarly, one battalion chief attested that GFD firefighters knew of the “coaching” efforts made by GFD leadership toward Jones and that Jones‘s continued posting seemed “defiant” and intended to “stir the pot.” (Doc. 59-15 ¶ 4.) Multiple firefighters with supervisory roles in the GFD (who were identified by Jones as persons with knowledge of GFD‘s alleged discrimination) have also provided declarations agreeing that conduct like Jones‘s “cannot be tolerated” because it “risks significant disruption to the [GFD‘s] effective operations and undermines leadership, discipline, and public trust.”7 (Doc. 59-25 ¶ 7; Doc. 59-26 ¶ 7;
Jones counters that he received only “equivocal” and “ambiguous” counseling and “coaching sessions,” rather than “clear directives,” on his social media behavior. (Doc. 60 at 17-18.) He also contrasts his termination with other GFD employees who received less harsh disciplinary measures for their own posts, and he asserts that the City ignored its own policy favoring progressive discipline. (Id. at 18.) Finally, he argues that the City ignores the context of his post, “To those watching me . . . . . . keep watching . . . . ,” by disregarding his nearly contemporaneous post on freedom of speech and his testimony that he did not intend to direct this post at the GFD leadership, but rather at those individuals who, according to Chief Robinson, had placed “a target on his back.” (Id. at 18-19.)
Jones‘s posts may well represent a form of argumentative (albeit inflammatory) social commentary based on his legitimately held beliefs, and he may have intended to direct the “keep watching” post at the individuals who had placed a “target on his back.” And to be sure, in Grutzmacher, the post of an elderly woman raising her middle finger with the comment directed at the chief that the plaintiff “liked” was more obviously directed at his department leadership. See Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 339. But perception of disruption and insubordination in light of the other record evidence.
Jones‘s response relies in part on his claims of disparate treatment compared to other firefighters who posted controversial material to social media but were not terminated. (Doc. 63 at 15, 18.) For example, he points to one firefighter‘s post referencing “Black Pride” alongside the terms “Natural,” “Dope,” “Educated,” “Melanin,” and “Classy” (Doc. 63-15 at 1), and a post from a GFD captain reading, “PSA . . . . . If you want to live . . . walk towards the police and tell them you are going to kill them. DON‘T WALK AWAY” (Doc. 63-17 at 3). He also highlights several posts from another firefighter, to include one depicting a “Truly” draft beer tap handle with the caption, “White gurl [sic] heaven . . . . truly on tap . . . .” and another of a meme stating, “My generation had WONDER WOMAN . . . y‘all generation is WONDERING if that‘s a WOMAN.” (Doc. 63-16 at 11, 14.) Jones elsewhere contends that the alleged disparate treatment of other firefighters amounts to a “double standard” that singled out his “Christian conservative” views. (Doc. 65 at 18-19.) He does not
Even if comparators were relevant, the undisputed facts contradict Jones‘s claims of disparate treatment because - unlike the other firefighters who all received some level of discipline for their potentially offensive posts (upon GFD‘s knowledge of them) and then stopped posting (see Doc. 62-6 ¶ 13; 63-25 at 11-12; Doc. 64-1 at 3; Doc. 69-2 ¶¶ 5-8) - Jones‘s problematic social media activity intensified after he met with Chief Robinson.8 Jones‘s argument that the City failed to follow its own progressive discipline policy in terminating his employment is also difficult to square with the fact that he received three separate coaching
Further, the City‘s evidence of the reasonable apprehension of disruption extends beyond its perception of Jones‘s conduct as insubordinate. To begin, the City has demonstrated that Jones‘s Facebook activity created some disruption within the GFD itself. One battalion chief, for example, “observed that Jones‘s social media activity was creating difficult conversations and disruption within certain parts of the daily GFD environment.”10 (Doc. 59-15 ¶ 5.) An African American firefighter who worked for the GFD at the time of Jones‘s termination also attested that Jones‘s posts generated “considerable discussion” among the GFD and that his posts led her to “fear that [she] could not trust him as [her]
Jones‘s response that some firefighters opposed his termination and that the City‘s evidence relies on declarations from supervisors rather than line-level firefighters does not raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the City reasonably anticipated disruption in the GFD. And, while Jones speculates that there may have been some who sought to discredit him for his views, as his counsel conceded at argument the record provides no evidence that any declarant or other GFD personnel claiming disruption or otherwise favoring Jones‘s termination harbored any personal animosity toward him. (Doc. 78 at 71:1-7.) The court therefore accords “substantial weight” to the City‘s interest in preventing Jones from impairing harmony among coworkers at the GFD. See Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 346 (lending substantial weight to the fire department‘s interest in workplace harmony in part because one African American firefighter stated, “I don‘t want to work for [Plaintiff] anymore. I don‘t trust him.”
Jones‘s leadership position exacerbated the potential disruption caused by his posts. “The expressive activities of a highly placed supervisory employee will be more disruptive to the operation of the workplace than similar activity by a low level employee with little authority or discretion.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 1997)). And here, according to Chief Robinson, captains “set the standard” within the GFD. (Doc. 59-2 at 10.) Thus, as a captain, Jones was “responsible for ensuring implementation of the GFD‘s policy and mission.” (Doc. 59-6 ¶ 4.) Yet as noted, according to one battalion chief, personnel throughout the GFD knew that Jones had been “coached” on his “offensive posts” but continued posting, thereby creating a perception of public defiance. (Doc. 59-15 ¶ 4.)
Contrary to Jones‘s response (see Doc. 60 at 23), the fact that Jones did not post “in a supervisory capacity” or direct the posts “at his subordinates” does not preclude the City‘s finding of potential disruptive effect on his workplace relationships where, as here, the posts generated discussion and concern among firefighters at his workplace. Notably, Jones prominently displayed his employment with the GFD on his Facebook page, including, at least at one point, setting his profile photograph as a photograph of him in his GFD uniform. (Doc. 62-2 at 26; Doc.
Next, the City has produced evidence that Jones‘s conduct threatened the GFD‘s relationship with the community. “The more the employee‘s job requires public contact, the greater the state‘s interest in firing him for expression that offends his employer.”
Here, according to City Manager Jaiyeoba, the “net effect” of Jones‘s posts was “to dehumanize, delegitimize, disparage and disrespect” the members of the community who were different from him. (Doc. 65-3 at 3.) Indeed, one member of the community filed a complaint with the City over Jones‘s post referring to Sheriff Rogers as a “clown,” describing the post as “blatantly racist” and alleging its “wide[] circulat[ion].” (Doc. 59-10 at 7.) Jones‘s other posts on the killing of Tyre Nichols, “Straight Pride,” former Assistant Health Secretary Levine, and blackface raised similar concerns by commenting on “hot-button political issues” like race, sexual orientation, and gender identity “in a mocking, derogatory, and disparaging manner.” See MacRae v. Mattos, 106 F.4th 122, 137 (1st Cir. 2024). A public employee has a reduced First Amendment interest in speech of an “insulting and disparaging” nature. Id.; see Moser v. L.V. Metro. Police Dep‘t, 984 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that “racially charged comments . . . arguably receive less First Amendment protection
Indeed, less than one month after Jones‘s termination from the GFD, thirteen community members voiced their support for his termination at the Greensboro City Council‘s bimonthly meeting. (Doc. 62 at 12 (citing Meeting Agenda City Council).) Jones argues that this commentary is only “post-hoc political pressure” used by the City as a retroactive justification for his termination. (Doc. 63 at 20.) But the mere fact that Jones‘s termination generated such a reaction corroborates the City‘s reasonable apprehension over the deleterious effects of his posts. The City need not, despite Jones‘s suggestion to the contrary, wait until more fallout from his posts materialized to find that Jones‘s posts risked damage to its relationship with the public. Cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983) (“Furthermore, we do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.“).
Moreover, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have all tempered any concerns related to an alleged heckler‘s veto in the context of the Pickering balancing test. See Bennett v. Metro. Gov‘t of Nash. & Davidson Cnty., 977 F.3d 530, 544 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Because effective emergency service ‘presupposes respect for the members of [minority] communities,’ such agencies are permitted to
Finally, the GFD‘s paramilitary nature strengthens its
By contrast, the interest in Jones‘s commentary on matters of public concern does not outweigh the significant governmental interests identified above. To be sure, a public safety official‘s interest in speaking on matters of public concern will outweigh even a compelling government interest “when, for example, the official‘s speech is ‘grounded . . . in specialized knowledge [or] expresse[s] a general “concern about the inability of the [Department] to carry out its vital public mission effectively.“‘” Id. at 347-48 (alterations in original) (quoting Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 410 (4th Cir. 2016)). This balancing comports with the fact “that public employees are often the members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions as to the operations of their public employers,” City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam), as “[g]overnment employees are often in the best position
But here, though Jones‘s firefighting experience may have given him some particular insight into the Guilford County Sheriff‘s Office or the dangers of riots and hoarding, his actual posts on these matters failed to demonstrate any specialized knowledge that would heighten the interest of his speech. Jones did not, for example, raise “[s]erious concerns regarding officer training and supervision” at the GFD, see Liverman, 844 F.3d at 410-11, nor did he note that GFD leadership “was overlooking violations of safety regulations,” see Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 355 (4th Cir. 2000); cf. Templeton v. City of High Point, No. 24cv671, 2026 WL 1759255, at *5 (M.D.N.C. June 18, 2026) (finding that the firefighter plaintiff had a clearly established right to speak on “the ability of the fire department to carry out its mission effectively” without suffering an adverse employment action). Rather, he described Sheriff Rogers as a “clown” and a “Freaking Joke” without further explanation,12 and he queried whether cities would burn because of Tyre Nichols‘s death at the hands of Memphis police officers before asserting that “ALL LIVES MATTER.” (See Docs. 59-
To oppose the City‘s motion for summary judgment, Jones cites Moser, 984 F.3d at 911, where a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government employer. In Moser, the plaintiff, who served as a member of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department‘s special weapons and tactics unit, commented on a friend‘s social media post concerning the arrest of a man suspected of shooting another police officer: “Thanks to a Former Action Guy (FAG) and his team we caught that asshole . . . It‘s a shame he didn‘t have a few holes in him . . . ” Moser, 984 F.3d at 902-03. The Ninth Circuit held that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to the “objective meaning” of the plaintiff‘s social media comment, yet the district court “appeared to accept” the employer‘s interpretation. Id. at 907. This interpretation in favor of the moving party prevented the
Unlike the social media post in Moser, Jones‘s posts plainly do not “address[] problems at the government agency where” he worked even under his proffered meaning. See id. at 906 (noting that commentary about such problems rests “[a]t the apex of the First Amendment“). Nor do Jones‘s posts meaningfully “touch[] on an important public policy issue that falls within his personal experience.” Id. Indeed, even Chief Robinson expressed doubts on whether he, as chief, would “have an understanding of what the upper administration in the sheriff‘s department does.” (Doc. 59-2 at 26.) As already noted, the City has also provided evidence well beyond the viewing of his Facebook posts by a single anonymous tipster of its reasonable apprehension of the disruption caused by Jones‘s speech. Cf. Moser, 984 F.3d at 910. And unlike the plaintiff in Moser, Jones made posts that the City reasonably believed to be insubordinate. See Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 347.
Ultimately, the GFD has demonstrated that it reasonably
B. Motion to Seal
“[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy . . . judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc‘ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern,” Landmark Commc‘ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978), “and the public‘s business is best done in public,” Cochran v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d 725, 727 (M.D.N.C. 2013). “When parties ‘call on the courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution by public (and publicly accountable) officials.‘” Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 271 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000)).
The right of public access derives from both the common law and the First Amendment. See Va. Dep‘t of State Police v. Washington Post, 386 F.3d 567, 576 (4th Cir. 2004). “While the common law presumption in favor of access attaches to all ‘judicial records and documents,’ the First Amendment guarantee of access has been extended only to particular judicial records and documents.” Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597). Thus, in any given case, some documents will “fall within the common law presumption of access,” while others will be “subject to the greater right of access provided by the First Amendment,” and some “may not qualify as ‘judicial records’ at all.” United States v. Moussaoui, 65 F. App‘x 881, 889 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1995)).
When a party makes a request to seal judicial records, a district court “must comply with certain substantive and
Here, the City‘s motion to seal was filed by the same party claiming confidentiality. Specifically, the motion seeks to seal portions of both parties’ briefs in support of their motions for summary judgment, their responses and replies, and their attached exhibits. According to the City, the relevant information includes
The City argues that most of the material it seeks to seal falls within the purview of
In response, Jones has objected to several of the City‘s requests for sealing. Jones contends that the City‘s redactions
To begin, “the more rigorous First Amendment standard” applies “to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.” Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988). The court agrees that the photograph of the interior of a citizen‘s private residence and Chief Robinson‘s place of worship constitute “sensitive personal information,” and safeguarding such information “is an important governmental interest.” See Courthouse News Serv. v. Smith, 126 F.4th 899, 910. The same goes for Jones‘s date of birth and specific shift
Further, the court agrees that the disclosure of the names of GFD personnel who previously complained of or were involved in alleged inappropriate relationships or sexual harassment incidents involving Jones would not serve the public interest. A redacted, public version available at docket entry 66-8 omits the individuals’ names but otherwise provides all the necessary context. The court will protect the identities of these non-party individuals and therefore seal docket entry 69-8. Cf. Alexander v. City of Greensboro, Nos. 09-CV-00293, 09-CV-00934, 2013 WL 6687248, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 18, 2013) (“Names of alleged sexual assault victims ‘serve no useful public or investigative
The remaining exhibits, which largely deal with Facebook posts made by other GFD employees who received less severe punishments than Jones, present a closer call. On the one hand, the court agrees with Jones and will not seal documents that only reference the City‘s responses to this other controversial social media activity without identifying the individual personnel involved. The court also declines to seal records that merely provide the phone number and office address of Chief Robinson, or the name, email address, office address, and phone number of the City‘s law and compliance consultant, as this information appears readily available to the public on the City‘s website. See Just. 360 v. Stirling, 42 F.4th 450, 455 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record” (quoting Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem‘l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009))); see also
On the other hand, the court finds that the actual personnel records of non-parties - which contain the complaints filed with the City, internal discussions between GFD leadership and the human resources department, copies of the social media posts at issue, and the discipline ultimately meted out – should largely remain sealed.
The remainder of the documents reside somewhere in between these two poles. Generally, the documents identify the individuals who were disciplined for their social media posts, and they include a description of both the offending post and the punishment
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Jones‘s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 45) is DENIED, Defendant the City of Greensboro‘s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 46) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the City‘s motion to seal (Doc. 71) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Docket entries 62, 62-1, 62-7, 62-15, 62-16, 63-5, 63-15, 68-5, 68-16, 69-1, 69-5, 69-8, 70-5, and 70-7 shall be SEALED. Page 4 of docket entry 62-2 and page 21 of docket entry 63-25 shall also be SEALED.
The motion to seal is otherwise DENIED, and docket entries 62-6, 62-10, 63, 64-1, and 69 shall be UNSEALED. Page 9 of docket entry 62-2 and pages 11 and 12 of docket entry 63-25 shall be UNSEALED, and within seven days Jones shall file new copies of
/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
August 10, 2026