delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thеre can he no question that the judgment of the Cirсuit Court upon the agreed case was correct.
The defendants, and those under whom they сlaimed, had been in continued adverse possession of the land in dispute, claiming the same under deeds in fee simple, ever since August, 1845. If Thomas Hаrmon, the ancestor of the plaintiffs, ever had any valid title to this land, the cause of actiоn, as to him, accrued when the adverse pоssession commenced — namely, in August, 1845 — and he and his hеirs were barred by force of the statute of limitations, in seven years from that time.
It can make no difference that he died before the bar had formed, leaving heirs who were under disability. The statute would continue to run against them, and they would be bаrred in the same time as Thomas Harmon, had he lived. This is well settled. The present action, brought by them оn the 1st of September, 1857, was, therefore, too late.
The pendency of the action of forcible entry and detainer, brought by Thomas Harmon in his lifetime, and which abated .upon his death, cаn be no answer to the statute of limitations an this case; because, by the express language of the statute, :the suit, to have that effect, must bе one effectually prosecuted against the person or persons in possession of the land. Norment v. Smith,
Nor can it make any difference that the action of forcible •entry and detainеr was incapable of being revived, (Tucker et al. v. Burns,
It is unnecessary to consider what effect thе third section •of the act of 1819, ch. 28, would have had upon the case, if the present actiоn, by the heirs of Thomas Harmon, had been instituted within onе year after the abatement of the aсtion
The judgment of the Circuit Court will be affirmed.