*1 by referring majority in- If to the evidence mentioned the the de- imply plaintiff perpetrated tend to fendant, that fraud on finding negatived specific implication that jury plaintiff’s Special that in answer to Issue 24No. agent represent intend did defendant it did not not sold to claim a it sold the or it was commission unless prospects. majority imply to one of its If the intend to meaning mutually the language mistaken as to used, any,
they remedy, defendant’s was in reforma- if tion of the contract. He not seek Reformation did reformation. legal through should accomplished device of now be holding supra, ambiguous. Richards, the contract See Jackson v. cited; 334, Contracts, and cases there 10-A Texas Jur. 168. Sec. I would that the creates hold contract us an exclusive before agency and, finding law, as a matter of other reason re- versing judgment Appeals, of the Court of I would judgment. affirm that
Opinion February 18, delivered 1959.
Rehearing overruled March 1959. Leggett
Ruth Jones Al Et v. J. R. Al. Et
No. A-6890. Decided 1959. February Rehearing overruled March 1959. (321 290) Series *2 Pope Wagstaff, Hartioell, Childers, Alms Childers & Dallas, Stubbeman, Abilene, Shank, Payne, all of Dedman & Sealey, McGee, Harry. Midland, Roby, McRae & Watson & Williams, Kennerly, Dippel, Worth, Lee Jesse J. G. Fort & Lee, Joyce Vinson, Fountain, Gaines, Cox, Elkins, Cox Weems & Searls, Kurth, III, Burns, Andrews, H. & Ben Rice F. Richard Campbell Erwin, Wagner Bradley, Hodson, & & Willard B. Houston, Jr., peti- Wagner, Wagner, all B. for and Willard tioners. holding erred Court determining all
court abused his discretion in under the facts respondents and circumstances without title should appointed required stance, at in- the fees of the receiver their possession properties took and who never involved Ross, properties. Archer or did act of benefit to said v. 2d 213. Sprain McMahon, Smart, Smart, & Wilson and Hudson Abilene; Adkins, Folley, Hankins, McConnell & and A. J. Folley, Amarillo, respondents. all of opinion delivered the Court.
Mr. Justice Norvell We are here with the allocation of concerned refer to we shall as costs of suit. For convenience respondents petitioners plaintiffs and the numerous the Jones (except State) Strayhorn as the defendants. State intervening an Court and Texas was in the District alligned necessary, defendants. When intervening Upon State will successfully referred to the State name. sought appointment and a number of a receiver See, joined application. Spring- of the defendants in the Jones er, trial court’s 256 S.W. wherein the upheld. of a receiver primary County action involved land in Kent ultimately title issue was decided in favor of the *3 plaintiffs. Strayhorn, Jones Jones v. 157 Texas 300 S.W. Following 2d liams, sitting decision, 623. the Honorable Lewis M. Wil- regu- Chapman,
for the Honorable Ben Charles judge lar County, hearing of the District Court of Kent held a 17, 1957, and on among June entered an order which other things discharged approved previous the receiver and orders directing payment compensаtion of certain monies as for the attorney. items, together receiver and his These with other charges aggregated incurred in the receivership, course of the $39,052.01. the sum following finding As to this item the and judge: order was made * ** “It appearing further to the just it is Court and
equitable that the receivership for whose benefit the was required ordered to receivership the costs and any that neither the receivership nor act of the Receiver in manner property placed benefited the receivership or the parties adjudged thereof, prop- to or owners made such erty more appointment; than it valuable was at thе time of his adjudged resulted in no benefit to the owners thereof and who at all times resisted the receiver, of the therefore, is, Ordered,
“It Adjudged and Decreed that expenses aforesaid costs of the Receiver and the Receivers $39,052.01, be, hereby total they sum of are taxed as costs, jointly severally, against and are taxed one-half (%), herein, Strayhorn, Stringer, to-wit: J. R. the Defendants R. L. Leon, (Mike) Barron, Barron, Sullivan, E. E. B. C. E. W. W.W. O’Brien, Reimers, H. the Livestock Marvin Charles National against Chicago, (%) Bank of and one-half of Texas.” State taxing the Appeals the order reversed The Court Civil Strayhorn against de- expenses and the the State sup- evidence аs suit and there fendants costs of held porting finding out. trial above set court doing appellate Jones, so the lower v. 2d 582. In erred.
Judging opinion its from authorities cited in applicable seemingly the rules confused Civil compensation right to the to have his receiver receivership funds incurred him out of the governing between with the rules parties. the allocation costs receiver, proper under orders of time to time the From fund certain from the retained sums attorney by check his which he transferred himself duly questions payments. report. his these listed in final No one incidently seeks to the receiver who No one recover them from thereby. рarty proceeding, nor affected The Court following Taylor Taylor, Appeals quotes history: no writ Texas Civ. S.W. 2d general entitled to reasonable “The rule is that the receiver is compensation funds to be taxed as regard litiga- receivership, result of and that without tion, irrespective right to recover either adversary.” suit cost of *4 questions simply point. It one this rule. It is beside the No may be at the defendants conceded outset good property yet had a faith to involved in invalid claim the litigation. improper may this It it likewise be conceded was charge appointed for a pending receiver to take of be However, the final of this circum- outcome the suit. stance does not in itself the issue of the allocation determine things, parties. of appointment as between the In the nature of costs upon preliminary a a of receiver must based be may assume estimate the situation and while this case we sought appointment that the of a who receiver by motives, requires “pro- worthy small actuated nevertheless showing phetic adequate ken” to invision an for case which upon preliminary application; could be made thorough hearing investigation yet, upon final the whole might exposed judicial as a clever to use our scheme be device rightful depriving prop- a means of owner of his tribunals as erty through program oppression. harassment and a studied may of the unsuccessful claimant be an fides While bona by taxing judge costs it is trial item to considered be controlling. no means governed by 131 and is Rules Nos.
The matter us as follows: which read Texas Rules of Procedure party shall recover Rule 131. “The successful suit therein, except adversary his where otherwise all costs issued provided. good cause, may,
Rule 141. “The court to be stated adjudge provided by the record the costs than law otherwise as or these rules.” provisions These seem to be a statement in rule fоrm the
general practice. Corpus It is stated Juris that: Secundum statute, “In may the absence of adjudged against apportioned one or the other of the between 981, them discretion of the court.” 75 C.J.S. Re- ceivers, 303(a). Sec. authority points apportionment same out that equitable recognizes principles controlled that while the ultimate success or failure of the who re- quests controlling, of a receiver not in itself prime determining it is nevertheless a factor in who shall ul- timately pay the costs of the 75 C.J.S. Re- ceivers, 303(b). Sec. right distinction compensa- between receiver’s pointed tion and the allocation of cоsts was early case Espuella Company Bindle, Land & Cattle history. no writ The Court said: think the fees “We receiver’s must be considered a costs, meaning statute, such, within the and, moneys are out of entitled that came into Co., 858; hands. Ellis v. Water 86 Texas Id., 23 S.W. 4 Texas *5 why 856. We see no reason this statute* apply plaintiff does to a case in not which the recovers. doWe however, prevent making hold that it would the court from 1889, Supp. Sayles’ 1.—Acts Texas Civ. St. art. now article Vernon’s Ann. that, moneys Stats, provides which “All that come into the hands of applied payment: be receiver as such receiver shall as follows to the ” * * * 1. Of all court of suit. costs, adjudgment as between the proper equitable a parties of these suit, manner de- to nor that is in the a defendant might had, prived such as he otherwise have of such remedies damages, protect separate to himself a reconvention or suit for against taking property by wrongfully from loss his occasioned expensive having re- possession, squandered it an his ceivership.” general judge vary rule the trial authorized to the was
While taxing costs, opinion equities case of the re- as quired if his the
it, present and set did to do case he not choose so prompted his him tax costs forth in against order the reasons which litigation parties in accordance unsuccessful something to be said in favor of with Rule No. There is 131. Receivership known is one the harshest remedies such action. deprive an owner of the use of his law. it is used to When remedy invariably property, injury results. He who invoked risk, prepared it cannot be said the must to assume some for lawsuit is a matter which should disre- final garded of the outcome taxing costs, entirely we cannot rest the matter receivership. preliminary for a upon estimate of need finally adjudged that the Jones plaintiffs it was While involved, the real the effect of de- owners to saddle such cision of the of Civil expenses receivership deny and to all the costs and recovery against over the unsuccessful claimants who to them protests over their and ob- procured the receiver’s jections. discretionary judge undoubtedly au- had As costs, controlling question adjudge this
thority to case failing adjudge is, discretion in such costs he his did abuse plaintiffs? the Jones judge that a which have held trial cases abused adjudging costs, including receivership discretion party, appeared are those in which the successful party has dispute derived some “benefit” as without It is not sufficient to establish an a result simply to show that discretion abuse applied who had have benefited they litigation. successful been way can be read only a “benefit” into case is to solely losing standpoint parties. situation view *6 actually owned Had defendants and State dispute them to have beneficial to lands it have been prevent lands from wells thereon in order to such oil drilled by being adjacent by owned drained located lands wells plaintiffs plaintiffs. owners of However the were the Jones Jones anything, disputed property ownership and if means the it means that lands belongs the fruits and income from and he is to receive and control the owner thereof entitled receivership ancillary This thereto were same. lawsuit They plaintiffs. no needed no additional benefit to the Jones Ordinarily necessary protect it him- oil wells. is not for one to drainage However, from his there were self own wells. drilling acreage operations upon disputed carried litigation at not the conclusion of this the receiver did turn plaintiffs developed fully exploited over to Jones more By agreement drilling land area. of additional obviated, proportionate part proceeds but paid derived from the entire Field was over Salt Creek to the simply money pending receiver who held this as a stakeholder litigation. portion paid the outcome of the receiver acreage prоportion disputed was determined which the working area bore leasehold to the interest of entire Salt Field. Creek provided
The contract that: “Upon discharge Receiver, he shall over and money property paid distribute and delivered to him hereunder, (less expenses the reasonable allowed operating development costs herein- mentioned), persons after entitled thereto.” quoted provision paren- contractual set forth within the thesis does not relate allocation costs as between the parties. agreement This has been carried out and the receiver has been his fees and оut of the fund which he as a stakeholder. collcted “benefit,” only called, if such it can be the Jones
plaintiffs receivership proceedings from the received was one they obviously desire, sought did prevent, which but namely, having money, the receiver collect their it a hold certain length eventually right- turn over time and to them as the owners, $39,052.01, less ful receiver’s costs. type
This is justify not the “benefit” which will appel- an judge law, a trial saying, as matter late court *7 losing against adjudging in costs his discretion abused litigation. parties Birdwell, App.,
The case of Moore v. holding of the history, support writ does not no Appeals. it was held that In that case Court of Civil ap- adjudging costs its discretion abused possession an pellants merely and filed a suit for title who appointed eight-acre request that a Receiver be tract but did not appointment. contrary on the said but resisted holding that v. Birdwell was The true of the of Moore basis — — appellee received benefits the owner of the said, this receivership. “At the conclusion of from turned over to him in the the Receiver [the suit lower fully equipped.” Here the producing appellee] oil wells two wells, improved property, simply took no but drilled Receiver charge previously portion produced a the income plaintiffs upоn land owned them. drilled the Jones judge holding that a trial do not understood as We wish grounds may adjudge equitable receivership not upon sufficient prevailing part or in costs either in whole from the accrues to such where no benefit even which, rules, party. under the within the This is matter lies court. mere fact or circumstance that discretion of the trial may discretionary judge decide a matter within his au- a trial judge thority appellate from what an in a manner different placed in if a similar circumstance does demon- decide an abuse of discretion occurred. When is once strate that exercising “discretionary” judge authority that a trial decided way to then to follow and one decide the dis- has but one course cretionary power effectually destroyed and is the rule which effectively repealed. grant power is purports to such What we finding judge’s say trial recited set out in is that the the fore- do support opinion has the evidence and that adjudging judge his discretion did not abuse 131. accordance with Rule No. judgment of Court of Civil is reversed and affirmed. trial court February 1959. Opinion delivered Smith, and joined by Hickman Mr. Justice Chief Justice dissenting. Greenhill, Associate Justices Griffin directly particular in this lawsuit This Court concerned question appointment with the of whether not the good showing Receiver, Davis, legally upon Tom was made cause. The record in this case shows that at time of thereto, appointment subsequent all times Receiver at good maintaining seeking respondents acted faith in goodfaith upon action Such belief based they were the land involved. The owners Therefore, wrongful improper. of the Receiver was neither nor compensation fees of the Receiver and hands, attorney in the of the funds Receiver’s *8 charged against any parties and not to the lawsuit. The judgment holding court, contrary, of the trial has been by Appeals. reversed rendered the of Court 312 S.W. judgment 2d would affirm the 582. We of the latter court for the reasons now to be stated. original trespass try
The suit was one in title. It was filed 24, County, the District Court Kent of Texas on October by petitioners against Strayhorn al., respondents. the et intervened, claiming State of Texas an undivided in the interest upon alleged seeking lands acreage, ap- based excess the pointment Stringer, of a R. Receiver. L. the one of defendants original suit, Texas, separate the and the State of filed motions asking appointment protection the for of a Receiver for the of parties. Upon all hearing, interested the trial court found that controversy danger the being lost, destroyеd, lands were in materially damaged producing gas or because of oil and adjacent lands, applicants (respondents and that both in the case), probable instant land, because their the interest appointed. petitioners entitled to excepted have Receiver appointing Receiver, and, to the action of the trial court in the upon appeal, by the of the trial court action affirmed the Appeals. 1016; Strayhorn Court of Civil See 256 2d et al. S.W. ah, 321; et Jones Texas Civ. 289 S.W. et ah, al. v. et Jones 2d 623. appointing
The action of the trial court in the Receiver and necessity by the therefor to be determined not the ultimate retrospect, result the probable suit in conditions but existing appointment. petitioners at the the time of them- instigated litigation. They put selves this the title in issue and alleged defendants-respondents possession the were in protect interests of appointed the land. The receiver was
the under at all times acted parties all the involved. receiver Such time the at the the The trial direction of court. the Receiver, a situation the confronted was. ownership and where waste land was in doubt the where case, re- likely In the record shows occur. prop- necessary in order that for all the ceiver was lаnds, protected and saved for whom- erty, valuable oil would be finally it. The re- should entitled to it was determined soever recognized performed us should service that seems to ceiver orders as a service concerned. Under beneficial possession in contro- trial of the versy, preserved court he took it, through developed his efforts se- agreement adjacent pooling and unitization with other cured drilling permits pool- in addition to the landowners. He secured ing agreement. agreement, pooling it was immaterial Under the long produced it was where the oil came from so from pool. After affirmance of Civil reсeiver, appointing proceeded of the trial he action court necessary steps of the trial to take under direction drilling placed of wells on the lands He for drilling permits obtained Railroad for Commission arranged financing operations. of six wells. He He filed Stewart, County plaintiffs in Kent Frank suit one of original gain drilling suit, to access At in the site. that time County petitioners filed suit the Receiver in Travis *9 seeking permits to his set aside from the Railroad Commission negotiations the The to drill wells. Receiver entered into with contractors, sundry drilling finally and various and made a con- approval shortly tract which he to the trial court for submitted by Ap- his after was affirmed the Court of Civil hearing peals. At the time set for the on the contract drill to proposition up well the came to unitize land in the first the re- surrounding ceivership lands in the Salt Fork Field. The drilling approval its the trial court withheld contract until explored. months the unitization idea was After several a uni- by the owners tization contract interests, executed of the leasehold Governor, Attorney General, the the the Land Com- missioner, Springer, Reimers, Davis, R. L. Charles H. and Tom acting Receiver, latter under orders from the trial court. 31, 1953, provided contract, portion dated March that This working interest entire Salt Creek Field was paid the land in should to bе to the attributable himself; receiver, not drill that he would that and he brought by him the suit Frank dismiss Stewart sought others, whereby drilling access to he land for and Commission; that by and well Railroad first authorized County petitioners the suit in Travis would dismiss sought they to filed, they wherein the receiver which had and permits six This con- set aside the to drill the wells. receiver’s provided tract further the income attributable one-half working by to withheld interest drilling operators payment applied the proportionate part and to first drilling equip- property’s
of that and cost of field, $278,830.00. ping the entire which to amount was stated be paid provided $278,830.00 It been also that after the sum had receiver, оut of the then the receiver one-half withheld from the working was to receive all of the interest attributable to rceivership. provided paragraph land in The contract follows: Receiver, Davis, joining only
“The Tom herein capacity as property Receiver and said described in Ex- ‘1,’ only during hereby hibit and shall be bound for and period Upon discharge such Re- of such ceiver, he shall money property over and distribute (less paid hereunder, delivered him the reasonable ex- penses receivership' by operating allowed development persons mentioned), costs hereinafter portion money entitled theretо. property of such operators may which repaid be entitled shall be them proportions paragraph portion set under above. money may to which the adverse claimants shall parti- entitled to them in accordance with the cipation acreage factors attributable to the or tract of land re- participation covered each. Said recomputed factors shall be may between the adverse claimants who recover title to the acreage ‘1,’ thereof, part described Exhibit or a in the manner provided agreements. per- said unitization There shall be no liability sonal Recеiver, except on the of said for bad misapplication ours). faith (Emphasis of funds.” Thus, petitioners it is position seen are in no nothing performed establish that benefit was the receiver. receivership, unitization contract alone enabled the for the *10 ultimately benefit the thereto, found to be entitled proceeds to receive the oil of the attributable to the lands in re- though ceivership, from wells on receivership, other lands not in pool. controversy but in the by in lawsuit, the land in With filed petitioners by respondents, the and not the under the circum- stances, receiver, acting the under the direction of the trial only person effeсtively the was who could execute the that agreement. to conclude
pooling It is not unreasonable producing company a chance of producing have taken oil were included pool in the lands in suit oil only which executing agreements to of the claimants thereto portion of the unitize, the to receive and without a receiver controversy. unitiza- proceeds The to the lands in attributable dangers pro- agreement put any of the tion or liabilities rest pool production or the dis- oil from the entire ducers in the disputed acreage production puted allocated the the freeing acreage thereby such pool, or from other lands the controversy in so production lands and all therefrom from concerned, they producers far as thus increased were great acreage This, certainly, undisputed unit. was of in the among petitioners producers, are to the who listed benefit only actually did not drill court. The reason the receiver produce which the oil was because contract petitioners made with him. It is to conclude that reasonable contract, the drilled and the absence of the produced receiver would have agreement, pooling the drill- oil. As result ing operations contraсt, under the the receiver collected $278,830.00 $749,410.59 in cash and above the total sum of over Thus, operational he was as initial costs. with which credited ample receivership there pay is an fund out which to was and It was a clear abuse of discretion the costs for the trial court to refuse to order out of receivership fund. opinion Jones, supra,
The this Court respondents intervener, demonstrates that the The State Texas, probable controversy. had a interest in the land in jury Issues of facts were submitted were answered respondents’ adversely particularly claim. We refer claiming acreage. The the State’s claim. an excess in State acreage. petitioners The claimed there was no excess The basis testimony that each contention was of Sections originally Surveyor, Wise, as located L. S. did jury found, than acres. not contain more special in answer to issues, jury in favor such evidence. further found that ran lines each of these three Wise sections to length and on the called for in course notes. varas field assume, purposes opinion, for the of this that the evidence We question acreage. of fact on the of claimed raised an issue excess impliedly, least, at of Civil so found. That findings jury supported by court held this, opinion reflеcts addition to In evidence. many questions of law for presented determination
433 Appeals, appoint- and this Court. the Court of wrong- find proper. lawful and no ment of the Receiver was We part respondents. ful conduct on of years receivership of the seven- functioned for some five litigation phases year period of this lawsuit. the various fully per- faithfully The trial court found Receiver duties, formed his functions and and that abided all orders of he receivership approved the court. The firmed, accounts were and con- paid petitioners funds hand have been with the accordance order of the trial court. The Receiver and surety, Casualty America, Company have General been things fully discharged any all liability on the Receiver’s receivership several bonds filed in proceed- connection with the ings.
The trial court in instant case found that it would be unjust inequitable petitioners require agree. costs of With this we do not The court further $39,052.01, ordered that the sum of which had been previously paid fund, receivership costs, be taxed as jointly severally against one-half defendants, J. R. al. et and one-half The State of Texas. This justified action of the trial court was not the record in this Where, case, as in case. the instant receivership- have out of funds, been and where there is qustion legality no propriety Receiver, payable the Receiver’s are from the 878,883, 889; fund. See 68 A.L.R. Clark on 1, Receivers, High 22, Chapter p. 885; 978, Volume 302; 75 C.J.S. Sec. (Fourth Edition), Am. 963, on Receivers p. 809a; Sec. 45 293; Espuella Bindle, Jur. Sec. Land & Cattle Co. v. 11 App. (1895), Texas Civ. guson Dent, 32 history; S.W. 582 no writ Fer- 88, 98; Carroll, v. 46 Fed. Beckwith v. 12; 56 Ala. Bridwell, Moore 110 (1937), S.W. 2d 196 history. In this writ latter case ap- held that merits, pellants, who were losers on the had bona fide “* * * disputed tract land claim to the and that they were contesting by legal appellee’s justified in means application oil thereon.” The court to drill further ap- found that (the losers) prosecuted good pellants had thеir suit faith, though they lost. The court cited and followed the case of Palmer Sup. 230, 235, of Texas. 212 Ct. v. State U.S. 53 L.Ed. case, (1909). In the Palmer where the Receiver had been erroneously appointed by Court, the Federal the United States Supreme held: reversing right appeals think the circuit court
“We *12 In that appointing a receiver. the of the circuit court order against Palmer, receivership assessed costs the court the pending gone original receivership on complainant. has the justice opinion proceedings upon appeal, the and are of we paid receivership the if the are will be done the costs of Court, it ordered.” fund Federal and is so realized in the following general 226, 293, In Am. find the 45 Jur. Section we rule: general expenses a rule is that costs
“The against litigation upon parties the are not be taxed to the Although where is the thereto. basis of who unsuccessful against procured judgment goes plaintiff has the final a who receiver, expenses appointment of the incurred a managing may, is no re- property the if there the receiver thereto, plaintiff, applicable taxed the ceiver’s fund always necessarily such costs should it does not follow that all plaintiff every the de- which be taxed the case prevails.” fendant 978, 302, Sec. equally rule is in 75 well settled C.J.S.
supra: general giving
“In accordance with the rule Court dis- liability receivership expenses, cretion to determine for general does, may, a hold Court in its discretion and as rule necessarily compensation expenses that a in- receiver’s caring property preserving him under curred for the competent primarily jurisdiction are a the order of court of charge property the funds or on out of hands, regardless principal of the ultimate outcome of the suit, being that, object further held where rights preserve pending property is to determination of litigation thereto, and there reference legality question рropriety or of the as to availing receiver, party, himself of the of the the successful subject expenses litigation, fruits must take them receivership.” Chapter page Receivers, 885, In Volume Clark following: supra, find we “(c) BY PAYMENT OF RECEIVER’S FEES DEFEND- — ordinary jur- when the circumstances ANT. Under subject suit and matter isdiction of receiver, property or properly appoints funds themselves receivership including the re- are liable plaintiff nor fees. Under such circumstances neither the ceivers * * * It, fees. there- are liable for the receiver’s the defendant very fore, the receiver- follows that there are few cases in which distinguished ship placed feеs on the defendant between are being placed on the in the hands the receiver whether property belonged anybody the defendant else.” petitioners rely upon Ross, the cases of Archer v. App., history, 2d no writ S.W. Petroleum Shell Corporation Grays al., et al. et Texas Civ. *13 cases, controlling'. opinion,
289. These in our are not In the case, supra, findings Archer of view of fraud and misconduct, wrongful correctly held that where the conduct of party receivership during pendency necessary, made of suit things and entry proper, court, upon was all judgment, assessing
of not did abuse his discretion in of receivership wrong- costs who had acted fully. case, In wrongful the instant therе exists no acts on part respondents of invoking application equitable principles Ross, supra. as found in Archer v.
There are several Corpora- features of the Shell Petroleum case, supra, tion distinguishable which render it from the in- thing, stant case. For one the trial court did not undertake to ultimately determine who should required the Re- merely ceiver’s fees. The court authorized the Receiver to re- tain the receivership costs out of the funds in his hands and taxed of the court abide the ultimate result case, original supra, of the suit. In the Shell suit was filed in the District County. Court McLennan The defendants filed privilege plea alleging Gregg Cоunty. ap- venue to be in On peal, Appeals Court Civil questions certified certain Supreme 23, This Court. Court June 1933 decided that Gregg lay County, venue the case plea and that since the privilege sustained, should have been the trial court erred in appointing It a Receiver. was further certified that the defendant supersede should have been allowed to appointing the order Corporation
Receiver. Shell Petroleum Grays, See 122 Texas 591, question 113. whether S.W. wrongful finally was determined the Court of Civil Appeals. any appellate have not been cited pro- We further case, concerning cedure after was ordered transferred event, Petroleum Cor- Gregg County, In Texas. Shell to poration case, supra, application here. af- judgment
firmed.
Opinion February 1959. delivered Rehearing March 1959. overruled Rodriguez City Munoz. Antonio v. Herlinda San February 25, 1959. No. A-7138. Decided Rehearing' 1959. overruled March 573) (321 2d Series *14 Smith, Cadena, City Attorney, L. Carlos and Charles C. Asst. City Antonio, Attorney, for Petitioner. of San Phillip Semaan, Edwards, A.
Anees E. Palmer Morris R. Antonio, respondents. all of San PER CURIAM: sought
Respondent district court writ of man- city City compel the Antonio and certain offi- of San damus Rodriguez Munoz, “City respondent, issue to Herlinda cials to sought Beer License.” The relief on Premises Retail Dealer’s appealed Respondents to the Court of Civil was denied. judgment of the trial affirmed court. 318 and that court its City applied Antonio and officers have 2d 741. San of error. for writ