449 S.E.2d 330 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1994
Following a trial by jury, the appellant, Charles Edward Jonel
We do not determine the credibility of eyewitness identification testimony. Rather “[t]he determination of a witness’ credibility, including the accuracy of eyewitness identification, is within the exclusive province of the jury.” Norris v. State, 258 Ga. 889, 890 (1) (376 SE2d 653) (1989). Moreover, on appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict; the appellant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence; and, rather than weighing the evidence or determining the credibility of witnesses, this court determines evidentiary sufficiency. Grant v. State, 195 Ga. App. 463, 464 (1) (393 SE2d 737) (1990).
Further, inasmuch as the inconsistent verdict rule has been abolished, Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562 (2) (341 SE2d 216) (1986), we do not reach appellant’s argument urging the insufficiency of the evidence for inconsistent verdicts. Neither do we reach Jones’ argument asserting insufficiency of the evidence as a result of a “suspect” out-of-court identification not objected to at trial. Where error is raised for the first time before this court, nothing is presented for review, for this court is a court for correction of error and no issue was ever raised during the trial calling for a ruling. Leonard v. State, 146 Ga. App. 439, 440 (1) (246 SE2d 450) (1978). We have reviewed all evidence of record and conclude that the jury was authorized under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judgment affirmed.