OPINION
Appellant was convicted by a jury of delivery of a controlled substance. The jury assessed punishment at five years in the Texas Department of Corrections. Ap
The first six grounds of error take issue with the trial court’s disposition of the appellant’s “motion to suppress identification”. The trial court dealt with the motion in the following manner:
“[THE COURT]: The next motion is a motion for an identification hearing based on a lineup, either a photo or a person lineup.
“Did the State’s witnesses attend a lineup?
“[STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, to my knowledge none of the State’s witnesses for the case-in-chief attended any type of lineup with a photo spread or a live lineup.
“THE COURT: That motion will be denied.”
The trial court certainly did not follow the procedure suggested in Martinez v. State,
The record contains no evidence whatsoever of a lineup. Appellant did not attempt to show by cross-examination that the witnesses’ in-court identifications were tainted by any prior identification. Appellant made no bill of exceptions or offer of proof under TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 40.09, sec. 6(d)(1) (Vernon Supp.1984). See Gates supra. Appellant made no objection
Appellant’s seventh ground of error alleges the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask their chemist if a “street name” of Pentazocine is “synthetic morphine”. Before a conviction will be reversed the question propounded must obviously be harmful. Sensabaugh v. State,
In ground of error number eight, the appellant asserts the trial court erred in restricting the appellant’s counsel’s cross-examination of a witness in two instances. Even if the questions were relevant and the answers thus admissible, we cannot conclude, in light of the entire record, that the trial court’s exclusion constitutes reversible error. Parrish v. State,
Appellant’s grounds of error nine and ten complain of the trial judge’s refusal to submit requested instructions regarding an “extraneous alibi” and an “extraneous offense”. It is proper to refuse to give special requested charges which are vague and misleading and do not directly state the law. Gill v. State,
Appellant’s next ground of error is as follows: “The trial judge erred in not suppressing certain comments of the district attorney of [sic] the trial judge’s own motion.”
Appellant, apparently recognizing that there is much authority requiring an objection in order to preserve error, asks this Court to impose a duty upon the trial judge to “suppress certain comments of the district attorney” absent a proper objection. This we decline to do. See Sanchez v. State,
Appellant’s twelfth ground of error apparently questions the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the name alleged in the indictment and the proof of the appellant’s association with the name “James Jones”. After reviewing the complete record and in consideration of the standard for review enumerated in Banks v. State,
Ground of error thirteen claims cumulative error. This ground does not comply with TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 40.09, sec. 9 (Vernon Supp.1984), and will not be reviewed. Love v. State,
Appellant’s final ground of error concerns the overruling of appellant’s objection to the State’s attorney’s question relating to the means of introducing “sets”
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Appellant did reurge his request for a hearing outside the presence of the jury, which was overruled.
. "Sets” is the street name for the mixture of Tripellanimine and Pentazocine.
