85 So. 839 | Ala. Ct. App. | 1920
The following are the facts upon which the cause was tried: *445
"It is agreed by and between the solicitor and the attorney representing the defendant and the defendant in his own proper person that this cause be submitted to be tried by Hon. H.A. Pearce, judge, a jury being waived, and that the following are the facts, viz.: On the second Sunday in October, 1919, the sheriff of Geneva county, Ala., having in his possession a warrant to search the premises of Henry Jones, went to his residence in this county, and after making diligent search found sitting in the bedroom of the said defendant not exceeding one-half gallon of rum; that this was the only liquor or rum of any kind found by the sheriff on the premises. This liquor was found in the home of the said Henry Jones, and not elsewhere.
"It is further agreed that the said Henry Jones, the defendant, would testify that he had said liquor or rum for his own personal use and that he did not have it for sale or any other unlawful disposition and that he had never sold any. It is agreed that there is no evidence in the case that shows the contrary."
The facts show an act in the very teeth of section 2 of an act of the Legislature approved January 25, 1919 (Acts 1919, p. 6).
The duty and power of courts is to interpret and declare the law as it is, and not in accordance with the individual ideas of judges as to what it ought to be. Upon this principle rests the security of our liberties from judicial tyranny. Is it so written in the statute? Is the statute in conflict with constitutional inhibition? This is the end of inquiry. It is written in the statute as plainly as language can make it:
"That it shall be unlawful * * * to have in possession, or possess, in this state, any of said prohibited liquors and beverages." Acts 1919, p. 6, § 2.
This, to us, seems to leave no room for construction. It means what it says, and says what it means. This is emphasized when the exceptions named in the section are read in connection with the prohibition.
It may be admitted that unless the Legislature acted within the general police power in enacting section 2, then the enactment, in so far as it prohibits the possession of any quantity of liquor, must fail. In this connection, we are not unmindful of the well-established rule, sustained by the best authorities, that —
"It does not * * * follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these ends [i. e., the public morals] is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the state. There are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go. * * * If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution." Mugler v. Kansas,
The police power of the state is that power which is necessary for its preservation, and without which it cannot serve the purpose for which it was formed. Ex parte Rowe,
"A very different question would be presented if the act had made it unlawful for any person to keep intoxicating liquors in his possession, either for himself or for another, for the purpose of selling it, or as a device to evade the revenue laws."
In the later case of Southern Express Co. v. Whittle,
The main purpose of all our statutes *446
embracing prohibition laws is to promote temperance and prevent drunkenness (Carl's Case,
Section 2 of the act of the Legislature (Acts 1919, p. 6) is not in violation of the Constitution, and is therefore valid.
There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.