Jones v. StateJones v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Holman
*439 OPINION
HOLMAN, Justice.
Appellant Kenneth Bernard Jones appeals his conviction and sentence of life in prison for a murder he committed in 1995.
See
The first issue is whether in 1993 the Legislature unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof in murder trials from the State to the accused by enacting language in
A third issue was Appellant’s request that we abate the appeal long enough for the trial court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the voluntariness of Appellant’s statement to police.
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Constitutionality of
The State contends that Appellant’s lack of specificity in his objections during trial failed to preserve for appeal Appellant’s claim that
The gist of Appellant’s argument on this issue is that when the Legislature eliminated voluntary manslaughter as a separate offense
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it relieved the State of the burden of persuasion on sudden passion from an adequate cause, shifted the burden to the defense in
In 1985, the Court of Criminal Appeals opined that under the penal code version then in effect, voluntary manslaughter was a lesser included offense of murder when evidence of sudden passion was raised during the guilt phase of a trial.
See Bradley v. State,
688 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). That version of the law remained in effect until September 1, 1994, and required the State to prove a negative: that the accused did
not
act under sudden passion, when there was evidence of voluntary manslaughter. The State suggests that the Legislature’s 1994 deletion of involuntary manslaughter as a separate offense and the enactment of
Appellant concedes that Texas is free to reject the holdings of federal courts on con *440 stitutional issues as long as the state action in question does not fall below the minimum mandates of the federal constitution. See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Although the State argues persuasively that Appellant’s constitutional issue is governed by the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d 281, 292 (1977), Appellant contends that we should refuse to apply Patterson’s principles to this case. Patterson addressed a New York murder statute that reduced murder to manslaughter if the defendant demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted under the influence of extreme emotional distress. See id. at 200, 97 S.Ct. at 2322, 53 L.Ed.2d at 286. Justice Powell’s dissent characterizes the words “extreme emotional disturbance” as equivalent to the traditional manslaughter “heat of passion” element. Id. at 220, 97 S.Ct. at 2332, 53 L.Ed.2d at 298.
The majority in Patterson concluded that New York’s legislature did not violate the Due Process Clause because the accused’s burden of persuasion on the affirmative defense under that statute did not serve to negate the statutorily-defined elements of murder that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict the accused of murder. Id. at 206-07, 97 S.Ct. at 2324-26, 53 L.Ed.2d at 290. Moreover, the majority in Patterson refused to adopt as a constitutional imperative for the states that a state must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every affirmative defense related to the culpability of an accused. Id. at 210, 97 S.Ct. at 2327-28, 53 L.Ed.2d at 292.
In Texas,
The Photograph
The evidence in this case establishes that Appellant beat the victim to death by striking him in the head with an aluminum baseball bat. Although there is evidence that Appellant struck the victim’s head with the bat twenty to thirty times, Appellant testified, in his own defense, that he could not recall striking the victim more than three times with the bat. The medical examiner testified that his examination of the victim found a “very obvious deformation and massive crushing injury of the head,” and that the cause of death was “massive craniocere-bral trauma, massive injury of the brain and surrounding supportive blood vessel and nerve structures due to blunt force injury of the head and face due to multiple blows to the face and head by a blunt instrument.” The indictment alleged that Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the victim’s death by hitting him with a bat, and that in the manner of its use and intended use, the bat was a deadly weapon, capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.
State’s exhibit no. 2 was a photograph of the victim’s head made at the crime scene after his death. At trial, Appellant objected to the photograph’s introduction into evidence, arguing that its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 403. Among the factors we may consider when deciding whether a photograph has more probative value than prejudicial effect are the number and size of the photographs offered, their detail and size, whether they are in color or black and white, whether close-up, and whether the body depicted is clothed or naked. See Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 326 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 861, 115 S.Ct. 174, 130 L.Ed.2d 110 (1994). A photograph should be excluded if it is so *441 horrifying or appalling that a juror of normal sensitivity would necessarily encounter difficulty rationally deciding the critical issues of the case after viewing it. See Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 206 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 941, 113 S.Ct. 2418, 124 L.Ed.2d 640 (1993).
Among the elements the State must prove to support a conviction for the offense of murder are the cause and the manner of death.
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Conclusion
Because we have carefully considered and overruled Appellant’s first and second issues, and because his third issue is moot, we affirm the trial court judgment.