Gary JONES v. STATE of Maryland
No. 60, Sept. Term, 1987
Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jan. 11, 1988
535 A.2d 471
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
Hotel Corp. v. Jernigan, 202 So.2d 830 (Fla.App.1967), appeal dismissed, 209 So.2d 669 (Fla.1968); Gulf Collateral Inc. v. Morgan, 415 F.Supp. 319, 320 (S.D.Ga.1976); Thomas v. First Nat. Bank, 213 Ill. 261, 267, 72 N.E. 801, 803 (1904); Maxey v. Railey & Bros. Banking Co., 57 S.W.2d 1091 (Mo.App.1933); Burris v. Witcover, 158 N.C. 384, 74 S.E. 11 (1912); Resorts International, Inc. v. Agresta, 569 F.Supp. 24, 26 (E.D.Va.1983), affirmed without opinion, 725 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1984).
Valerie J. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS and BLACKWELL, JJ.
MURPHY, Chief Judge.
The question presented is whether the parental notification provisions of
“(1) Pursuant to an order of the court;
(2) By a law enforcement officer pursuant to the law of arrest;
(3) By a law enforcement officer or other person authorized by the court if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the child is in immediate danger from his surroundings and that his removal is necessary for his protection; or
(4) By a law enforcement officer or other person authorized by the court if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the child has run away from his parents, guardian, or legal custodian.”
“(b) If a law enforcement officer takes a child into custody he shall immediately notify, or cause to be notified, the child‘s parents, guardian, or custodian of the action. After making every reasonable effort to give
notice, the law enforcement officer shall with all reasonable speed: (1) Release the child to his parents, guardian, or custodian or to any other person designated by the court, upon their written promise to bring the child before the court when requested by the court, and such security for the child‘s appearance as the court may reasonably require, unless his placement in detention or shelter care is permitted and appears required by
§ 3-815 , or(2) Deliver the child to the court or a place of detention or shelter care designated by the court.”
“(a) The court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a child alleged to be delinquent, in need of supervision, in need of assistance or who has received a citation for a violation.
....
(e) The court does not have jurisdiction over:
(1) A child 14 years old or older alleged to have done an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, as well as all other charges against the child arising out of the same
incident, unless an order removing the proceeding to the court has been filed under Article 27, § 594A .”1
I
On February 20, 1985, as Baltimore City school teacher Nellie Hines was exiting her automobile, she was approached by two young males who grabbed her purse. When she resisted, she was shot in the stomach. She died on March 9, 1985, as a result of the gunshot wound.
On March 19, 1985, fifteen year old Charles Wheatley testified before the Baltimore City Grand Jury in connection with these crimes. He also made a statement to the police in which he implicated his seventeen year old cousin Gary Jones and one Tony Hopson as the robbers and slayers of Ms. Hines. Immediately thereafter, the police brought Gary Jones to the police station. At 4:25 p.m., he was placed in an interview room and given Miranda warnings.
Josephine Jones was in an outer office of the police station at that time. She was the grandmother and guardian of both Gary Jones and Wheatley, each of whom lived with her. Whether Josephine was present at the station in connection with Wheatley‘s interrogation or with Gary Jones‘s arrest and interrogation was not clear from the evidence. There was also conflicting evidence as to whether the police intentionally prevented Ms. Jones from seeing Gary and as to precisely when she was apprised of his arrest.
When first interrogated by the police on March 19, Gary denied complicity in the crimes. An hour later, he acknowledged being with Hopson when Hopson robbed and shot Hines; he also acknowledged receiving money from Hopson taken from the victim‘s purse. After his statement was reduced to writing, Jones made numerous corrections, several of them of typographical errors, before signing it.
Jones was acquitted of first degree murder and armed robbery; he was convicted, however, of robbery. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. It said that the parental notification statute was intended as a safeguard “dealing with juvenile causes” and had no application to a case not within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. We granted certiorari to consider the significant issue raised in the case.
II
Jones argues before us that a literal interpretation of the first sentence of
Since, according to Jones, the provisions of
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. In re Ramont K., 305 Md. 482, 484, 505 A.2d 507 (1986); In re Stephen K., 289 Md. 294, 298, 424 A.2d 153 (1981). The primary source of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. In re Arnold M., 298 Md. 515, 520, 471 A.2d 313 (1984). This language must be construed without resort to subtle or forced interpretations. Id., 298 Md. at 521, 471 A.2d 313. When construing a provision that is part of a single statutory scheme, the legislative intent must be gathered from the entire statute, rather than from only one part. In re Stephen K., supra. Hence, the language of
Jones‘s reading of
Nor can Jones‘s interpretation of
Crawford v. State, supra, the Georgia case upon which Jones places reliance, is not apposite. Unlike Maryland, Georgia provides that a juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court over a juvenile who is alleged to have committed a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment. Moreover, on similar facts, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reached an opposite result in Colyer v. State, 577 S.W.2d 460 (Tenn.1979), stating as its rationale that “[i]t logically follows that where the statute mandates that a child be tried as if he were an adult, he may no longer have the benefit of statutes expressly applicable to children.” Id. at 463.
As
We recognize, of course, that great care must be taken to assure that statements made to the police by juveniles are voluntary before being permitted in evidence. McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 617, 526 A.2d 30 (1987). Our cases have held that the age of a juvenile, in itself, will not render a confession involuntary; rather, we have applied the totality of the circumstances test in determining the validity of a juvenile‘s waiver of constitutional rights and the traditional voluntariness of a juvenile‘s confession. Id. at 620, 526 A.2d 30. The absence of a parent or guardian at the juvenile‘s interrogation is an important factor in determining voluntariness, although the lack of
In the present case, no evidence was presented that Jones ever requested to see his guardian. It is also clear from the record that the trial judge, in making her assessment of the voluntariness of Jones‘s confession, was aware of and considered the absence of Jones‘s guardian during his interrogation, as well as other factors bearing on voluntariness.5
As our grant of certiorari was limited to determining the applicability of
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.
COLE and ADKINS, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, Judge, concurring.
The only questions presented in this case are (1) whether
It is troublesome that the unilateral and preliminary charging decision of a single police officer can remove a juvenile from the protections otherwise afforded by
This defect in the Juvenile Causes Act is, of course, subject to legislative cure if the General Assembly agrees that it presents a problem. The problem would be much less serious, however, if the principles I espoused in McIntyre were adopted. Adoption of these principles, I continue to believe, is constitutionally mandated and also in harmony with the philosophy expressed in the statutory protections the legislature has provided for juveniles.
In the McIntyre dissent I argued, first, that if a juvenile charged as an adult and under custodial interrogation asks to see a parent, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), requires that questioning must cease until the parent has been produced-just as it must cease when a suspect under custodial interrogation requests a lawyer. 309 Md. at 630-632, 526 A.2d at 41-42. In a proper case, I would extend that principle to a situation in which the juvenile under interrogation requests a grandparent or guardian. But in the case before us, Jones, unlike McIntyre, requested nobody, so that principle is not involved here.
The McIntyre dissent also asserted that with respect to a juvenile under the age of 14, no waiver of constitutional rights can be effective unless the juvenile has first consult-
“there should ordinarily be a meaningful consultation with the parent, interested adult, or attorney to ensure that the waiver is knowing and intelligent. For a waiver to be valid without such a consultation the circumstances should demonstrate a high degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication on the part of the juvenile.”
Id. at 633, 526 A.2d at 43 (quoting Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 134, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (1983)). Jones was not permitted to consult with an “interested adult” although his grandmother/guardian was at the police station while he was being questioned. He was 17 years old. Under those circumstances, for his statement to have been admissible, the State should have been required to show that Jones had “a high degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication....” In short, the validity of his statement was subject to heightened scrutiny. The trial judge‘s voluntariness review here arguably was sufficient to meet the totality standard of the McIntyre majority, 309 Md. at 621-626, 526 A.2d at 36-39. It was certainly more careful and focused more on the appropriate factors than the trial judge‘s cursory analysis in McIntyre, id. at 634-637, 526 A.2d at 43-45. The judge here did consider Jones‘s age, intelligence, level of maturity, the lack of physical coercion, and the somewhat exculpatory nature of the statement. But it is not clear that this would meet the heightened scrutiny I believe was required under the circumstances. That question is likewise not before us today, however.
The majority concedes that “great care must be taken to assure that statements made to the police by juveniles are voluntary before being permitted in evidence.” Maj.op. at 407, 535 A.2d at 476. Particularly when
Judge COLE has authorized me to say that he joins in this concurring opinion.