Jones v. StateJones v. State
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Omar Shareef Jones. We have jurisdiction.
During the evening of November 4, 1993, Omar Jones — who was nineteen years old at the time — and Ellis Curry drank beer and smoked marijuana and then accepted a ride in a car occupied by two friends, Jerome Goodman and Marlon Hawkins. The group drove to the local high school to find a person who owed Goodman money. Hawkins was carrying a gun and after the group argued over it (“[E]verybody was like, `Give it to me, give it to me.‘“), Jones said, “Give me the gun before one of us might do something crazy” and took possession of it. The group entered the school grounds at about 10 p.m. and came upon two boys, Jefferson Mitchell and a friend. Jones approached Mitchell and asked if he had any money. When Mitchell said, “No,” Jones shot him twice — first in the leg and then, when Mitchell bent over, in the top of the head. Jones fled the scene, exclaiming, “What happened?,” and was hysterical when he reached the car.
Jones was arrested early the next morning and confessed to the shooting (he said it was an accident), and when police told him that Mitchell was fourteen years old and that he had died, Jones cried and exclaimed, “I killed a baby.” Jones was charged with first-degree murder and attempted robbery and was convicted on both counts. The trial court followed the jury‘s seven-to-five recommendation and imposed a sentence of death on the first-degree murder count based on one aggravating circumstance,1 no statutory mitigating circumstances, and little nonstatutory mitigation.2 The court imposed a consecutive thirty-year term on the attempted robbery count.
Jones raises ten issues on appeal3 but we find a single claim dispositive. He
In the present case, as noted above, the court found but one aggravating circumstance,7 and our review of the record reveals copious unrebutted mitigation. The defense expert, Dr. Krop, attested to the following: Jones was born two months prematurely, suffered periods as an infant when he turned blue due to lack of oxygen, and was diagnosed by EEG testing at two months old as organically brain damaged; he is learning disabled, was consistently classified as borderline retarded in school, was placed in special education classes, has an IQ of seventy-six, and reads at the first-grade level; he has the mental age of a child.
Jones quit school when he was eighteen (one year before the present crime) because he had been held back so many times he could no longer fit in, and although he tried to obtain jobs, he could not fill out the applications. According to psychological testing, Jones consistently scored his lowest marks in the sub-test measuring judgment, and Dr. Krop testified that Jones’ impulsivity and lack of judgment in a stressful situation would be exacerbated by drugs and alcohol. After the shooting, Jones was distraught and hysterical and was seen that night crying by himself. He cried the next day when police told him the victim‘s age and that he had died. We note that the jury voted for death by the narrowest of margins, seven to five.
We find Jones’ sentence of death disproportionate to other single-aggravator cases wherein we reversed the death penalty. See Thompson v. State, 647 So.2d 824 (Fla.1994) (reversing death sentence for shooting death of fast food worker — the victim was summarily shot in the top of the head, just like in the present case — where commission during a robbery was the sole aggravating circumstance).8 In fact, the present case has more
In conclusion, we note that this was an extraordinarily tragic crime — the senseless and unprovoked killing of a schoolboy — and is every parent‘s worst nightmare. The applicable law, however, is established, simple, and clear: Under Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme, death is not indicated in a single-aggravator case where there is substantial mitigation.12 Although this legal precept — and indeed the rule of objective, dispassionate law in general — may sometimes be hard to abide, the alternative — a Court ruled by emotion — is far worse.
We affirm the convictions and the consecutive thirty-year sentence for attempted robbery. We reverse the death sentence and remand for imposition of a life sentence without possibility of parole for twenty-five years on the first-degree murder count.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
WELLS, J., concurs as to convictions and dissents with an opinion as to sentence.
WELLS, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent because I conclude that I should respect the decision of the jury in recommending death and the decision of the trial judge in imposing death for this intentional killing of a school student on school property during an attempted armed robbery. The trial judge wrote an extensive sentencing order explaining his decision, and I refuse to reweigh the aggravation-mitigation evidence under the label of a proportionality review.
Furthermore, I disagree with the majority‘s opinion that, under the circumstances of this tragic murder, one aggravating factor was insufficient.