Fоllowing a jury trial, Gerald Eugene Jones appeals his convictions of four counts of child molestation, cоntending that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by denying Jones’ motion in arrest of judgment and by improperly charging the jury. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
1. We have held that:
On appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, and [Jones] no longer enjоys a presumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court determines evidence sufficiency and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. The verdict must be upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found *485 the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Punctuation omitted.)
Barber v. State,
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, Jones’ nephew testified that on five or six occasions while he was spending the night at his grandmother’s home and sleeping in Jones’ room, Jones had reached over, grabbed аnd rubbed the boy’s penis with his hand. On another occasion, Jones touched his penis to the boy’s buttocks. The boy further tеstified that once while riding in a truck with Jones, Jones had reached over and placed his hand on the boy’s pеnis. Another nephew testified that Jones had rubbed the boy’s penis; that Jones had put his penis in the boy’s buttocks; that Jones put his penis in the boy’s mouth; that Jones held the boy’s hand to Jones’ penis and masturbated. The evidence was ample to authorize the conviction. See
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. .Jones raises as error the trial court’s denial of his motion in arrest of judgment, contending that Count 1 of the seven-count indictment failed to state an essential element of aggrаvated child molestation. A motion in arrest of judgment is an appropriate remedy,
[w]hen an indictment is absolutеly void in that it fails to charge the accused with any act made a crime by the law[,] and, upon the trial, no demurrer to the indictment is interposed and the accused is convicted under the indictment and judgment is entered on the vеrdict.
(Punctuation omitted.)
McKay v. State,
Jones’ motion in arrest of judgment was properly denied by the trial court as Count 1 charges Jones with a crime under Georgia law. Count 1 of the indictment attempted to charge Jones with aggravated child molestation, аlleging that Jones had “unlawfully perform [ed] an immoral and indecent act which did involve an act of sodomy upоn ... a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, by touching said child’s buttocks with his penis.” After the conviction, the State cоnceded that Count 1 failed to allege aggravated child molestation because the allegation thаt Jones had touched the child’s buttocks failed to allege sodomy which must involve the mouth or anus. 1 *486 Nonetheless, thе allegations of Count 1 describe a crime under Georgia law, the offense of child molestation, although calling the offense aggravated child molestation. OCGA § 16-6-4 (a). The State asked the Court to sentence on child molestation instead.
It is not the name, but the description of the crime, which characterizes the offense charged. . . . An alleged variance between the offense as named or the Code section cited and the allegations specified in the indictment goes only to the form of the indictment. State v. Eubanks,239 Ga. 483 , 489 (238 SE2d 38 ) (1977). Where the accused desirеs to take exception to the form of an indictment, it is essential that he should do so by a demurrer or motion tо quash, made in writing and before entering a pleading to the merits.
(Punctuation omitted.)
Phillips v. State,
Moreover, any аlleged error is harmless. “It is useful to remember that the purpose of the indictment is to allow defendant to prepare his defense intelligently and to protect him from double jeopardy.” (Punctuation omitted.)
Davis v. State,
3. Jones contends that the trial court erroneously chаrged the jury that
the uncorroborated testimony of a victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction of the charges оf child molestation and/or aggravated child molestation, as contained within the bill of *487 indictment, if the jury finds that testimony is suffiсient to convince them of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
We have previously approved this charge, holding that this “charge, which was cоupled with instructions regarding the burden of proof, was an appropriate statement of relevant law tо give to the jury.”
Mency v. State, 228
Ga. App. 640, 649 (3) (
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
“A person commits the offense of aggravated child molestation when such person commits an offense of child molestation which act physically injures the child or involves an act *486 of sodomy.” OCGA § 16-6-4 (c). “A person commits the offense of sodomy when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.” OCGA § 16-6-2 (a).