This is аn interim appeal, granted pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-35.1, in which the state is seeking the death penalty.
Brandon Ashton Jones was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1979. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court.
Jones v. State,
1. The trial court did not err in denying Jones’ request to charge the jury that if it decided to sentence him to life imprisonment, such sentence meant “that he should spend the remainder of his life in prison.”
Hill v. State,
2. We find no error in the trial cоurt’s denial of Jones’ motion to *905 dismiss the case due to alleged governmental overreaching. The record supports the trial court’s finding that the assistant district attorney did not violate Jones’ attorney-client privilege by merely obtaining the name of the attorney who represented Jones in criminal proceedings in Illinois.
3. The trial court did not err in quashing Jones’ subpoеna to the Cobb County District Attorney, thereby disallowing Jones to call the district attorney to the stand to be questioned regarding Jones’ general allegations of racial discrimination in prosecution of “all” criminal cases, selection of juries, and the hiring of his staff. None of these matters relate specifically to Jones’ case, and thus fail to meet the test in
McCleskey v. Kemp,
[Pjolicy considerations behind a prosecutor’s traditionally “wide discretion” suggest the imрropriety of . . . requiring prosecutors to defend their decisions to seek death penalties, “often years after they were made.”
Id. at 296. Because Jones “offers no evidence specific to his own case that would support аn inference that racial considerations played a part” in the district attorney’s decision to again seek the death penalty, id. at 292-293, Jones has failed to meet the required quantum of proof in this case.
4. Likewise, Jones’ claim of rаcial discrimination in imposing the death penalty based on historical patterns in Cobb County must fail. Much of the evidence оffered was not contemporaneous and was therefore insufficient to show current intent to impose the death рenalty in a discriminatory manner. McCleskey at 298, fn. 20. Additionally, much of the evidence offered was speculative and, like the Baldus study rejected in McCleskey, “clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in [Jones’] case actеd with discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 297.
5. Although a reasonable juror might very well determine that there was no torture in this case, seе Jones v. Kemp, supra at 1562, it is premature to rule on whether the evidence adduced by the state at the resentencing trial will be sufficiеnt to justify instructing the jury regarding the crucial element of aggravating circumstance under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (7).
6. Jones argues that the trial court erred in denying three motions to suppress.
*906
(a) During the 1979 trial of the case, the state was permitted to offer inculpatory statеments of Jones’ co-defendant, Van Solomon, made following their arrest. Solomon did not testify at trial. In his petition for habeas corpus before this court Jones argued that he was denied the right to confront Solomon at trial in violation of
Pointer v. Texas,
Relying on
Pointer v. Texas,
supra, and
Bruton v. United States,
The admission of Solomon’s incriminating statements violated Jones’ right of cross-examination secured by the Sixth Amendment. Id. In analyzing this error on habeas corpus, we found it to be hаrmless because Jones’ own incriminating statements, virtually identical to those of Solomon, were admitted. However, the original error in admitting Solomon’s stateménts at trial may not be perpetuated on the ground that it continues to be “harmless.” Solоmon’s incriminating statements may not be admitted at the resentencing trial.
(b) The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress statements Jones made to Alex Woolard at the scene of the crime. Jones v. Francis, supra at (5); Jones v. Kemp, supra at 1551.
(c) The record shows that a van was found by pоlice at the scene of the crime and searched, as is permissible in this situation. See
Delay v. State,
7. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in denying Jones’ motion to require the district attorney to disclose any ties his office might have with prospective jurors, given that Jones may pursue this line of questioning during voir dire. OCGA § 15-12-133.
8. The trial court did not err in denying Jones’ motion to eliminate from the oath the crimes with which he is charged. OCGA § 17-8-52.
9. (a) The trial cоurt did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’ request that witnesses be sequestered for voir dire. The trial court ruled that it would exclude all witnesses from voir dire, with the exception of one for the state, and would give cautionary instructions that the witnesses not disсuss the case among themselves. Further, *907 the trial court stated that it would invoke the rule of sequestration during voir dire if circumstanсes dictated it. We find no error.
(b) The trial court has a discretion to control voir dire,
Hall v. State,
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.