*1 1206 786, (Wyo.1981) delivery of a controlled substance to a Selig, 635 P.2d 793 for
State
materially prejudiced
Consequently,
when minor.
we will
consider
one is
charges to
access to the
significant
notice
issue of denied
there is no
of
investigation report
against.
police
officer’s
defended
Ostrowski
(quoting Gon-
481
when consideration
665
cross-examination8
(Wyo.1976)),
advisory
929
for appel
zales v.
be academic and
would
of
Mari v.
said:
late resolution
this case.
Raw
Rawlins,
charge and CONCLUSION Craney degree charge first sexu- To reasons, Craney’s reverse For these degree sexu- attempted and first al assault attempted and convictions sentences and then convict him of third al assault degree and third de- third sexual assault attempted third degree sexual assault and affirm the convic- gree sexual assault. We only prevents assault degree sexual delivery of a con- tion and sentence for defense, allows for the con- adequate trolled substance to a minor. Craney crime. uncharged of an viction prejudiced. materially was THE INVESTI- TO
DENIAL OF ACCESS REPORT
GATING OFFICER’S Craney’s record review
Our closing argu- attorney's opening and appellate issue can
ments indicates this degree sexual to the third as- only relate Crafty JONES, Charles a/k/a are left with this convictions. We sault (Defendant), Jones, Appellant ap- counsel because his trial impression opening argu- during concede peared to Wyoming, Appellee STATE Craney purchased alcohol for the ment (Plaintiff). mari- child and that the two smoked minor closing argument, During juana together. make the same counsel seemed to his trial Wyoming. Craney by indicating that concession marijuana a passed minor child had impression pipe back forth. Our being delivery is not chal- conviction Craney’s ap- when
lenged was confirmed negative responded in the
pellate counsel if asked he
during argument oral delivery of
attacking the conviction minor. Since we substance to a
controlled appeal is directed to that this
are convinced pre- upon Craney has
the convictions which
vailed, the conviction we leave undisturbed 18(c) Act); added.) (Jencks Jencks United
(Emphasis 8. W.R.Cr.P. States, U.S. 77 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (1957). *2 I, In Appellant following Jones raised the issues: sentencing judge constitutionally
“[A] required indigent to defendant full credit both his minimum and maximum sentences for time served in presentence confinement. district in concluding court erred “[T]he Appel- it lacked discretion to credit lant’s minimum sentence with the time spent presentencing in incarceration.” at respond- Id. 369. The in Jones following with the ed issue: sentencing jurisdic- court lacked “[T]he tion appellant’s to credit sentence with spent time in actually excess of that in presentence confinement[.]” Id. Munker, Leonard D. State Public Defend- None of the three issues addressed er, Cornia, Counsel, Appellate and Mike in challenged this Court I origi- the Program, the appel- Public Defender (ten given Appellant nal sentence lant. months). years Instead, eleven and seven Gen., Joseph Meyer, Atty. John W. our focused on whether the district Renneisen, Gen., Atty. Deputy Karen A. (and court had the discretion Byrne, Gen., Atty. Sr. Asst. and Paul S. discretion) pretrial to credit time Rehurek, Gen., Atty. appellee. Sr. Asst. statutorily served to the mini- mandated mum term of a sentence. Jones we URBIGKIT, C.J., Before held, alia, firmly inter that “it with- [was] THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and discretionary sentencing authority in the GOLDEN, JJ. mandatory court to credit the mini- indigent’s mum term of an sentence with MACY, Justice. presentence time Id. served.” at 372. We Appellant The district court resentenced then reversed and remanded for the district Jones, Jones, Crafty aka Charles Appellant in court resentence longer following term our re- reversal and opinion. in the mand case of resentencing, At the the district in Appellant P.2d 368 {Jones giving Appellant off addition to challenges the increased sentence and rais- pretrial minimum incarcera- es issues: two tion, increased maximum term ISSUE years of sentence from eleven and seven Whether the district court violated this years. months to fifteen Ap- Court’s mandate when it increased acknowledge We the Court’s lan- pellant’s sentence. guage in overly I was broad and that ISSUE interpreted giving could it as the district Ap- Whether the district court violated sentencing the full its au- pellant’s rights by increas- thority Appellant. it resentenced ing Appellant’s sentence. That, however, was not our intent. The dispositive appeal We reverse the increased sentence on issue on I Jones was is, I. basis of whether was entitled to receive therefore, incarceration; unnecessary to Appel- Thus, proper. lant’s constitutional claims. whether the sentence was wrong, given to time we made a mistake —we were we reinstate right. he was Appellant. affirm. with directions for dis-
We remand *3 trict against incarceration taking imposed, into consideration State, (Wyo.1990). P.2d
Renfro
Reversed and remanded. Justice,
CARDINE, dissenting. OSBORN, properly I dissent. The trial court resen- Richard (Plaintiff), appellant in tenced State, mandate (Jones A trial court must MANNING, Lyle Clarice substantially comply with the mandate on (Defendant). Appellee may remand. issues unnec- essary to on the mandated is- a decision Gregory,
sues. Sanders v. of Wyoming. case, (Wyo.1982). In this trial court did go beyond of our mandate. we held that was allow- maximum able
remanded order that the trial court “[i]n
may range full its sentenc- exercise the * * ing authority at 371. The plain merely complied
trial court with
language of our and now faces opin- majority
reversal a time. The second says range mean of its
ion we did not “full
sentencing authority” said “full when we
range sentencing authority.” of its exactly I means hold i.e., says,
what it that the trial remand, may
resentencing on exercise its sentencing authority. Our
full language
refusal to of our abide unjustifiably
written interferes the trial court’s discretion in sentenc-
ing. Kavanaugh v. See (Wyo.1989); Duffy 914-15
730 P.2d 757-58 Kallas v. 695-96
Perhaps only a Cassandra will be heard neglected rule of
to mourn the stare deci-
sis, day is a sad indeed the same case are sub-
declarations within
ject judicial revision. If we are unwill- write,
ing seriously what how take seriously? expect
can we others take us minimum, judge owe an
At a this
apology up-front admission