175 P. 882 | Mont. | 1918
delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendants, W. F. and Lila Shannon, are husband and wife. The husband owns and conducts a public inn or hotel at Glasgow, in Valley county, known as the Shannon Hotel, the wife giving her assistance by acting as housekeeper and exercising a general supervision over the guests and their entertainment, her husband giving her authority to do so. On the evening of November 10, 1913, the plaintiff was a guest of the hotel, intending to spend the night there. She and her husband, Roy Jones, were assigned to a room and were occupying and using it. After narrating the foregoing facts, the complaint charges:
“IV. That said plaintiff, while so occupying the room so assigned her by the said defendants, at about the hour of 1 o’clock in the night of November 10, 1913, retired, and thereafter the said defendant Lila Shannon willfully, wrongfully, forcibly and maliciously entered the said room, so assigned as aforesaid, of this plaintiff, and then and there abused and insulted this plaintiff, applying to her vile and indecent epithets, and charged the said plaintiff with improper and disorderly conduct, and wrongfully, maliciously and without any cause therefor required, demanded and compelled said plaintiff to arise from the bed in said room to which she had retired, and dress, and wrongfully, forcibly, maliciously and without any cause therefor ousted and ejected said plaintiff from said hotel.”
It then alleges that by being ejected from the hotel and thus compelled to find lodging elsewhere late at night, the plaintiff suffered great inconvenience and humiliation, and great mental anguish and bodily pain, to her damage in the sum of $5,000.
The answer,' by direct and argumentative denials, puts in issue every allegation of the complaint, except that the defend
The trial resulted in a verdict against the defendants jointly for $500 compensatory, and against each of them for $250 exemplary, damages, and judgment was entered accordingly. The defendants have appealed from an order denying them a new trial.
It is contended by counsel that the court erred in denying the motion for a new trial, because the evidence is insufficient to justify a verdict for either compensatory or exemplary damages.
"When a person has been received as a guest at a public house,
As to compensatory damages: At about 6 o’clock on the
This brief synopsis of the evidence is sufficient to show that it presented a substantial conflict, the solution of which was primarily the province of the jury. As we have so often said, the conclusion of the jury in such a case must be accepted as final and conclusive, subject to the rule, however, that it is within the sound legal discretion of the trial judge to grant a new trial on motion of the losing party, if, aided by his recollection of the appearance and conduct of the witnesses in giving their testimony at the trial, he is impelled to the conclusion that the evidence as a whole preponderates against the verdict. (Orr v. Haskell, 2 Mont. 225; Western Min. Supply Co. v. Melzner, 48 Mont. 174, 136 Pac. 44; Gibson v. Morris State Bank, 49 Mont. 60, 140 Pac. 76.) Otherwise the motion should
As remarked by the judge in determining the motion for a
As to exemplary damages: In this character of action the defendant is liable to respond in exemplary damages, when it
Counsel contend that, since the evidence discloses that W. F. Shannon was not present and took no part in the trespass upon plaintiff’s rights, and did not thereafter ratify Mrs. Shannon’s
It is true that we held in the case of Grorud v. Lossl, 48 Mont. 274, 136 Pac. 1069, that the malicious motives of an officer of a corporation while acting in its behalf are imputable to the corporation. We also held in the case of Burles v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., 49 Mont. 129, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 873, 140 Pac. 513, that a corporation is liable in exemplary damages for the willful and malicious acts of one of it's servants. A corporation, however, is an artificial person, and can only act through agents; and if the malignant motives of the agent are not imputable to it, it would necessarily follow that it could not be held liable for the malicious acts of its agents in any case. The corporation cannot, as a natural person, participate in any maliciously wrongful act, and it is not to be supposed that the board of directors — the executive body of the corpo-. ration — would by a formal resolution authorize such an act or by the same method ratify it. In the Grorud Case, the president of a corporation had instituted a baseless criminal prosecution against the plaintiff for the alleged theft of money of the corporation. If the malice of the president could not be imputed to the corporation, it could not have been held liable at all, and the only recourse of the plaintiff would have been against the president. In that case the question of exemplary damages did not arise.
In the ease of Burles v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., however, it was distinctly held that, where the act of the servant was prompted by a willful disregard of the rights of the plaintiff, his motive was properly imputable to the company. A natural person can act for himself, and therefore the malignant motive of another should not be imputed to him unless, under the rule of the cases cited above, he directly or indirectly authorized
Now, it is not controverted that Mr. Shannon was not present when the plaintiff was ejected; nor is there any evidence
It does not follow, however, that because plaintiff joined the defendants in the one action, she should be held to have waived her right to recover exemplary damages against Mrs. Shannon
It is contended that the court erred in submitting instruction No. 6. This instruction authorized the jury to award exemplary damages against Mrs. Shannon, if they believed that she acted maliciously, and also against W. F. Shannon, if they found that with full knowledge of the facts and circumstances he ratified and approved her acts. There is no merit in this contention.
It is insisted that the court erred in admitting evidence of
It is earnestly argued that the verdict is so excessive as to indi
There is no standard of measurement by which to determine the amount of damages to be awarded, other than the intelligence of the jury, made up of impartial men governed by a sense of justice. To the jury, therefore, is committed the exclusive task of examining the facts and circumstances of each case and valuing the injury and awarding compensation in the shape of damages. “The law that confers on them this power, and exacts of them the performance of the solemn trust, favors the presumption that they are actuated by pure motives. It therefore makes every allowance for different dispositions, capacities, views, and even frailties in the examination of heterogeneous matters of fact, where no criterion can be applied; and it is not until the result of the deliberations of the jury appears in a form calculated to shock the understanding, and impress no dubious conviction of their prejudice and passion, that courts have found themselves compelled to interpose.” (1 Graham & "Waterman on New Trials, p. 451.)
We have examined the other contentions made by counsel, but find no merit in them.
As to Mrs. Shannon, the order is affirmed. As to W. F. Shannon, the cause is remanded, with directions to the district court to grant him a new trial unless, within twenty days after the