27 N.M. 41 | N.M. | 1921
Lead Opinion
OPINION OF TPIE COURT.
(after stating the facts as above).
At the time the quitclaim deed was made to ap-pellee, the title was in the grantors named in that deed, for until some name was inserted as grantee in the original deed it was ineffective as a conveyance.
“The deed in blank passed no interest, for it had no grantee. The blank intended for the name of the grantee was never filled, and until filled the deed had no operation as a conveyance. * * * There are two conditions essential to make a deed thus executed in blank operate as a conveyance of the property described in it; the blank must be filled by the party authorized to fill it, and this must be done before or at the time of the delivery of the deed to the grantee named.” Allen v. Withrow, 110 U. S. 128, 3 Sup. Ct. 523, 28 L. Ed. 90.
Even though the deed was delivered to the corporation, and it had implied authority to fill in its. name as grantee, following the rule of some courts (1 Dev. on Real Estate [3d Ed.] § 457), there is no evidence from which the court could infer the corporation authorized its name to be inserted as grantee in the deed. But assuming that the corporation did authorize Canavan to authorize Bushman to fill in its name as grantee in the deed, at the time this was done the appellee had obtained title through the quitclaim deed from the Wilsons. Mabie-Lowrey Hdwre. Co. v. Ross et al. (26 N .M. 51), 189 Pac. 42. The consideration of $1 given for the quitclaim deed is sufficient consideration to pass title, unless it was made in bad faith. 2 Dev. on Real Estate (3d Ed.) §§ 813, 814. Whether or not a purely nominal consideration is a sufficient protection of a bona fide purchaser against a holder of an unrecorded deed is not necessary to- determine (Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 135 N. Y. 40, 31 N. E. 994, 31 Am. St. Rep. 809) ; for it is our conclusion that, at least until the grantee’s name had been inserted in the original deed, the title remained in the Wilsons, for the deed was ineffective until some grantee was named therein. Allen v. Withrow, supra.; Board of Education v. Hughes, 118 Minn. 404, 136 N. W. 1095, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 637.
The deed under which appellant claims being ineffective as a conveyance at the time of the execution and delivery of the deed to appellee, and she having no knowldge of any interests of the appellant in the property, the quitclaim deed conveyed a good title.
Courts have long disagreed over the construction of deeds executed without a grantee being named therein. Some hold that such a deed is absolutely void; others that an agent duly authorized in writing only could fill in the name of the grantee; others that parol authority could be given, but the grantee’s name must be written in before delivery; others that such parol authority could be exercised after delivery ; others that the delivery of such a deed would carry with it implied authority for the intended grantee to fill in his own name as grantee at any time. The most extreme cases are to the effect that when such deed is duly executed and delivered to the intended grantee, who long thereafter held the property in actual, open, adverse possession, that such possession coupled with tfye deed was effective in passing title, although the name of grantee was never supplied.
The following authorities contain the several views of the courts on the subject: Barden et al. v. Grace et al., 167 Ala. 453, 52 South. 425, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 537 and note at page 538; Allen v. Withrow, 110 U. S. 128, 3 Sup. Ct. 517, 28 L. Ed. 90; Montgomery v. Dresher, 90 Neb. 632, 134 N. W. 251, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 423 and note; Guthrie v. Field, 85 Kan. 58, 116 Pac. 217, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 326; McGrew v. Lamb, 60 Colo. 463, 154 Pac. 91; U. S. v. Lumber & Mfg. Co. (D. C.) 198 Fed. 893; Reed v. Reed, 98 Miss. 354, 53 So. 691, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1194; Lafferty v. Lafferty, 42 W. Va. 789, 26 S. E. 264; Cribben v. Deal, 21 Or. 215, 27 Pac. 1047, 28 Am. St. Rep. 749; Sayles v. Queirolo, 71 Misc. Rep. 566, 130 N. Y. Supp. 806; 3 Washburn on Real Property (6th Ed.) § 2091; 2 Tiffany on Real Property, § 434 (p. 1597), also section 461 (p. 1745) ; Board of Education v. Hughes, 118 Minn. 404, 136 N. W. 1095, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 637; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 54 How. Prac. 250; 1 Devlin on Real Estate (3d Ed.) § 457; Osby v. Reynolds, 260 Ill. 576, 103 N. E. 556, Ann. Cas. 1914D;387, and note at page 390; Threadgill v. Butler, 60 Tex. 599; 8 R. C. L. p. 956.
We do not find it necessary to pass upon this question, as the deed under which-appellant claims contained the name of no grantee, nor was he ever in possession of the property so far as the record shows, at the time of the execution, delivery, and recording of the quitclaim deed to appellee; and this falls short of coming within any of the rules of construction we have found.
It follows that the judgment of the district court ought to be and is affirmed, and it is so ordered.
Rehearing
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
The appellant has filed a motion for rehearing, in which it is claimed that at the time the quitclaim deed was made to appellee the appellant had the equitable title to the property in controversy, which equitable title was created by or resulted from appellant’s paying the Wilsons the purchase price for said premises, together with the fact of the execution of the deed by the Wilsons with the name of the grantee blank and its delivery to appellant.
Assuming that the quitclaim deed, bearing a nominal consideration, was not effective as against a prior equitable title (which question it is unnecessary to decide), then, if appellant was possessed of such equitable title at the time of the execution and delivery of the quitclaim deed by appellee, it would appear that appellant’s motion for a • rehearing should be sustained.
If an equitable title was vested in appellant, it must necessarily have resulted, either from the execution and delivery of the deed with the grantor’s name left blank, or else on account of the payment of the purchase money, together with the execution and delivery of such deed. We are assuming,. for the sake of argument, that such payment was made by appellant, and that the deed in question was delivered to it with authority, express or implied, to fill in its name as grantee, and, acting under such authority, it authorized Bushman to fill in its name. That there is authority for the contention of the appellant is found in decisions of the Texas courts:
“Here it clearly appears that the purchase money was paid to McDonough, and that the sale and conveyance was, in every respect, complete, save that the name of the grantee was not inserted in the deed. It also appears that it was intended by the parties that the title should vest in Latham at once, and he was expressly authorized by McDonough, at the time the deed was delivered, to insert his own, or any other, name in the deed as grantee. This was a power coupled with an interest vested by McDonough in Latham for the benefit of the latter, and is therefore irrevocable.” Threadgill v. Butler, 60 Tex. 601.
And this case was followed by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in the case of Schleicher v. Runge et al., 37 S. W. 982, and Fennimore v. Ingham, 181 S. W. 513.
In the Threadgill Case, just quoted from, Latham, after a sale of the property to Butler, wrote his name in as grantee in a deed from McDonough to Latham. In that suit by the heirs of McDonough against Butler, which was brought after the deed had been properly corrected, it was held that Latham still had power to perfect the instrument by inserting his name as grantee. This case would not be authority in the case at bar because the quitclaim deed to the appellee had been executed before the insertion of the appellant’s name as grantee.
The case of Schleicher et al. v. Runge et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 37 S. W. 982, would seem to support appellant’s contention, for it is held that, notwithstanding the name of the grantee was never filled in during his lifetime, his heirs were entitled to recover the land from the heirs of the grantor; and the same conclusion was reached by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in the case of Fennimore v. Ingham, supra. If the conclusion of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals is correct, then our original opinion, is not the law. In the early days of Texas, it became a custom to transfer real property by the execution and delivery of deeds with the grantee’s name in blank, with authority to write in the name of the grantee or any other name as grantee in such conveyance, and title was passed by delivery of the deed until some purchaser inserted his own name therein. It is believed that this custom affected land titles to such a degree that Texas courts took this into consideration in adopting this rule (Schleicher v. Runge, 37 S. W. 982) ; but we are unable to assent to the doctrine laid down in these decisions.
If the deed in question conveyed any title, it was a legal title. We have held such deed to be void, at least until the intended grantee’s name was supplied. Ii void, then such deed' was ineffective as a conveyance; a nullity. If a nullity, title to the property was not affected by its execution and delivery. We cannot see how efficacy could be given to it by reason of the fact (if it be a fact) that appellant had paid the purchase money. The payment of the purchase money was ineffective to transfer the equitable title, and the void deed did not add to its efficacy. 2 Tiffany on Real Property (2d Ed.) § 461, p. 1145; also section 434, p. 1597; 25 R. C. L. 655; Grafton v. Cummings, 99 U. S. 100, 25 L. Ed. 366.
Our conclusion is that no equitable title was vested in appellant at the time of the execution and delivery of the quitclaim deed to appellee, for which reason the motion for rehearing should be, and is, denied.