SHIRLEY ANN JONES v. RISING PHOENIX HOLDINGS CORPORATION, et al.
Civil No. 25-00178 MWJS-RT
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
October 1, 2025
Case 1:25-cv-00178-MWJS-RT Document 32 Filed 10/01/25 Page 1 of 23 PageID.200
INTRODUCTION
A few weeks after fires ravaged the island of Maui in August 2023, Plaintiff Shirley Ann Jones was hired as a temporary contact center supervisor for a Maui disaster call center project. Jones is a Black woman over the age of 70. And in this lawsuit, she alleges that her employer at the call center project—in concert with other named defendants—unlawfully demoted her, retaliated against her, denied her promotional opportunities, and terminated her based on her race, age, color, sex, and protected activity. She asserts claims under four separate federal civil rights statutes.
Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint, contending that Jones (1) did not exhaust her administrative remedies as to some claims, and (2) has not alleged sufficient facts to plausibly support the others. Because the court finds both arguments persuasive, it GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss. But because it is at least
BACKGROUND
1. On August 8, 2023, flames tore through parts of Maui, destroying thousands of homes and claiming over a hundred lives. It was the deadliest wildfire in the United States in over a century. See generally In re Hawaiian Elec. Indus., Inc., S‘holder Derivative Litig., No. 24-CV-00164, 2024 WL 3594783, at *1 (D. Haw. July 30, 2024).
About three weeks after the fire, Jones was hired as a temporary Contact Center Supervisor for the Maui Disaster Call Center Project, which was operated by Defendant TB Customer Relations, LLC (“TBCR“). As alleged in Jones‘s complaint, the project “supported survivors of the Maui wildfires and was staffed under” contracts with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Dkt. No. 1, at PageID.3 (¶ 15). Jones reported to Traci Thompson, a TBCR employee who is not named as a defendant in this suit. Id.
Jones alleges that she “brought more than 30 years of experience in supervision, counseling, crisis response, and education,” and that she “held a Master‘s Degree in Guidance and Counseling and a Professional Educator License.” Id. (¶¶ 17-18); see also id. at PageID.8 (¶¶ 73-75). She also “was one of the only African American supervisors assigned to the project.” Id. at PageID.3 (¶ 19).
According to Jones, Henion and Piho had substantially inferior qualifications to her own. See id. at PageID.7 (¶ 68); see also id. at PageID.8 (¶¶ 70-72). Nonetheless, Jones alleges that “[w]ithin her first month,” she “began noticing unequal treatment compared to her non-Black temporary supervisors from Traci Thomspon.” Id. at PageID.4 (¶ 23). In October 2023, the company created new supervisory roles for a “Debris Removal Project,” and Jones alleges that these roles “were not posted internally and were not made available for application” by Jones or others similarly situated. Id. (¶¶ 24-25). Instead, Henion and Piho were selected for the new positions. Id. (¶ 26).
Jones does not allege that she was specifically qualified for or interested in the supervisory positions that Henion and Piho took on—the job responsibilities of which
Jones‘s complaint also focuses on another supervisory position opening that arose in “late October 2023,” this one for a position as “Project Manager of the contact center.” Id. (¶ 29). Jones does not allege that she applied for or was even interested in the role. But she alleges that Brooke Fisher, a “White employee under age 40 with a background in social work,” was promoted to the position. Id. She further alleges that Fisher “lacked experience in disaster operational management or FEMA systems as required for the role of Project Manager“; that Jones was “significantly more qualified” than Fisher; and that she “was neither considered nor offered an interview for the Project Manager role.” Id. (¶¶ 30-31). She alleges, without elaboration, that Defendant Lori Nichols—who worked as a human resources specialist at TBCR—promoted Fisher “solely” because of Fisher‘s “race and age.” Id. (¶ 30).
On December 1, 2023, Jones allegedly submitted an internal race discrimination complaint. She also allegedly informed management of “her intent to support a separate discrimination complaint” filed by “another African American temporary supervisor.” Id. (¶¶ 38-39). According to Jones, she learned at some point that “leadership,” including Fisher, expressed “fatigue with these Supervisors,” referring to Jones and the other African American temporary supervisory. Id. at PageID.7 (¶ 59). And she generally alleges that “shortly after” her complaint, she “began experiencing increased retaliation“: “her shifts changed without notice, she was excluded from
On January 13, 2024, Jones “requested unpaid medical leave to undergo eye surgery.” Id. at PageID.6 (¶ 44). TBCR initially approved her leave “through March 15, 2024, and later extended it to May 9, 2024.” Id. (¶ 45). Jones alleges that she “remained in communication with HR and followed all leave procedures.” Id. (¶ 46). But on May 10, 2024—the day she was scheduled to return to work—Jones allegedly “informed the company she was not yet medically cleared to return.” Id. (¶ 47). On May 22, 2024, Defendant Tiffany Niles—another human resources professional at TBCR—notified Jones via email that “she was being terminated for ‘job abandonment.‘” Id. (¶ 49). When, in “[l]ate June 2025,” Jones “formally requested an appeal of her termination under the company‘s handbook policy,” Niles “denied the appeal, stating the termination was not disciplinary and therefore not eligible for appeal.” Id. (¶¶ 54, 56). Jones alleges that “Defendants’ behavior reflects a larger culture of exclusion, particularly of Black, older, and disabled employees.” Id. at PageID.9 (¶ 89).
2. This lawsuit followed, in which Jones brings claims under (1) race and color discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
The entity Defendants and individual Defendants each filed motions to dismiss Jones‘s complaint. Dkt. Nos. 13 (entity Defendants), 17-18 (individual Defendants). After the court granted a month-long extension of her deadline to respond, Dkt. Nos. 20, 25, Jones opposed all motions. Dkt. Nos. 27, 30. Defendants then filed reply memoranda in support of their motions. Dkt. Nos. 28, 29.
The Court opts to resolve the motions without a hearing as authorized by Local Rule 7.1(c).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Two principles guide the court‘s assessment of the adequacy of a complaint‘s allegations. The first is that the court must assume the truth of well-pleaded allegations, as well as all reasonable inferences that could be drawn from them, and “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The second is that the court must disregard any bare assertions or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Id. at 996; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (explaining that a pleading must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Put differently, while a complaint‘s factual allegations are assumed true, its conclusory or legal assertions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Ultimately, the court must dismiss claims for which there is either “no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732.
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Before addressing the sufficiency of Jones‘s factual allegations, the entity Defendants raise a threshold argument in their motion: that Jones has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to certain of her claims. They note that exhaustion is a requirement for Jones‘s Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims—that is, for every one of her claims except for those based on § 1981. See Winns v. Exela Enter. Sols., Inc., 2023 WL 4992825, at *1 (9th Cir. 2023) (Title VII and ADEA); Douglas v. Cal. Dep‘t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 823 n.12 (9th Cir. 2001) (ADA). They provide, as Exhibit B to their motion, what they describe as Jones‘s Charge of Discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC“). See Dkt. No. 13-4, at PageID.99-101. And they point out that this EEOC charge (1) only lists RPHC as the employer (with TBCR‘s name appearing only in the “Street Address” entry); (2) asserts only discrimination based on race and retaliation based on a “race discrimination complaint,” and does not list hostile work environment or discrimination or retaliation based on age, disability, or color; and (3) identifies only the October 2023 demotion from Contact Center Supervisor and the selection of Henion and Piho for supervisory positions as the discriminatory acts, and does not list hostile work environment, Jones‘s termination, or the alleged failure to provide reasonable accommodations for her disability.
In light of the EEOC charge, Defendants contend that the court should dismiss each of the following for failure to exhaust: (1) all claims against TBCR and Tidal Basin Group because they were not named as employers in the EEOC Charge; (2) Jones‘s Title
In her opposition to the motions to dismiss, Jones not only declined to dispute the authenticity of the EEOC charge that the entity Defendants supplied, but also declined to dispute her failure to exhaust administrative remedies along the lines detailed above. Nonetheless, the court concludes that the reference to TBCR in the address field of Jones‘s EEOC charge was enough—given that TBCR is a subsidiary of RPHC—to exhaust administrative remedies as to TBCR, to whatever extent those claims have adequately been exhausted as to TBCR. For that reason, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss to the extent that it sought to dismiss claims against TBCR on the ground that TBCR had not been explicitly listed as an “employer” in the EEOC charge.
Given Jones‘s non-opposition, however, the court otherwise GRANTS the entity Defendants’ motion to dismiss on these grounds. This exhaustion-related dismissal does not reach (1) Jones‘s Title VII race discrimination and retaliation claims against RPHC and TBCR concerning Jones‘s October 2023 demotion and the promotion of Henion and Piho, which appear to have been exhausted, or (2) Jones‘s claims under § 1981, as to which no exhaustion is required. Moreover, because it is at least conceivable that Jones could allege, in a future complaint, that she did exhaust her
B. The Individual Defendants
The individual Defendants raise a threshold challenge of their own: they contend, correctly, that Jones cannot “bring the Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims against the [i]ndividual Defendants because such claims can only be asserted against the employer, not individuals.” Dkt. No. 18, at PageID.148 n.1 (collecting authorities). For that reason, the individual Defendants contend that Jones may only proceed against them under § 1981.3 Jones does not challenge this argument in her opposition—and could not have done so, given prevailing law. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must dismiss claims lacking any “cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732. The court therefore GRANTS the individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss all
Turning to the complaint‘s factual allegations, the individual Defendants next contend that the § 1981 claims against them should be dismissed because they are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. The court agrees. To state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff “must show intentional discrimination on account of race,” Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1989), and “must initially plead . . . that, but for race, [she] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right,” Comcast Corp. v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020). Furthermore, a plaintiff may not generically allege that all defendants participated in a legal violation; to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege facts showing that each named individual plaintiff either “personally participated in the discriminatory acts or was informed of the wrongdoing of [her] subordinates but was grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent as to their supervision.” McAllister, 2018 WL 6112956, at *13 (cleaned up).
Jones‘s complaint does not meet these requirements. Concerning Defendant Niles, the complaint merely alleges that she notified Jones of her termination, that she denied Jones‘s request for an appeal, and that she “oversaw the termination and appeal denial with full knowledge of Plaintiff‘s protected status and medical situation.” Dkt. No. 1, at PageID.6, 10 (¶¶ 49, 56, 98). Even accepting these factual allegations as true,
As to Defendant Nichols, the complaint makes the allegation that she promoted Fisher “because of” Fisher‘s “race and age.” Dkt. No. 1, at PageID.10 (¶ 99). But that bare assertion is a legal conclusion couched as fact—and in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must disregard it. See Eclectic Props. E., 751 F.3d at 996; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Although it is conceivable that Jones could substantiate this assertion with factual detail in an amended pleading, she has not substantiated it in the current complaint. The only other allegation against Nichols is that she “failed to investigate or take action on internal complaints raised by Plaintiff.” Dkt. No. 1, at PageID.10 (¶ 99). Even accepting this assertion as true, it does not state a plausible claim for relief under
To be sure, Jones‘s complaint also contains more generalized assertions to the effect that “[e]ach Defendant played a role” in one form of misconduct or another. Dkt. No. 1, at PageID.10 (¶ 97). But these broad allegations do not help Jones satisfy her pleading obligations; “‘everyone did everything’ allegations” of that variety are insufficient to satisfy federal pleading standards. Shumlich v. U.S. Bank, N.A., Case No. 2:24-cv-01681, 2025 WL 19871, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2025) (quoting Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., 484 F. Supp. 3d 921, 943 (D. Or. 2020) (explaining that a complaint may not “assert[] claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions” (cleaned up)).
For these reasons, the court GRANTS the individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss Jones‘s § 1981 claims. Jones could conceivably address these deficiencies, however, and this dismissal is therefore without prejudice and with leave to amend. But Jones is cautioned that if she cannot allege facts that would establish each of these individuals’ personal liability, she should not include them as named defendants in an amended pleading.
//
//
The remaining question is whether the complaint‘s factual allegations against the entity Defendants are sufficient to plausibly allege claims for race discrimination and race-related retaliation under either Title VII or § 1981.
1. To make out a plausible a claim of disparate treatment on the basis of race, whether under Title VII or § 1981, Jones must allege facts that, taken as true, would establish that the entity Defendants either failed to promote or demoted her because of her race. And while race must be at least a “motivating factor” under Title VII, Jones cannot proceed under § 1981 unless she plausibly alleges that “but for race, [she] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp., 589 U.S. at 337, 341.
The allegations in Jones‘s current complaint do not meet these standards. As an initial matter, many of the allegations amount to bare assertions and therefore must be disregarded. For example, Jones asserts that Fisher was promoted “solely” because of her “race and age.” Dkt. No. 1, at PageID.4 (¶ 30). In a similar vein, she alleges that “Defendants’ behavior reflects a larger culture of exclusion, particularly of Black, older, and disabled employees.” Id. at PageID.9 (¶ 89). She generally alleges that “[w]ithin her first month,” she “began noticing unequal treatment compared to her non-Black temporary supervisors from Traci Thompson.” Id. at PageID.4 (¶ 23). At the motion-to-
Other allegations are less conclusory but are still lacking critical detail. Jones alleges that she received substantially less training during her onboarding than Henion and Piho, for example, but her own allegations provide a race-neutral reason: according to Jones herself, Henion and Piho had substantially inferior qualifications to her own. Id. at PageID.7 (¶ 68). Accepting these allegations as true, Jones has shown a difference in treatment, but has not shown that the difference was because of race.
Similarly, Jones alleges that in October 2023, Henion and Piho were selected for newly created supervisory roles overseeing a “Debris Removal Project.” Id. at PageID.4 (¶¶ 24-25). But Jones does not allege that she was specifically qualified for or even interested in these new positions, the responsibilities of which the complaint does not describe. Moreover, although Jones alleges that her prior qualifications were superior to those of Henion and Piho, she does not allege that her actual work experience at TBCR—between August and October 2023—was materially the same as that of Henion and Piho. The complaint, in its current form, is therefore consistent with the possibility that Henion and Piho might have obtained on-the-job experience that made them better suited than Jones to pivot into the newfound tasks. Moreover, while Jones alleges that she performed her own job tasks “satisfactorily” between August and October 2023, id. at PageID.3 (¶ 20), she does not allege that Henion and Piho performed no better in the
Jones also alleges that at around the same time Henion and Piho were promoted, she was demoted from her temporary supervisory position. But the complaint does not adequately allege facts that would support the inference that this was done for race-related reasons. The complaint does not allege, for example, that her concededly temporary supervisory position continued to exist after she was removed from it; nor does she alleged that, if the position continued to exist, it was filled by someone outside of her protected classification. Here again, then, the complaint does not plausibly allege that Jones was demoted because of her race.
The same is true of Jones‘s allegations concerning Fisher‘s promotion. Although Jones alleges that she was substantially more qualified on paper than Fisher, she makes no allegations about what work Fisher was actually performing at TBCR—or whether that hands-on work might have made Fisher a more natural choice for the “Project Manager” role. What is more, the complaint does not allege that Jones even applied for or expressed an interest in the position. That is a significant omission because—unlike with the debris removal positions to which Henion and Piho were promoted—Jones
In fact, the complaint itself identifies race-neutral reasons for any disparate treatment of Jones at TBCR, and while the complaint asserts that these reasons were false, it does not offer sufficient factual detail to support that conclusion. First, the complaint alleges that Fisher “made unfounded and unjustified complaints about Plaintiff‘s alleged insubordination, falsely reporting to other leadership that Plaintiff ‘does not follow directions.‘” Dkt. No. 1, at PageID.7 (¶ 59). But the complaint does not offer any factual detail to support the conclusion that the complaints were in fact unfounded or unjustified, or that the reports of insubordination were false. Second, the complaint alleges that leadership expressed “fatigue” with Jones and another African American colleague. Id. Given that the comment itself did not refer to race, Jones must allege sufficient facts to support the inference that it nonetheless was motivated by race. She might, for example, allege facts showing that leadership had similar moments in which it concluded that others outside of Jones‘s racial classification had been accused of insubordination or failing to follow directions, and yet leadership did not show “fatigue” toward them. The complaint, in its current form, does not offer any factual material of that sort.
Jones does adequately allege that on December 1, 2023, she submitted an internal race discrimination complaint. She also adequately alleges that she informed management of her intent to support the discrimination complaint of another African American temporary supervisor. Dkt. No. 1, at PageID.5 (¶¶ 38-39). But while she generally alleges that she thereafter faced “retaliation,” the complaint does not offer sufficient factual detail to support the inference that she suffered retaliation as a result of her protected activity.
For example, Jones alleges that after she had engaged in protected activity, she experienced the “retaliation” of “her shifts chang[ing] without notice, [her being] excluded from strategy calls, and [her being] ignored during team planning.” Id. (¶ 40). But the complaint does not allege that Jones had not been experiencing these things before her protected activity; if anything, the complaint suggests that her difficulties with Fisher began well before December 1, 2023. See, e.g., id. at PageID.5 (¶ 33) (alleging that after Fisher was promoted in October 2023, Jones‘s input “was increasingly ignored,
Finally, Jones alleges that TBCR mishandled her leave requests and request for an appeal of her termination. But the complaint does not adequately allege that TBCR acted with retaliatory motives. Jones in fact alleges that when she asked for leave in January 2024, after her internal race discrimination complaint had been filed, TBCR granted it—and then extended the leave period. TBCR did not terminate Jones until she failed to report to work on May 10, 2024, the day she was scheduled to do so. And while Jones generally alleges that she had “remained in communication with HR and followed all leave procedures,” id. at PageID.6 (¶ 46), she does not plausibly allege that similarly situated employees who failed to report to work would be treated any differently. Nor does she plausibly allege that the “company‘s handbook policy” should have afforded her an appeal of her termination, despite the fact that it was “not disciplinary” but rather based on “job abandonment.” Id. at (¶¶ 54, 56).
*
*
In short, the complaint does not plausibly allege racially disparate treatment or retaliation, whether under Title VII or § 1981. The court therefore GRANTS the entity Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground. Because Jones could conceivably cure these deficiencies, this dismissal is without prejudice and with leave to amend. In granting leave to amend, however, the court notes that Jones‘s current complaint offers no factual detail to support the inclusion of RPHC or Tidal Basin Group as named defendants. Jones is cautioned that if she chooses to file an amended complaint, she should not include these entity Defendants if she cannot allege facts to support their liability.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The dismissal of the Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims against Defendants Tiffany Niles and Lori Nichols is with prejudice and without leave to file an amended complaint. The dismissal is otherwise without prejudice and with leave to amend.
If Jones elects to file an amended complaint, she must comply with the following requirements:
- Jones‘s deadline to file an amended complaint is October, 30, 2025;
- Jones‘s amended complaint should be titled “First Amended Complaint“;
Jones must cure the deficiencies that have been identified above in the current complaint. If she cannot cure the deficiencies as to any defendant, her First Amended Complaint should not name that entity or individual as a defendant.
Jones is cautioned that failure to timely file an amended complaint that conforms with this order will result in automatic dismissal of this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 1, 2025, at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
/s/ Micah W.J. Smith
Micah W.J. Smith
United States District Judge
Civil No. 25-00178 MWJS-RT, Shirley Ann Jones v. Rising Phoenix Holdings Corporation, et al.; ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART