Aрpellant Tenner R. Jones appeals from a decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (Board) which denied her unemployment compensation on the basis that she voluntarily left her employment without good cause in connection with her work.
Jones wоrked for Marian Hill as a cook from December 12, 1977 through March 24, 1978. When she was offered the position she informed her supervisor that she could only work the hours of 9:00 a. m. to 3:00 p. m. because she had‘family responsibilities. In March 1978, Jones was told that her hours would be changed to'9:00 a. m. to 6:00 p. m. When Jones protested the change she was told that if she did not work the new hours, someone would be hired that would. Jones then agreed to accept the change of hours. The next day, however, Jones informed her supervisor that she could not work the hours becаuse she had four children at home to care for. Jones agreed to continue working until a replacement was found.
Jones contends on appeal that the Board’s decision wаs contrary to law since the reason for termination, a change in her working conditions contrary to an existing employment contract, constituted good cause.
Generally, an employer has the prerogative of setting business hours, working schedules and working conditions in the absenсe of a specific agreement. However, an employee has the right to plaсe conditions or limitations on his employment. If such conditions are made known to the emplоyer and are agreed to by it, these conditions become contractual working conditions. If the working conditions are unilaterally changed by the employer and the employee сhooses to terminate the employment rather than accept the change, the еmployee will be entitled to unemployment benefits since the reason for termination was а change in work agreed to be performed by the employee. Such reason constitutеs good cause. Wade
v. Hurley
(1973),
In the case at hand, the record supports a Board determination that Jones agreed to the change in the therеtofore agreed upon working conditions. Therefore, she was not entitled to good cause status for terminating her employment because of the change. Additionally we note that lеaving employment because of family responsibilities constitutes leaving without good causе.
Gray v. Dobbs House, Inc.
(1976), Ind.App.,
Jones also contends that the Board’s decision is contrary to law because the evidеnce before the Board shows conclusively that the termination was not voluntary. *846 Jones characterizes the employer’s statements that she would be replaced if she did not work the hоurs as coercive threats rendering her termination involuntary. We do not agree. While it is apparent that Jones would have been discharged had she failed to work the additional three hours, she was not thereby forced into tendering her resignation. She was able to choose, of hеr own free will, to remain employed by working the additional three hours as she had agreed to do. Furthermore, the record reveals that the spectre of discharge was not the causе of. her termination. Jones’ motivation to leave her employment was induced by her parеntal responsibilities and her husband’s demands that she not work the hours.
The decision of the Board denying benefits is affirmed.
Notes
. IC 22-4-15-1 provides in pertinent part,
“ ‘Discharge for just cause’ as used in this section is defined to include but not be limited to separation initiated by an employer for falsifiсation of an employment application to obtain employment through subterfuge; knowing viоlation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer; unsatisfactory attendance, if the individual cannot show good cause for absences or tardiness; damaging the employer’s property through wilful negligence; refusing to obey instructions; reporting to work undеr the influence of alcohol or drugs or consuming alcohol or drugs on employer’s premises during working hours; conduct endangering safety of self or coworkers; incarceration in jail following conviction of a misdemeanor or felony by a court of competent jurisdiction or for any breach of duty in connection with work which is reasonably owed employer by an employee.”