Opinion delivered by the
The facts to be collected from the record, so far as they are material in this case, are, that the premises sued for are a part of the estate of Lewellen Jones, deceased; that the said deceased left two sons, Alexander P. the defendant below, John N. S. Jones, and Mrs Perkins, the wife of Benjamin Perkins, his heirs at lawfthat the defendant, after the death of his' father, had taken possession of the premises sued for, and continued in the possession for several years before the commencement of the plaintiff’s suit. The plaintiff claimed title by a deed purporting to have been made by Benjamin Perkins, transferring to him all his interest in the real and personal property of the said Lewellen, within the State of Alabama. On the trial, the defendant offered to prove that all the right and title that the said Benjamin Perkins had in the premises, had vested by sheriff’s sale, in one Thomas Moore, a judgement creditor of the said Benjamin, prior to the sale to the plaintiff. But this testimony was rejected by the Court; and the Judge charged the jury, that “the defendant could not be permitted to adduce evidence of an adverse title in a stranger from whom he does not profess to derive any title,- or between whom and himself there is no connexion of interest.” This charge is now assigned for error. If the defendant can, from the evidence, be viewed in the light of a mere trespasser without color of title, perhaps the charge could well be sustained. He ought not in such a case, to be permitted to shew a paramount outstanding title in a stranger, to defeat the prima facie title of the plaintiff; it would be unreasonable, under such circumstances to allow him to protect himself in the trespass by such testimony. But this rule has never been so far extended as to embrace a defendant who had entered and was in possession under a claim of right. The entry of the defendant was certainly lega!; he was the heir at law to one third of the premises in dispute, as a