20 N.E.2d 592 | Ill. | 1939
The plaintiffs, Ethyle, George Henry, Frederick W. and Helen Jones, brought an action in the circuit court of DuPage county against the defendants, Edwin G. Pebler, J.H. Cownie Co., a corporation, and John H. Cownie and J.M. Schiltz, doing business as J.H. Cownie Co., to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision near the village of Glen Ellyn on October 31, 1936. By their amended complaint plaintiffs charged that Pebler was in possession and control of an automobile which he was driving for and on behalf of the co-defendants as their agent, servant or employee. The defendants, non-residents of Illinois, were served with process conformably to the provisions of section 20a of the Motor Vehicle act. Service upon Pebler was not challenged. Appearing specially the corporate defendant, Cownie and Schiltz interposed motions to quash the service of summons on the ground, among others, that neither on the day named, nor at any other time, did they use and operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State as a corporation, a partnership, individually or otherwise, personally or through an agent. The motions to quash were sustained, and the amended complaint dismissed as to all the defendants except Pebler. An appeal to the Appellate Court for the Second District by the plaintiffs resulted in an affirmance. (Jones v. Pebler,
By an act approved June 25, 1929, section 20a was added to the act in relation to motor vehicles. Section 20a (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 95 1/2, par. 23, p. 2092) so far as pertinent, provides: "The use and operation by a non-resident *311 of a motor vehicle over the highways of the State of Illinois, shall be deemed an appointment by such non-resident of the Secretary of State, to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all legal process in any action or proceeding against him, growing out of such use or resulting in damage or loss to person or property, and said use or operation shall be a signification of his agreement that any such process against him which is so served, shall be of the same legal force and validity as though served upon him personally."
Plaintiffs contend that the operation and use of an automobile on the highways of this State by a servant, agent or employee of a non-resident corporation or the individual members of a partnership, render the superior amenable to the quoted provisions of the statute. To sustain the judgment of the Appellate Court, defendants maintain that section 20a is applicable only to individuals who are in actual possession of and driving an automobile within the State, and, conversely, that the statutory provisions for service on non-residents do not apply to a non-resident principal whose agent, also a non-resident, operates his own or his principal's automobile on the highways of Illinois. A primary purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intention of the legislature. In determining this intent courts consider the language used, the evil to be remedied and the object to be attained. (Burke v.Industrial Com.
At least thirty-five States authorize the commencement of suit against non-resident motorists by substituted service *312
on a public official of the State where the cause of action arises, the official being made for this purpose the agent or attorney of the non-resident motorists. These statutes usually make the mere operation of a motor vehicle on the highway by a non-resident the equivalent of a formal appointment of a public officer as agent for receiving service of process. (Maurice S. Culp, "Process in Actions against Non-Resident Motorists," 32 Michigan L.R. p. 325.) In Pawloski v. Hess,
In like fashion section 20a expresses the manifest legislative intent of conferring jurisdiction of suits against non-resident motorists on the courts of Illinois to the end that compensation for injuries to local residents may be obtained. Admittedly, the policy is as desirable when the driving is done on behalf of a non-resident by an agent, chauffeur, servant or a third person with consent, as when by the non-resident himself. "The potential harm," it has been well said, "is as great whether the non-resident owner himself or another be driving his car, and the necessity for resorting to substituted service is just as pressing." (Culp, "Process in Action against Non-Resident Motorists," supra.) Again, it has been pertinently observed: "The large proportion of cars owned and operated by foreign corporations and partnerships was as obvious to the legislature as was the fact that a corporation can perform such physical acts as operating a car only through agents." (6 University of Chicago L.R. p. 122.) Section 20a provides that the mere use or operation by a non-resident of a motor vehicle on a highway of this State serves automatically to appoint the Secretary of State as attorney to receive service of process, and the "use or operation," the law ordains, shall be a signification that such substituted service shall be of the same legal force and validity as personal service. The word "non-resident" appears without definition, does not purport to be limited to non-resident natural persons, and is obviously broad enough to include every non-resident, individual or corporate, owner or non-owner, using and operating a motor vehicle over Illinois highways. In short, a non-resident, within the contemplation of section 20a may be a non-resident corporation or an individual member of a non-resident partnership.
Defendants nevertheless place reliance on O'Tier v. Sell,
Likewise, reliance upon Brown v. Cleveland Tractor Co.
Plaintiffs have recourse to cases construing statutes expressly applying to the operation by a non-resident operator, owner or chauffeur. McLeod v. Birnbun, 185 Atl. (N.J.) 667, is illustrative. The New Jersey statute, construed in the case cited, provides that: "Any chauffeur, operator or owner of any motor vehicle, not licensed under the laws of the State * * *, who shall accept the privilege extended to non-resident chauffeurs, operators and owners by law of driving such a motor vehicle or of having the same driven or operated in the State * * *, without a New Jersey registration or license, shall, by the acceptance and operation of such automobiles within the State," etc., make and *316 constitute the commissioner of motor vehicles their agent for the acceptance of civil process in any suit or proceeding by any resident of the State, arising out of motor accidents. Substituted service pursuant to the statute on a non-resident corporate defendant in an action resulting from a collision in New Jersey of an automobile driven by its non-resident officer and employee, and owned by a non-resident third party, was held authorized. The Supreme Court of New Jersey pointed out that the quoted statutory provisions, including not only the person who was actually driving the car, who would fall under the designation of chauffeur, but likewise the person in whose behalf the vehicle was being driven, were broad enough to cover a person in whose interest and for whose benefit a car is being operated, although such person may be neither the chauffeur nor the owner.
Producers' Refiners' Corp. v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 73 S.W.2d (Tenn.) 174, construed the non-resident statute of Tennessee which applies, as does the New Jersey statute, to any owner, chauffeur or operator of a motor vehicle who shall make use of the privilege of operating such vehicle on the State's highways. Holding that the law was not limited in its application to non-residents personally present and driving the automobile involved but applied as well to a non-resident owner who placed his automobile in the control of an employee and sent it into Tennessee, thereby rendering himself subject to the process defined in the statute, the court said: "Liability to this service of process is cast upon non-residents `who shall make use of the privilege * * * to operate' on highways within the State; and this liability is cast, not merely upon a non-resident `while operating,' or upon one whose exercise of the privilege is evidenced by `his operating' the automobile involved, as in the statutes of New York and Texas, * * * but the non-residents to be affected are classified and identified as `any owner, chauffeur or operator,' of the automobile involved." *317
Section 20a of the Motor Vehicle law of this State differs essentially from the statutory provisions in the cases relied upon by both the plaintiffs and defendants. Those cases suffice to illustrate that the class of non-resident motorists affected by the statutes of other States authorizing substituted service is far from uniform. A statute itself affords the best means of its exposition, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained from its provisions such intent will prevail without resorting to other aids for construction. (2 Lewis' Sutherland on Stat. Const. (2d ed.) secs. 348, 366; Burke v. Industrial Com. supra;Schoellkopf v. DeVry, supra; People v. West Side Trust andSavings Bank,
The judgment of the Appellate Court and the order of the circuit court are each reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court, with directions to overrule defendants' motions to quash the service of summons.
Reversed and remanded, with directions. *318