LORETTA JONES, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, - vs - OHIO EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
CASE NO. 2014-A-0015
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO
2014-Ohio-5466
[Cite as Jones v. Ohio Edison Co., 2014-Ohio-5466.]
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
Civil Appeal from the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2013 CV 00623. Judgment: Affirmed.
John T. Dellick, Harrington, Hoppe & Mitchell, Ltd., 1200 Sky Bank Building, 26 Market St., Suite 1200, P.O. Box 6077, Youngstown, OH 44501-6077 (For Defendant-Appellee).
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.
{¶1} Appellants, Loretta Jones and William Fifolt, appeal the judgment of the Ashtabula County Cоurt of Common Pleas dismissing their complaint for damages against appellee, Ohio Edison Company, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. At issue is whether appellants’ complaint represents a service complaint, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO“). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶3} In response, Ohio Edison filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to
{¶4} Appellants appeal the trial court‘s judgment, asserting the following for their sole assignment of error:
{¶5} “The trial court committed prejudicial error in granting defendant-appellee‘s, Ohio Edison Company‘s, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.”
{¶7} Further, in ruling on a
{¶8} “The General Assembly has created a broad and comprehensive statutory scheme for regulating the business activities of public utilities.” Kazmaier Supermarket,
{¶9}
{¶10} However, courts retain limited subject-matter jurisdiction over “pure tort claims” and certain contract actions involving public utilities. State ex rel. Illuminating Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 97 Ohio St.3d 69, 2002-Ohio-5312, ¶20.
{¶11} Thus, we must determine whether appellants’ claim falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of PUCO or is a pure tort claim within the jurisdiction of the common pleas court. Id. at ¶21. “‘[C]asting the allegations in the complaint to sound in tort * * * is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a trial court’ when the basic claim is
{¶12} Further, while “trial courts determine their own jurisdiction,” such determinations can be challenged. Allstate, supra, at ¶11. The Ohio Supreme Court in Allstate, adopted a two-part test to help courts decide when a trial court, rather than PUCO, has jurisdiction over a case involving a public utility alleged to have committed a tort, i.e., a “pure tort.” Under this test, a court asks (1) whether PUCO‘s administrative expertise is required to resolve the issue in dispute, and (2) whether the act complained of constitutes a practice normally authorized by the utility. If the answer to either question is “No,” the claim is one for a pure tort and is not within PUCO‘s exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at ¶11-13. Thus, the answer to both questions must be yes in order for the claim to fall within PUCO‘s jurisdiction.
{¶13} With respect to the first question, the complaint alleged that Ohiо Edison was negligent in attaching power lines to a utility pole by using faulty equipment in attaching the lines to the pole; connecting the power lines to the pole too tightly; or connecting them too loosely.
{¶15} In contrast, Allstate, supra, provides a typical example of a case аgainst an electric utility involving a pure tort. In Allstate, the plaintiff noticed a large tree limb leaning on the power lines leading to her home. Over a period of five hours, she called CEI three times to report the situation. Shortly after the last call, the lines broke, causing sparks that set her home on fire, resulting in extensive damage. Allstate paid the claim and asserted a subrogation claim against CEI. The trial court denied CEI‘s
{¶16} Further, the issue of whether Ohio Edison provided faulty service resulting in a power surge is expressly governed by Ohio Edison‘s tariff on file with and approved by PUCO. The General Assembly has given PUCO statutory authority to review and approve tariffs. Migden-Ostrander v. Pub. Util. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 451, 2004-Ohio-3924, ¶8, fn. 5. “Public utility tariffs are books or compilations of printed materials filed by public utilities with, and approved by, [PUCO] that contain schedules of rates and charges, rules and regulations, and standards for service.” Id.
{¶17} In Hull v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, 110 Ohio St.3d 96, 2006-Ohio-3666, the Supreme Court of Ohio held, “‘it is readily apparent that the General Assembly has provided for commission oversight of filed tariffs, including the right to adjudicate complaints involving customer rates and services.‘” Id. at ¶20, quoting Kazmaier, supra, at 151. Onсe approved by PUCO, a tariff has the same binding effect as a law. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Steinberg, 94 Ohio St. 189 (1916), paragraph four of the syllabus;
{¶18} Section IV(B) of Ohio Edison‘s tariff provides:
{¶19} Continuity. The Company will endeavor, but does not guarantee, to furnish a continuous supply of electric energy and to maintain voltage and frequency within reasonable limits. The Company shall not be liable for damages which the customer may sustain due to variations in electric service characteristics * * *.
{¶20} In addition, Section X(B) of Ohio Edison‘s tariff provides:
{¶21} Limitation of Liability. The Company shall not be liable for any loss, cost, damage, or expense that the customer may sustain by reason of damage to or destruction of any property, including the loss of use thereof, arising out of, or in any manner connected with * * * high or low voltage * * * except such damages that are caused by or due to the willful and wanton misconduct of the Company.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶22} In Hiener, supra, this court addressed limitation-of-liability provisions related to power surges similar to those at issue here. In that case, CEI‘s tariff provided that CEI would not be liable for damages sustained due to interruptions of service, variations in service characteristics, or high or low voltage whether or not such damages were caused by any negligence of CEI, except such damage that was caused by willful and wanton misconduct of CEI. In Hiener, this court held that because the plaintiff‘s
{¶23} Similarly in LaForge, supra, where the plaintiff‘s furnace was damaged during a pеriod of low voltage referred to as a “brownout,” this court held the complaint was covered by the same tariff at issue in Hiener, and thus review by a trial court or an appellate court other than the Supreme Court would result in usurpation of authority. LaForge at 741.
{¶24} The Seventh District considered a case quite similar to the one before us in Valentin v. Ohio Edison, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 11 MA 93, 2012-Ohio-2437. In Valentin, the plaintiff allegеd that Ohio Edison‘s faulty wire caused a power surge, which in turn ruined various electronics in his home. He further asserted that the substance of his claim is that Ohio Edison was negligent in failing to inspect, repair, and maintain its electric feed wire that is attached to his house. Ohio Edison filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that PUCO has the sole authority to hear and determine electric service complaints from its customers. In opposition, the plaintiff argued his complaint asserted a negligence claim and, therefore, did not fall within PUCO‘s exclusive jurisdiction. In considering the identical tariff provisions as those before us in the instant case, the Seventh District, citing this court‘s holding in LaForge, supra, held: “When the plaintiff‘s cause of action falls within thе parameters of the utility company‘s tariffs, review by a common pleas court or appellate court would result in usurpation of authority from PUCO and the Ohio Supreme Court.” Valentin at ¶17. As a result, the Seventh District held that the answer to the first question of the Allstate test, i.e., whether PUCO‘s expertise was required to resolve the dispute, was yes. Valentin at ¶19.
{¶26} [T]he plaintiffs argue that CEI is responsible for damages stemming from two alleged power surges. Plaintiffs’ claim calls into question the manner by which CEI provided electrical service. In addressing the power surges, it will be necessary to determine whether CEI‘s response and correction of the problem сomplied with industry standards. The answers to these questions require the expertise of the PUCO administration because jurors do not have the experience or understanding regarding the distribution of electricity. The determination of issues related to applicable laws and regulations, industry practices and standards, is best accomplished by PUCO with its expеrt staff technicians familiar with the utility commission provisions. Id. at ¶11.
{¶27} Because appellants’ claim is covered by Ohio Edison‘s tariff, review of their claim by this court would amount to usurpation of PUCO‘s exclusive jurisdiction. Hiener, supra, at *4-*5.
{¶28} In light of the foregoing analysis, we agree with the trial court‘s finding that, under the first part of the Allstate test, the answer to the question whether PUCO‘s administrative expertise is rеquired to resolve the issue in dispute, the answer is “yes.”
{¶29} Next, under the second step of the Allstate test, we determine whether the act complained of constitutes a practice normally authorized by Ohio Edison.
{¶31} In Valentin, supra, the Seventh District stated the plaintiff‘s claim that too much power was provided to his home causing damage to his electronics constituted a claim that there was a problem with his service resulting from a faulty wire and power surge. Thus, the court held the act complained of constituted a practice normally authorized by the utility, satisfying the second step of the Allstate test. Valentin, supra, at ¶22.
{¶32} As in Valentin, here, appellants claimed that too much power was provided to their home causing damage to their electronics. In other words, appellants claimed there was a problem with their service that resulted from Ohio Edison‘s improper connection of the power lines to the utility pole. As a result, the act
{¶33} Moreover, the practice of repairing and replacing utility poles and power lines is specifically authorized by
{¶34} Each electric utility shall establish and maintain written programs, procedures, and schedules for the * * * repair and replacement of its transmission and distribution circuits and еquipment. These programs shall establish preventative requirement for the electric utility to maintain safe and reliable service.
{¶35} For this additional reason, the repair and replacement of an electric utility‘s utility poles and the attachment of power lines to those poles are practices normally authorized by Ohio Edison.
{¶36} Further, contrary to appellants’ argument that they could not recover their damages if they filed their complaint with PUCO,
{¶37} If any public utility * * * does * * * any act * * * prohibited by Chapters 4901., 4903., 4905., 4907., 4909., 4921., 4923., and 4927. of the Revised Code, or declared to be unlawful, or omits to do any act * * * required by the provisions of those chapters, * * * the public utility * * * is liable to the person * * * injured thereby in treble the amount of damages sustained in consequence of the violation, failure, or omission.
{¶39} In summary, no matter how their claim is labeled, appellants are complaining about a service regularly provided by Ohio Edison. In view of the foregoing analysis, we agree with the trial court‘s finding that, under the second part of the Allstate test, the answer to the question whether the act complained of constituted a practice normally authorized by Ohio Edison, the answer is also “yes.”
{¶40} We therefore hold that because both questions of the Allstate test are properly answered in the affirmative, the trial court did not err in finding that appellants’ claim is within PUCO‘s exclusive jurisdiction.
{¶41} For the reasons stated in this opinion, appellants’ assignment of error is overruled. It is the order and judgment of the court that the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
concur.