93 Va. 214 | Va. | 1896
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Chancery Court of Richmond city, and the case grows out of the following agreement:
“ This agreement, made and entered into this 2nd day of Nov., 1889, between Merriwether Jones, of the first part, and S. S. Murphy, of the second part.
“ Witnesseth: That the Clover Hill mines and mining property, and [the] land of the late Franklin Stearns, both situated in Chesterfield county, Virginia, have been put upon the market; and the parties to this agreement have agreed that each shall use his best endeavors to sell the said lands, as a whole or in part, and that each of the parties hereto shall receive one-third of the money or other consideration paid, or to be paid for said property above the actual cost paid to the owners, either as a profit or as commissions. The remaining third is hereby agreed to be paid to, James R, Werth, Esq. The necessary traveling expenses are tobe deducted out of the net consideration or profits.
(Signed) Merriwether Jones.
S. S. Murphy.”
The averments of the bill filed by Murphy against Merriwether Jones and James R. Werth, after referring to the above agreement, are substantially as follows:
That, while the said Werth’s name is not affixed to this agreement, he not only knew of and consented thereto but allowed and encouraged complainant and Jones to act under the same, and' acted under the same himself, and, as complainant believes and charges, agreed in writing, signed by him, as well as orally, to be bound by the terms thereof, &c.; that sometime before this agreement was entered into, complainant had made and faithfully carried out an agreement with Jones to divide the profits arising from sale of lands,
It is further averred, that Jones, or Jones and Werth, had put $5,000.00 of the profits thus realized in an option on some other of the land mentioned in the agreement of 1889, which will not expire for a year or more—said $5,000.00 to be treated as part payment on the land if the option is closed; that complainant expended money in traveling expenses under the terms of the contract of November, 1889, and not only procured the said Dininy, the purchaser, but continuously in season and out of season, in New York, New Jersey, and afterwards in Colorado, where he went before the sale to Dininy was concluded, endeavored to sell the balance,
Jones and Werth filed their separate demurrer and answer to this bill, and in their answer set up as a defence against the claim asserted by Murphy, that Murphy, after the above agreement was made, had left Virginia and abandoned the agreement, or had failed, when required to do so, to put up his share of certain moneys needed to effectuate the sale made to Dininy. The demurrer was overruled, and the cause was referred to a commissioner who made a report of the transactions between these parties showing the amount due to Murphy from Jones and Werth to be $7,231.17. Exceptions were filed to the report by the plaintiff and the defendant Jones, but iwere overruled, and the report of the commissioner confirmed, and the decree, which is appealed from, after reciting that the plaintiff admitted that he had received satisfaction from James R. Werth, for the one-half of the profits of the plaintiff received by Werth in full of
The demurrer raised the question of equity jurisdiction only, and appellant insists that the demurrer should have been sustained on the ground that the complainant’s bill did not make a case for equity jurisdiction. We are of opinion that the demurrer was properly overruled, as the bill upon its face shows that the agreement under which the parties had acted made them partners; that there were partnership accounts between the parties which were properly to be stated and settled by a court of equity, and that the remedy of the complainant was not complete at law.
In order that persons may be partners in the legal acceptation of the word, it is requisite that they shall share something by virtue of an agreement to that effect, and that that which they have agreed to share shall be the profit arising from some predetermined business engaged in for their common benefit. An agreement that something shall be attempted with a view to gain, and that the gain shall be shared by the parties to the agreement is the grand characteristic of every partnership, and is the leading feature of nearly every definition of the term. 1 Lindley on Partnership, p. 1; Story on Part., sec. 2; Duvos & Co., v. Hoover &c. 25 Fla. 727; Lengle v. Smith, 48 Mo. 276; Cothran v. Marmaduke & Brown, 60 Tex. 370.
In the last named case it was said' that it is not essential to constitute a partnership that the parties are by agreement to share in the losses of the business; it is sufficient if they are to have a community of interest in the profits as such, and that where a party to the agreement was entitled to an interest in the profit this would entitle him to an account to ascertain the result of the enterprise.
In the case of Lengle v. Smith, supra, the parties entered
In the case here the agreement between the parties contemplated and provided for the selling on commission, or the purchase and sale at a profit, of several tracts of land (eight of which were in fact sold to Dininy), which agreement was indefinite in its continuance, the deduction from the net profits, whether these consisted of money or land, of the expenses of the parties, and the division of these net profits thus arrived at, into three equal parts, one of which was to go to Jones, one to Murphy, and one to Werth. These lands were not to be sold all at once, but could be sold, as they were, part at one time and part at another. It provided, in fact, for a series of transactions, involving expenditure of time, skill, and expense by the parties. The parties to the agreement being partners, and the bill showing that of necessity there were accounts to be taken to ascertain the result of the enterprise, the remedy of the complainant was only complete in a court of equity.
In the case of Smith v. Marks, 2 Rand. 452, this court said: “The principle of interference is, that courts of law either cannot give a remedy, or cannot give so complete a remedy as equity.”
The evidence in this case consists of a long correspondence between the parties, especially between Jones and Murphy, and the depositions of the parties themselves, and it discloses that, at the time of the agreement above set forth, Werth held an option on the Stearns property, consisting of a number of tracts of land situated in Chesterfield county, and on other property in that county, which option expired in March, 1890, and that Werth had engaged Jones to assist
This letter is far from being candid. It utterly fails to disclose the real situation. It does not tell of the real transaction with Dininy. Perhaps, if it had, Murphy would have readily agreed to execute his note, as the result showed that he would have run no risk in doing so, and Jones ran none, and did not have one dollar to raise that was not realized from the cash and the notes received from Dininy—Dininy having paid promptly his note, and the first falling due in ample time to meet the note given by Jones to the Citizens Bank. These are the conditions upon which Jones seeks to deprive Murphy of his interest in the profits realized, in part at least, from the energy, skill, and effort of Murphy, and he seems to have had himself serious question as to his right to thus deprive Murphy of his interest in these profits, for we find upon the examination of the record that the “ bold parties” to whom Jones in his letter to Murphy refers as being willing to give Murphy |2,000.00 for his interest and assume his proportion of the responsbility, &c-., is no other than Jones himself. On cross-examination of Jones, he was asked who it was that he had gotten to agree to pay Murphy the $2,000.00 and assume his responsibility, &c., and his answer was that Mr. Werth had said if Murphy would return any contract he ■had with him that he would take them and pay $2,000.00 for them, but that he did not wish to be known in the transaction. This statement is not corroborated by Werth, who testifies in the case, nor in any way by the record, Upon a
Affirmed.