The opinion of the Court was delivered by
This is a feigned issue to try the validity of a certain instrument of writing dated the 16th April 1837, purporting to be the last will and testament of Peter Shade, deceased.
The defendants deny it to be his last will, because they aver that the testator after that date, viz. on or about the 17th June 1837, made another will,, different in its dispositions, revoking all former wills, and that said will was destroyed, or suppressed by fraud. If the defendants can substantiate the truth of this statement, the paper writing of the- 16th April cannot be admitted to probate; and whether there was a subsequent instrument containing different and inconsistent dispositions from the former will, or a clause revoking all former wills, are the great questions in the cause.
Before entering into a particular examination of the case, I wish to premise that the poiixt is not whether the evidence was sufficiently strong to establish the making of a will subsequent to the 16th April, but (from the course which the court below have thought right to pursue) it is whether there was evidence given or withheld proper to be submitted to the jury for their decision.
The 13th section provides that no will in writing concerning real estate shall be repealed, nor shall any devise or direction therein be altered otherwise than by some other will or codicil in writing declaring the same, executed and proved in the same manner as is hereinbefore provided; or by burning, cancelling, or obliterating or destroying the same by the testator himself, or by some one in his presence and by his express direction. And the 14th section makes the same provision respecting wills bequeathing personal property.
It is not alleged that the testator cancelled, obliterated or destroyed the first will. The defence rests on the first clause of the 13th section of the Act. In the construction of that clause it is conceded that an instrument purporting to be a last will and testament, must have the same attestation, &c. to operate as a revocation, as is requisite to give it validity as a will. But although a will must be proved regularly by two witnesses, yet circumstances may supply the want of one witness, when they go directly to the immediate act of disposition. Eyster v. Young, (3 Yeates 511); Reynolds v. Reynolds, (16 Serg. & Rawle 87); Miller v. Carothers, (6 Serg. & Rawle 215). It has also been ruled (and with these principles, as will be hereafter seen, we do not interfere) that the contents of such second will must in general be found, and the contents so found must appear to be inconsistent with the dispositions of the former will, to operate as a revocation; and that if part is inconsistent and part is consistent, the first will shall only be revoked pro tanto, and to the extent of these discordant dispositions. 3 Wilson 497; Cowp. 87; 7 Bro. P. C. 344. But it is not necessary (as I conceive) where the will is destroyed, and especially where it is suppressed or destroyed by fraud, to prove the precise facts in which the latter will so set up as a revocation of a former will differs from it. For if the jury find expressly, or infer from circumstances (which I shall show hereafter they may), that the dispositions made by the second will are inconsistent with the dispositions in the former, that is a sufficient ground to decide the latter will a revocation. And this seems to be the opinion of Mr Powell, in his Treatise on Devises, p. 519.
In conformity to the principles above stated, the plaintiff having given the ordinary proof of the execution of the first will, it is incumbent on the defendant, to sustain his case, to prove to the satisfaction of the jury the factum of a subsequent will, and that it was suppressed or destroyed by fraud. These preliminary points
The points above indicated are the natural order in which the case should be viewed, for, it will be observed, if the defendants fail in sustaining either of the two first propositions, the third, which is a corollary from them, cannot arise.
1. As to the factum of a will subsequent in date to the writing of the 16th April 1837. It is admitted that a revoking will must be in writing, that it must be attested by two witnesses, or by one witness accompanied by proof of circumstances which go directly to the immediate act of disposition; and the first question to which the attention of the court and jury must be directed, is, have these indispensable requisites of the Act been complied with ? If the jury find against the defendants on this point, further inquiry is needless. And the first thing which strikes the mind is, that no person can examine the testimony without coming to the conclusion that .the testator made two, and but two wills, one on the 16th April 1837, the other a short time before or after that date. This is put beyond the possibility of doubt by the concurring testimony of Dr Klapp and Samuel Green, one a witness for the plaintiffs, the other for the defendants. The only conceivable difficulty which can arise is, whether the instrument which it is sought to set up as a revoking will, be subsequent or prior in date to the I6th April; and next, whether the witnesses refer to one and the same instrument of writing. Without stopping to inquire whether when a will is regularly attested one witness may prove its contents or the date of it, where the date becomes material, here we cannot fail to observe there are two witnesses, with a variety of circumstances to confirm their statements, who depose that the writing in question was executed on or about the 17th June 1837, and, of coui'se, subsequent to the will now in issue. For on this part of the case the jury will pay great attention to the testimony of Samuel Green and Susan Green, corroborated, as they unquestionably are, by strong and cogent motives which the testator had after the execution of his first will to make a different disposition of his property. The testimony (and I refer as well to the testimony rejected as that which was received) discloses this case. The testator, aged 70 years, lying helpless in bed in the extremity of sickness, believing he had serious cause of displeasure against a young and favourite child, on the 16th April 1837, some three or four months before his death, made his last will and testament, containing a devise to his second wife and to her daughter, who was a stronger to his blood, and also this item: “I consider that Maria Jones (his daughter by a former wife) has had her full share of my said estate in moneys improperly taken, moneys loaned, and property improperly taken.” That a misapprehension of improper conduct by his child was the operating cause of this
But another reason suggests itself equally cogent. The will of the 16th April contains an imputation of dishonesty in his own child, a direct charge of embezzlement and fraud. In the full 'flow of returning affection, he must naturally be anxious to prevent so disgraceful a charge from going on the records of the county. This is a conclusion from which no parent will dissent, and it may account for the fact that he preferred executing a new will rather than making the necessary alteration by means of a codicil. In the one case he gets rid of an odious imputation; in the other he perpetuates it. But it is said there is some conflict in the testimony of Dr Klapp and Green and wife; but it will be for the jury to say whether this is not more fanciful than real, The only thing of which Dr Klapp appears to have been certain was, that he witnessed two wills. After having proved the first will, he says, “ To the best of my recollection I witnessed another will. It is impossible for me to recollect whether the will hereto annexed (meaning the will of the 16th April) marked (A), is the first or last will. Both wills were witnessed by me during the course of my visits in his last sickness. Of course I cannot say that the facts I have stated in relation to the acknowledgment of the will refer to the first one I witnessed or the last one. I cannot specify the time that elapsed between the' execution of the first and last will. I should suppose that the period of time may not
We will now notice the next subdivision of the factum of a subsequent will; that is to say, we will next inquire whether Dr Klapp and Samuel Green refer to the same instrument. It appears that the testator, at periods of time not far distant from each other, executed two wills, and we have not the least reason to believe he made more than two wills. Dr Klapp was a witness to two wills, and Samuel Green was a witness to one will. From this we arrive at the conclusion that as Dr Klapp was a witness to both wills, one in conjunction with John V. Tittermary, the will of 16th April, and there were but two wills, and Mr Green was a witness to one wi.ll only, they must have attested the same instrument. There was no other writing to which Dr Klapp could be a witness except the one attested by Green. Dr Klapp says neither of the wills was read over to him. He has no recollection of the first will being produced when the last was subscribed. He then adds, the testator, to the best of his recollection, assigned some reason for the making another will, the nature of which he does not recollect. This part of the testimony bears not only on this point, but the time of the factum of the revoking will; for the inquiry is pertinent, what motive could he have had so probable as that he felt it a duty to alter the unjust and unequal provisions of the will of the 16th April, obliterating, as far as he could, the cruel and as he was afterwards no doubt convinced unfounded aspersions on the character of an unoffending, or at any rate repentant child. A difference is also suggested in this, that Green states he was the first witness to the will of the 17th June, whereas Dr Klapp says, to the best of his recollection, he was the first witness to the second will, drawing an argument from this against the identity of the instrument. To this it may be replied that Dr Klapp testifies he cannot say that the facts stated by him in relation to the acknowledgment of the will refer to the first or the last will. By this it appears how confused and imperfect is his memory, confounding the one instrument with the other. Besides, it is not altogether improbable that this impression may be produced by a mistake as to the instrument; for, in truth, he was the first witness to the will of the 16th April. For these reasons we are of
The factum of the will being established, another question, necessary to the defence, presents itself. Was the will so made destroyed or suppressed by fraud? This, which is peculiarly a question of fact, presupposes that a will was made by the testator after the date of the first will. The next inquiry then is, was the second will cancelled by the testator himself, or by some person in his presence and by his express direction? or was it destroyed or has it been suppressed by others, without his privity and consent? In the investigation of this point the first and most natural inquiry is, to whose custody and control was the paper committed? It is idle to say it was in the actual custody of the testator. The condition of his health and all the testimony are in opposition to this idea. It is in proof the first will, in which, be it remembered, Mrs Shade is a devisee, and her brother, Daniel R. Murphy, one of the executors, was in the possession of Mrs Shade or Daniel R. Murphy, or of both; and the jury will have the right, under the facts disclosed, to infer that the subsequent paper was committed to her care also. I do not say they are bound to make this inference, but they may infer it without doing any violence to the probabilities of the case. If a subsequent devise was made, and that, with the first, went into the custody of Mrs Shade or Mr Murphy, the next and most natural inquiry will be, what has become of it ? One of two things must have taken place. It was either cancelled by the testator, which he had an undoubted right to do, or it has been suppressed or destroyed by those to whose custody it was committed. The jury must choose between the one or the other of these alternatives. It is an undeniable principle, that while a will is in the possession of the testator, the presumption is that it has been cancelled by himself. But was this paper in the possession of the testator ? Practically it was not, for the evidence show's it was under the control and in the power of the wife, or of his executor.
But is it probable it was destroyed by the testator himself, or in his presence and by his express directions ? If it was, how easy to have proof of it! The absence of such proof is an argument against it. Besides, the very reasons which have been assigned for making a second will are those which make it so difficult to believe that he could have been induced to cancel it. The very supposition is a gross libel on his parental feelings, as there is no evidence, but directly the reverse, that anything afterwards occurred to alienate his affections from his erring but repentant child. He died, as is shown, in her arms. For these reasons and others which may be suggested, the jury may be of the opinion it was neither destroyed by him nor by his orders, or with his con
From the remarks which have been made, it will appear that we entirely differ from the court in their positive instruction given to the jury, that there is no evidence of fraud or spoliation, either as against the plaintiff or any one else. Without undertaking to express an opinion on the weight of it, we think there is testimony which should be submitted to the jury, and of which they alone are the legitimate judges.
But the court further instruct the jury, that if there had been evidence of these facts, that is, the factum of a subsequent will, and its destruction or spoliation by any person other than the testator himself, it would still be necessary to prove what the contents of the will alleged to be destroyed were, and to show that it was a revocation of this, in whole or in part, and in what particular it revokes this will. For this position the court relies on Morton v. Clark, (5 Rawle 235); Lawson v. Morrison, (2 Dall. 286); Sir Henry Killgrew’s Case, (Salk. 592); and Goodright v. Harwood, (3 Wils. 497, 2 Black. 937, and Comp. 87).
It is not denied that in the ordinary case of a disposing will lost or destroyed, and where there is no allegation of fraud, in addition to proof of the factum of the will, it is requisite to prove its contents; and this from necessity, for it is obvious it cannot operate as a disposition of the property without proof of its contents. So, if the instrument which was intended to be a will and not merely a-revocation, cannot operate as a will, it cannot, as appears from all the authorities, take effect as a revocation. But even this doctrine must be taken with some qualification; for a will, though rendered inoperative by extrinsic circumstances, may revoke a former will. Thus, if properly executed and attested to pass freehold lands according to the statute of Cha. 2, though it should be prevented from operating by the incapacity of the devisee or any other matter dehors the will, the former will is nevertheless revoked by it. So a will devising lands in fee to the heir at law, though void as to the purpose of a will, yet operates as a revocation if attested according to the statute. 1 Vez. Jun. 17; Ellis v. Smith, (8 Vez. Jun. 370); 4 Roll. Af. 615; 1 Roberts on Wills 199. With much more reason is it that where a will is rendered inoperative as a will by the fraud of a person interested in its destruction, it will nevertheless operate as a revocation. It is better, surely, that a person should die intestate, than that a
If, therefore, on another trial the jury should find the factum of a subsequent will, and that this will was destroyed or withheld by fraud, they may, and, as I conceive, are bound to infer that the second will contained inconsistent dispositions with the first; nay more, in odium spoliatoris, that the second will contained a clause expressly revoking all former wills. In point of law it must be
In conclusion, I have to remark that I have examined the several bills of exception, and it seems to me that in every case the evidence ought to have been received. The evidence rejected by the court has a bearing more or less direct on the factum of the revoking will, as well as the imputed fraud in its destruction. On the whole case we are of the opinion the facts were improperly withdrawn from the jury, and that the judgment must be reversed and a venire de novo awarded.
Judgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.