Jones v. Muir

JUDGMENT ON WHEREOF, CONSIDERATION it is now hereby ordered and adjudged by this Court that the order Commonwealth Court is reversed.

LARSEN, Justice, dissenting.

I dissent and in support thereof cite the Commonwealth opinion case, Court filed this Orage Commonwealth, v. Administration, 85 Pa.Commw.Ct. 482 A.2d

Office 1174 (1984), Judge Williams, and authored by dis- my sent v. Guthrie The Borough Wilkinsburg, 505 Pa. (1984). 478 A.2d 1279

515 A.2d 855 JONES, al., Appellees, Carol et

v. MUIR, Acting William Insurance Commissioner al., Pennsylvania, Appellants. et Commonwealth Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of

Argued May 1986. Sept.

Decided Harrisburg, appellants. L. for Harvey, Michael Media, Curran, Winning, appel- for E.J. William J. Robert lees. LARSEN, FLAHERTY, C.J., NIX,

Before HUTCHINSON, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA PAPADAKOS, JJ.

OPINION McDERMOTT,Justice. of the Commonwealth from an order appeal

This is an firm to the law expenses counsel fees awarding Court Jones, in a suit com- Carol represented appellee, which subject Court. her in Commonwealth by menced Catastrophic Loss the establishment suit involved (CAT Fund). Trust Fund February

On the General Assembly enacted the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility part Law.1 Act Fund, established the CAT was designed which provide certain benefits Commonwealth residents for medical treatment and injuries rehabilitative services for arising out maintenance or use motor vehicle the United States or Canada. See Pa.C.S. 1761-1769. §§ The CAT Fund was to be levying funded an initial charge upon motor vehicles registered $5 the Common- wealth. 75 Pa.C.S. 1762. The Act directed that this charge was to be remitted to an agent designated Department, Insurance in turn who would remit charge Department Insurance deposit fund. trust Id. To enforce payment the Act directed PennDOT to renewal, refuse registration, transfer registration of motor any vehicle to the charge which attached there until was proof charge that the had paid. been 75 Pa.C.S. 1763. The 1, of the was effective date Act 1984. October § to appoint

Pursuant the Act’s direction party to a to collect the charge, Department the promul- $5 Insurance gated proposed regulations designated which in- individual companies surance to collect the charge their automo- bile policyholders. Department’s The rationale for this procedure to create a mechanism match to the roster persons having purchased paid insurance automobile and charge, against the CAT Fund roster the of automobile registrants, and thereby discover both uninsured motorists and failing charge. regula- those to the CAT pay Fund The tions were presented Independent Review Regulatory (IRRC)2 2, August Commission on 1984. a 5-0 the vote 12, 1984, 10, amended, 1. Act of Feb. P.L. No. as Pa.C.S. §§ I— seq. et 2. This Commission was composed appointed by of five commissioners Assembly proposed and the to Governor leaders of General review regulations agencies evaluating of executive with a toward their view benefits, conformity inflationary impact, legislative cost and intent. Subject powers overriding Attorney to certain and the General Governor, power disapprove proposed had the Commission regulations Pennsylvania publication and bar their in the Bulletin. regulations August on 1984. rejected proposed

IRRC Thereafter, regulations in an proposed were revised to meet the IRRC’s concerns and attempt resubmitted 6, 1984, September on September the IRRC On again rejected proposed regula- 3-2 the IRRC a vote to- Department began working tions. The Insurance then submitting revised time proposing regulations ward meeting before the IRRC on Septem- for the next scheduled 20, 1984. ber

However, 7, 1984, Jones, September appellee, on Carol Complaint Equity filed in Commonwealth Court a mandatory injunc- a Special Injunction, seeking Petition as directing charges PennDOT to collect the CAT Fund tion registration motor Department’s vehicle part of complaint sought also program. fee collection renewal That costs and counsel fees. same appellee’s payment granted temporary injunc- a Judge President Crumlish day Thereafter, charges. to collect the requiring tion PennDOT 18th, on hearings were held 12th and September on appellee’s on com- Proceedings injunction. merits a similar com- proceedings consolidated with on plaint were Federation of Penn- the Insurance filed on behalf of plaint companies. and certain insurance sylvania an Department submitted time the Insurance During this rejected regula- publication order for administrative Bulletin, with a view toward Pennsylvania tions in the regula- from the Governor obtaining certification making emergency, thereby to an meet required tions were days being to 120 while up for regulations effective the permitted by This was Assembly. by the General reviewed 745.6(b). Act,3 71 P.S. Regulatory Review terms of the § the such Thornburgh issued 26, 1984, Governor September On however, day, same That emergency certification. an 633, 181, 15, 25, 1982, § P.L. No. Regulatory of June Review Act 745.14, expired 1985. on December 745 to 71 P.S. 1-14, 25, 1982, as amended. This §§ No. Act June P.L. 3. of 31, 1985. expired effective December Act Judge Crumlish entered a preliminary injunction directing the Insurance Commissioner designate to PennDOT as the agent fee, to collect and present $5 regulations governing IRRC collection of the fee.

Appellants4 took an from appeal that this order to Court. In a four-to-three vote we Judge affirmed Crumlish’s di- rection that PennDOT temporarily collect the CAT fund charge,5 and remanded the action to Court Commonwealth for final on disposition the merits. hearing

While final on the merits pending, was still into parties agreement entered settlement on December 1984, which provided for charge collection the CAT Fund independent, an non-profit corporation. appel- Because disputed appellee’s alleged right lants to attorney’s fees the agreed later, that parties that issue upon would be decided appellee’s application to the Commonwealth Court. 18, 1985,

On January appellee filed an application hearing fees and costs. After a on the matter Judge Colins of the Commonwealth Court issued an order $37,887.50 fees, awarding as counsel as and costs $481.75 and expenses appellee’s attorneys. These and costs were to paid be the CAT Fund. Judge Colins based to an entitlement award of counsel fees on his finding attorneys’ efforts implementation resulted a system funding for the of the CAT Fund. Characterizing fund, “creating” these efforts as the court held that the entitled to attorneys equitable, were an award under the fund, “common” doctrine. Muir, Appellants Acting consist William Insurance Commissioner Pennsylvania and Commonwealth the Commonwealth of Larson, Pennsylvania, Secretary Department; Thomas Insurance D. Transportation Pennsylvania Department Transportation; and Board, through Catastrophic Loss Trust Fund Johna- Acting Neipris, than F. Executive Director. Larsen, Flaherty, por-

5. Justices from that Hutchinson dissented directing tion of our until order PennDOT collect the fee final disposition of matter Court. in Commonwealth 540 to raise appellants

On of the award this Court6 appeal of Because challenges to the lower court’s order. various fund question equitable of whether the our resolution attorney’s fees apply should an award of justify doctrine challenges.7 case need not address all of those this we the The Code establishes costs for Judicial allowable litigation: of conduct prescribe by general shall rule governing authority

The of governing imposition the and taxation the standards costs, costs, including the items which constitute taxable costs, shall and the discretion litigants who bear such the responsibil- the amount and modify the courts vested All and related system costs matters. ity specific general rules. by shall be bound such personnel rules, governing authority general such the prescribing considerations, among guided following the by shall be others: item taxable costs Attorney’s are not an

(1) fees (relating the extent authorized section except to fees). to receive counsel participants to right of (2) his costs party The should recover prevailing the: litigant except where the unsuccessful existence, disposi- or possession (i) Costs relate borne tion of fund and costs should be fund. public question is a where

(ii) Question involved purpose law is uncertain and applicable clarify the law. primarily is litigants rule work substantial (iii) would Application injustice. Code, pursuant Act to the Judicial in this Court is vested

6. Jurisdiction amended, 9, 1976, Pa.C.S. as July § P.L. No. 723(a). § equitable applicability fund challenging the In addition to doctrine, attorney’s preclud- is appellants an award of claim that 1726(2)(ii) underlying action in- because the ed under Pa.C.S. purpose of was to public question volved a barred under clarify They claim the award is also the law. sovereign immunity. doctrine (3) imposition multiple actual costs or a thereof be used as a may for violation of penalty general rules or rules of court. added)

(emphasis Pa.C.S. 1726.8 § The authority awarding fees is contained in attorney’s Code, Section 2503 of the provides perti- Judicial which part: nent

The following participants shall entitled to a be reason- able counsel part fee as of the costs taxable matter:

[*] ^{[*] [*]} >fc ^[*] # (8) Any participant who is awarded counsel fees out of a fund within the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to any general rule relating to an award of fees from a fund within jurisdiction the court. 2503(8).9

42 Pa.C.S. Although this Court has not estab- § any explicit lished rule specifying the circumstances under allowed,10 which an award of attorney’s fees from a fund is long recognized we have the common fund doctrine. That doctrine, doctrine, also equitable known as the fund is an to exception that, the “American” rule the absence of contract, statute or party each to is adversary required pay to his counsel fees. own

In Hempstead School, v. Meadville Theological Pa. 493, (1926), 134 A. 103 explained the doctrine was thusly:

Where the protect services a common fund for adminis- court, tration or distribution under the direction of the or where such fund has been raised for like it purpose, is liable for costs and in- expenses, including counsel fees 9, 1976, 586, 142, July 8. Act of P.L. 2.§ No. 9, 1976, 142, July

9. Act of P.L. No. 2.§ 10. As is evident from the language of Section 1726 of the Judicial Code, power prescribe 42 Pa.C.S. this Court’s under what § attorney’s may permitted circumstances an award of be is re- by legislative Assembly specifically stricted enactment of the General — Code, has, Section 2503 Judicial 42 Pa.C.S. 2503. This Court however, prescribed by general rule the factors to be considered in fixing attorney’s the amount of fees to be awarded where court is impose authorized to them. Pa.R.C.P. 1716. is case though protection This even given

curred. raising of a fund results from be may or what adversary litigation. termed properly Id., 495-96, 134 A. at 103. this rule of 286 Pa. at We find 2503(8), set parameters Section law be within validity. continued thus have “common fund” has been nar exception traditionally and most often applied, attorney’s invoked where the rowly preserved protected an estate or fund efforts have International Or waste, or fraudulent claims. dissipation America, Master, Local Mates and Pilots ganization Masters, Mates and v. International Organization No. 2 America, Inc., (1981); Pilots of Pa. 439 A.2d 621 Tose, Weed’s (1978); Estate of 482 Pa. 393 A.2d 629 Estate, Appeal, Manderson’s (1894); A. 163 Pa. 30 272 The has also (1886). 6 A. 893 doctrine been 113 Pa. it augmented the created fund or where services a applied v. Myers, new assets. Miller Pa. 150 A. 588 300 Moore, v. 70, 419 Shearer (1930); A.2d Pa.Super. is then (1980). for the services recovered Compensation itself, amongst the costs thereby spreading the fund supra. Organization, International the beneficiaries. the efforts created attorneys’ contends that her Appellee no was reached Fund, settlement CAT since before the and the fund was place charge, in to collect was system con- that the substantial benefits penniless. argues She not persons class of efforts on the attorneys’ her ferred fees. her to counsel in the entitled participating has the burden for counsel applicant Paper Fine Re See thereto. entitlement proving his/her Cir.1984). As not Litigation, (3rd Antitrust 751 F.2d this matter found above, in Court the Commonwealth ed which re attorneys provided legal services appellee’s that funding for system a implementation sulted the court concluded finding, this Fund. From the CAT entitled Fund and were the CAT “created” attorneys these their services. fee for reasonable to a Although this Court is not at liberty to disturb the finding finder, of the fact absent an abuse of discretion or lack of evidence, supporting we are free and required to review the legal conclusions drawn from the facts as found.

Accepting the lower court’s finding that this suit culminated establishing system fund, a collecting accept we cannot the deduction that the method of collec equal tion was legislative with the creation the fund itself.

The system proffered in this litigation was one of the options available Department; Insurance had this suit precipitous been less the very option suggested might have been considered. There nothing creative, was unique innovative appellee’s system. It was one of several proposals, any one of which could have effectuated what was the ineluctable intention of the legislature. An act creation remotely differs from its applications.

Indeed, purpose of the litigation not simply implementation of a viable collection system, but the estab- lishment of a collection system preferred by appellee and the Insurance Federation. Specifically, plaintiffs in the consolidated actions wanted PennDOT to collect the charge opposed as to system utilizing companies insurance as agents. the collection important It is to note that at the time the action was commenced the fund was not even existence; authorized to be that the Insurance Depart- ment was duly proceeding establishing acceptable an collection; method of and that the reason only Depart- the ment’s efforts had implementation not achieved of a collec- tion as of the system, appellee time filed complaint, her was due to the objections of the IRRC. Under these circum- stances the lower court’s conclusion implementation of a particular form of system collection created the fund was and, believe, a novel expansion we unwarranted of the meaning of “create” in the context common fund doctrine. a of

Clearly, appellee’s efforts did not claim establish “in right charges; to the CAT Fund that claim was not Tose, Estate 482 Pa. 393 A.2d 629 jeopardy”. See (1978). Liability charges the was established the by Act, that the Thus also directed fund be established. which was the Act. Nor did demon- by appellee the fund created the that her counsel’s efforts the assets of preserved strate fund; for there is no indication that the intervention of the decision-making process pre- court into this administrative endangered charges, augmented the amount served If collected, process. or hastened the collection charges intervention, appel- anything, the court’s necessitated complaint, stymied proce- the normal administrative lee’s being pursued by Depart- the Insurance dures which were most, to influence litigation At the effect of the was ment. statutory management Department’s the of the Insurance However, no effect on the duties. there was demonstrated of the fund. integrity financial analogous Hemp are those in The facts of this case to School, In that Theological supra. v. stead Meadville to brought dissenting trustees case, an action equity was from theological the of a school majority restrain trustees activities from transferring its institution educational Chicago, to and to restrain Pennsylvania its location to an Illinois property corporation. of its transfer restraining in a transfer of the litigation resulted decree school, prohibiting the trustees assets corporate strictly its business managing directing Meadville, Pennsylvania. This Court any place other but fees on the the lower court’s award reversed litigation was purpose and effect basis that trustees, pre managerial actions of the not control the fund, have property since the would property serve in Pennsylvania. safe in Illinois as been as instant and effect Similarly, purpose acts of the Insurance managerial control the merely the assets litigation preserved Department. Whether issue, purpose of the not the since the Fund was CAT 545 litigation was not to insure the integrity of the fund but to preferred obtain a method collection, of managing the a collection which in some form was inevitable. Under such circumstances the award of attorney’s fees was not justified under the common fund doctrine. inquiry

Our is not at an end. In support of her claim for fees, appellee alternatively relies on a theory extrapolated from the common fund doctrine, often referred to as the “common benefit” doctrine, doctrine. This which this Court adopted has neither nor expressly rejected, provides that attorney’s fees may be awarded to individuals whose litiga tion has substantially benefitted a persons class of not Cole, v. participating in Hall litigation. 1, 412 U.S. 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto- S.Ct. Co., Lite U.S. (1970). S.Ct. 24 L.Ed.2d 593 One distinction of the “common benefit” doctrine is that it is not limited to cases a involving fund within the jurisdic- Hall, tion of the court. For instance, supra, the theory applied to justify an award of counsel fees assessed against a union found guilty violating a right member’s Mills, supra, speech. of free In the theory was similarly applied to against assess fees corporation a which had been sued aby shareholder. That suit had brought been to set aside a merger which had been induced through the use of misleading proxy statement.

Another distinction of the “common benefit” doctrine is it is limited to instances where the beneficiaries are small in number and easily identifiable. example, For Hall, supra, the benefits accrued to members of the union who shared expense of counsel fees through their union. Mills, supra, the benefits accrued to the corporation and its shareholders who expense shared the through the corpo- ration.11 Appellee Pennsylvania also relies on Association State Mental Hospital Physicians Board, Employees’ v. State Retirement 87 Pa. (1984), Cmwlth. justified 483 A.2d 1003 in which the court an award of generated by counsel fees from an interest reserve fund employees state retirement fund on the basis of common benefit principles. The fees were awarded for services rendered in a class Pipeline Society, Alyeska Service Co. v. Wilderness

In 240, 1612, (1975), 421 44 141 the U.S. L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Supreme Court that the common explained United States theory benefit litigation

ill in the benefits accrue purported suits which In this common-fund and general public. Court’s decisions, the common-benefit classes beneficiaries in The bene- easily were small number identifiable. some accuracy, fits could be traced with there by that the costs could indeed reason confidence benefiting. some to shifted with exactitude those Id. at 39, 265, 1625-26, Consequently, n. 39. n. S.Ct. at unwilling to extend the common that case Court was to envi- theory justify to an award of counsel fees benefit initiated litigation interest who had groups ronmental permits Secretary issuance of prevent by pipeline. of the trans-Alaska oil Interior for construction purported appellees In the case the benefits present supposed general public.12 to accrue to the litigation were here do justify application Thus the circumstances not theory. the common benefit Alyeska, and, such as we public interest as case, awarded, are if at it, the instant counsel fees

perceive successfully challenging the method of Retirement Board’s action suit part-time employees participating calculating "credited service” for all system. question is a as to whether There difficult the retirement empowered apply Pennsylvania judiciary the common benefit is statutory Pennsylvania is where there no as in Association doctrine awarding is a of counsel fees for such an award. authorization this 42 Pa.C.S. statute in Commonwealth. matter controlled (8) Judicial Code autho- of Section 2503 of the Subsection § 2503. jurisdiction of a "within the fees out fund rizes an award upon clearly based While authorizes awards the court.” this doctrine, appear it not to authorize does traditional common fund involving not a fund within common cases awards in benefit 1943, Cole, Hall v. 412 U.S. 93 S.Ct. jurisdiction the court such as Co., (1973) 396 U.S. and Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1970). 24 L.Ed.2d 593 90 S.Ct. litigation actually bene- whether instant 12. As we remarked above general public public questionable would general is since fitted the the funds were col- inevitably howsoever benefit whomsoever be expect must done will done. that what be lected. We can all, under a “private attorney-general” theory. In Alyeska, the majority of the Court held that the circumstances under attorney’s which fees were to be awarded was a matter for Congress determine, if it so chose. Id. at at S.Ct. 1624. The Court viewed the common fund doctrine and the rules allowing attorney’s for willful disobedience of a order, court and for acting faith, in bad as assertions of the power inherent in the court to allow attorney’s fees particular situations, unless forbidden by Congress. at Id. 257-59, 95 However, S.Ct. at 1621-22. the Court held that the private attorney-general did theory not derive from the power. same The power to award attorney’s fees under theory alone, rests in Congress and the courts are not pick free to and choose which vindications of public interest warrant an award of attorney’s fees. Id. at 95 at S.Ct. 1627. we find

Similarly, power that the to authorize an award of attorney’s fees for the vindication of public interests embodied in the enactments of the General Assembly rests in exclusively The body. statute which enumerates the rights of litigants fees, to attorney’s 42 Pa.C.S. § bears this out. Section 2503 first enumerates nine tradi- recognized tionally awards, bases for such including the common fund doctrine. None of these nine authorize pri- vate attorney-general awards for vindication of public inter- ests.

In the subsection, tenth and final 2503(10), Section permits an award of attorney’s fees to “any partici other pant such may specified circumstances as be by statute heretofore or hereinafter enacted.” In accordance with this authorization, the General Assembly specified has by stat ute numerous circumstances in litigant which a may be awarded counsel Many fees. of these include actions to enforce public interests embodied enactments of Assembly.13 public General Since interest is not Examples following: appeals of such statutes include the Hearing permits, Environmental Board of issuance of industrial waste 691.307; provisions P.S. Building enforcement of certain traditional, created bases for an award judicially one fees, and the has chosen to attorney’s Assembly General fees, con- awarding we therefore govern attorney’s attorney’s that the to authorize awards of fees power clude theory, rests private attorney-general exclusively under is basis Assembly. statutory Since there no in the General attorney-general attorney’s award private for a case, of this no basis for an award under circumstances applicable. such fees is is the order of the Commonwealth Court Accordingly, reversed, pay all their own costs. parties

LARSEN, J., a dissenting opinion. files LARSEN, Justice, dissenting. dissent, support adopt

I thereof the Common- filed in this case and opinion Court memorandum wealth Honorable James Gardner Colins. authored Judge opinion: following is Colins 2659 C.D.

No. IN OF THE COMMONWEALTH COURT

PENNSYLVANIA May COLINS, Judge. BY MEMORANDUM OPINION Fioravanti, P.C., Curran, has Winning and The firm of fees, expenses and in connection for costs applied (petitioner) and the of Jones representation Carol with of motor owners, passengers and operators, of all class and all operated Pennsylvania, maintained vehicles against suit Pennsylvania brought who pedestrians within Act, 7201.315(a); Energy 35 P.S. enforcement § Conservation 30.63; Act, enforcement Disposal § Control 52 P.S. Coal Refuse Act, Land Conservation 52 P.S. Subsidence and Bituminous Mine Also, permit awards a of statutes which there are number 1406.13. § granted private rights in the enforcement of counsel fees for public General Assem- promote interests declared enactment Gasoline, Motor Accessories bly, e.g., Products and Vehicle Petroleum 202-1, Act, seq., Fair Business Feature Motion Picture P.S. et § Law, seq. 203-1 P.S. et Practices the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department Insurance al., (respondents) et for their failure to a system establish funding (CAT for the of the Catastrophic Loss Trust Fund Fund).1

The “CAT Fund” was to become effective on October 1984; however, 7, 1984, of September as petitioner the date complaint petition filed a special for injunction, respon- dents had not established a system funding for the “CAT Fund”. 7, 1984, September

On our special Court issued a injunc- ordering tion The Pennsylvania Department of Transporta- (PennDOT) tion to collect all necessary implement part “CAT Fund” as a of PennDOT’s Motor Vehicle Registration and Renewal Fee Program. Collection At this time, the question payment of costs and counsel fees was deferred pending final outcome of the case. 7, 1984,

On December pursu- class action was settled ant to agreement an entered by petitioner into and respon- Agreement dents. The Settlement provided for the identifi- cation the entities to collect charge, the “CAT Fund” collection, method of and the relationship of the “CAT Fund” collection system the PennDOT registration sys- counsel, tem. As a result of the petitioner’s efforts of for the system collection of the charge “CAT Fund” created. for petitioner Counsel spent have 145.25 hours connection with this action and are requesting a fee of One ($150.00) hour, Hundred Fifty per plus Dollars costs and expenses. Respondents’ counsel are opposing applica- tion for fees contending and costs that a rate of One ($150.00) Hundred Fifty per high Dollars hour too is pursuant 1. The “CAT Fund” was established to Sections 1761-1769 of Law, Responsibility the Motor Vehicle Financial Act 11 of provides funding payment Pa.C.S. 1761-1769 and §§ for the catastrophic seriously injured loss benefits to accident victims who expenses incur medical in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). Funding by levying charge shall occur an initial ($5.00) upon registered. required Five Dollars all motor vehicles to be Furthermore, Pennsylvania Department designate Insurance shall ($5.00) company party insurance an or other to collect the Five Dollar charge. efforts of counsel not that the did create a fund but that Legislature. fund was created respondents’ compel discovery, As a result of motion to 4, 1985, April requiring this Court issued an order dated redacted produce copies any counsel to bills. petitioner’s however, bills; produced counsel a Petitioner’s number 23, 1985, filed a April respondents on motion sanctions all petitioner’s produce to the fact that counsel did not due ($150.00) a rate of One Hundred Dollars Fifty which bills charged. hour per 29, 1985, hearing our held a on this matter April

On Court petition- from both sides on whether arguments and heard Dollars Fifty er’s counsel is entitled to fees One Hundred ($150.00) hour costs to be extracted from the “CAT per plus Fund”.2 forth in No. 1716 following factors as set Pa.R.C.P. reviewing determining court

are to be considered amount of counsel fees to be awarded:

(1) expended by the attor- reasonably the time and effort litigation; in the ney rendered;

(2) the of the services quality (3) upon conferred the results achieved benefits upon public; class or uniqueness

(4) magnitude, complexity, litigation; and on suc-

(5) contingent of a fee was receipt whether the cess. addition, must be considered existing case law should awarded if fees and costs be

determine create attorney the efforts of an instant matter. Where others, to a attorney is entitled a fund for benefit fund. See fee extracted reasonable to be Bank, 307 59 S.Ct. U.S. v. Ticonic National Sprague denying respon- April also issued an order our Court 2. On for Sanctions. dents’ Motion

551 (1939); Tose, 482 Pa. 393 83 L.Ed. Estate of (1978). A.2d pleadings petition- in this matter that

It is clear from prior created a fund that was not existence er’s counsel September The suit filed on instituting the action. was fund created three months. Since and a within effect great salutary of the “CAT Fund” has a the creation entitled to reasonable fees from public, counsel is on fund as a whole. counsel fees awarding underlying

The rationale an for the benefit of others attorney from a fund created legal representation proportionate- the costs of spread is to Otherwise, the suit. among those benefited ly of a lawsuit without who the benefit persons obtained enriched at the unjustly to its costs would be contributing litigant’s expense. successful Builders, Philadelphia v.

In Inc. Lindy Brothers Corp., Sanitary and Standard America Radiator Cir.1973), Appeals (3rd the Third Circuit Court F.2d 161 fees from a fund created awarding of counsel discussed fund doctrine equitable benefit of others under the for the stated: and is, however, the award of fees under authority for

There (citations the court omit- powers general equitable equitable under the ted). powers may, These equitable whose doctrine, compensate individuals fund be used settling litigation, commencing, pursuing actions and for their own in their own name solely if taken even in the interest, participating not persons a class of benefit omitted). at 165. (citations Id. fee for determining that the method It is axiomatic hourly multiply basis is to on an legal provided services hourly by the reasonable expended of hours total number fee, as the “lodestar” figure is known resulting rate. in light the lodestar fee or decrease a court can increase of the work quality and the involved contingencies Antitrust Litiga- Coal In Re Anthracite performed. See (M.D.Pa.1979). tion, 81 F.R.D. 499 After carefully reviewing all of the and listen- pleadings sides, ing arguments both we find that the 145.25 expended by petitioner’s hours counsel on this matter were litigation. reasonable and to the conduct of this necessary addition, indicate, as the coun- findings petitioner’s above negotiate sel were able to a settlement efficiently performed.3 due to the effectively quality work Petition- substantially expended er’s counsel limited the time in an of this complexity by being well-prepared, well-orga- action nized, willing quick to settle the matter in a fashion public. the best interests of the respect charged rate each hourly attorney, With is of the that the rate of Hundred Fifty this Court view One ($150.00) Curran, charged per Dollars hour Robert E.J. is in rates Esq., prevailing charged by accordance with education, with similar and attorneys backgrounds, experi- practicing attorneys working ence in the for locality firm; however, petitioning charged by Joseph the rate Fioravanti, reduced from Hundred Esq., M. shall be One ($150.00) hour to Hundred Fifty per Twenty- Dollars One ($125.00) hour. per five Dollars the lodestar fee in determining whether shall be two, multiplier of must consider by requested creased we (1) following magnitude, complexity, factors: and involved; (2) legal and factual issues absence novelty action; (3) or similar financial any prior governmental of counsel; (4) the petitioner’s by peti risk to result obtained class; (5) expertise petitioner’s of tioner’s counsel for the suit; (6) matter of the achievement of subject for the class with a minimum invest a substantial benefit (7) time; ment of of work submitted to this quality Court; (8) professional methods counsel which case. substantially expedited Municipal Authority v. Bloomsburg Pennsylva the Town Commonwealth (M.D.Pa.1981). nia, F.Supp. 982 (3) months after suit was institut- 3. Settlement occurred within three ed. multiplier requested two by petitioner’s counsel applied

will be to the lodestar fee contingent based on the case, nature of the and the quality of the work performed and results obtained.

Petitioner’s counsel have also requested reimbursement and expenses. costs Those expenses were reasonably necessary for the conduct of this litigation and are reason- Thus, able amount. they will be awarded.

ORDER NOW, AND this 13th day of firm May, Curran, Winning Fioravanti, P.C., is awarded the sum of Thirty-seven Thousand Eight Hundred Dol- Eighty-seven lars, Fifty ($37,887.50), Cents as fees and Four Hundred Dollars, Eighty-one ($481.75) Seventy-five Cents as costs expenses, for a total award of Thirty-eight Thousand Dollars, Three Hundred Sixty-nine ($38,- Twenty-five Cents 369.25), paid to be from the Catastrophic Loss Trust Fund.

Costs for the April are hearing to be assessed upon respondent.

/s/ James Gardner Colins COLINS, JAMES GARDNER JUDGE 515 A.2d 865 Pennsylvania, Appellee, COMMONWEALTH of

v. Rodney GRIFFIN, Appellant. Lawrence

Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of

Argued April 17, 1986. Sept.

Decided

Case Details

Case Name: Jones v. Muir

Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: Sep 25, 1986

Citation: 515 A.2d 855

Docket Number: 38 M.D. Appeal Dkt. 1985

Court Abbreviation: Pa.