*1 661 Everton, Downs, Angus Mary R. Alane Marianne DePaulo Plant, Valley, Hunt for petitioner. Love, Love, P.A., Baltimore,
David B. David B. for respon- dent. BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER,
Submitted to WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The Court having granted considered and petition writ of case, certiorari the above-captioned it is this 8th day 2001, February,
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals Maryland,
that the
judgment
be,
of the Court of Special Appeals
it is hereby,
vacated, and the case is remanded to
Special
the Court of
Appeals with directions to dismiss the appeal. See Dennis v.
412,
Folkenberg,
(1999);
354 Md.
v.
MID-ATLANTIC FUNDING COMPANY et al. Sept. Term,
No. 2000. Appeals
Court of Maryland.
Feb. *3 (Lisa Kerpelman Saul E. & E. Smith of Kerpelman Saul brief), Baltimore, Asoc., petitioners. on (David & Meyers, A. Carter of Rodbell Una M. Perez brief), Rosenbaum, P.A., Annapolis, Magdebur- Natalie C. on Whiteford, & Preston Taylor L. Marshall of ger (Raymond brief), Towson, (Morgan, L.L.P., Angus R. Everton Shels- on P.A., brief), Everton, Hunt Carlo, Valley, by, Downs & respondents. BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, before
Argued CATHELL, WILNER, F. HARRELL and LAWRENCE RODOWSKY, (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.
CATHELL, Judge. 5,1994, Holmes, individually Carrie May petitioners, On children, Erika minor Antonio Jones and on behalf her City Jones, Circuit Court for Baltimore filed an action1 (hereinafter Funding Co. Mid-Atlantic against Mid-Atlantic (hereinafter Funding), Inc. Darius Funding), Funding, Darius brought Interlineation Philip Hanson. Amendments Co.), (formerly Funding Inc. MD-A Mid-Atlantic Funding, (hereinafter Ben-Ezras), Con- and Julie Ben-Ezra Peter (hereinafter Man- Corporation sumer into the action.2 agement), and BBG *4 action, alleged 1. that her children had contracted In this Ms. Holmes respondents’ through negligence respondents and poisoning lead of negligence of Protection Act. Petitioner’s count violation the Consumer City alleged a of 702 the Baltimore also violation Article section Code. Ben-Ezras, Management, and are the Mr. Hanson The appeal. Funding, Funding, respondents Mid-Atlantic MD-A in this
665 Summary Motions for were Judgment by Philip filed Han- son, Ben-Ezras, Management. and Consumer After two hearings Summary Judgment, on the Motions for the Circuit City Court for Baltimore granted motions. Petitioners filed a Motion to Alter or Judgment. by Amend It was denied the Circuit filed an appeal Court. Petitioners to the Court of Special Appeals. Management Because BBG not had a judgment it, petitioners final entered against had to voluntari- ly dismiss initial appeal they their so could dismiss BBG from the suit. Petitioners then tiled a new appeal to the of Special Court Appeals. (in 27, 2000 Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Com- April
On pany, Md.App. (2000)), 638 A.2d Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision the Circuit Court for City. Baltimore Petitioners filed a Petition for ofWrit Certio- rari granted this Court. We their Petition. Petitioners presented have two questions for our review:
I.
Is a landlord’s
knowledge
lead hazards in a rented
premises a jury issue to
totality
be decided
under this
Court’s recent ruling in Brown v.
evidence
Dermer,
[344,
(2000),
Md.
II. Does this
Pittman v. Atlantic Real-
Court’s ruling
Co.,
ty
513[,
(2000)
was not the Complaint served with Funding partici- and Darius not has pated any pleadings.
666 I, that a trial court should In we hold question to response Dermer, v. Brown in test follow the enunciated a motion summary (2000), ruling when on A.2d trial hold that the poisoning in a case.3 We judgment lead Appeals the of Special Court improperly granted, court judi- the case sub in affirmed, summary judgment improperly the of Special ce. decision of Court shall reverse the We the for that court to reverse decision with instructions Appeals to case City and remand the of for Baltimore the Circuit Court consistent with proceedings for further to the Circuit Court the the decision of reversing this we are opinion. Since in to Special Appeals respect the of Circuit Court and Court II,4 I, question although we do we need not address question to be a Pittman case first the instance. not this perceive 14, 2000, January after opinion v. Dermer filed 3. Our in Brown Therefore, the in this case. court rendered the decision the trial guidance to the trial court. holding was not available as of Brown brief, petitioners’ petitioners’ counsel made several note that in We practice. place appellate He stated: have little statements that Special Appeals analysis is based the of the Court is clear that [I]t judge’s the appellate view.... Neither does upon the insulated understand____The prepare him Court of judge’s experience life to privi- world Appeals judge’s world is not the of the under Special leged, of the tenement dweller.... speculation up come with again below uses wild to [T]he ... Court explanation.... explanation This ... reveals how the Court an Appeals through privileged lens Special views facts socioeconomic reality living conditions---- to see the Plaintiffs’ that refuses willing up any explanation of to come with Court below seems [T]he jury to the Plaintiffs do not receive trial. the facts ensure that comical, analysis it were not such a would be almost if The Court’s tragedy.... life real completely although petitioners’ counsel aware that want to make We points, respect right party of each to make their counsel should we judge to that a assumptions be to as the environment hesitant make currently more resides in. Counsel should be even hesitant raised in or proceedings court and to assumptions to on such formal comment judges to environmental improperly attribute the decisions those of, of, he aware If counsel is not aware then should become factors. Maiyland which preamble Rules of Professional Conduct are, provides lawyers’ responsibilities part: in relevant
Facts genuine disputes There are as the material facts of this case. we examining granting Because are of a motion for summary we will judgment, light examine facts *6 the case sub nonmoving to party most favorable the —in judien, petitioners. children,
Carrie Holmes and two of her Antonio Jones and Jones,5 Avenue, Erika moved to 1229 Central a North two- story row on east of City, house located the side Baltimore in signed sometime 1984-85.6 Carrie Holmes a written lease with Management,7 Consumer was managing prop- which the Ben-Ezras, erty purchased for the who had property the September of 1983.8 Ms. inspected Holmes testified that she the that property prior moving in and the “was in property fair chipped paint, condition. There wasn’t no nothing. no It advocate, lawyer zealously position
As the asserts client’s under the adversary system. rules the . .. of lawyer respect system ... should legal A demonstrate for the and it, judges including [Emphasis for those who serve . ... added.] (Judicial officials) legal Maryland Rule 8.2 and Rules Profes- sional Conduct states that: (a) lawyer A shall not lawyer make a statement that the knows to disregard be false falsity concerning or with reckless as to its truth or qualifications judge. the integrity [Emphasis ... added.] 1, was August Antonio Jones born on 1983 and Erika 5. was born Jones 1, on November may 6. Erika not Jones have been when bom Ms. Holmes first moved into 1229 North Central Avenue. 7. Consumer property management company is a manages approximately properties. 150 to 200 landlords, manages properties for providing arranging services such as collection, evictions, repairs, for rent renting properties. and vacant conveyed 8. The property Ben-Ezras the at 1229 North Central Avenue 1987, 28, Funding February to Darius for the consideration $11,500.00. Funding conveyed Darius property then to Mid-Atlan- Funding tic Funding on March 1987. Mid-Atlantic then leased the property ninety-nine Funding years. back to Darius for Darius Fund- ing Philip then transferred the lease to Hanson on March 519,100.00. a consideration way all through.”9 nice clean already painted was however, house, Ms. start- into the row Holmes moving After For paint peeling.10 example, that the inside ed notice walls, peel. would She she clean the as would room, dining peeling paint problems noticed with bedrooms, bathroom. Holmes, Holmes, in with of Carrie moved the brother
Harry her shortly began tenancy after she Ms. sometime Holmes years approximately from sometime lived with her two into he moved Holmes testified when 1985 to 1987. Mr. Avenue, row problems were with the Central there North It was a shack.... It was cold. “[i]t’s house. He stated that stucco, needed holey, sanding, painting, needed needed needed doors, floors, windows, everything.” needed needed needed peeling. also the window Mr. Holmes stated with diagnosed poison- Jones lead Antonio and Erika Ave- North Central ing during residing 1986 while *7 17, 1986, a on October Antonio During checkup nue.11 routine a 87 registered and test results blood taken the Jones had on Antonio Jones ug/dL.12 Subsequent performed blood tests during agreement, notation 9. On the rental there Manage- by representative inspection Ms. and a of Consumer Holmes in, moving petitioners a cracked window was discovered prior ment painted. and needed to be the closets Interrogatories, In Ms. Holmes stated her Answers to that: 10. chipping paint in N. Avenue flaking 1229 Central There flaking and we there. I first observed the entire time that lived almost room, mostly dining bedrooms chipping paint on all walls but (6) property just six we had lived at the months. and bathroom after basement, on in the kitchen and chipping There was also front of the house. outside was the residence house 1229 North Central Avenue 11. The row majority time. spent of their Antonio and Erika Jones where micrograms per reading A [xg/dL deciliter. is an abbreviation 12. micograms every 37 deciliter (xg/dL 37 means the child had of lead blood have elevated lead levels in his of blood. A child is considered to Preventing Poisoning (xg/dL. Lead if the is at least 10 measurement (1991). Children, A the Center for Disease Control Young Statement micrograms [xg/dL per deciliter as We seen the abbreviation for have
669 10, showed lead levels of 33 on ug/dL December 34 ug/dL 20, 1987, on January 2, 1987, 38 ug/dL on April 32 ug/dL 11, 1988, on March ug/dL 25, 1988, 62 on July ug/dL on October 1988. Erika originally Jones was also diagnosed during a routine Her checkup. blood showed lead 17, 1986, levels of 25 on ug/dL October 19 ug/dL on December 10, 1986, 2, 1987, ug/dL 28, 1988, April ug/dL on July ug/dL and 27 on January
Carrie Holmes testified that the first time she called Con- sumer was one month before her children were diagnosed with lead poisoning.13 She testified she “called the landlord14 and told them to send me some I didn’t never get paint.” no questioned When as to why she requested paint, Ms. Holmes testified that “I figured that the house needed It painting. had not been I painted since had been there.” Ms. Holmes was told that Consumer Man- agement does not give paint. out Once Ms. Holmes learned that her children had diagnosed been with lead poisoning, she again once called Consumer Management. She testified that she spoke to a woman at and she her, stated that I I “[w]hen called my told her children had lead. She said she don’t know how the got children it. I said they get tested from the clinic. That is how I my knew children had it. That is when I called the Depart- Health ment.”
Harry Holmes testified that while he was living at 1229 Avenue, North man, Central drunk, he described being as came to the paint. row house to Mr. Holmes stated that this occurred 1986 or 1987. He stated that a man showed up just and “[h]e said that he was maintenance, from that is all. He was going paint.” Mr. Holmes testified that the man *8 ug/dL deciliter). (micrograms per and ug/dL We shall use as that is parties.
what is used 13. Ms. Holmes also testified that she called Management Consumer one time having problems when she was with her heat at 1229 North Central Avenue. Consumer repairman sent a to the row house to fix the couple days. heat within a Consumer property manager. was the 14. Because of the landlords, Management provided services Consumer to the it acted as the de. landlord to the tenants. facto 670 house, about an and the walls for hour scraped
entered the left, then never to return. first an City Department Health issued
The Baltimore to Remove Lead Nui- Notice and Order Emergency Violation The February on 1988.15 Philip Mr. Hanson sance to inside paint hazards both thirty-three notice cited lead-based included on These violations the row house and the exterior. bathroom, floor floor second following in the rooms: second room, hall, floor second room, floor middle second rear second kitchen, room, first floor posts, stair treads and floor front room, room, A second first floor front and basement. middle in Central Avenue was issued for North code violation as it other of violations such types and included March of 1989 kitchen, in stairway, in a defective wall a defective wall bathroom, floor wall in the a stairway, a a defective defective water, impervious that was not to in the bathroom covering bedroom, front a defective wall glass cracked or in the window bedroom, ceiling dining a in the defective middle room. Court for Balti- Complaint filed the Circuit
Petitioners Funding, May against Mid-Atlantic City more Hanson as the owners of Funding, Philip Darius The set Complaint at 1229 North Central Avenue. property counts, included same five counts forth which thirty The counts every defendant. five plaintiff each minor as negli- Complaint plaintiff for each minor alleged deprivation right mother’s claims her own gence, the minority, Maryland during her services Consumer child’s claim, punitive damages. Act16 liability, Protection strict directly because 15. Mr. never received this notice violation Hanson City Department the violation 1229 North the Baltimore Health sent lived, Avenue, of to petitioners where instead Mr. Hanson’s Central home office. Md.Code Maryland The Protection Act is codified in (1975, Cum.Supp.), Repl.Vol., 2000 Title 13 Commercial Law Article. *9 27, Petitioners filed an Amendment Interlineation on June by 1994, which thirty-one through forty added counts and MD-A brought Funding, formerly Funding, Mid-Atlantic into by the action. Petitioners filed a second Amendment Interlin- 30, 1994, August forty-one eation on counts added through fifty allegations against and made the same Peter and Ben-Ezra. A Julie third Amendment Interlineation was 28, 1995, February fifty-one filed on that added counts through fifty-six brought Management and Consumer into the A action. fourth Amendment on by Interlineation filed 14, 1997, January that added counts fifty-seven through sixty- two brought Management and BBG into the action.17 Ben-Ezras,
Respondents, filed a Motion for Partial forty-two, Dismissal as to counts forty-four, forty-five, forty- seven, forty-nine. 1, and motion granted May The on 1995 by the Circuit Court for Baltimore also City and included the dismissal of fifty. only count The counts remaining against suit the Ben-Ezras were the negligence and Consumer Respondent, Protection Act counts. Management filed a Motion to Dismiss counts fifty-two fifty-five and Complaint. granted This motion was by the Circuit Court for Baltimore on City October 1995. The only counts remain- ing in suit against Consumer Management were the negligence and Consumer Act Respondent, Protection counts. Hanson, Philip filed a Motion to Dismiss on October Mr. Hanson requested twenty-two through counts twen- (all ty-five and twenty-seven through thirty of the counts counts) except negligence be dismissed.18 Management Management only 17. Consumer and BBG had six counts against filed them. The six counts for Consumer and minor, negligence BBG were for each a violation of the minor, Consumer Protection Act for each and Ms. Holmes’ claims right deprivation her during minority own for of her child’s services liability each minor child. punitive damages The counts for strict were not included for these two defendants. through against 18. Counts one Funding ten filed Mid-Atlantic Funding were dismissed when Mid-Atlantic was dismissed from the through twenty against action. Counts eleven were filed Darius Fund- on Summary Judgment filed a Motion The Ben-Ezras Ben-Ezras 1996. The remaining counts October all not receive notice of existence they did asserted that because lead-based flaking peeling chipping, *10 them, be fact, disputed, they was not should according to this a Motion for Hanson filed summary judgment. Philip granted 23,1996. alleged Mr. Hanson on October Summary Judgment fact, negli- he was not no of material dispute that there was Avenue, and he of 1229 North Central in his maintenance gent premises. flaking paint knowledge chipping no Summary Judg- for filed a Motion Management Consumer asserted 23, Management 1996. Consumer ment on October of material fact and that Consumer dispute was no that there any lead- knowledge have notice or did not filed a Avenue. Petitioners at 1229 North Central based Summary Judgment. for to all three Motions Response suit, having party to the not ing. Funding apparently is not Darius thirty supra. twenty-one through Counts See footnote been served. against counts Mr. Hanson against Mr. Hanson. All of the were filed twenty-one twenty-six. Counts except and dismissed for counts were Funding forty against MD-A Inc. These thirty-one through were filed Funding from MD-A Inc. was dismissed were dismissed when counts forty-one through fifty against the Ben- were filed the suit. Counts forty-nine, forty-five, forty-seven, forty-two, forty-four, and counts Ezras fifty-one through fifty-six were filed fifty Counts and were dismissed. fifty-two fifty-five Management. and against Counts Consumer through sixty-two against BBG fifty-seven were filed Counts dismissed. when BBG Management. These counts were dismissed dismissed from the suit. Hanson, summary, Management, Mr. respondents, Consumer In Ben-Ezras, against remaining following them when had the counts Summary Judgment. Manage- they Consumer filed their Motions (An- (Antonio negligence), fifty-three fifty-one had counts ment Jones — Act), (Erika fifty-four negli- Protection tonio Jones —Consumer Jones— Act), (Erika part of gence), fifty-six Protection as Jones —Consumer forty- Summary Judgment. had counts The Ben-Ezras its Motion (Antonio (Antonio forty-three negligence), Jones —Consumer one Jones — (Er- (Erika Act), forty-eight forty-six negligence), and Protection Jones — Act), part of their Motion for Protection as ika Jones —Consumer following part as Summary Judgment. Hanson had the counts Mr. (Antonio Summary Judgment, twenty-one count Jones— his Motion for (Erika twenty-six negligence). negligence) and count Jones — all motions on December hearing open A was held on At the City. for Baltimore 1996 before the Circuit Court Hanson’s Motion to submitted as to Mr. hearing, petitioners twenty- twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-four, Dismiss counts The five, twenty-nine, thirty. twenty-seven, twenty-eight, granting an on December signed Circuit Court order Summary three Motions for that Motion to Dismiss.19 The Hanson, Management, and filed Mr. Consumer Judgment hearing, At end of the argued. the Ben-Ezras were then days fifteen to file petitioners the Circuit Court allowed Reply petitioners’ Reply Mr. Hanson’s to the response to Court, on Summary Judgment. Motion for The Circuit De- 5, 1996, an signed granted cember Order Summary Judgment fifty- Motion for on counts Management’s in a handwritten fifty-six. one and The Order also stated by the Circuit Court on the bottom the Order passage motion for judgment is further ordered that defendant’s “[i]t are negligence disputes on the issue of is denied as there *11 opportunity the material issues of notice and to regarding cure.”20 filed both and pleadings by petitioners
After several regarding Summary Mr. Hanson Mr. Hanson’s Motion for Court, the Circuit with the Honorable John Carroll Judgment, a on Motions Byrnes presiding, hearing held second the three granted Summary Judgment.21 The Circuit Court granted previously. 19. Other Motions to Dismiss had been The Mo- tions to Dismiss are not before the Court. appears judge 20. It from the record that the Circuit Court made a granting Management’s Summary mistake when Motion for Judgement. fifty-one, Order The stated that the motion was for counts fifty-three, fifty-four, fifty-six. summary judge granted judg- and The fifty-one fifty-six. judge ment on counts The wrote on the Order denied, however, summary judgment negligence on the counts was granted summary fifty-one. fifty- judge judgment on Counts count fifty-four negligence against one were the counts Consumer Man- agement. Summary judgment fifty-three; was denied for count this was a Consumer Protection Act count. Judge Byrnes preside hearing. did not over the first motions Peti- only hearing tioners asserted that this motions Mr. on Hanson's that the re- Summary Judgment, finding Motions for three not received notice of the lead-based spondents had petitioners in the row house. The flaking, peeling, chipping 15, on Judgment Motion to Alter or Amend October filed a by the Circuit Court. 1997. This motion was denied Appeal Special a Notice of to the Court Petitioners filed to required 1997. Petitioners were on December Appeals a final because there had not been appeal this first dismiss Management. request, At their respect to BBG judgment dismissal, to prejudice, without as granted Court Circuit timely Notice of petitioners filed Management, BBG 27, 1999. May on Special Appeals to the Court Appeal April Special Appeals the Court of opinion The filed for Balti- of the Circuit Court affirmed the decision Summary Motions for City respondents’ granting more stated that Special Appeals “[i]n The Court of Judgment. sum, failed to evidence suffi- appellants [petitioners] produce knew or should appellees [respondents] prove cient Premises, at the and there- have known of deteriorated fore, granted correct when he judge legally the trial appellees.” in favor of the Petitioners summary judgment Certiorari, granted. which we a Petition for Writ filed
Discussion City Court for Baltimore and the We hold the Circuit improperly genuine disputes resolved Special Appeals Court granting summary judgment fact in this case of material Judgment judge presiding over the Summary because the Motion for Management’s hearing already Motion for first ruled on Consumer to, *12 yet, Summary Judgment judge going had not ruled and the but Summary Judgment. Judge Byrnes held on the Ben-Ezras’ Motion for Summary arguments Judgment he would hear on the Motions for Byrnes judge respondents. Judge found that the had not from all three Summary Judgment and the the Motions for from Mr. Hanson ruled on Judge Byrnes granting part of Ben-Ezras. also found that the Order Summary Judgment ambigu- Management’s for Consumer Motion summary judgment granted Hanson and the and that if is as to Mr. ous Ben-Ezras, principals, keep to then it would be "ridiculous” Management, agent.
675 applying for at the standard will look respondents. We this case how the facts of and consider summary judgment to that standard. pursuant were considered Summary Judgment A. Standard 2- Rule court, Maryland with trial accordance The “if the summary judgment 501(e), a motion for grant shall as genuine dispute is no show that there response motion and judg favor party whose material fact and any to of law.” as a matter judgment is entitled to ment is entered motion, we are summary judgment of a reviewing grant In of material fact exists. dispute whether concerned with Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, Mayor City v. & Council Williams of Inn Ins. Co. v. Manor (2000); 41, 113, 47 753 A.2d Hartford (1994); Bethesda, Inc., 219, 224 135, 144, 642 A.2d 335 Md. Sussex, Inc., 255, 1156, 247, A.2d 1160 v. 332 Md. 630 Gross Prods., Inc., 726, 737, v. Trailmaster (1993); 330 Md. Beatty Collins, Inc. v. Developer, Arnold (1993); 1005, 1011 625 A.2d Bachmann v. (1990); 949, 259, 262, 951 567 A.2d 318 Md. Glazer, Inc., 405, 408, 365, 559 A.2d 366 & 316 Md. Glazer Bankerd, 608, 98, 110-11, v. (1989); 492 A.2d King 303 Md. (1985). of which “A fact is a fact the resolution 614 material King, 303 Md. the outcome of the case.” will somehow affect Prods., Inc. v. Ordnance (citing Lynx, 111, at 614 492 A.2d Inc., (1974)). 1, 8, 502, as dispute 509 “[A] 273 Md. 327 A.2d the decision is not grounds upon which relating to facts to a material fact and such dispute respect rested is not a with entry summary judgment.” prevent does not dispute Cosmetologists, v. State Bd. 268 Salisbury Beauty Schs. (1973). 32, 40, 367, 300 374 Md. A.2d judgment procedure is purpose summary The disputes, or to decide the factual but try not to the case fact, sufficiently is there is an issue of which decide whether Hospital v. Sinai to be tried. See Goodwich material Inc., Baltimore, 185, 205-06, 1077 343 Md. 680 A.2d Co., 241, 247, Derby v. Steel (1996); 434 A.2d Coffey Md. Delia, 302, 304, v. (1981); Berkey 567-68 (1980). summary hearing The on a motion A.2d *13 676
judgment disputed is not to determine facts but to determine facts. v. In disputed whether there are Sumner Travelers (1964) Co., 480, 483, 775, 235 Md. 201 777 demnity A2d 38, 43, 660, 222 (quoting Thorpe, Carroccio v. Md. 158 A.2d (1960)). Thus, the has moving party provided 662 once the grounds summary judgment, court with sufficient for the must to the trial nonmoving party produce sufficient evidence See, genuine dispute court that a of a material fact exists. Chevrolet, Washington County Inc. v. Nat’l Sav. e.g., Hoffman (1983). Bank, 691, 712, 758, 297 Md. 467 A.2d 769 evidence, for summary judgment, On a motion the therefrom, all is most including light inferences viewed Natural Inc. v. nonmoving party. Design, favorable Co., 47, 62, 663, (1984); Rouse 302 Md. 485 A.2d 671 Doe v. Educ., 70, 67, Montgomery County, Board 295 Md. 453 814, (1982); Co., 241, Coffey Derby A2d 815 v. Steel 291 Md. (1981). 246, 564, If presented 434 A.2d 567 the facts to the trial court on a motion for summary judgment susceptible are inference, to more than must be one inferences drawn light person against most favorable to the whom the made, light motion is and least favorable to movant. (1973) 48, 53, v. 259 Tyler, James 269 Md. 304 A.2d Hess, 109, 118, (quoting Lipscomb v. 257 A.2d (1969)). 183 recently opportunity
This Court has had the to examine the in a granting summary judgment paint poisoning lead-based Dermer, (2000), case. In Brown v. 47 Md. A.2d negligence which claim of and a violation of the Baltimore involved, twins, City Housing Code were minor petitioners, diagnosed were with elevated levels. After being blood-lead levels, minors’ City notified blood-lead the Baltimore Department inspected premises Health and issued a viola- defendants, tion citing thirty notice violations. Plaintiffs suit, alleging negligent seeking filed defendants were damages paint poisoning. responded lead Defendants although they were aware that lead-based paint banned properties interior surfaces of rental must be kept loose, from or flaking, peeling paint, free defendants were on the loose, flaking, premis- any peeling unaware es. assert- Summary Judgment, filed a Motion
Defendants Health that, City from the Baltimore to the violation ing prior (1) hazard of lead- knowledge had no they Department, (2) flaking chipping unaware that paint, based *14 (3) children, never a to had pose danger in houses could older a lead paint violation notice or had paint a lead before received (4) them, premis- unaware that the against and were suit filed The trial in a condition. paint contained lead deteriorated es It deter- summary judgment. motion for granted court the jury from which a could that there was no evidence mined of knowledge presence of the respondents that the infer by the with notice they provided before lead-based of The Court Department Health violation. City Baltimore court, finding of the trial affirmed the decision Special Appeals knew to that the defendants that there was no evidence show contained to know that the deteriorated or had reason Special of the Court of reversed the decision lead. We Appeals. Court, Bell, stated that: Judge writing for the
Chief Thus, alleging a lead summary judgment, plaintiff to survive failing in by negligence caused a landlord’s paint poisoning dwelling in a leased must to correct a defective condition test, this a the “reason to know” test. Under first meet that the evidence that establishes plaintiff present must on the or had reason to know of a condition landlord knew to physical an unreasonable risk of harm premises posing 358(l)(b) Restatement § See in premises. the persons ”) condition (“knows or has reason to know (emphasis added). engages that a is a landlord or The fact defendant to know enough is not to meet the reason a certain trade facts, that, of those the standard. Some evidence virtue to an inference knowledge support defendant has sufficient Joint [Richwind required. of the condition is knowledge of Brunson, 661, 677, v. 645 A.2d Venture 4 (1994) that, the present 1154-55 It follows order ]. in a lead negligence jury of to the question respondents’ the action a violation of poisoning negligence upon based §§ statutory City duties 702 and 708 the Baltimore [of Code], Housing judice, plaintiff as is the case sub all that a to know element is satisfy must show in order reason that there loose or and that the flaking, peeling paint had notice that condition. It need not be defendant loose or was lead- flaking, peeling paint shown based.
Once it is established the landlord has reason to i.e., condition, flaking, know of the defective the existence of paint, plaintiff present loose or must peeling facts ordinary establish that he or she or a landlord intelli- knowledge, the same should realize the risk gence with stage lead The test at this is one of foreseeabil- poisoning. ity; encompasses person ordinary prudence it what realize, not what he or know or actually should she did Thus, only realize. for the court to question decide summary judgment stage is whether the lead-based without, within, paint injury range is of reasonable *15 anticipation and probability. added). 361-62, at at (emphasis Judge
Id. A.2d Chief Bell, test, the facts in Brown to the went on to state applying that: judice, clearly
In the ease sub the first of the test is prong that petitioners’ satisfied. The mother testified she com- about plained respondents deteriorating to the the condition of before the petitioners the well were born. The respondents deny receiving of course notice of the condition. true, Accepting petitioner’s explanation the as as the law do, trial requires genuine the court we conclude that a fact dispute regarding of material exists the landlords’ knowledge dangerous condition. prong poisoning
The second
is also satisfied. The lead
injury alleged
range
here is within the
of reasonable antici-
Moreover,
pation
probability....
respondents
and
the
ac-
knowledged
they
that
were aware of the
City
Baltimore
and
Maryland
laws
banning
paint,
State
lead-based
and
the
City
required
ordinances that
rental
to be
in
properties
kept
sur-
condition,
interior
including requiring the
a habitable
loose,
paint.
flaking
peeling
or
kept
to be
free of
faces
could find
circumstances,
jury
hold
a
we
that
these
Under
realize, after
reasonably
landlord would
prudent
that
notice,
peeling paint presents
loose or
flaking,
receiving
investigate
and thus would
dangerous
condition
an unsafe
housing
the
The effectiveness of
correct the condition.
severely
safety
be
in
health
would
promoting
code
lack of
if
to use
permitted
undermined
landlords
as
flaking paint
that the
lead-based
knowledge
injuries
civil
caused
against
liability
proximately
for
defense
law.
comply
failure to
with the
by their
(footnotes omitted).
367-69,
The in the case sub contend Petitioners, adequate from petitioners. did not receive notice to this at oral advanced argument, their briefs Court and think, they that were lower three facts before the courts *16 inferences, fact, if believed that trier of with reasonable sufficiently notice of respondents would establish that had in facts flaking paint or conditions the house. The chipping (1) that Consumer are that: Ms. Holmes testified she called positive one month before her children tested (2) paint, of lead in blood and requested elevated levels their man, Mr. Holmes drunk, testified who appeared be showed up stating at the row house that he was from mainte- (3) nance and was there to paint, and Ms. Holmes testified that she called Consumer Management after her children tested positive elevated lead poisoning and told Consumer Management about her children’s tests.
In addressing phone the two calls from Ms. Holmes to Management, Consumer the Court of Special Appeals looked phone at the calls individually and without applying the most favorable inference to petitioners. The Court of Special Ap- peals stated that:
Appellants maintain that Carrie Holmes’s call to the management company requesting paint was sufficient to alert the Consumer Management Corporation and the land- lord of the defective condition. This argument is without merit. As Ms. Holmes deposition, described this call her she could have requesting paint reasons, been for numerous none of which would lead the appellees to infer that Premises contained paint. deteriorated For example, Ms. may Holmes have to repaint wanted her home order to cover or stains to alter the color According scheme. to her deposition testimony, Ms. Holmes did not inform agent of Consumer Management Corporation with whom she spoke that paint she needed new existing because her paint loose, chipping, either flaking, peeling. Without information addition to a request mere for paint, the management company way had no knowing (which, old) existing most, paint was three years had deteriorated.
Likewise, Corporation’s knowl- edge the children developed lead poisoning did not give the management company reason to know of deterio- rated at the Premises. Ms. Holmes did not accuse the of having landlord been the cause of the poisoning Consumer Management Corporation could not be expected to infer that the Premises contained deteriorated from the fact that the children had been poisoned by paint. lead The children could have contracted lead paint poisoning *17 than the Premises: other of locations any from number playground their paint from lead example, friends, or relatives. neighbors, of homes Mr. Holmes’ examined then Special Appeals The Court house Holmes’ arrived at Ms. a man had testimony that that: The Court stated maintenance. to be from claiming Holmes that he was man did tell that the drunk It is true to corrobo- maintenance,” was no evidence but there “from no was there specifically, More representation. rate had re- Holmes or her brother Ms. testimony that either time of the to the painted prior home be that their quested addition, In there man “from maintenance.” from the visit had sent any appellees of the no indication stranger pre- Possibly the drunk to the Premises. painter entry into gain in order to maintenance” to be “from tended it, testimo- Ms. Holmes’s given burglarize home to later on numerous broken into had been that the Premises ny whatever proven, not agency was occasions. Because concerning may gained man have knowledge the inebriated imputed cannot be at the Premises the condition appellees. to the to sufficient sum, produce to evidence
In failed appellants of deterio- have known knew or should appellees prove therefore, Premises, judge trial at the rated in judgment granted summary when he legally correct appellees. favor did not analysis and conclusion Special Appeals
The Court of the circumstances totality at the facts look properly inferences, that is most favorable all light, including and in a judgment. summary the motion for responding party main facts forth put that when the three We find most light and in the totality in their are examined petitioners might the facts nonmoving party, petitioners, favorable to to know” test was met the “reason a trier of fact that satisfy notice to the sufficient provided petitioners and that to know” test the “reason distinguished We respondents. Brunson, 661, 676-77, Richwind Joint v. Venture k 1147,1154 (1994), 645 A.2d when we stated that: this Finally, distinguished Court has between “reason to know,” § required by which is the Restatement [of (Second) ], know,” Torts and “should which is utilized sections, other in the following manner: “ ‘Both the expression “reason to know” and “should *18 respect know” are used with to existent facts. two These however, phrases, differ in that “reason to implies know” no of on duty knowledge part the of the actor whereas implies “should know” that the actor owes another the duty of fact in ascertaining question. the “Reason to that knowledge know” means the actor has of facts from a man ordinary intelligence which reasonable of or one of the superior intelligence of the actor would either infer question the existence of the fact in or regard would its highly existence as so that probable his conduct would be predicated upon the that assumption the fact did exist. duty “Should know” indicates that the actor is under a to to diligence another use reasonable to ascertain the exis- tence or non-existence of the fact in question and that he would ascertain the existence thereof in the proper per- ” duty.’ formance of that Feldstein, 20, 33, 100, Md.
[State v.] [207 113 A.2d (1955)] (1934)); § 12 (quoting Restatement Torts cmt. a (Second) § Restatement Torts 12. See Landlord’s Lia- bility Injury or Death Tenant’s Child Lead from Paint 19 A.L.R.5th at Poisoning, 418-24. stated, Dermer,
As in supra, Brown v. the “reason to know” test plaintiff is the first test that a alleging poisoning lead caused a landlord’s failure to correct a defective condition Brown, in a dwelling leased must meet. in We stated test, 744 A.2d at this a plaintiff “[u]nder must present evidence establishes that the or landlord knew had reason to know of a premises condition an posing physical unreasonable risk of harm to in persons premis- es.” We also stated that “all that a plaintiff must show in satisfy order to the reason to know element is that there the defendant paint flaking, peeling loose Id. of that condition.” notice facts, to petitioners, most favorable light at the
Looking to the “reason have satisfied judice, petitioners case sub Sidney C. deposition It was established know” test. hazards of aware of the Caplan that Mr. first became Caplan22 when he received approximately lead-based Department City Baltimore Health violation notice from the managed by Consumer being that was property for a different deposition in a that he Caplan stated Management. Mr. flaking, when it was that lead was hazardous “learned to Management, pursuant chipping, peeling.” landlords, landlords, provides on behalf of contracts with services, arrangements including handling leasing various all properties to it arranging repairs with tenants and proper- managing manages. Consumer it, Avenue when on behalf ty at 1229 North Central landlords, they moved premises petitioners leased the manage prop- in and Consumer continued *19 also by Caplan it was obtained Mr. Hanson.23 Mr. erty after man- testified, properties if tenants of deposition, his that number locat- aged by Management phone Consumer called who answered the application, person ed the rental the Management, was autho- phone, employee an of Consumer accept complaints repairs. rized to and authorize fifty Management Caplan percent Mr. stockholder in Consumer is daily operation company. He testified at and is still active in the deposition corporate representative of Consumer his that he was a corporation. Management that is one the officers of the he Management question whether Consumer 23. There is some as to by Management managed property BBG the when it was first obtained any provide to show that Mr. Hanson. Mr. Hanson did not records managed property Caplan testified Management BBG ever and Mr. manage property after it was sold to Mr. that he continued to property deposition, that Hanson. In his Mr. Hanson also stated Management. Taking with the managed was the facts Management petitioners, for we assume that Consumer best inferences managed property and Mr. Hanson. for both the Ben-Ezras Ms. in her that first deposition Holmes testified time approximately she called Consumer one for prior testing positive month to her childrens’ elevated deposition testimony levels of lead in their blood.24 Her was: your Q. you paint, The time asked was after paint poisoning? kids had tested for lead I my A. No. asked for before children were tested for lead. before, You that that was about a month is
Q. mentioned that correct?
A. Yes. in her that she deposition Ms. Holmes also testified later posi- called Consumer after her children tested her, tive for lead She testified that I called poisoning. “[w]hen my I her children had lead. She said she don’t know how told I got they get the children it. said tested from the clinic. I I my That is how knew children had it. That is when called the Health Department.”
Mr. Holmes testified at his that he resided with deposition 1985-87, making Ms. Holmes in when Ms. Holmes positive calls to the landlord and her children first tested lead Mr. Holmes testified that a man came to the poisoning. paint during row house to this time. Mr. Holmes testified: Q. you you talking Where were when to him? A. At the door.
Q. Why was he there?
A. Why coming was he there?
Q. Yes. coming paint,
A. He was there to he said.
Q. identify Did he himself? *20 maintenance, just A. He said that he was from that is all. He was to going paint. stated, supra, positive
24. As the children first tested for elevated levels of lead in their blood on October he was from maintenance and He said that he was Q. going paint? to Yes,
A. that is all. with he and have this conversation Q. year What did come you? '86, know, something, '87.
A. I about '80 don’t totality, and the reasonable Looking at the facts their therefrom, peti- most favorable to light and inferences tioners, satisfied. Con- might the “reason to know” test be agent, managed as the landlord’s Management, sumer Central Avenue for both the Ben- at North property Management general Mr. Hanson. Consumer Ezras and and was autho- knowledge paint of the hazards lead-based arrange repairs employees rized to for the landlords. The answered the Management phone of Consumer who repairs. to to authorize Ms. accept complaints authorized called, occasions, once to request paint Holmes on two to to the landlord that her children had tested report then for lead Mr. Holmes testified that around positive poisoning. time, stating this a man at the row house that he appeared man from paint. was from maintenance and was there The with scrape peeling maintenance then wall proceeded paint leaving. before Brown,
In at we held that A.2d they complaint had made a to the petitioners’ allegations about deteriorating landlords condition condition, respondents denying receiving the notice of the genuine dispute was a of material fact and satisfied the “reason to test. the facts and the infer- Examining know” light ences in the most favorable to present case the man from sent to the row petitioners, maintenance was by house because Ms. Holmes two phone calls had notified Consumer that there problem was a with the at 1229 North Central Avenue. An inference could be made a trier of fact that the man wall; from paint peeling maintenance saw the on the course, a trier of fact could also decide not to make such an
686 inference, such an Regardless, whether to make inference.25 fact, ease, for the trier of under the circumstances of the was its Management, knowledge not the court. Consumer with have been on notice dangers paint, the of lead-based would with it a risk problem paint, might pose that if there was a the premises. the children on the Consumer physical harm to landlords, as notice is attributable to the Con- Management’s to act for the apparently authorized Management sumer said, making repairs.26 it came to As we have landlords when jury petitioners that might inferences be made Management in their row house and Consumer peeling paint calls through phone of the condition Ms. Holmes’ had notice seeing peeling paint. man from maintenance and the knowledge with their lead-based Management, Consumer harm physical known the reasonable risk of paint, might have the “reason to may passed to the Petitioners have petitioners. test, they passed the under these know” test. Whether fact, circumstances, for the trier of not the court. There to whether Consum- was a of material facts as genuine dispute er had notice. test, in that we enunciated part
The second
Dernier,
facts that
petitioners
present
Brown v.
is
the same
ordinary intelligence
that a landlord of
with
establish
In
risk of lead
knowledge,
poisoning.
should realize the
60-61,
Brown,
367-68,
finding
687 realize, notice, ably prudent receiving landlord would after flaking, paint presents loose or an unsafe or peeling dangerous investigate condition and thus would and correct the condition. Brunson,
In Richwind Joint Venture v. (1994), that:
A.2d we stated however, presented, jury Based on the evidence *22 Scoken[27] instant case could have found that received actual also, notice of on the peeling paint premises and because knowledge containing Chodak’s about older homes often paint, lead-based knew or reason to know that peeling in this Upon obtaining house lead-based. that knowledge, peeling the landlords knew the risk lead- paint represented based to the tenant’s children.
Id. at
Conclusion hold We the trial court and the Court of Special Appeals improperly applied the facts of judice the case sub deciding grant respondents’ whether to for Summary Motions facts, Judgment. inferences, Examining including all light most favorable to the nonmoving party, petitioners Management Corporation 27. Scoken manage property was hired to part suit in Richwind. Mark Chodak was the that was president Management Corporation. of Scoken that this Court enunci- test two-prong have satisfied might fact issues of material There were in Brown. ated fact, on motions for a trier of not by to be resolved needed summary judgment. APPEALS THE COURT OF SPECIAL OF
JUDGMENT THAT COURT REVERSED; REMANDED TO CASE IS THE REVERSE JUDGMENT TO INSTRUCTIONS WITH AND BALTIMORE CITY FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THAT FOR FUR- TO COURT REMAND THE CASE TO THIS OPIN- WITH CONSISTENT THER PROCEEDINGS AND IN THE COURT OF ION; IN THIS COURT COSTS BY BE PAID RESPONDENTS. TO APPEALS SPECIAL ELDRIDGE, RAKER, J., in which Concurring Opinion J., joins.
RAKER, concurring. Judge, exception with the of the Court opinion I join footnote *23 role of Bar exercised the inappropriately has
The Court in Mary- set forth procedures and circumvented Counsel attorney relating to the through 16-718 Rules 16-701 land I the conduct do not defend process. While grievance notice counsel, that he should have had I believe Petitioner’s opportunity, him and the complaint against not This Court should forum, himself. to defend appropriate Counsel, judge, adjudicator. hearing Bar act as joins that he authorized me to state ELDRIDGE has Judge herein. expressed in the views