Jones v. LynnJones v. Lynn
Case Information
*1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 46735
BRANDI JONES, natural parent of REGINALD )
JUSTICE NAULT, and DASHA DRAHOS (a/k/a )
DASHA HUNTER), biological sister of REGINALD )
JUSTICE NAULT, Decedent, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
v. )
) TRACEY LYNN, ) Boise, August 2021 Term
)
Defendant-Respondent, )
) Filed: November 22, 2021 and )
) CAMEREN NOSWORTHY, BRODY THOMAS ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk LUNDBLAD, and CHRISTOPHER NOSWORTHY, )
DALE ATKISSON, DOES I-X, )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________________________)
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Cynthia K. C. Meyer, District Judge.
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d’Alene, attorneys for Appellants.
Monica Brennan argued.
Law Offices of Mark Dietzler, Liberty Lake, attorneys for Respondents.
Daniel Stow e argued.
________________________________
BEVAN, Chief Justice.
This appeal concerns the applicability of the Idaho Dram Shop Act to a federal maritime wrongful death case. R.N.’s mother, Brandi Jones, and sister, Dasha Drahos [1] (referred to hereafter *2 as “Appellants” or “Plaintiffs”), filed a complaint against the Respondent, Tracy Lynn, alleging she recklessly and tortiously caused R.N.’s death (R.N. was sixteen years old at the time) by providing him with alcohol before he drowned in Lake Coeur d’Alene. Lynn filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the district court to dismiss the case because the Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements under Idaho’s Dram Shop Act. The district court agreed and granted Lynn’s motion for summary judgment after concluding there was no uniform body of federal maritime dram shop law that would preempt Idaho’s Dram Shop Act. Thus, the Plaintiffs had to comply with the Dram Shop Act’s notice requirements. The Plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court. We affirm.
I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
The parties do not dispute the facts relevant to this appeal. On July 21, 2015, R.N. went boating on Lake Coeur d’Alene with his friends C.N. and B.L. All three boys were sixteen years old at the time. The boat was owned by C.N.’s father. C.N., B.L., and R.N. obtained about 12 beers from an unknown source and consumed them while boating. Later, the boys stopped at Shooters, a restaurant and bar near the south end of the lake. Lynn allegedly provided C.N., B.L., and R.N. with an alcoholic drink [2] known as a “Shooter sinker” (also known as a “derailer” and “d tailer”). The boys left the restaurant and drank the derailer on the lake. At some point during the trip, R.N. jumped or fell off the boat into the water and drowned.
On May 2, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint against C.N. and B.L., as well as two adults who furnished alcohol to the boys, Lynn and her husband Dale Atkisson. [3] Relevant to this appeal are the Plaintiffs’ claims against Lynn for “negligence, negligence per se, recklessness, and in the record on appeal. Although the district court apparently granted Drahos’ motion to reconsider, in its subsequent memorandum decision granting Lynn’s motion for summary judgment, it stated that Drahos’ “wrongful death claim was dismissed pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.” Along with the wrongful death claim, the Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint alleged “[a]s a direct and proximate result of each Defendant’s negligence, negligence per se, carelessness, recklessness, heedless conduct and tortious conduct, Plaintiffs have incurred emotional distress damages attended by physical manifestations, including but not limited to emotional distress resulting from the delay in discovering [R.N.’s] death and the delay in discovering [R.N.’s] body.” Because the district court continued to reference Drahos as a plaintiff after her wrongful death claim had been dismissed, she was presumably permitted to proceed on her emotional distress claim following the district court’s order granting her motion to reconsider. Thus, Drahos is still referenced as an Appellant herein.
[2] There are inconsistent descriptions of the amount of alcohol in the derailer. In the complaint and amended complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged the drink contained 12 shots of hard alcohol. However, at the motion for summary judgment hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel said, “it is uncontested [the derailer] has six shots.”
[3] Dale Atkisson passed away during these proceedings, the status of his estate is unknown.
tortious conduct,” and a claim for “wrongful death.” [4] R.N.’s father, Andrew Nault, filed a similar complaint that was later consolidated. [5] On July 12, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, adding a cause of action for spoliation of evidence against C.N. and B.L. The claims against Lynn remained the same at that time. On November 7, 2017, Lynn answered the first amended complaint, asserting the affirmative defense that “Plaintiffs’ claims were barred because of, but not necessarily limited to, their failure to comply with pre-suit notice requirements of I.C. § 23-808.”
On November 30, 2017, Lynn filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that she did not receive proper notice of the Plaintiffs’ intent to sue as required by Idaho’s Dram Shop Act. The Plaintiffs opposed Lynn’s motion, arguing that the Idaho Dram Shop Act does not apply to cases governed by federal maritime law.
While Lynn’s motion for summary judgment was pending, on June 5, 2018, Jones moved to amend the complaint to add a claim of spoliation against Atkisson and Lynn. There is no ruling on this motion in the record.
On August 9, 2018, the district court entered a memorandum decision and order granting Lynn’s motion for summary judgment. The district court concluded that Idaho’s Dram Shop Act applies to these facts, which shields from liability “any person who sold or otherwise furnished” alcohol to the intoxicated person who did not receive notice by certified mail “within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim or cause of action arose by certified mail.” I.C. § 23-808 (2), (5). Because the Plaintiffs did not provide timely notice, the district court granted Lynn’s motion.
On August 15, 2018, the district court dismissed all claims against Lynn with prejudice. The district court did not execute a Rule 54(b) certificate at that time. The Plaintiffs moved to reconsider, arguing that the elements of maritime tort law apply to their claims and the element of proximate cause cannot be narrowed by the application of Idaho’s Dram Shop statute. Lynn opposed the motion to reconsider. On December 20, 2018, the district court denied the motion after concluding that the Plaintiffs had resubmitted the same line of cases that the district court had previously rejected.
*4 On January 30, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. On March, 5, 2019, the district court issued its final judgment regarding all defendants. On March 21, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed an amended notice of appeal.
On December 3, 2019, nearly nine months after the district court entered final judgment,
and almost a year after the court declined to reconsider Lynn’s dismissal from the case, the
Plaintiffs moved to amend the judgment under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60. The
Plaintiffs argued that while researching their brief for the appeal before this Court, they discovered
a case that said, in dicta, that the notice provision of Idaho Code section 23-808(5) does not apply
to the service of alcohol to minors. (Citing
Slade v. Smith Management Corp.
,
II. I SSUES ON A PPEAL
1. Did the Appellants comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules?
2. Did the district court err in holding that federal maritime law applied?
3. Did the district court err in holding that Idaho’s Dram Shop Act applied rather than federal
maritime general negligence law? 4. Did the district court err in holding that Idaho’s Dram Shop Act precluded the Appellants’
claims? 5. Should Lynn be precluded from raising the Idaho Dram Shop Act as a defense when she
lied to police, spoliated evidence, and had unclean hands? 6. Does the time limitation in Idaho Code section 23-808(5) apply when the alcohol was
furnished to minors?
7. Is Idaho Code section 23-808 unconstitutional?
8. Is either party entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
III. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
This Court employs the same standard as the district court when reviewing rulings on
summary judgment motions.
Owen v. Smith
,
“[W]hen reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration following the grant
of summary judgment, this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue
of material fact to defeat summary judgment.”
Tricore Invs., LLC v. Est. of Warren through
Warren
,
IV. A NALYSIS
A. The Appellants complied with the Idaho Appellate Rules.
Lynn first asks this Court to impose sanctions based on her allegation that the Appellants failed to file a timely brief. This Court may levy sanctions when a party violates the time limits prescribed by the Idaho Appellate Rules. I.A.R. 21. The Appellants’ opening brief was originally due on April 30, 2020, and not filed until May 1, 2020. However, on April 21, 2020, this Court issued an emergency order due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which specified:
In the event a deadline has been set by court order or rule and the last day for filing any document, holding any hearing, or doing any other thing or matter in any court falls on or between March 26, 2020 and April 30, 2020 when courts are reducing operations, the time for filing or doing any other thing in any court shall be extended until May 1, 2020.
The Appellants plainly complied with the extension granted by this emergency order.
Second, Lynn argues the Appellants violated the augmented record rules. This Court denied the Appellants’ initial motion to augment the record on May 5, 2020. Appellants remedied the issue and filed an amended motion to augment the record, which this Court granted on June 4, 2020. On July 21, 2020, the Appellants filed an amended opening brief to reflect citations to the *6 augmented record. Because the Appellants complied with the time restraints imposed by the Court in this case, we deny Lynn’s request for sanctions.
B. Lynn is precluded from raising new arguments concerning the district court’s
application of federal maritime law.
Lynn raises an additional issue of whether the district court erred when it found that maritime law applied to these facts. In particular, Lynn attacks the district court’s determination that Lake Coeur d’Alene is a navigable body of water. The Appellants counter that Lynn did not file a timely cross-appeal of the district court’s application of federal maritime law, nor did she argue in opposition to that determination below. Thus, it was not properly preserved for appeal.
Although Lynn did not file a cross-appeal from the district court judgment, she may raise an additional issue on appeal so long as she is not seeking “reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment.” I.A.R. 15(a); I.A.R. 35(b)(4). That said, Lynn did not directly challenge the district court’s application of federal maritime law below. Lynn did attempt to incorporate co-defendant C.N’s summary judgment argument against application of federal maritime law in her brief; however, Lynn specifically declined to take a formal position on whether federal maritime law applied during the proceedings below. Lynn admitted that she “need not take a formal position on whether maritime/admiralty law applies to the facts of this case but will concede it applies for the sake of argument.” In addition, in Lynn’s summary judgment reply brief, she stated that “irrespective of whether this [c]ourt decides the case falls under maritime/admiralty jurisdiction,” the Idaho Dram Shop precluded the Plaintiffs’ claims. Beyond that, even if we found review to be appropriate based on Lynn’s separate statement that she was “incorporat[ing] Defendant [C.N.]’s argument against application of federal maritime/admiralty law,” C.N.’s summary judgment motion and memorandum in support were not included in the record on appeal.
A party must raise both the issue and its position on that issue before the trial court for this
Court to review it.
Eagle Springs Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Rodina
,
The record establishes that Lake Coeur d’Alene’s characterization as a navigable body of
water does not appear to have been challenged by the parties before the district court. In general,
“a party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a
tort claim must establish the water body’s [1] location and of [2] connection with maritime
activity.”
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co
.,
not conflict with any uniform federal common law.
The Appellants argue that federal maritime law preempts Idaho’s Dram Shop Act. In particular, the Appellants allege that state law applies only if it adds remedies and does not diminish them. Because R.N.’s death is actionable under general maritime common law negligence, the Appellants contend that the Idaho Dram Shop Act does not apply, even though furnishing alcohol was Lynn’s alleged negligent act.
In general, “[s]tate courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to try cases
at admiralty, but in doing so must apply federal maritime law rather than state law.”
Fisk v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd
., 141 Idaho 290, 292, 108 P.3d 990, 992 (2005) (citing
Kermarec v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique
, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959)). That said, “state law may
supplement maritime law when maritime law is silent or where a local matter is at issue, but state
law may not be applied where it would conflict with maritime law.” . at 294,
In
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.
,
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the issues presented as: “(1) is there a judicially established federal admiralty rule governing these warranties? [And] (2) [i]f not, should we fashion one?” Id . at 314. The Court ultimately found there was no established admiralty rule governing the insurance question presented:
A mere cursory examination of the cases, state and federal, will disclose that through the years this common law doctrine, when accepted, has been treated not as an admiralty rule but as a general warranty rule applicable to many types of contracts including marine and other insurance.
Id . at 314–15.
The Court then answered the second issue, declining to fashion a new federal rule and concluding that because the United States Congress had failed to enact a national law, the problem was best left to the state legislatures. . at 321. We agree. Put another way, and the test which we affirmatively adopt today, holds that Idaho law governs in the absence of a (1) well-settled body of admiralty case law or (2) federal legislation covering the specific issue.
Consistent with this rationale, the U.S. Supreme Court later recognized: Traditionally, state remedies have been applied in accident cases of this order— maritime wrongful-death cases in which no federal statute specifies the appropriate relief and the decedent was not a seaman, longshore worker, or person otherwise engaged in a maritime trade. We hold, in accord with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that state remedies remain applicable in such cases . . . .
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun
,
Despite
Wilburn Boat’s
two-fold test, the Appellants argue that general maritime common
law negligence should apply, not the Idaho Dram Shop Act, even though furnishing alcohol was
involved in Lynn’s alleged negligent act. Appellants rely on several Florida cases for their
contention that when maritime claims are filed in state court under the concurrent jurisdiction
afforded by the “savings to suitors” clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, the state court generally applies
federal maritime common law rather than state law.
See, e.g
.,
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v.
Sinclair
,
In addition, as they did below, Appellants continue to assert that federal courts have
overwhelmingly ruled that maritime law supplants state dram shop statutes that deviate from
federal law. For example,
Young v. Players Lake Charles LLC
, was a case in which Louisiana law
limited dram shop liability for dram shops that provide alcohol to others.
In Reyes , the Fifth Circuit addressed liability for the death of an intoxicated seaman who leaped from his vessel and drowned. The court held that the seaman’s widow could maintain a cause of action for negligent rescue, then remanded the case for a determination on causation and *10 comparative negligence. 558 F.2d at 239. The court instructed the lower court on remand to consider the defendant’s role in operating a “floating dram shop”:
It is the opinion of this Court that the practice revealed by this record of operating a floating dram shop makes a ship unseaworthy, and if not that, at least clearly negligent. Certainly the sea holds enough perils for a sailor, even a sober one. But for his employer to supply the beer without adequate control and then complain that Reyes was negligent for being drunk on board ship is indeed ironic.
Id . at 244–45. The court specifically instructed that the district court, in considering causation and the plaintiff’s comparative negligence, weigh the “unseaworthiness or negligence [of defendants] with respect to the operation of a floating dram shop.” Id .
In Thier , the plaintiff suffered severe injuries when a car driven by the defendants’ chief officer of the vessel, while intoxicated, crashed on the way to a dinner. 900 F. Supp. at 866. Evidence revealed that his intoxication stemmed from a shipboard atmosphere that the court characterized as a “floating dram shop.” The court found that the owners of the vessel were negligent in “allowing a party atmosphere to prevail onboard wherein ship’s officers frequently had girlfriends and guests onboard together with a regularly stocked store of party supplies including alcoholic beverages.” Id . The court ultimately found that the defendants were directly liable for their negligence in “failing to monitor alcohol consumption onboard, fostering a party atmosphere, and failing to prohibit drunk [naval] officers from driving.” . at 879.
We affirm the district court, which rejected the Appellants’ reliance on these cases after concluding they were based on Reyes , which failed to follow the analysis outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wilburn Boat . The district court suggested it believed Reyes was wrongly decided for that reason, noting that the Fifth Circuit appeared to fashion its own rule by judicial fiat without citing any authority. The district court also determined that this line of cases stands for no more than the proposition that the owner of a ship can be held liable under maritime rules when the owner allows his boat to become a “floating dram shop.” The district court recognized that “[s]uch a duty would not extend to Lynn, who did not own the boat.”
In contrast to the authority relied on by the Appellants, the district court cited a series of
cases that found that there is no uniform body of federal case law to preempt the state dram shop
law.
See Horak v. Argosy Gaming Co.
,
In wrestling with this decision, we are guided by the fundamental tenet of preemption doctrine that federal law will not preempt state law “absent a clear statement of congressional intent to occupy an entire field” or unless applying state law would conflict with or otherwise frustrate a federal regulatory scheme. Barske v. Rockwell Int’l Corp ., 514 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Iowa 1994). Plainly there is no federal maritime statute comparable to Iowa Code section 123.92 governing the rights and liabilities of dram shops or third parties victimized by their patrons. And as the federal trial court in Meyer [ v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. , 1994 WL 832006,*1, 4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 1994)] observed, neither is there a consistent or uniform body of maritime common law imposing tort liability on sellers of alcohol for injuries resulting from their sales.
648 N.W.2d at 146–47. Likewise, in Kludt , the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana discussed the “unsettled nature of this area of federal law.” 200 F. Supp. 2d at 979. In Vollmar , the United States District Court for the District of Maryland similarly recognized:
It appears that federal trial courts have disagreed on whether there is a maritime dram shop law. Compare Bay Casino, LLC v. M/V Royal Empress ,199 F.R.D. 464 , 467 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that federal maritime law may be applied to a dram shop liability cause of action), Young v. Players Lake Charles, L.L.C ., 47 F. Supp.2d 832, 837 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“there is an existing maritime rule governing the issue of dram shop liability”), with Meyer v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. , No. C–93–2383 MHP,1994 WL 832006 , at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 1994) (finding no authority supporting federal maritime dram shop law and applying the state’s dram shop law), Horak v. Argosy Gaming Co. , 648 N.W.2d 137, 147 (Iowa 2002) (finding no federal maritime statute or maritime dram shop law preempting the state dram shop law), Kludt v. Majestic Star Casino, LLC ,200 F.Supp.2d 973 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (applying state dram shop law to supplement general maritime law).
The district court also identified a case from Alaska that addressed similar arguments to
those raised in this case. In
Christiansen v. Christiansen
,
Given the lack of analogous precedent in maritime law, the superior court found no “controlling federal rule” imposing liability on an unlicensed social host. We agree. In the absence of a controlling federal rule, we conclude that Almeria has not demonstrated that a characteristic feature of maritime law would be materially prejudiced by applying AS 04.21.020 in this case.
The clear conflict among these authorities makes one thing eminently clear: there is no well-settled body of admiralty case law regarding the applicability of state dram shop statutes. The district court recognized this, finding no uniform body of federal maritime dram shop law which would preempt Idaho’s Dram Shop Act. At a hearing below, the Appellants’ counsel admitted there is a split in authority whether there is a federal dram shop law, but urged the district court to follow what they argued is the majority approach among several states and federal circuits. We hold the district court did not err by declining to pick and choose from conflicting federal authority on the issue. In denying the motion to reconsider, the district court reaffirmed its prior acknowledgment that it was not bound to accept the Fifth Circuit precedent on matters of federal law. The district court recognized there are two lines of cases that reflect there is no uniform body of federal case law that could preempt state law on point.
That said, Appellants contend that the district court erred by glossing over
Yamaha Motor
Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun
,
To the extent that Plaintiffs continue to argue that there is a conflict between the application of Idaho’s Dram Shop Act and the principles of federal maritime law, Plaintiffs’ argument is not well taken. The [c]ourt previously determined that under the facts of this case no conflict existed between Idaho’s Dram Shop Act and general federal maritime law that would preclude the application of state law. . . . At the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion [to reconsider], Plaintiffs cited to Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun for the proposition that “state remedies remain applicable . . . and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful death action.” Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun ,516 U.S. 199 , 202 (1996). The [c]ourt notes that the application of Idaho’s Dram Shop Act does not automatically limit a plaintiff’s recovery. However, in the present case, Plaintiffs’ failure (inability) to comply with the deadlines in the Idaho Tort Claims [sic] Act ultimately barred Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Lynn.
The district court did not err in applying Idaho law, even though that led to a statutory bar to the
Appellants’ ability to pursue a claim in this case.
See Wilburn Boat
,
D. The district court did not err in holding that the Appellants’ claims were barred
because they failed to comply with the Idaho Dram Shop Act.
Next, Appellants argue they did not have to comply with the notice requirements of Idaho Code section 23-808 because Lynn is not a “dram shop” nor is she a “social host.” Appellants contend that Lynn knowingly sold alcohol to minors at the dock, and that to consider her either a “dram shop” or “social host” would provide her with protection not intended by the statute. Lynn argues that the Appellants wrongly focus on “dram shop” and “social host” labels instead of clear legislative intent as stated in the plain words of the statute.
In 1986, the legislature enacted Idaho Code section 23-808, also known as the Idaho Dram Shop Act, which outlines the civil liability imposed on a furnisher of alcoholic beverages for a plaintiff’s injuries caused by an intoxicated person. Section 23-808 reads:
LEGISLATIVE FINDING AND INTENT — CAUSE OF ACTION. (1) The legislature finds that it is not the furnishing of alcoholic beverages that is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons and it is the intent of the legislature, therefore, to limit dram shop and social host liability; provided, that the legislature finds that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages may constitute a proximate cause of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons under the circumstances set forth in subsection (3) of this section.
. . . .
(3) A person who has suffered injury, death or any other damage caused by an intoxicated person, may bring a claim or cause of action against any person who sold or otherwise furnished alcoholic beverages to the intoxicated person, only if: (a) The intoxicated person was younger than the legal age for the consumption of alcoholic beverages at the time the alcoholic beverages were sold or furnished and the person who sold or furnished the alcoholic beverages knew or ought reasonably to have known at the time the alcoholic beverages were sold or furnished that the intoxicated person was younger than the legal age for consumption of the alcoholic beverages; or (b) The intoxicated person was obviously intoxicated at the time the alcoholic beverages were sold or furnished, and the person who sold or furnished the alcoholic beverages knew or ought reasonably to have known that the intoxicated person was obviously intoxicated.
(4) (a) No claim or cause of action pursuant to subsection (3) of this section shall lie on behalf of the intoxicated person nor on behalf of the intoxicated person’s estate or representatives.
. . . .
(5) No claim or cause of action may be brought under this section against a person who sold or otherwise furnished alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person unless the person bringing the claim or cause of action notified the person who sold or otherwise furnished alcoholic beverages to the intoxicated person within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim or cause of action arose by certified mail that the claim or cause of action would be brought.
. . . .
I.C. § 23-808.
“The Dram Shop Act addresses proximate cause, not duty or breach of duty.”
Idaho Dep’t
of Lab. v. Sunset Marts, Inc.
,
In
Fell v. Fat Smitty’s LLC
, a patron sued a bar owner, asserting a claim for negligence
after he was stabbed by another bar patron.
Here, both parties agree that Idaho Code section 23-808 is clear and unambiguous. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free review. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist .,139 Idaho 65 , 72 P.3d 905 (2003). It must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. Id . If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written. .
Idaho Dep’t of Lab. v. Sunset Marts, Inc.
,
The Appellants concentrate their argument on the stated purpose of section 23-808, which is to “limit dram shop and social host liability,” and argue that Lynn is neither a “dram shop” nor a “social host.” Appellants contend that an everyday understanding of the word “Dram Shop” would lead one to think of a commercial bar where alcohol is sold. Appellants also suggest that *15 Lynn does not meet the definition of a “social host,” which would presumably consist of a party at a residential home or an office party. Appellants argue there was no social gathering in this case, nor was R.N. a guest in Lynn’s home.
The Appellants’ focus on the definitions of “dram shop” or “social host,” is misplaced. As
the district court recognized, the plain language of Idaho’s Dram Shop Act specifies that it applies
to “
a person
who sold
or otherwise furnished
alcoholic beverages . . . .” I.C. § 23-808(5) (emphasis
added). If the legislature had intended to limit the Act’s application to only social hosts, it could
have repeated the words “dram shop or social host” rather than use the different, longer, and more
expansive phrase “any person who sold or otherwise furnished alcoholic beverages.” “[T]his Court
has been reluctant to second-guess the wisdom of a statute and has been unwilling to insert words
into a statute that the Court believes the [L]egislature left out, be it intentionally or inadvertently.”
Stanley v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund
, ___ Idaho ___, ___,
The heart of the Appellants’ negligence claim against Lynn stemmed from her furnishing
alcohol to R.N., B.L., and C.N. Thus, the district court concluded the Idaho Dram Shop applied,
including the notice provision of subsection (5). The district court’s analysis tracks this Court’s
recent decision in
Fat Smitty’s
, which mandated application of Idaho’s Dram Shop Act when a
negligence cause of action was brought against the vendor of alcohol, even though that case
involved a saloon instead of a person.
The district court correctly concluded the Idaho Dram Shop Act encompassed Lynn’s conduct because she furnished alcohol to R.N. The Act requires that no claim may be brought against the furnisher of alcoholic beverages unless notice is provided “within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim or cause of action arose.” I.C. § 23-808(5). The Appellants did not provide timely notice to Lynn under the statute, thus, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of their claims against Lynn.
Alternatively, Lynn asserts that Idaho’s Dram Shop Act bars the Appellants’ claims because R.N. was intoxicated before his death. Having ruled that the Appellants’ failure to provide notice under Idaho Code section 23-808(5) precludes their claims, we will not address this additional argument.
E. The record does not support Appellants’ claims for spoliation and unclean hands.
The district court determined that Idaho’s Dram Shop Act applies to these facts, and it shields from liability “any person who sold or otherwise furnished alcohol” who did not receive notice “within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim or cause of action arose by certified mail.” (Citing I.C. § 23-808). On appeal, Appellants argue that even if the Dram Shop Act applies here, Lynn should not be permitted to avail herself of the defense because she intentionally lied to police and spoliated the evidence and has unclean hands.
a. Spoliation of evidence On June 5, 2018, Jones moved to amend the complaint to add a claim of spoliation against Dale Atkisson and Tracy Lynn. In Lynn’s summary judgment reply brief, she referenced that Jones had moved to amend the complaint requesting oral argument, but noted that she had not set her motion for hearing. Presuming that Jones would try to argue her motion at the upcoming summary judgment hearing, Lynn incorporated Defendant C.N.’s arguments and authorities on spoliation and asked the district court to dismiss the claim. There is no ruling on the motion to amend the complaint or a second amended complaint in the record. There is also no reference to either document being filed in the case summary. However, the judgment dismissing the claims against Lynn references a “[Second] Amended Complaint.” In addition, at a July 11, 2018, hearing on various motions, Lynn’s counsel referenced the added claim, stating: “[t]he negligence claims, the spoliation claim have now been added.”
Although it is unclear whether Jones was ultimately permitted to file a second amended complaint, the district court did discuss spoliation in its memorandum decision. After the district court held that the Appellants’ claims were precluded based on their failure to comply with the notice requirements of Idaho’s Dram Shop Act, the district court analyzed Jones’ spoliation claims. That said, we do not know whether that analysis pertained to the claims lodged against C.N., or the later allegations against Lynn. To the extent the analysis includes Lynn, we will address the Appellants’ arguments.
“The spoliation doctrine is a general principle of civil litigation which provides that upon
a showing of intentional destruction of evidence by an opposing party, an inference arises that the
missing evidence was adverse to the party’s position.”
Waters v. All Phase Const
.,
The Appellants don’t identify how much time passed before they were aware of Lynn’s involvement, however, they claim that “[d]ue to Lynn’s lies to the police in essence hiding and spoliating evidence, Jones and Drahos could not have discovered the name of the appropriate defendant prior to the 180-day time limit set forth in I.C. § 23-808.” In support of their claim, the Appellants assert this Court should consider the amended declaration of Detective Terry Campbell, even though it was not admitted by the district court. The district court struck Detective Campbell’s original declaration because it contained hearsay. The Appellants responded by filing an amended declaration after their motion to reconsider, however, the district court determined that the Appellants cited no authority or provided any argument on why the document should be admitted. In addition, the district court concluded the amended declaration, “to the extent it would be admissible,” had no bearing on the issues raised in the motion to reconsider. We decline to consider the amended declaration on appeal because it was properly not admitted below.
Ultimately, the district court rejected the Appellants’ claim for spoliation after concluding that under federal maritime law, spoliation is an evidentiary remedy only available when a party destroys evidence, generally after a lawsuit has been filed. Because the court found that spoliation of evidence was an evidentiary sanction, not a tort, it determined that it did not apply, thus, the “Defendants [were] entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s spoliation claim as a matter of law.”
The district court’s decision tracks this Court’s precedent declining to adopt first-party
spoliation as an independent tort. In
Raymond v. Idaho State Police
, this Court distinguished
between first-party spoliation and third-party spoliation, recognizing that first-party spoliation of
evidence “is a general principle of civil litigation which provides that upon a showing of intentional
destruction of evidence by an opposing party, an inference arises that the missing evidence was
*18
adverse to the party’s position.”
Appellants claim their argument is much like the third-party spoliation tort remedy because
even though Lynn lied to police and was sued within the statute of limitations, she was dismissed
from the case because of the alleged defects in prelitigation notice requirements. Thus, Appellants
allege they cannot have an evidentiary remedy in the litigation and ask this Court to follow the
reasoning in
Raymond
, which allows third-party tort spoliation to “provide a remedy for spoliation
victims” who would “otherwise be unable to recover in their underlying lawsuits” and to “deter
future spoliation.” . (citing
Raymond
, 165 at 687,
b. Unclean hands The district court also held that the unclean hands doctrine is inapplicable to the facts here because the notice provision of Idaho Code section 23-808(5) is not an equitable remedy, it is a statutory bar to relief, and the doctrine of unclean hands only applies against a person pursuing an equitable remedy.
“The unclean hands doctrine ‘stands for the proposition that a litigant may be denied relief
by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy in issue.’ ”
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Sheets
,
In determining if [the clean hands] doctrine applies a court has discretion to evaluate the relative conduct of both parties and to determine whether the conduct *19 of the party seeking an equitable remedy should, in the light of all the circumstances, preclude such relief. A trial court’s decision to afford relief based on the unclean hands doctrine, or to reject its application, will not be overturned on appeal absent a demonstration that the lower court abused its discretion.
Ada Cnty. Highway Dist
.,
On appeal, Appellants simply state, “[m]oreover, [Lynn] has unclean hands as set forth in
Sword v. Sweet
,
F. The notice requirements under Idaho Code section 23-808(5) still apply when alcohol
is furnished to minors.
Next, the Appellants argue that the 180-day limitation in Idaho Code section 23-808(5) does not apply to adults who knowingly provide alcohol to minors. In support, the Appellants cite the following dicta from Slade v. Smith Management Corp. :
the legislature was equally specific that there was no curtailment of the right to file an action for furnishing alcoholic beverages to a person below the legal age for consuming alcoholic beverages where doing so caused injury, death or damage.
Based on this statement, the Appellants ask this Court to conclude that the 180-day notice requirement of section 23-808 does not apply to limit a remedy to persons who knowingly provide alcohol to minors. Yet the statute does not carve out any exception for minors. To limit dram shop and social host liability, the legislature recognized minors in the statute, and prescribed that “the furnishing of alcoholic beverages may constitute a proximate cause of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons” if:
The intoxicated person was younger than the legal age for the consumption of alcoholic beverages at the time the alcoholic beverages were sold or furnished and the person who sold or furnished the alcoholic beverages knew or ought reasonably to have known at the time the alcoholic beverages were sold or furnished that the intoxicated person was younger than the legal age for consumption of the alcoholic beverages . . . .
I.C. §23-808(3)(a).
This section refers to the “intoxicated person.” Thus, subsection (5), which also refers to the “intoxicated person” applies to this section equally and Slade merely holds that a cause of action is not curtailed—except as limited by the 180-day provision. Because the legislature did not carve out any exception specifying the notice requirement did not apply to minors, we will not write one into the statute.
G. The Appellants have failed to prove that Idaho Code section 23-808(5) is
unconstitutional.
Last, Appellants argue that Idaho Code section 23-808(5) is unconstitutional. “The party
asserting the unconstitutionality of a statute bears the burden of showing its invalidity and must
overcome a strong presumption of validity.”
Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co.
,
The constitutionality of Idaho’s Dram Shop Act was previously addressed by this Court in
Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity
, where an eighteen-year-old student sued her sorority, other
fraternities and sororities, and the school, after she became intoxicated at a party and fell down a
fire escape. 133 Idaho 388, 392–93, 987 P.2d 300, 304–05 (1999). The district court held the
unambiguous language of Idaho Code section 23-808 bars suits by intoxicated persons against the
server of alcohol and granted summary judgment for the fraternities. Coghlan appealed,
challenging the constitutionality of section 23-808 on various grounds: (1) the statute violates the
equal protection clause because it permits recovery by third parties but not intoxicated persons; (2)
the statute impermissibly revives the doctrine of contributory negligence; and (3) that the statute
impermissibly infringes on the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by article I, section 7 of the Idaho
Constitution. This Court affirmed the district court’s holding that Idaho’s Dram Shop Act
*21
prohibited Coghlan from bringing a cause of action against the providers of alcohol.
Id
. at 394,
First, the Court held that Idaho Code section 23-808(4)(a) does not violate the equal
protection guarantees of the Idaho and United States Constitutions even though it allows recovery
by third parties but not intoxicated persons.
Id
. at 395,
The Appellants make three constitutional arguments here. First, the Appellants claim that Idaho Code section 23-808(5) is unconstitutional when applied to minors. Second, Appellants argue that section 23-808(5) is unconstitutional because it violates Article 3, Section 19 of the Idaho Constitution. Third, Appellants claim that the statute violates equal protection and due process standards under the Idaho and United States Constitutions. Even if the statute survives constitutional scrutiny, the Appellants allege subsection (5) contravenes the stated purpose of Idaho Code section 23-808, and must be stricken.
a. Whether Idaho Code section 23-808(5) is unconstitutional when applied to minors.
Appellants argue that Idaho Code section 23-808(5) is unconstitutional as applied to
minors. The Appellants rely on
Slade
to assert, “the Supreme Court recognized this distinction
when stating that the legislature was ‘specific’ in not curtailing the ‘right’ as it applied to supplying
alcohol to minors.” Appellants urge this Court to consider this “guidance” when considering the
constitutionality of Idaho Code section 23-808 as it applies to service to minors rather than service
to obviously intoxicated persons. Appellants did not provide any other argument or authority for
their assertion that section 23-808(5) is unconstitutional as applied to minors beyond their
interpretation of the Court’s statements in
Slade
, which we rejected above. “The party asserting
the unconstitutionality of a statute bears the burden of showing its invalidity and must overcome a
*22
strong presumption of validity.”
Olsen
,
b. Whether Idaho Code section 23-808(5) is unconstitutional because it violates Article III, Section 19 of the Idaho Constitution.
Appellants argue that Idaho Code section 23-808 violates Article III, Section 19 of the Idaho Constitution because it limits a person’s ability to pursue a common law dram shop cause of action with respect to a sub-class of claimants bringing negligence claims. In support, Appellants point out the inconsistencies between the notice requirements under section 23-808(5) and the notice requirement of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, which contains a “reasonableness provision,” allowing the notice period to run from the “date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later.” I.C. § 6-906.
Article III, Section 19, of the Idaho Constitution prohibits “local and special laws” on several issues. This Court has outlined three characteristics of special laws:
First, a special law applies only to an individual or number of individuals out of a single class similarly situated and affected or to a special locality. It is important to note that a law is not special simply because it may have only a local application or apply only to a special class if, in fact, it does apply to all such cases and all similar localities and to all belonging to the specified class to which the law is made applicable. Second, we have found that when the Legislature pursues a legitimate interest in protecting citizens of the state in enacting a law, then it is not special. Lastly, courts must determine whether the [statute’s] classification is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. If a law’s classification is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, it is a special law. In assessing the legitimacy of a particular law, as well as whether it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, this Court has on occasion examined not just the law itself, but its legislative history.
Citizens Against Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish And Game Dep’t
,
The district court found that Idaho’s Dram Shop Act is neither a local nor a special law because it applies generally to all members of the class it creates, and it is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. We agree. As the district court noted, the Appellants failed to identify which fundamental right is allegedly encroached upon. Their argument on appeal suffers from the same flaw. Without the ability to identify what fundamental right was infringed upon, we affirm the district court’s holding that the Idaho Dram Shop Act does not violate Article III, Section 19 of the Idaho Constitution.
c. Whether Idaho Code section 23-808 violates equal protection and due process.
*23
Next, Appellants argue that Idaho Code section 23-808(5) violates the equal protection
clause of the Idaho and United States Constitution because it discriminates between claimants who
notify the negligent seller or furnisher of alcohol and those who do not. The Appellants also claim
that the notice by “certified mail” requirement irrationally discriminates between negligent
purveyors of alcohol who will be held liable and negligent purveyors who will not, even though
they may have engaged in the same degree of negligence. The district court declined to issue an
advisory opinion on this argument because the Appellants gave no notice under the Idaho Dram
Shop Act in this case. We likewise decline to issue an advisory opinion on this hypothetical issue.
See PHH Mortg. v. Nickerson
,
As to the merits of this claim directly, this Court has evaluated whether the Idaho Dram Shop Act violates equal protection, concluding:
This Court has also previously recognized that “[n]ot every legislative classification which treats different classes of people differently can be said to be ‘discriminatory,’ much less ‘obviously’ ‘invidiously discriminatory.’ ” State v. Beam ,115 Idaho 208 , 212,766 P.2d 678 , 682 (1988). “For a classification to be ‘obviously’ ‘invidiously discriminatory,’ it must distinguish between individuals or groups either odiously or on some other basis calculated to excite animosity or ill will.” Id . I.C. § 23-808 limits dram shop liability to those persons who are innocently injured as a result of the negligent provision of alcohol. Preventing intoxicated persons from recovering from the negligent providers of alcohol furthers this purpose and is not calculated to excite animosity or ill will. The classification at issue here is neither invidiously discriminatory nor does it involve a fundamental right.
Coghlan , 133 Idaho at 396, 987 P.2d at 308. Though the equal protection claim in Coghlan concerned the disparate treatment of intoxicated persons, the Court held it was not invidiously discriminatory, thus, it was subject to scrutiny under the rational basis standard. Id. Likewise, the disparate treatment of claimants who notify the negligent furnisher of alcohol and those who do not is not invidiously discriminatory, thus, rational basis test applies.
On rational-basis review, courts do not judge the wisdom or fairness of the legislation being
challenged.
Id
. The United States Supreme Court has held that “[o]n rational-basis review, a
classification in a statute . . . comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, and those
attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it.’ ” . (quoting
Federal Communications Comm’n v.
*24
Beach Comm’n Inc
.,
The district court determined that Idaho had a legitimate and rational basis for enacting Idaho’s Dram Shop Act: it wanted to limit liability upon purveyors of alcohol and implicitly leave liability for injuries caused by inebriated persons upon the person who allowed themselves to become inebriated: the inebriate himself. The exceptions to this rule are limited to those who lack capacity at the time they were served or who are otherwise not allowed to drink alcohol: obviously intoxicated persons and minors. We agree with the district court’s holding that these bases are enough to satisfy rational basis review.
That said, the Appellants urge us to reject the ordinary presumption of constitutionality because the statute “irrationally and arbitrarily discriminates against a class of tort victims for the benefit of a segment of the business community selling an intoxicating drug. [Thus,] [t]he judicial deference to the judgment of the legislature is unwarranted and unwise under such circumstances.” Appellants claim the Court must step forward to examine and remedy the improvident decisions of the legislature, especially under such circumstances where factors justify a constitutional review. Despite stating that “[s]uch factors exist here,” Appellants do not fully articulate what factors mandate such review, nor do they cite any authority for why this Court should reject the well-established principle that legislative acts are presumed to be constitutional. Olsen , 117 Idaho at 709, 791 P.2d at 1288. Without authority or express argument in support of the Appellants’ position, we affirm the district court’s conclusion, based on the standard of rational basis review articulated above.
The Appellants separately claim that Idaho Code section 23-808(5) violates due process.
That said, the Appellants did not support this claim with any argument or authority. “Regardless
of whether an issue is explicitly set forth in the party’s brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the
issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot
be considered by this Court.”
Bach v. Bagley
,
d. If Idaho Code section 23-808(5) survives constitutional scrutiny, whether subsection (5) contravenes the stated purpose of Idaho Code section 23-808, renders the statute ambiguous, and should be stricken.
Last, Appellants claim that subsection (5) contravenes the stated purpose of Idaho Code section 23-808. In describing the legislative intent behind section 23-808, the statute provides:
The legislature finds that it is not the furnishing of alcoholic beverages that is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons and it is the intent of the legislature, therefore, to limit dram shop and social host liability; provided, that the legislature finds that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages may constitute a proximate cause of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons under the circumstances set forth in subsection (3) of this section.
I.C. § 23-808(1).
Appellants argue this reflects the legislative balance between shielding furnishers of alcohol from potential liability, while protecting victims and the public welfare by providing that a victim may maintain a cause of action where the harm resulted from a purveyor of alcohol furnishing alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person. Subsection (3)(b) provides that a person may maintain a cause of action against the furnisher of alcohol where “[t]he intoxicated person was obviously intoxicated at the time the alcoholic beverages were sold or furnished, and the person who sold or furnished the alcoholic beverages knew or ought reasonably to have known that the intoxicated person was obviously intoxicated.”
Appellants allege that they may seek recovery against Lynn under section 23-808(3)(b); however, subsection (5) then strips their statutory right to bring a claim. Appellants argue that there is an irreconcilable conflict between section 23-808(5) and subsections (1) and (3), and that this conflict can only be resolved by allowing the more specific statutes—Idaho Code section 23- 808(1) and (3)—to prevail to the exclusion of subsection (5).
A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the more specific statute or section addressing the issue controls over the statute that is more general. Thus, the more general statute should not be interpreted as encompassing an area already covered by one which is more specific.
Valiant Idaho, LLC v. JV L.L.C.
,
The stated purpose of the Idaho Dram Shop Act is to limit a person’s ability to sue furnishers of alcohol. Thus, the 180-day notice requirement in subsection (5) aligns with the purpose of the statute and does not conflict with subsection (1) or (3). As such, we reject the Appellants’ argument that the statute is ambiguous or that subsection (5) contravenes the purpose of Idaho Code section 23-808.
H. We decline to award attorney fees on appeal.
Both parties request attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. The Appellants request
attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121 “[b]ecause Lynn lied to the police and
obstructed justice.” The Appellants emphasize that Lynn’s actions caused the matter to proceed to
summary judgment. Lynn also requests attorney fees under section 12-121, arguing that the appeal
was brought “frivolously.” Although Lynn cites
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating &
Paving, Inc
.,
Idaho Code section 12-121 allows the award of attorney fees in a civil action if the appeal
merely invites the Court to second guess the findings of the lower court.
Owen v. Smith
, 168 Idaho
633,
A party seeking attorney fees on appeal must state the basis for such an award. Bromund v. Bromund , 167 Idaho 925, 932, 477 P.3d 979, 986 (2020) (citing I.A.R. 35(a)(5), (b)(5)). In addition, the party seeking fees must provide argument on the issue. I.A.R. 35(a)(6), (b)(6). “[A]bsent any legal analysis or argument, ‘the mere reference to [a] request for attorney fees is not adequate.’ ” . (quoting Johnson v. Murphy , 167 Idaho 167, 176, 468 P.3d 297, 306 (2020) (second alteration in original).
We decline to award either party attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. The Appellants are not the prevailing party on appeal, thus, they are not entitled to attorney fees. Even though we have concluded that Lynn is the prevailing party on appeal, she provided no argument to support her request for attorney fees. Because a “mere reference to [a] request for attorney fees is not adequate” we decline to award Lynn attorney fees on appeal. We also recognize that the *27 Appellants raised important, complex issues that merited review; thus, their appeal was not brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
V. C ONCLUSION
We affirm the decision of the district court. Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded to Lynn as the prevailing party on appeal.
Justices BRODY, MOELLER and ZAHN, CONCUR.
STEGNER, Justice, specially concurring.
I concur fully in the majority’s decision; however, I write separately to note that the
majority’s opinion leaves open the question of whether equitable estoppel could have been
successfully invoked against Lynn. Though Appellants argue spoliation and unclean hands, neither
doctrine squarely fits the facts of this case. Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, “ ‘is available to
a plaintiff when the defendants, by their representations or conduct, kept the plaintiff from
pursuing a cause of action during the limitation period.’ ”
Gregory v. Stallings
,
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth;
(2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon; and
(4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his prejudice.
Id.
at 131–32,
I agree that, as the majority concludes, Appellants were required to comport with the 180- day notice requirement of Idaho’s Dram Shop Act in order to bring a cause of action against Lynn. See I.C. § 23-808(5). However, if it is true that Lynn intentionally lied to police about whether she had purchased alcohol for the boys, and there does not seem to be any dispute that it is, it appears Appellants could have successfully invoked equitable estoppel to prevent Lynn from asserting Appellants’ failure to provide Lynn notice within 180 days barred Appellants’ claim against Lynn.
At the end of the day, the majority’s opinion should not be read to preclude equitable
estoppel from being employed in a future case in which a defendant lies to the police and in so
doing prevents a plaintiff from learning facts which would give rise to a violation of Idaho’s Dram
Shop Act. The resolution of that case will have to await a situation in which the facts give rise to
a claim of equitable estoppel and in which the plaintiff raises such a claim. Equitable estoppel must
be asserted by the party seeking to have it employed.
See Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Siler
, 162
Idaho 30, 35,
Notes
[1] Dasha Drahos’ status in the case requires more explanation. At some point, the district court dismissed Drahos from the case based on standing. On June 27, 2018, Drahos moved to reconsider. After hearings were held on July 11, 2018, and July 26, 2018, the district court granted Drahos’ motion to reconsider. However, these documents are not included
[4] Dasha Drahos’ wrongful death claim was later dismissed.
[5] Andrew Nault did not join the current appeal.