OPINION
delivered the opinion of the Court,
This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiff college professor was asked by his employer college to teach a summer class. The class was cancelled after the professor had taught only two class sessions. The college said that the class was cancelled due to low enrollment; this reason was disputed by the professor. The professor filed a lawsuit against the college for breach of express contract, breach of contract implied in fact, breach of contract implied in law, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional interference with contractual relations. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant college on all of the professor’s claims. The professor appeals, arguing that he was denied discovery and that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. We affirm the challenged discovery rulings and the grant of summary judgment as to the claims for *899 breach of express contract, breach of contract implied in fact, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional interference with contractual relations, and as to the claim for breach of contract implied in law with respect to the second class taught by the plaintiff. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the claim for breach of contract implied in law with respect to the first class taught by the plaintiff.
Facts and Procedural History
Plaintifi/Appellant Dr. Herbert Jones (“Dr. Jones”) was hired by Defendant/Ap-pellee LeMoyne-Owen College (“the College”) in 2002 as an assistant professor in the Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences. During his time with the College, Dr. Jones was employed under two nine-month, tenure-track contracts and five short-term, non-tenure-track contracts.
Dr. Jones asserts that he entered into an oral agreement with the division chairperson, Dr. Margaret James, to teach a history class for the College’s 2004 summer session. 1 Dr. Jones asserts that, in order for a class to “make,” that is, continue for the entire session, the College’s policy required five students to be enrolled on the first day of class. Dr. Jones insists that, on the first day of class, May 24, 2004, there were five students enrolled in his class. He asserts that, on the morning of May 24, the administrative assistant to the Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Ms. Clara Parker (“Ms. Parker”), notified him that his written contract to teach the summer session class was ready to be signed. Dr. Jones taught the first day of class; only one student was present. The next day, Dr. Jones аsserts, Ms. Parker told him that she would bring the contract by his office for him to sign. However, later that afternoon, Ms. Parker called Dr. Jones to inform him that he would not be able to sign the contract. To learn the reason for this action, Ms. Parker allegedly said, he would need to speak to Dr. Cheryl Golden (“Dr. Golden”), who had recently been appointed the division chairperson. Dr. Jones alleges that he contacted Dr. Golden, who told him that she would not permit Dr. Jones to sign the contract to teach his summer class and in fact his class was going to be cancelled, despite the fact that five students were enrolled, because Dr. Jones wаs not performing any work on a project for the College’s accreditation. After leaving Dr. Golden’s office, Dr. Jones taught the second meeting of his history class, again with only one student in attendance. Thereafter, the class was cancelled. Dr. Jones taught no further classes during the 2004 summer session, and Dr. Jones apparently received no remuneration from the College for teaching the summer class.
On August 5, 2004, Dr. Jones filed a lawsuit against the College and Dr. Golden in the Shelby County General Sessions Court. The original complaint alleged implied contract and retaliation; Dr. Jones later amended the complaint to remove thе retaliation claim. From the record, it appears that the General Sessions Court granted a motion to dismiss filed by the College and Dr. Golden. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-5-108, Dr. Jones appealed the General Sessions dismissal of his claims to the Shelby County Circuit Court on November 1, 2004.
In the Circuit Court, Dr. Jones was permitted to amend his complaint to in- *900 elude claims for breach of express contract, breach of contract implied in fact, breach of contract implied in law, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional interference with contractual relations. In their аnswer, the Defendants denied Dr. Jones’ allegations and asserted several affirmative defenses. They claimed, inter alia, that Dr. Jones was an at-will employee and that the complaint should be dismissed because the condition precedent to the contract, requiring a sufficient number and type of students for the class to make, was not satisfied, thus preventing execution of the contract.
On March 3, 2006, Dr. Jones filed a motion to compel discovery. Among other things, he sought policy emails sent by administrators regarding the number of students that must be enrolled for a summer class to avoid cancellation. On April 7, 2006, the trial court denied Dr. Jones’ motion tо compel. On May 11, 2007, the College and Dr. Golden filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. On June 1, 2007, Dr. Jones filed several motions for more time to respond to the Defendants’ summary judgment motion and to take depositions, and asking the trial court to set a discovery schedule. On June 18, 2007, Dr. Jones filed his response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. On July 25, 2007, the trial court entered orders denying Dr. Jones’ motions and granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dr. Jones filed a motion to alter or amend. On December 7, 2007, the trial court granted Dr. Jones’ motion, and entered an amended order that granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and also included the reasoning for its decision. The trial court concluded that there were no material issues of fact in dispute with regard to Dr. Jones’ express contract claim because he admitted that he never signed the contract. The court also concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact with regard to the contract implied in fact claim because the employee handbook requires that there be an employment contract and there was no employment contract. Without explanation, the court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute ■with regard to the contract implied in law claim. Finally, the trial court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute concerning the claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing or the claim for intentional interference with contractual relations because those claims require there to be a written contract and there was no written contract in this case. Dr. Jones then filed a timely notice of appeal.
Issues on Appeal and Standakd of Review
On appeal, Dr. Jones raises eight issue for our review. We restate them below, consolidating the last two issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Dr. Jones’ motion to compel discovery.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Dr. Jones’ motion for a continuance to depose Dr. Margaret James.
3. Whether the trial court erred in granting the College’s motion for summary judgment as to Dr. Jones’ claim for breach of express contract.
4. Whether the trial court erred in granting the College’s motion for summary judgment as to Dr. Jones’ claim for breach of implied contract in fact.
5. Whether the trial court erred in granting the College’s motion for summary judgment as to Dr. Jones’ claim for breach of implied contract in law.
*901 6. Whether the trial court erred in granting the College’s motion for summary judgment as to Dr. Jones’ claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
7. “Whether the trial court erred in granting the College’s and Dr. Golden’s motion for summary judgment as to Dr. Jones’ claim for intentional interference with contractual relations.
A trial court’s decisions concerning discovery are reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard.
Benton v. Snyder,
In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the appellate court is to determine whether the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 have been met.
Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc.,
In order to make the required showing and shift the burden to the non-moving party, the party seeking summary judgment must either: (1) affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim; or (2) show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.
Id.
(citing
Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co.,
On the other hand, “[i]f the moving party makes a properly supported motion, then the nonmoving party is required to produce evidence of specific facts establishing that genuine issues of material fact exist.”
Id.
(citing
McCarley,
(1) pointing to evidence establishing material factual disputes that were overlooked or ignored by the moving party; (2) rehabilitating the evidence attacked by the moving party; (3) producing additional evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue for trial; or (4) submitting an affidavit explaining the necessity for further discovеry pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P., Rule 56.06.
Id.
(citing
McCarley,
Because only questions of law are involved, we review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo
with no presumption of correctness.
Id.
(citing
Blair,
Analysis
Discovery Issues
Dr. Jones argues first that the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel discovery. As noted above, trial courts have broad discretion in matters of discovery.
Benton,
The appellate record does not indicate the basis for the trial court’s denial of Dr. Jones’ motion to compel. The April 7, 2006 order denying the motion does not state the reason for the denial. The order references a hearing on Dr. Jones’ motion, but the record does not include a transcript of the hearing.
It is the appellant’s duty “to prepare [a] record which conveys a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired in the trial court regarding the issues which form the basis of the appeal.”
In re M.L.D.,
Next, we address whether the trial court erred in denying Dr. Jones’ motion for a
*903
continuance to depose Dr. Margaret James, the College division chair with whom Dr. Jones allegedly entered into an oral agreement to teach the summer class. Dr. Jones argues that he had insufficient time to conduct discovery prior to the trial court’s ruling on the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In support of his argument, Dr. Jones cites
Everett v. McCall,
No. E2000-02012-COA-R3-CV,
In Everett, this Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff was given insufficient time in which to conduct discovery prior to the trial court’s ruling on the defendant’s summary judgment motion. We stated that
after a moving party has established the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, “summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party after being given a reasonable opportunity to establish its claims, or after a sufficient time for discovery has elapsed, is unable to demonstrate that he or she can indeed do so.”
Id.
at *2 (citing
Byrd v. Hall,
In the present case, the Defendants filed the motion for summary judgment on May 11, 2007. Dr. Jones filed his Rule 56.07 motion for a continuance to take depositions on June 1, 2007, and the hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held on June 29, 2007. As with the plaintiff in Everett, even though the ease had been pending for several years by the time thе summary judgment motion was filed, Dr. Jones had a relatively short period of time during which to conduct discovery after the motion was filed.
However, there is an important distinction between Everett and the case at bar. In Everett, the defendant’s summary judgment motion established that there was no genuine issue of material fact, which the plaintiff was unable to rebut by affidavit. Id. In such a situation, it is in the trial court’s discretion, under Rule 56.07, to determine whether to order a continuance to allow for additional discovery. 2 In this case, Dr. Jones argues that he should have been permitted to depose Dr. James in order to show that he and Dr. James entered into an oral contract to teach the class at issue. However, in his affidavit, Dr. Jones stated that he entered into an oral agreement with Dr. James. *904 Therefore, regardless of whether Dr. James conceded such an oral agreement or disputed it, Dr. Jones’ affidavit was sufficient for summary judgment purposes to demonstrate that a genuine issue exists as to that fact. Therefore, ordering a continuance to permit Dr. Jones to depose Dr. James would not have made a difference in the outcome of the summary judgment motion. Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dr. Jones’ motion for a continuance to depose Dr. James.
Contract Claims
Dr. Jones argues next that the trial court erred in granting summаry judgment on his claim for breach of contract. In Tennessee, a contract can be express or implied, and can be either written or oral, but regardless, “an enforceable contract must result from a meeting of the minds in mutual assent to terms, must be based upon sufficient consideration, must be free from fraud or undue influence, not against public policy and must be sufficiently definite to be enforced.”
Thompson v. Hensley,
Written Contract
In the present case, in support of their motion for summary judgment, the Defendants submitted affidavits from Dr. Golden and other College employees, stating that, although a written contract was prepared for Dr. Jones to sign, no written contract was ever executed because the requisite number of students had not enrolled in, paid for, and attended Dr. Jones’ class. Thus, the Defendants established in their motion that there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to the alleged written contract. At that point, the burden shifted to Dr. Jones to proffer evidence showing that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the written contract.
See Martin,
Dr. Jones seems to argue that, despite the fact that he never еxecuted the written contract, the Defendants are nevertheless not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the written contract claim. Dr. Jones argues that there was mutual assent between the parties to the terms of the written contract that the College drafted in anticipation of Dr. Jones teaching the summer class, even though the College did not present the contract to him to sign. He cites two prior cases of this Court for the proposition that written contracts need not be signed to be enforce
*905
able.
See T.R. Mills Contractors, Inc. v. WRH Enters.,
In
Remco,
the issue was whether a signed rental agreement between the parties established a course оf dealings under the Uniform Commercial Code, such that identical terms in a second, unsigned agreement were binding on the parties.
Remco,
In
T.R. Mills,
the primary issue was whether an arbitration provision in an unsigned construction contract was enforceable.
T.R. Mills,
These cases are inapposite to the present case. Here, the College prepared a written contract for Dr. Jones to sign, but Dr. Jones was not allowed to sign the contract. In fact, he concedes that he was told by Dr. Golden that his class would be cancelled. Although Dr. Jones and the Defendants dispute the reason why he was not allowed to sign thе contract, the reason is immaterial. The fact remains that Dr. Jones was prevented from signing the written contract. Under these circumstances, there was clearly no mutual assent between Dr. Jones and the College to the terms of the written, unexecuted contract, and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Dr. Jones’ claim for breach of the express, written contract.
Contract Implied in Fact
The trial court also granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Dr. Jones’ claim for breach of contract implied in fact. A contract implied in fact “arises under circumstances which show mutual intent or assent to contract.”
Thompson,
Dr. Jones argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his claim for breach of contract implied in fact because he and Dr. James entered into an enforceable oral аgreement for him to teach the class at issue. Dr. Jones points out that he performed under the oral agreement by teaching two classes. He contends that the parties’ conduct and the surrounding circumstances show mutual assent to the oral agreement.
By affidavit, Dr. Jones testified that the College’s usual practice was for the oral agreement between the College ánd the professor to be followed up by a written contract prepared by the division chairperson. Although Dr. Jones and the College apparently dispute the class cancellation policy in effect at that time and why the contrаct was never presented to Dr. Jones to sign, it is undisputed that Dr. Jones was notified the class was cancelled after he taught the first class, and that no written contract was executed. Therefore, the parties’ undisputed conduct and the surrounding circumstances in this case are inconsistent with what Dr. Jones stated was the College’s usual practice, and in fact show a lack of mutual assent. Dr. Jones, of course, cannot create mutual assent by his unilateral action of teaching the second class after Dr. Golden informed him that the class would be cancelled.
See Peoples Bank of Elk Valley v. ConAgra Poultry Co.,
Contract Implied in Law
Dr. Jones argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his claim for breach of contract implied in law. Contracts implied in law have been described as “a legal fiction that can only arise in the absence of an actual contract or contract implied in fact.”
Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Div.,
(1) There is no existing, enforceable contract between the parties covering the same subject matter;
(2) The party seeking recovery proves that it provided valuable goods or services;
(3) The party to be charged received the goods or services;
(4) The circumstances indicate that the parties to the transaction should have reasonably understood that the person providing the goods or services expected to be compensated; and
(5) The circumstances demonstrate that it would be unjust for a party to retain the goods or services without payment.
*907
Ferguson,
We established above that there was no contract between Dr. Jones and the College as to the class. Dr. Jones taught two class sessions, one after he was told that his class would be cancelled. For this claim, we focus on whether, under the circumstances, it was reasonably understood by the parties that Dr. Jones expected to be compensated for either of the classes that he taught and whether the circumstances demonstrate that it would be unjust for Dr. Jones not to receive such compensation.
The affidavits submitted with the College’s motion for summary judgment explained that for summer classes, the College is governed by a “self-sustaining principle,” meaning that the tuition and fees for each summer class are used to pay the professor teaching the class. The College’s affidavits do not set out the College’s policy at that time concerning professor compensation in the event that a class was cancelled after classes had begun to meet. In its brief on appeal and in its motion for summary judgment, the College points to the deposition testimony of Dr. Jones, purportedly showing that Dr. Jones did not reasonably expect to be compensated. However, we do not find Dr. Jones’ deposition in the record on appeal. Therefore, we cannot consider it in reaching our decision.
See
Tenn. R.App. P. 13(c);
State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Owens,
However, the undisputed facts show that the second class taught by Dr. Jones occurred after he was informed that the class was cancelled. Under those circumstances, it would be unreasonable for Dr. Jones to expect compensation for the second class, and it would not be unjust for him to not receive such compensation.
Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on Dr. Jones’ claim for breach of contract implied in law as to the first class taught by Dr. Jones, and affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the second class, taught after he was told that the class was cancelled.
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Dr. Jones also argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, a claim based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not a stand alone сlaim; rather, it is part of an overall breach of contract claim.
Lyons v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
Intentional Interference with Contract
Finally, Dr. Jones argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the College on his claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. In order to state a claim for statutory or common law interference in the performance or the procurement of the breach of a contract, the following elements must be established:
1. There must be a legal contract.
2. The wrongdoer must have knowledge of the existence of the contract.
3. There must be an intention to induce its breach.
4. The wrongdoer must have acted maliciously.
5. There must be a breach of the contract.
6. The act complained of must be the proximate cause of the breach of the contract.
7. There must have been damages resulting from the breach of the contract.
Buddy Lee Attractions, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.,
In the alternative, Dr. Jones argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the intentional interference claim because it failed to recognize that a plaintiff may state a claim for intentional interference with at-will employment. However, Dr. Jones points to no place in the record in which he argued to the trial court that Dr. Golden interfered with his at-will employment; he alleged only that Dr. Golden interfered with his contract with the College. Indeed, Dr. Jones repeatedly insisted to the trial court that he was not an at-will employee. The appellate court will normally not consider on appeal issues that were not first raised to the trial court.
See Crossley Constr. Corp. v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford,
Conclusion
Thus, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed as to Dr. Jones’ claim of contract implied in law or quasi-contract as to the first summer class that he taught. The grant of summary judgment in favor of the College is affirmed as to all of Dr. Jones’ remaining claims.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part as set forth above, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant Herbert Jones, and his surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.
Notes
. Becausе Dr. Jones is appealing a grant of summary judgment, for purposes of this appeal, we assume the truth of the facts alleged by the non-movant, Dr. Jones.
See Roberts v. Vaughn,
No. W2008-01126-COA-R3-CV,
. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.07 provides as follows:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that such party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07.
. The term "quantum meruit” is Latin for "as much as he has deserved.” Black's Law Dictionary 1255 (7th ed.1999).