Jones v. LeedsJones v. Leeds
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Watson
This was a suit to quiet title, and for partition of certain real estate of which appellant claimed to be the owner, as an heir by adoption, of Louisa W. Leeds and Josiah M. Leeds. Louisa W. Leeds, in her lifetime, was the owner, and seized of all of said real estate, and all the parties claim through her. At the request of appellant the court found the facts specially. In substance they are as follows: Louisa W. Leeds, in her lifetime, was the owner of the real estate in question, and died intestate the owner *166thereof. She was survived by her husband, J osiah M. Leeds, three sons bom in wedlock, and an adopted daughter, appellant herein. On June 12, 1880, Josiah M. and Louisa W. Leeds petitioned the Howard Circuit Court for the adoption of Daisy Rammel, appellant in this cause. The words ‘1 and Louisa W. Leeds” were interlined in the petition after the same was written. Said petition was not signed or verified by Louisa W. Leeds. The petitioners were husband and wife at the time of said adoption. The child adopted was at that time three years old, without any property whatever, and a resident of Howard county, Indiana. Her mother was dead, and her father resided in Marion county, Indiana, but he appeared in open court and consented to the adoption. The petition was signed and verified by J. M. Leeds. On said date, the petitioners being present, the court, having examined the petition and being satisfied that it would be for the interest of said child, decreed that said child be, and she was, adopted by said Josiah M. and Louisa W. Leeds, and that she “be entitled to receive all the rights and interest in the estate of J osiah M. and Louisa W. Leeds, by descent or otherwise, that said child would if the natural heir of said foster-father and foster-mother, and that from and after this date said Josiah M. and Louisa W. Leeds shall occupy the same position towards said child that they would if the natural father and mother, and be liable for maintenance, education and in every other way responsible as natural father and mother.!’
Upon these facts the stated conclusions of law were that appellant (1) was duly adopted by Josiah M. Leeds, and (2) became thereby one of his heirs, but (3) that the adoption proceedings were void as to Louisa W. Leeds, and (4) appellant did not become thereby an heir of said Louisa W. Leeds. A decree was entered in favor of appellees as to the real estate owned by Louisa W. Leeds at her death. From this decree an appeal was taken to this court, assigning as errors: (1) The third conclusion of law stated by the court *167upon the facts found; (2) the fourth conclusion of law stated by the court upon the facts found; (3) overruling the motion for a new trial.
*170The heirship of an adopted, child is established by the order of the court adopting such child. The case of Quinn v. Quinn, supra, involved the right of the adopted heir to inherit as such from the foster-father. The contention was that the contract as to property rights between the adopting parent and the mother of the child was not in writing. The court said: “The respondent contends that the fact that the plaintiff is heir of Quinn is conclusively established by the order [of adoption]. We fully agree with counsel in this contention. The order is that said plaintiff ‘shall be capable of inheriting the estate of said Hollis S. Quinn.’ * * * But in the case at bar, as we have seen, the plaintiff, by judicial proceedings was duly adopted as the child and heir of said Hollis Quinn; and this proceeding, in our view of the case, renders it unnecessary to discuss or consider the questions discussed by counsel in their brief. * # * ipjjg fac£ that the plaintiff was legally adopted and made the heir of said Quinn by the order of the court is the important and controlling element in this case. ’ ’
The judgment is reversed, with instructions to the trial *171court so to restate its conclusions of law as to be consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.