17 Colo. App. 76 | Colo. Ct. App. | 1902
May, 1883, James H. Learned was adjudged insane by the county court of said county and a conservator appointed of his person and estate. February, 1886, the same court held him sane, discharging the conservator. Shortly thereafter he removed to New York state, taking up residence there. By a court of that state he was adjudged insane June, 1886, one Snow being appointed as committee of his person and estate; Snow continued to acf as such until November, 1894, when his committeeship was concluded and he discharged. The lunatic escaped from the New York asylum to Connecticut during
1. This is a direct proceeding to vacate the appointments of Mrs. Learned and Jones. From the above statement it appears that Mrs. Learned was appointed conservatrix without notice to the lunatic and without the verdict of a jury finding him insane. On the resignation of Mrs. Learned, Jones was appointed conservator without notice to the lunatic. The effect of such orders was to deprive him of his liberty and of the possession and control of his property. Such result was without giving him an op
To the same effect are Chase v. Hathaway, 14 Mass. 222; Evans v. Johnson, 39 W. V. 299, 19 S. E. 623; Holman v. Holman, 80 Me. 139; McCurry v. Hooper, 12 Ala. 823; Allis v. Morton and another, 4 Mass. 63.
2. The absence of a verdict of insanity was also fatal to the judgments. Our statute requires the finding of a jury that the person claimed to be disordered is so “insane or distracted as to render him or her incapable or unfit to care for or manage his or her estate.” An inquisition of lunacy is regulated
That the absence of a verdict of insanity is fatal to the inquisition, Eslava v. Lepreter, 21 Ala. 504; 56 Am. Dec. 266; Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 34, 27 Atl. 229.
Wood v. Throckmorton, 26 Colo. 248, 57 Pac. 699, cited as contra to the conclusions here reached does not rule the question before us, the court there declined permission to a lunatic, by a next friend, to question the appointment of a conservator, saying, that as it affirmatively appeared that it was to the best interest of the lunatic to retain the then conservator and as it was within the court’s discretion to refuse to permit the appointment to be questioned it would decline to do so and for this reason alone dismissed the writ of error.
It did not appear in the present case that it was to the interest of the lunatic to retain Jones.
Judgment affirmed. Affirmed.