78 So. 568 | La. | 1918
Lead Opinion
Plaintiff in this suit prays for the recovery of damages in the sum of $30,-000 for the benefit of herself as widow, and for the benefit of her minor children, alleged to have been suffered on account of the death of Thomas A. Jones, her late husband and father of her said children.
She charges that her said husband, who was a locomotive engineer in the employ of defendant company, was killed while so em
The case was then brought by writ of error to the United States Supreme Court, and that tribunal reversed our decree on the ground that we had committed error in ruling that evidence of contributory negligence rejected by the trial court for a wrong reason was nevertheless properly excluded, because it was not offered for the specific purpose of mitigating damages, there being no local rule requiring counsel, without inquiry from the court, to announce in advance the purpose for which evidence is tendered. The cause was then remanded to the trial court, in order to afford defendant an opportunity to show, if it could, that deceased had contributed to his death by his own negligence.
Pursuant to the decree of the United States Supreme Court, the case was again tried in the district court for the parish of Caddo, and a verdict was then rendered in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $26,500, and the present appeal is from a judgment based upon that verdict.
Opinion,
Defendant alleges error on the part of the trial judge in his instructions to the jury. It complains of the failure of the jury to apply, the law as charged by the judge, and it also complains of the conclusions of fact reached by this court in its former opinion.
The questions of fact at issue herein were thoroughly investigated by this court on
We are firmly of the opinion that the collision which caused the death of Jones was the result of gross negligence on the part of defendant, and that plaintiff is entitled to recover compensation. The amount of that compensation, due regard being had to the purposes of the law, cannot be fixed with any mathematical certainty, and it is left more or less to the discretion of the courts.
We are most earnestly asked to establish some fixed rule by which it might be gauged, but that function being more properly legislative than judicial, we are unwilling to assume it, however desirable and beneficial such a rule might be.
The original award of $17,500 made by the jury on the,first trial was approved by this court as fair and just, apd we see no good reason either to increase or diminish it, and so believing and for the reasons stated.
It is ordered that the amount of the judgment appealed from be reduced from $26,-500, to $17,500, and, as thus amended, that it be affirmed.
Rehearing
On Rehearing.
The life expectancy of a locomotive engi
The rate of discount to be allowed on the anticipated payments, to reduce them to their present value, is a fair or reasonable rate at which the money could be loaned or invested safely at interest. There is evidence that ■ that rate locally is 6 per cent.; but we think the evidence refers to loans or investments requiring some financial knowledge or ability, and therefore producing returns that are earned, not altogether by the money invested, but in part by the financial ability of the investor. A person without business ability would have to deal with a savings bank, or invest in bonds or other securities of equal standing, paying something like 4 per cent., to make a safe investment at interest. On the other hand, as money does not invest itself, or produce any revenue without investment, its earning power or value is always due, in some measure, to some financial knowledge or ability on the part of its investor. It would therefore be putting the value of the money too low to adopt the rate of 4 per cent, in discounting the payments to be anticipated in this case. Our opinion is that 5 per cent, is a more appropriate rate, ahd is fully warranted by the evidence. That is the -legal rate of interest — the rate we are constrained to allow when none is stipulated and interest is due. It seems quite .equitable that the discount charged to the beneficiaries in computing the present value of deferred payments should be at the rate at which interest would bo allowed to the plaintiffs on a past-due claim of similar character.
We have concluded, therefore, to reduce the amount of the judgment in this case to the present value of 11.7 annual payments of $1,500 each, that is, the net proceeds, or what would be the present or cash value, of $17,550, payable in 11.7 yearly installments, discounted at 5 per cent. The result of our calculation is that the plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment for $13,547.64, viz.:
Years. Amount. Divisor. Discount. Casli Value
1. $ 71.43 $ 1,428.57 $ 1,500. 1.05
2. 1,500. 1.10 136.36 1,363.64
3. 1,500. 1.15 195.64 1,304.36
4. 1,500. 1.20 250.00 1,250.00
5. 1,500. 1.25 300.00 1,200.00
6. 1,500. 1.30 346.15 1,153.85
7. 1,500. 1.35 388.89 1,111.11
8. 1,500. 1.40 428.57 1,071.43
9. 1,500. 1.45 465.52 1,034.48
10. 1,500. 1.50 500.00 1,000.00
11. 1,500. 1.55 532.26 967.74
11.7 1,050. 1.585 387.54 662.46
Totals $17,550. $4,002.36 $13,547.64
The judgment appealed from is amended by reducing the amount to $13,547.64, and,