18 Ala. 248 | Ala. | 1850
There is one question in this ease, which, if decided in favor of the plaintiff, will render the examination of the others unnecessary. It is this: admitting that the statute of limitations of Georgia would be a bar to an action on this contract, if brought in that State, will it avail the defendant, the suit being brought in Alabama?
It is a principle of law, admitted by all courts, that the lex loci contractus must govern as to the validity, interpretation, and construction of the contract. But the remedy to enforce it, or to recover damages for its breach, must be pursued according to the law of the forum where the suit is brought. — Peake v. Yeldell, 17 Ala. 636; Cornegee v.Morrison, 2 Metc. 381; Leroy v. Crowninshield, 2 Mason, 157; Story Con. of Laws, %% 275-6. Guided by these plain rules, which can be denied by no one, to my mind it seems plain, that where a law of another State is relied on as a defence to a suit brought in this State, it must be shown that, according to the lex loci contractus, the contract was invalid, or if once valid, that it has become extinguished, and therefore is not in legal contemplation a contract. If the foreign law does not affect the contract itself, but only the remedy to enforce it, we cannot regard it; for all remedies on contracts, whether made in or out of this State, must be governed by our own laws, when the suit is brought here, without regard to the remedies afforded ’by the laws of other countries. Applying this test to the question, there can be but one answer given, if we are to be guided by the settled principles of law; for all the authorities agree that the statute of limitations, even when the bar is perfected, does not annul the contract itself, but only takes away the remedy provided by law for its enforcement. Now if the contract itself is not discharged, but the remedy alone is taken away, how can we refuse to allow a remedy, the contract being valid, merely because there is no remedy in the State where the contract was made? To refuse a remedy on such a contract would not be to interpret the contract by the lex loci ofay, but it would be to govern ourselves by the laws of other
- In the case of Williams v. Jones, 13 East. 439, the parties entered into a contract in India and there remained until by the law of that country the remedy was barred. Suit was after-wards brought in England, and the foreign statute of limitations was relied on as a bar, but the court held that it was no defence. It was admitted by the court in that case, that if, by the law of India the contract was extinguished, then no remedy could be allowed upon it in England, but as the law only took away the remedy and did not affect the contract itself, the courts of England must enforce it. In the case of Leroy v. Crowninshield, 2 Mason, 157, the suit was brought in Massachusetts, and the defence was that the action was barred by the laws of New York, where the contract was made. Judge Story, after an elaborate examination of the question, finally yielded to the weight of autbority, and held, contrary to his own inclination, that the statute of limitations of New York Was no defence. In the case of Medbury v. Hopkins, 3 Conn. 472, the question was whether the statute of limitations of New York was a good defence to a suit brought in Connecticut, it appearing that the contract was made in the State of New York, and that if suit had been brought there the statute of that State would have been a good defence. The court said it was well settled that contracts were to be construed according to the law of the place, in reference to which they were made, but that the lex loci was applicable only as to the validity and the interpretation of contracts, not as to the time, mode, or extent of the remedy; and upon that principle held that the statute of New York was no defence. In the case of Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. 475, the Supreme Court of New York held that the statute of limitations of the State, where _the contract was made, was no bar to an action brought in the courts of New York. Savage, C. J., in delivering the opinion, said, the distinction between the lex loci and the lex fori is well settled. The laws of the lex loci are to govern all questions affecting the validity, nature, and construction of the contract, but the law of the place where the contract is sought to be enforced-must govern as to the remedy. To the same effect, see 3 Johns. R. 263; 3 Johns. Ch. R. 190-218. In the case of Byrne v. Crowninshield, 17 Mass. 65, the Supreme Court of that State
Let the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded.