| Me. | Aug 6, 1992
Defendant Jean W. Jones appeals from a divorce judgment of the Superior Court (York County, McKinley, A.R.J.). Jean argues that the court erred in failing to set aside to her as her nonmarital property the home in Biddeford that served as the family residence during her marriage. Because the stated rationale for the Superior Court’s decision is not supported by the record, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court.
Jean and Ralph D. Jones were married in 1958 at the ages of 16 and 20, respectively. They have no children. In 1975, they jointly acquired property in St. Albans. In 1976, they jointly acquired property in Biddeford that became their home. In 1978, Ralph filed for divorce and moved out. At that time, the Joneses executed deeds in which Ralph transferred all his “right, title and interest” in the Biddeford property to Jean, and Jean transferred all her “right, title and interest” in the St. Albans property to Ralph. After only seven or eight months of separation, however, the Joneses reconciled and Ralph dismissed the divorce action and moved back to Biddeford. The properties were never re-conveyed and, until the parties separated again in 1988, all payments on the Bidde-ford property were made from the Jones’s joint bank account into which both deposited their paychecks. In 1982, Ralph sold the St. Albans property for a net profit of about $17,000.
In 1988, they separated again and in 1989 Ralph initiated the present divorce action.
The court determined that the business was Jean’s separate nonmarital property, excluded from the marital estate by a “valid agreement of the parties” within the meaning of 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A(2)(D) (1981).
The division of property in a divorce proceeding is governed by 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A (1981 & Supp.1991).
The trial court properly recognized that because the property was acquired by Jean during the marriage, it was presumptively marital property under section 722-A(3). The court’s reasoning behind its further conclusion that Jean failed to overcome this presumption is, however, quite unclear. In concluding that Jean failed to overcome the presumption that the property was marital, the only specific finding made by the court was that the exchange of deeds bore a “relationship to the reconciliation” of the Joneses. There is no support in the record for this finding. Jean testified that the transfer was made simply because Ralph wanted the St. Albans property and she the Biddeford residence. Ralph, in turn, testified that the transfer was made as part of their impending divorce. The record discloses no testimony that the transfer was conditioned on the parties divorcing at that time, or that it was to be voided by, affected by, or related to their reconciliation.
While it is true that a property settlement made in anticipation of divorce may be abrogated by a subsequent reconciliation of the parties, essential to such a result is an intent on the part of the parties, either at the time of the settlement or at the time of the reconciliation, that the settlement be so abrogated. See Annotation, Reconciliation as Affecting Separation Agreement or Decree, 35 A.L.R.2d 707, 717 (1954). In this case there was no evidence of, and the court made no specific finding that, the parties intended to abrogate the settlement upon reconciliation. See id. at 719-27. Moreover, because the court refused Jean’s request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on that very issue, we cannot assume that the court made all necessary findings to support its decision. Bayley v. Bayley, 602 A.2d 1152" court="Me." date_filed="1992-01-29" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/bayley-v-bayley-2104814?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="2104814">602 A.2d 1152, 1154 (Me.1992). We therefore must vacate the judgment.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.
All concurring.
. The evidence of what happened to this money was contradictory. Jean testified that she never received any of the proceeds from the sale. Ralph testified that part of the money was used to buy a piano as a gift to Jean and the rest was used to pay for a trip to Italy that they took together.
. Ralph brought the action in the District Court. Pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 76C, Jean removed the case to Superior Court.
. 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A(2) provides as follows:
2. Definition. For purposes of this section only, “marital property” means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage, except:
A. Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
B. Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
C. Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
D. Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
E. The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.
. The court found that the Biddeford property had a value of $215,000. The property was subject to a $56,000 mortgage.
. Ralph filed a cross-appeal, but has made no separate cross-appeal argument in his brief to this court.
. 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A is based on section 307 of the 1970 version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. Zillert v. Zillert, 395 A.2d 1152" court="Me." date_filed="1978-12-29" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/zillert-v-zillert-1501920?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="1501920">395 A.2d 1152, 1154 (Me.1978)
. 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A(3) (1981) states:
All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety and community property. The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection 2.