Jones v. Illinois
464 U.S. 920
SCOTUS
1983
Check Treatment

JONES v. ILLINOIS

No. 82-6913

Supreme Court of Illinois

920

have jurisdiction to review it.

.

I would therefore grant certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, and reinstate the dismissal of the indictment.

No. 82-2091. MOODY v. MEYERS ET AL. C. A. 5th Cir. Motions of Washington Legal Foundation, American Conservative Union et al., and Citizens Economic Foundation for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

No. 82-6913.

. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,

, I would vacate the death sentence in this case.

JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case.

(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). However, even if I believed that the death penalty could be imposed constitutionally under certain circumstances, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence imposed here.

Given the wording of the Illinois death penalty statute and the trial court‘s instructions in this case, I am not convinced that petitioner‘s sentencing jury balanced mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances in the manner required by this Court in

, and
. Under the Illinois statute, once a sentencing jury finds a statutorily defined aggravating factor to exist, the jury proceeds to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. “If the jury determines unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 9-1(g) (Supp. 1982). At the sentencing trial in this case, the trial judge instructed the jury on how to evaluate mitigating evidence: “[Y]ou go out and determine whether or not this evidence has taken away the [aggravating] factors, mitigated the factors so that you might say no, we don‘t want to vote for the death penalty.” See
(Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Notwithstanding other portions of the trial court‘s instructions, this instruction coupled with the Illinois statute‘s ambiguous reference to “preclud[ing] the imposition of the death sentence” may well have led the sentencing jury to conduct its deliberation under the assumption that petitioner had the burden of proving that the death penalty was inappropriate in his particular case. Since I do not understand this Court‘s precedents to permit the placing of such a burden on a defendant, I would grant the petition.

No. 83-284. MOON ET AL. v. HYOSUNG AMERICA, INC. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for damages denied. Certiorari denied.

No. 83-5053. PETRELLA v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting.

Petitioner was admitted to the United States in 1978 and obtained a 1-year trainee visa. Upon expiration of his visa, he failed to depart voluntarily and, after protracted deportation proceedings, was deported to Italy. Approximately one month later, petitioner attempted to cross the border at Highgate Springs, Vt. He was arrested and charged with violating 8 U. S. C. §1326, which proscribes unauthorized entry or attempted entry into this country by one who “has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported.”

Prior to trial, petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the earlier deportation proceedings had denied him due process. The District Court refused to review the earlier proceedings and denied the motion. Petitioner was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year, all but 30 days of which was suspended. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed petitioner‘s conviction,