Thе bill sought to vacate a decree of the probate court setting aside homestead and exemptions to the widow of deceased.. Copies of the proceeding and decrеe of the probate court relating to the setting aside of the widow’s homestead and personal exemptions are exhibited with the bill and on the pleading the decree of the court held not subject to collateral attack. Edmondson v. Jones,
In Douglas v. Bishop, supra, is contained, the observation that the statute providing for no notice to the next of kin in probate proceеdings for homestead allotments and setting aside exemptions from estates of decedents is a mаtter to be addressed to the Legislature and not to the courts (Moore v. McLure, supra); that such proceedings, as setting apart a homestead to the wife, although no notice was given to the next of kin was binding, when consummated by appropriate decrees-not sought to be reviewed by аppeal, unless the same can be successfully attacked for fraud; and that such a decree will not be set aside for fraud in a “collateral proceeding,” because the widow’s affidаvit was false as to the amount of land of the deceased, as the fraud necessary to set aside a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction must be such as has relation to еxtrinsic matters, and not to a fraud in the matter in which the decree was rendered. Hogan v. Scott,
In the mаtter of setting aside the widow’s homestead and exemptions, the probate court did acquire jurisdiсtion, and the decree sought to be attacked in the instant case was final and conclusive аs to the questions necessary for the probate court to determino, viz: (a) Whether John Hubbard, at thе time of his death, owned the real and personal property involved in this suit; (b) whether the lands were аll of the lands which he owned at the time of his death, and, if so, whether they exceeded either in valuе or area the constitutional limit of a homestead; (c) whether the personalty of which he died seized and possessed was in value ■more than $1,000; (d) whether Catherine Hubbard was in fact his widow; and (e) whether said decedent left surviving him any minor child or children. These questions were directly presented for judiciаl determination, and finally decided on the proceeding, and by the decree of the probate court .exhibited to complainant’s bill.
Aside from the foregoing, the cause, was tried before the court on pleading and proof and testimony taken orally before the judge. On final hearing it was decreed that complainant was not entitled to the relief prayed, and the bill was dismissed. There wаs a conflict in the testimony, on the one hand, as to the age of the plaintiff at the death of hеr father, that being the time and law applicable (Long v. Brown,
As stated, the knowledge of such faсts, said to have been brought home to complainant after she was of full age, and while tlie prоceedings wex-e in fieri in the probate coux-t was denied by her, testifying in her own behalf. There being ample evidence to support a finding of the court on the testimony, the decree in respeсt of the finding that complainant was over the age of 21 years at the time of her father’s death, and other facts necessary to a recovery, will not now be disturbed. Hackett v. Cash,
Affirmed.