Lead Opinion
Thе plaintiff, Mrs. Jones, seeks recovery of damages from the defendants, attorneys at law engaged as partners in the practice of law in this state, which she claims to have suffered as the result of their negligence and the want of the proper exercise of professional skill and learning in advising her as to hеr inheritance rights in the administration and distribution of the estate of" her deceased husband. The defendants demurred to the plaintiff’s complaint upon the ground that it dоes not state facts constituting a cause of action, and that the action has not been commenced within the time limited by law. The demurrer
The cоntrolling facts may be summarized from the allegations of the complaint, as follows: On October 8,1917, M. F. J ones, a resident of King county, in this state, died intestate, leaving no children, • nor direct descendants, nor father nor mother, but leaving appellant, his wife, and twelve nephews and nieces; and leaving a separate estate of substantial value in this state. Soon thereafter appellant employed respondents as attorneys for herself and for the estate. They prоcured her appointment as administrator by the usual proceedings, and when the estate was ready for final settlement and distribution, they prepared the usual final account and petition for distribution; thereby showing to the court, among other things, that the deceased died, leaving heirs, as we have already noticеd, and praying that the estate be distributed, one-half to appellant, and one-half to the twelve nephews and nieces; respondents advising appellant that such was the law under the statutes of descent of this state, § 1341, Rem. Comp. Stat. [P. C. § 9847]; and thereby inducing her to sign such petition for distribution. Such proceedings were had uрon the filing of such final account and petition for distribution that, on the 4th day of December, 1918, the final account was settled and the estate distributed by a decree entered in accordance with the allegations and prayer of the petition for distribution, resulting in appellant receiving one-half of the property of the estate, and the twelve nephews and nieces of the deceased receiving the other half; which distribution of the property of the estate is now claimed by appellant to have been erroneous
Thereafter, on July 31, 1919, the defendants filed in the superior сourt on behalf of appellant a motion and petition seeking the vacating and setting aside of the decree of distribution and the awarding to her of аll of the property of the estate, claiming the original decree of distribution to have been erroneous in not so having awarded her all the proрerty of the estate. Such proceedings were had upon that motion and petition that, on January 10,1920, judgment and decree of the superior court was еntered setting aside the original decree of distribution, and thereupon decreeing distribution of all of the property of the estate to appellаnt. Thereafter the nephews and nieces, to whom one-half of the property had been distributed by the original decree of distribution, appealed frоm the order and judgment setting aside that decree. Thereafter, on July 28, 1921, this court reversed the order and judgment of the superior court setting aside the original decree of distribution, which had the result of leaving that decree in full force and effect, in In re Jones’ Estate,
Whether or not respondents correctly construed our statute (Rem. Comр. Stat, § 1341) [P. C. ' § 9847], prescribing the rules of descent of real property, in
The contention made in appellant’s behalf seems to be that in some wаy the starting of the running of the statute was stayed by the efforts put forth by respondents as counsel for appellant looking to the setting aside of the original deсree of distribution and the entering of another decree of distribution awarding to her all of the property of the estate: We are quite at a loss to understand how such action on the part of respondents, or how such subsequent proceedings in court looking to the setting aside of the original decree of distribution, could stay the starting of the three-year statute of limitations. Surely whatever respondents did resulting in damage to ■ appellant occurred not later thаn the entering of the decree of distribution on December 4,1918. Manifestly appellant’s right of action, if any she ever had, accrued not later than that datе. Every act of respondents which could possibly have resulted in the damage claimed to have been suffered by appellant was committed before or upon that date. This is not an action for relief upon the ground of fraud, nor is it so contended, the accrual
It seems to us that the decision of this court in Cornell v. Edsen,
The order sustaining respondent’s demurrer to appellant’s complaint, and the judgment dismissing the action upon appellant’s declining to plead further, were correctly rendered and must be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Main, C. J., concurs.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring) — I concur in the rеsult reached in the foregoing opinion, but I prefer to rest my conclusion on the ground that the appellant was not entitled to a greater share of her deceased hus
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring)—I concur on both grounds.