8 N.C. 379 | N.C. | 1821
Lead Opinion
As I think the real and substantial justice of this case was settled by the award I should be unwilling to set it aside unless compelled to do so by some rule of law. When Jones brought the land he expected to obtain an undisputed title, but discovering that the vendor claimed under a younger patent, when the same land had been previously patented, he sued on the covenant in the deed, and before the cause was put to issue the parties referred it to four of their neighbors to settle. The arbitrators decided from the fact of the older patent and possession under it that the defendant's seven years' possession did not give him a title, and that the possession of those claiming under Coxe's patent was co-extensive with their claim. Admitting the law to be otherwise, still it gives Jones such a title as is liable to be drawn into controversy and which he cannot establish in the common way of land titles by producing recorded grants and deeds, but must resort to parol evidence to prove Frazier's possession. It may happen, too, that some of the parties claiming under the elder patent may have been under disability during the whole time of Frazier's possession, thereby preventing it from ripening into a title. Now an award ought not to be set aside until it certainly appears to be against law, and that in a case where the arbitrators meant to decide according to law. From the few facts set forth in the case I cannot draw this inference, and therefore think that the judgment of the Circuit Court setting aside the award should be reversed and judgment be entered according to the award.
Addendum
This award sets forth no fact on account of which it ought to be set aside. If it was right to look into the affidavit which accompanies it that affidavit, instead of militating against it, furnishes the strongest reasons why it ought to stand. The plaintiff sold a tract of land to the defendant for which an older grant had issued, and whether the title under that (383) grant had been lost and acquired by the junior grantee by a seven years' uninterrupted possession had never been ascertained by a trial between the parties. The arbitrators were *201 at liberty and, I think, did right when they released the defendant from a contract for the purchase of land over the seller's title to which such a cloud was hanging; they were right in saying he should not be bound by a contract which would necessarily involve him in litigation. There is no evidence that he had any knowledge that the land was claimed by any other person than the plaintiff at the time of the purchase. I think the judgment of the Superior Court which set aside the award ought to be reversed and a judgment entered confirming it.