Laura Jones and her husband John brought this action in the State Court of Fayette County against Dr. Rick Verdin and Fayette Family Dental Care, Inc. (“the Practice”), for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and fоr loss of consortium. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Verdin and the Practice, and the Joneses appeal. For the reasons explained below, we аffirm.
“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in favоr of the nonmovant.” 1
Viewed in favor of the Joneses, the record shows the following. In September 2007, Laura was employed by the Practice as a dental assistant, working for Dr. Verdin. 2 According to Laurа, on September 5, 2007, she walked out of an x-ray processing room and into a hallway, where she saw Verdin with his pants lowered. Verdin was holding his penis in his hand and was masturbating. Laura saw Verdin in profile for about five seconds before she turned and left; she does not know whether Verdin saw her or not. Before Laura left, Jennifer Spivey, another dental assistant who worked for the Prac tice, entered thе hallway from the opposite direction and also saw Verdin masturbating. As he did so, he was looking at Spivey.
Instead of immediately leaving the office after the incident, 3 Laura assisted Verdin in treating a patient. At lunchtime, Laura and Spivey met with the office manager about the incident and resigned their employment. The two then reported the incident to the police. Although Verdin denies masturbаting in the hallway that day, he entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of public indecency in connection with the incident.
As to Laura’s claim for IIED, the Joneses allegе that Verdin’s actions directly injured Laura by humiliating, embarrassing, frightening, and outraging her, and they also claim that Verdin’s actions resulted in John’s loss of consortium. They alleged that the Practice is derivatively liable for Verdin’s conduct under the theories of respondeat superior, ratification, and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. In support of Laura’s IIED claim, she testified that “it’s just something I couldn’t get out of my head. I was shocked.” Nevertheless, she confirmed that she did not seek treatment from any type of doctor or counselor after the incident and suffered no physical ailments other than laсk of desire
The trial court found that a lack of evidence precluded Laura’s direct claim against Verdin. And, the direct claim having failed, it followed that John’s derivative claim and their claims against the Practice also failed. Specifically, the trial court found the conduct was not extreme and outragеous, and Laura’s distress did not rise to the level that no reasonable person could endure it. 5
To survive summary judgment on a claim for IIED, “In the absence of any physical impact to her person, a plaintiff seeking to recover for emotional distress must show[, in addition to the above four elements,] that the conduct in question was directed at her.” 7
a plaintiff must show all four of the following elemеnts: (1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) The emotional distress must be severe. 6
Conduct that is sufficiently extreme and outrageous is that which is “so serious as to naturally give rise to such intense feelings of humiliation, embarrassment, fright or extreme outrage as to cause severe emotional distress.” 8 It is not enough to show that the defendant
acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he . . . intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct [was] characterized by maliсe, or a degree of aggravation that would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 9
“[T]he existence of а special relationship in which one person has control over another, as in [an] employer-employee relationship, may produce a character of outrageousness that might otherwise not exist.” 10 “Regardless of the existence of such relationship, however, it must be emphasized that major outrage in the language or conduct complained of is essential to the tort.” 11 “Whether reasonable persons could find the conduct reaches [the required] level is a question of law for the court.” 12
We cannot say as a matter of law that the assеrted act of exposure and masturbating in a public hallway of a dentist’s office where anyone could and did happen upon the person so engaged is not extreme and outrageоus
Emotional distress includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that liability arises. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. 14
“Whether severe emotional distress can be found, based on the evidence presented, is a question for the court to decide.” 15
Laura testified that she was “shocked” and “upset for awhile,” but she suffered no physical ailments other than decreased sexual desire for apprоximately one year following the incident. It is undisputed that after the incident Laura sought no treatment from any type of doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist, or counselor. According to John, Laurа exhibited stress associated with their financial circumstances, stopped showing affection toward him, experienced “bursts of anger,” and “wasn’t the same person, just — not the outgoing person, not the social person that she used to be.” While the frustration associated with feeling forced to quit one’s job arising out of an incident such as the present one is understandable, under the facts рresented here, Laura’s distress does not rise to the level of severity necessary to sustain a claim for IIED.
Because John’s claim for loss of consortium depends on the viability of Laura’s IIED claim against Verdin, his claim against Verdin also fails. Likewise, the Joneses’ claims for vicarious liability against the practice, which were based on Verdin’s allegedly tortiоus conduct, also fail. 16
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
(Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Tackett v. Ga. Dept. of Corrections,
Since 1993, except for short period of time in the late 1990s, Verdin has operated a solo dental practice.
According tо Laura, the incident took place at approximately 11:30 a.m.
John testified that while he observed Laura’s decreased interest in sex and that she rejected his requests for sex approximately eight to ten times over the course of the year after the incident, the couple did engage in sexual relations as often as three to four times a month by March 2008.
The trial court deсlined to decide the issue whether Verdin’s conduct was “directed” at Laura. Because of our holding set forth herein, we also need not reach this question.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.)
United Parcel Svc. v. Moore,
Norton v. Holcomb,
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United Parcel Svc.,
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Johnson v. Allen,
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Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta,
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Wilcher v. Confederate Packaging,
United Parcel Svc.,
See
Trimble v. Circuit City Stores, 220
Ga. App. 498, 499 (
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Jones,
Abdul-Malik,
See, e.g.,
PN Express, Inc. v. Zegel,