19 Ala. 672 | Ala. | 1851
We may concede, for the purposes of this decision, that Col. Dawson was the agent of the trustees to take charge of this property, after its removal to this State from South Carolina, and that Mrs. Dawson had bound herself for the payment of the demand due to the plaintiff in error, as wages for overseeing the property for three years, under the contract of employment entered into between him and Dawson; and yet we are of opinion that under the circumstances of this case, as presented by the record, the plaintiff in error is not entitled to the relief which he seeks.
The bill prays that relief may be granted from the corpus of the trust; that the property be hired out, or enough of it sold to satisfy the plaintiff’s demand. Without stopping to inquire whether the services rendered by the plaintiff in error would, if rendered by the trustees themselves, have constituted a valid charge in their favor against the property, let us inquire, upon the hypothesis that it would, whether the employment by the trustees could confer upon the plaintiff a right to go into a court of equity for satisfaction out of the'trust fund. This is a highly important question, and although we do. not conceive it one of any difficulty, we have, nevertheless, given it a very mature consideration, both as to the principle upon which it turns, and the authorities in support of the view rvo have felt constrained to take of it.
We may safely lay it down as the general rule, that expenses properly incurred by a trustee in the execution of his office aw such, are treated by the court as a charge or lien upon the estate, and the cestuis que trust, or their assigns, cannot compel the trustee to convoy in equity without a previous satisfaction of all the trustee’s just demands. Does this equitable. right extend to the agents of the trustees 7 In the event of the death or insolvency of such trustee, can those employed by him go immediately upon the trust fund for payment1?
In Worrall v. Harford, 8 Ves. 4, the question now under consideration appears for the first, and, so far as I have been enabled to discover, the only time dircctty presented to the English
Mr. Lewin, (p. 455,) upon the authority of Lord Eldon, in Worrall v. Harford, supra, asserts the proposition broadly, that although there be an express declaration by the settler, that the trustee shall in the first place pay the expenses of the trust, and although the trustees themselves be charged to be insolvent, the agent or solicitor of the trustee has no equity as-against the trust fund, and that it would be a mischievous principle to hold that every person, with whom the trustees had incurred a just and fair demand, might sue the trustees and come for an account of the whole administration.
Speaking of the lien which the trustee has for expenses in■curred upon the trust estate in their hands, Mr. Hill, in his work
2. But if we were mistaken, either in the principle above stated, or in its application to the case made by the record, there is another ground upon which relief must be denied.
The fund, or property against which the bill is aimed, is distinctly asserted to be the corpus of the trust. Mr. and Mrs. Dawson had a joint estate for life, his interest, however, to cease when his creditors should attempt to subject his property for his debts. The expense here sought to be' charged upon the fund was incurred in the management' and employment of the property pending the life estate, and evidently for the benefit of the cestuis que trust for life, who reaped the profits' which accrued from it. It is well settled in such cases,' that the cestuis que trust for life, who are in possession of the trust estate, are liable-for all current expenses attending the enjoyment of the property, and that such expenses constitute no charge upon the general fund, or corpus of the trust. — Hill on Trustees, 571, and eases cited in note L.
Were the law otherwise, the estate in remainder would be utterly destroyed in many cases, for the benefit and protection of those entitled for life. So that conceding this bill to have been properly filed, and that the interest of Mrs. Dawson might have been subjected, yet she having departed this life, as is conceded by the counsel in this court, her interest ceased, and consequently no decree affecting the property can be made. The record does not show that there are any issues or profits due hey, apd none are sought to be -subjected.
It results that the decree of the chancellor was correct, and it is therefore 'affirmed.
I cannot join in overruling the ease of Coopwood v. Wallace, (12 Ala. 790.) In that ease the admin