17 Iowa 393 | Iowa | 1864
In consequence of the changes which the statute has made, there is perhaps no part of the law more involved in uncertainty and doubt, none about which the profes
We now come to chapter 101 of the Revision. The object of the first sections of this chapter is to abrogate some, and modify others, of the unreasonable rules of the common law as to rights of the wife (or, rather, her want of rights) in her property. At common law the effect of marriage was to vest in the husband at once, and absolutely, all of the wife’s personalty in possession, and her ehoses in action on condition that he reduced them to possession dur-. ing coverture. He had also the right to the rents and profits of her real estate. Bright on Husb, and Wife, 34, 36; Co. Litt., 351 a. These matters are now regulated by §§ 2499, 2502, 2504, of the Revision; but none of these sections contain any provisions removing personal restraints of cov-erture so as to enable married women to make valid contracts. And such has been the previous holding in this court. Mullin v. Mullin, 10 Iowa, 412; Duncan v. Roselle, 16 Id., -;
Sections 2505, 2506, et seg., of the Revision, are those which have been supposed to remove the personal disabilities of coverture. But they do not. Taking §§ 2505 and 2506 together, they are, that the husband is not liable on contracts made by the wife in relation to her separate property, or on those which purport to bind herself only; nor is the property of the wife, or the rents or income, liable for the debts of the husband. Two species of contracts only are here alluded to: 1st. “ Contracts by a wife in relation to her separate property.” This is clear; they bind her, and do not bind the husband. 2d. Contracts purporting to bind herself only are declared not to bind her husband. This is not very clear; but it would be a most unwarrantable construction to say that this vague and ambiguous language was intended to emancipate married women from all the disabilities of coverture, make them sui juris, and enable them to enter into valid contracts of all kinds with their husbands and others, with or without the husband’s consent. That this was not the intention, plainly appears from § 2508, which allows “ married women abandoned by their husbands to obtain authority from the District Court to act, and to transact business as though unmarried.” Why this special provision in favor of one class of married women, if all married women, without any such authority, have the right to act and contract as though unmarried ?
The above provisions were contained in the Code of 1851. In chapter 117 of the Revision of 1860, relating to “ Parties to Actions," it is, in addition, provided (§ 2771) “ That when
Our statute seems founded on a wise policy for the more effectual protection of the rights of married women. The two cardinal ideas upon which it proceeds are, first, the wife’s restoration to the exclusive dominion and enjoyment of her own real property, exempt from her husband’s control and from liability for his debts; and, second, her incapacity to make general personal contracts, except for “the expenses of the family,” &c. (§§ 2506 and 2507), through the persuasion of her husband or her own improvidence, whereby the property thus secured to her may be imperiled or lost. In this very inability thus to contract, consists her best and surest protection. Her disability is thus wisely converted into a security more certain and effective, perhaps, than any which, if the disability were removed, could be thrown around her by the most carefully constructed and elaborate legislative defenses; The foregoing views relate to the rights of the parties at law. Equity, it is well known, enforces in a peculiar manner, in certain cases, against the property of married women, debts which have be.en beneficial to them or to their separate estate, or which have been contracted on the faith of it, and this though the obligations are void at law. Patton and Wife v. Kinsman, ante. The principles upon which the jurisdiction is based, and upon which relief is administered, have been, and still remain, the subject of much dispute. As particularly bearing upon it, we refer to the recent , and warmly contested and important case of Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y., 265, reversing same case, 21 Barb., 286; and see same case again, 22 N. Y., 450; Gardner v. Gardner, 22 Wend., 525; S. C., 7 Paige, 112; Curtis v. Engel, 2 Sandf. Ch., 287; Story Eq., § 1397, et seq.; Holme v. Tenant, 1 Lead. Cases in Eq., 389, and English and American notes; Patton v. Kinsman, supra; Hollis v. Francois, 5 Texas, 195; Id., 152; Aylett v. Ashton,
The directions of the learned judge below, which need not be set out, were to the effect that the wife was not liable on this contract in the action then before the court; and in this there was no error. Whatever rights, if any, the plaintiff has with respect to the wife, must be asserted in a court of equity. The judgment of the District Court as to the husband is reversed: as to the wife, affirmed. The costs on appeal to be paid by the husband.