MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff in this lawsuit, Paula Corbin Jones, seeks civil damages from William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police Officer, for alleged actions beginning with an incident in a hotel suite in Little Rock, Arkansas. This case was previously before the Supreme Court of the United States to resolve the issue of Presidential immunity but was remanded to this Court following the Supreme Court’s determination that there is no constitutional impediment to allowing plaintiffs case to proceed while the President is in office.
See Clinton v. Jones,
— U.S. -,
I.
This lawsuit is based on an incident that is said to have taken place on the afternoon of *663 May 8,1991, in a suite at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Arkansas. President Clinton was Governor of the State of Arkansas at the time, and plaintiff was a State employee with the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission (“AIDC”), having begun her State employment on March 11, 1991. Ferguson was an Arkansas State Police officer assigned to the Governor’s security detail.
According to the record, then-Governor Clinton was at the Excelsior Hotel on the day in question delivering a speech at an official conference being sponsored by the AIDC. Am. Compl. ¶ 7. 3 Plaintiff states that she and another AIDC employee, Pamela Blackard, were working at a registration desk for the AIDC when a man approached the desk and informed her and Blackard that he was Trooper Danny Ferguson, the Governor’s bodyguard. Pl.’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶¶ 1-2. She states that Ferguson made small talk with her and Blackard and that they asked him if he had a gun as he was in street clothes and they “wanted to know.” PL’s Depo. at 101. Ferguson acknowledged that he did and, after being asked to show the gun to them, left the registration desk to return to the Governor. Id.; PL’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶ 2. The conversation between plaintiff, Blackard, and Ferguson lasted approximately five minutes and consisted of light, friendly banter; there was nothing intimidating, threatening, or coercive about it. PL’s Depo. at 226-27.
Upon leaving the registration desk, Ferguson apparently had a conversation with the Governor about the possibility of meeting with plaintiff, during which Ferguson states the Governor remarked that plaintiff had “that come-hither look,” ie. “a sort of [sexually] suggestive appearance from the look or dress.” Ferguson Depo. at 50; PL’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶ 3; President’s Depo. at 109. 4 He states that “some time later” the Governor asked him to “get him a room, that he was expecting a call from the White House and ... had several phone calls that he needed to make,” and asked him to go to the car and get his briefcase containing the phone messages. Ferguson Depo. at 50, 67. Ferguson states that upon obtaining the room, the Governor told him that if plaintiff wanted to meet him, she could “come up.” Id. at 50.
Plaintiff states that Ferguson later reappeared at the registration desk, delivered a piece of paper to her with a four-digit number written on it, and said that the Governor would like to meet with her in this suite number. PL’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶ 6. She states that she, Blackard, and Ferguson talked about what the Governor could want and that Ferguson stated, among other things, “We do this all the time.” Id. Thinking that it was an honor to be asked to meet the Governor and that it might lead to an enhanced employment opportunity, plaintiff states that she agreed to the meeting and that Ferguson escorted her to the floor of the hotel upon which the Governor’s suite was located. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-13.
Plaintiff states that upon arriving at the suite and announcing herself, the Governor shook her hand, invited her in, and closed the door., PL’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶¶ 7-8. She states that a few minutes of small talk ensued, which included the Governor asking her about her job .and him mentioning that Dave Harrington, plaintiffs ultimate superior within the AIDC and a Clinton appointee, was his “good friend.” Id. ¶ 8; Am. Compl. *664 ¶ 17. Plaintiff states that the Governor then “unexpectedly reached over to [her], took her hand, and pulled her toward him, so that their bodies were close to each other.” Pl.’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶ 9. She states she removed her hand from his and retreated several feet, but that the Governor approached her again and, while saying, “I love the way your hair flows down your back” and “I love your curves,” put his hand on her leg, started sliding it toward her pelvic area, and bent down to attempt to Mss her on the neck, all without her consent. Id. ¶¶ 9-10; Pl.’s Depo. at 237-38. 5 Plaintiff states that she exclaimed, “What are you doing?,” told the Governor that she was “not that kind of girl,” and “escaped” from the Governor’s reach “by walMng away from him.” Pl.’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶ 11; PL’s Depo. at 237. She states she was extremely upset and confused and, not knowing what to do, attempted to distract the Governor by chatting about his wife. PL’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶ 11. Plaintiff states that she sat down at the end of the sofa nearest the door, but that the Governor approached the sofa where she had talken a seat and, as he sat down, “lowered his trousers and underwear, exposed his penis (wMch was erect) and told [her] to ‘Mss it.’ ” Id. 6 She states that she was “horrified” by this and that she “jumped up from the couch” and told the Governor that she had to go, saying something to the effect that she had to get back to the registration desk. Id. ¶ 12. • Plaintiff states that the Governor, “while fondling his penis,” said, ‘Well, I don’t want to make you do anything you don’t want to do,” and then pulled up his pants and said, “If you get in trouble for leaving work, have Dave call me immediately and I’ll take care of it.” Id. She states that as she left the room (the door of wMch was not locked), the Governor “detained” her momentarily, “looked sternly” at her, and said, “You are smart. Let’s keep this between ourselves.” Id.; PL’s Depo. at 94, 96-97. 7
Plaintiff states that the Governor’s advances to her were unwelcome, that she never said or did anything to suggest to the Governor that she was willing to have sex with him, and that during the time they were together in the hotel suite, she resisted his advances although she was “stunned by them and intimidated by who he was.” PL’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶ 14. She states that when tbe Governor referred to Dave Harrington, she “understood that he was telling her that he had control over Mr. Harrington and over her job, and that he was willing to use that power.” Id. ¶ 13. She states that from that point on, she was “very fearful” that her refusal to submit to the Governor’s advances could damage her career and even jeopardize her employment. Id.
Plaintiff states that when she left the hotel suite, she was in shock and upset but tried to maintain her composure. Id. ¶ 15. She states she saw Ferguson waiting outside the suite but that he did not escort her back to the registration desk and notMng was said between them. Id. Ferguson states that five or ten minutes after plaintiff exited the suite he joined the Governor for their return to the Governor’s Mansion and that the Governor, who was working on some papers that he had spread out on the desk, said, “She came up here, and nothing happened.” Id. ¶ 16; Ferguson Depo. at 63.
Plaintiff states she returned to the registration desk and told Blackard some of what had happened. Blackard Depo. at 68. Blackard states that plaintiff was shaking and embarrassed. Id. Following the Conference, plaintiff states she went to the workplace of a Mend, Debra Ballentine, and told her of the incident as well. PL’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶ 18. Ballentine states that *665 plaintiff was upset and crying. Ballentine Depo. at 48. Later that same day, plaintiff states she told her sister, Charlotte Corbin Brown, what had happened and, within the next two days, also told her other sister, Lydia Corbin Cathey, of the incident. Id. ¶ 20. Brown’s observations of plaintiffs demeanor apparently are not included in the record.' Cathey, however, states that plaintiff was “bawling” and “squalling,” and that she appeared scared, embarrassed, and ashamed. Cathey Depo. at 52.
Ballentine states that she encouraged plaintiff to report the incident to her boss or to the police, but that plaintiff declined, pointing out that her boss was friends with the Governor and that the police were the ones who took her to the hotel suite. Ballen-tine Depo. at 50. Ballentine further states that plaintiff stated she did not want her fiancé to know of the incident and that she “just want[ed] this thing to go away.” Id. Plaintiff states that what the Governor and Ferguson had said and done made her “afraid” to file charges. Pl.’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶ 19.
Plaintiff continued to work at AIDC following the alleged incident in the hotel suite. Id. ¶ 22. One of her duties was to deliver documents to and from the Office of the Governor, as well as other offices around the Arkansas State Capitol. Id. She states that in June 1991, while performing these duties for the AIDC, she encountered Ferguson who told her that Mrs. Clinton was out of town often and that the Governor wanted her phone number and wanted to see her. Id. Plaintiff states she refused to provide her phone number to Ferguson. Id. She states that Ferguson also asked her how her fiancé, Steve, was doing, even though she had never told Ferguson or the Governor his name, and that this “frightened” her. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff states that she again encountered Ferguson following her return to work from maternity leave and that he said he had “told Bill how good looking you are since you’ve had the baby.” Id. ¶ 25. She also states that she was “accosted” by the Governor in the Rotunda of the Arkansas State Capitol when he “draped his arm over her, pulled her close to him and held her tightly to his body,” and said to his bodyguard, “Don’t we make a beautiful couple: Beauty and the Beast?” Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff additionally states that on an unspecified date, she was waiting in the Governor’s outer office on a delivery run when the Governor entered the office, patted her on the shoulder, and in a “friendly fashion” said, “How are you doing, Paula?” Pl.’s Depo. at 244-45.
Plaintiff states that she continued to work at AIDC “even though she was in constant fear that [the Governor] would retaliate against her because she had refused to have sex with him.” Id. ¶ 27. She states this fear prevented her from enjoying her job. Id. Plaintiff states that she was treated “very rudely” by certain superiors in AIDC, including her direct supervisor, Clydine Pennington, and that this “rude treatment” had not happened prior to her encounter with the Governor. Id. She states that after her maternity leave, she was transferred to a position which had much less responsibility and that much of the time she had nothing to do. Id. ¶ 28; Pl.’s Depo. at 53. Plaintiff states that she was not learning anything, that her work could not be fairly evaluated, and that as a result, she could not be fairly considered for advancement and other opportunities. Pl.’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶ 28. She states that Pennington told her the reason for the transfer was that her prior position had been eliminated, but that she later learned this was untrue, as her former position was being occupied by another employee. Id. Plaintiff states that she repeatedly expressed to Pennington an interest in transferring to particular positions at a higher “grade” which involved more challenging duties, more potential for advancement, and more compensation, but that Pennington always discouraged her from doing so and told her she should not bother to apply for those positions. Id. ¶29. She goes on to state that her superiors.exhibited hostility toward her by moving her work location, refusing to give her meaningful work, watching her constantly, and failing to give her flowers on Secretary’s Day in 1992, even though all the other women in the office received flowers. Id. ¶ 30.
*666 Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her employment with AIDC on February 20, 1993, in order to move to California with her husband, who had been transferred. Am. Compl. ¶ 40; PL’s Depo. at 48. She states that in January 1994, while visiting family and Mends in Arkansas, she was informed of an article in The American Spectator magazine that she claims referred to her alleged encounter with the Governor at the Excelsior Hotel and incorrectly suggested that she had engaged in sexual relations with the Governor. PL’s Statement of Mat. Facts, ¶33. Plaintiff states that she also encountered Ferguson in a restaurant during this same time and that he indicated he was the source for the article and that he knew she had refused the Governor’s alleged advances because, he said, “Clinton told me you wouldn’t do anything anyway, Paula.” Id. ¶ 35.
On February 11, 1994, at an event attended by the media, plaintiff states that she publicly asked President Clinton to acknowledge the incident mentioned in the article in The American Spectator, to state that she had rejected his advances, and to apologize to her, but that the President responded to her request for an apology by having his press spokespersons deliver a statement on his behalf that the incident never happened and that he never met plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47-48. Thereafter, on May 6, 1994, plaintiff filed this lawsuit.
Plaintiffs amended complaint contains several claims, three of which remain at issue.
See Jones,
II.
The President moves for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) plaintiff eannot show either quid pro quo or hostile work environment sexual harassment under § 1983 because (a) the record plainly demonstrates that plaintiff did not suffer any tangible job detriment for purposes of establishing a quid pro quo claim, let alone one caused by her purported rejection of Mr. Clinton’s alleged sexual advances, and (b) the alleged actions as described by plaintiff, even resolving all inferences and factual disputes in her favor, do not constitute severe or pervasive abusive conduct for purposes of establishing a hostile work environment claim; (2) if plaintiffs § 1983 claim fails, so too does her § 1985 conspiracy claim because (a) plaintiff has failed to show that any such conspiracy actually resulted in a deprivation of her constitutional rights, and (b) the undisputed facts do not show any agreement between Governor Clinton and Trooper Ferguson to deprive plaintiff of her constitutional rights; and (3) plaintiffs claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage fails because (a) by plaintiffs own testimony, the conduct at issue does not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage under Arkansas law, and (b) plaintiff did not as a result of the alleged conduct suffer emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could endure it. Ferguson, in turn, moves for summary judgment on grounds that (1) even if everything plaintiff has alleged were true, she does not have evidence to show either quid pro quo or hostile work environment sexual harassment, and (2) there was no conspiracy between the President and Ferguson to violate plaintiffs constitutional rights by sexually harassing her. The President and Ferguson both argue that there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to any of these issues and that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
*667 A.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As a prerequisite to summary judgment, a moving party must demonstrate “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 325,
B.
As a preliminary matter, the Court rejects plaintiffs contention that this case involves equal protection claims based not only on sexual harassment, but also on sexual assault and offensive conduct in violation of laws other than Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
et seq.
Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Clinton’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 23. In its August 22 Memorandum Opinion and Order, this Court recognized that a sexual assault can be a constitutional violation under § 1983, but concluded that plaintiffs allegations, even if true, were insufficient to state such a claim.
See Jones,
The Court finds plaintiffs attempt to restate her sexual assault claim in the guise of an equal protection claim to be no more meritorious now than when it was raised in the context of a due process claim. Although the Governor’s alleged conduct, if true, may certainly be characterized as boorish and offensive, even a most charitable reading of the record in this case fails to reveal a basis for a claim of criminal sexual assault as there is no alleged conduct that could be characterized as “forcible compulsion” or “sexual contact” for purposes of establishing a claim under the provision cited by plaintiff. See Ark. Code'Ann. § 5-14-101(2), (8) (defining “forcible compulsion” as “physical force or a threat, express or implied, of death or physical injury to or kidnapping of any person,” and defining “sexual contact” as “any act of sexual gratification involving the touching, directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, or buttocks, or anus of a person or the breast of a female”). 10 There being no ae- *668 tionable claim of criminal sexual assault under the facts of this case, the Court will proceed to a determination of the issues relevant to plaintiffs claim of sexual harassment.
1.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers a right to be free from gender discrimination that is not substantially related to important governmental objectives.
Beardsley v. Webb,
Although the President contends that plaintiff cannot establish that he acted under color of state law with the intent to discriminate against her on the basis of her gender, he states that he reserves those issues for trial, if necessary, and seeks summary judgment solely on the grounds of plaintiffs failure to prove that she was subjected to conduct that corresponds to sexual harassment under Title VII. Before discussing that issue, however, the Court must address plaintiffs argument that the essential elements of a sexual harassment claim under § 1983 do not correspond to those under Title VII- (although she acknowledges there is some overlap) and that her burden of proof is something less than that required under Title VII. The Court rejects this argument.
Throughout the pendency of this lawsuit, this Court and the parties have been operating under the assumption, based on the clear weight of authority, that a § 1983 sexual harassment claim should be analyzed under the standards developed in similar Title VII litigation.
See, e.g., Trautvetter,
a.
To make a
prima facie
ease of
quid pro quo
sexual harassment, this plaintiff must show, among other things, that her refusal to submit to unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors resulted in a tangible job detriment.
Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co.,
i.
Apparently recognizing the infirm ground upon which her assertions of tangible job detriments rest (which will be discussed
infra),
plaintiff
first
argues that a showing of a tangible job detriment is not an essential element of an action for
quid pro quo
sexual harassment under Title VII.
12
The Court rejects this argument as it conflicts with the Eighth Circuit’s requirement that a refusal to submit to unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors resulted in a tangi
*670
ble job detriment,
see Cram,
Even without benefit of the settled authority requiring a showing of a tangible job detriment in
quid pro quo
cases, the three cases upon which plaintiff relies in support of her argument,
Nichols v. Frank,
While it is true that the Seventh Circuit in
Jansen
concluded that a “clear and unambiguous”
quid pro quo
threat that “clearly conditions concrete job benefits or detriments on compliance with sexual demands” can constitute an actionable claim “even if the threat remains unfulfilled,”
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that a showing of a tangible job detriment is an essential element of plaintiffs quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. It is that issue to which the Court now turns.
ii.
As evidence of tangible job detriments (or adverse employment action), 15 plaintiff claims the following occurred after she resisted Governor Clinton’s alleged advances on May 8, 1991: (1) she was discouraged from applying for more attractive jobs and seeking reclassification at a higher pay grade within the AIDC; (2) her job was changed to one with fewer responsibilities, less attractive duties and less potential for advancement — and the reason given for the change proved to be untrue; (3) she was effectively denied access to grievance procedures that would otherwise have been available to victims of sexual harassment; and (4) she was mistreated in ways having tangible manifestations, such as isolating her physically, making her sit in a location from which she was constantly watched, making her sit at her workstation with no work to do, and singling her out as the only female employee not to be given flowers on Secretary’s Day. The Court has carefully reviewed the record in this case and finds nothing in plaintiff’s employment records, her own testimony, or the testimony of her supervisors showing that plaintiff’s reaction to Governor Clinton’s alleged advances affected tangible aspects of her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
1.
Plaintiff’s claim that she was discouraged from applying for more attTactive jobs and seeking reclassification at a higher pay grade within thé AIDC does not demonstrate any “tangible” job detriment as she has not identified a single specific job which she'desired or applied for at AIDC but which she had been discouraged from seeking: Pl.’s Depo. at 37-40. When asked for such specific information, plaintiff merely testified that the unidentified jobs she sought were “a grade higher” but that her supervisor “would always discourage me and make me believe that I could grow within the administrative services, which in fact I didn’t. I got degrade — downgraded.” Id. at 38, 42. She further states that those “few” times that she would talk to her supervisor and receive discouragement, she “would go ahead and fill out an application maybe or something.” Id. at 41. There is no record of plaintiff ever applying for another job within AIDC, however, and the record shows that not only was plaintiff’s position never downgraded, her position was reclassified upward from a Grade 9 classification to a Grade 11 classification, *672 thereby increasing her annual salary. Pennington Aff. ¶ 6; Arkansas Human Resources Management System Payroll Data Form for P.R. Jones, Ex. B-7. Indeed, it is undisputed that plaintiff received every merit increase and' cost-of-living allowance for which she was eligible during her nearly two-year tenure with the AIDC and consistently received satisfactory job evaluations. See id. Specifically, on July 1, 1991, less than two months after the alleged incident that is the subject of this lawsuit, plaintiff received a cost-of-living increase and her position was reclassified from Grade 9 to Grade 11; on August 28, 1991, plaintiff received a satisfactory job evaluation from her supervisor, Cly-dine Pennington; and on March 11,1992, the one-year anniversary of her hire date with AIDC, plaintiff received another satisfactory evaluation from Pennington and Cherry Duckett, Deputy Director of AIDC, which entitled her to a merit raise. Id. In addition, plaintiff was given a satisfactory job review in an evaluation covering the period of March 1992 until her voluntary departure from the AIDC in February 1993. Ex. B-6. Plaintiff signed this review on February 16, 1993, see id., and would have received another merit increase one month later in accordance with this review had she elected to continue her employment at AIDC. Pennington Aff. ¶ 8.
It is plaintiff’s burden to come forward with “specific facts” showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,
see Matsushita,
2.
Equally without merit is plaintiff’s assertion that following her return from maternity leave in September 1992, she suffered a tangible job detriment when her job was changed to. one with fewer responsibilities, less attractive duties and less potential for advancement.
16
These matters do not constitute a tangible job detriment as it is undisputed that there was no diminution in plaintiffs salary or change in her job classification following her return from maternity leave and, further, that her last review at AIDC following her return was positive and would have entitled her to another merit increase had she not resigned her position in order to move to California with her husband. Changes in duties or working conditions that cause no materially significant disadvantage, such as diminution in title, salary, or benefits, are insufficient to establish the adverse conduct required to make a
prima facie
case.
Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
Although plaintiff states that her job title upon returning from maternity leave was no longer that of pm-chasing assistant and that this change in title impaired her potential for promotion, her job duties prior to taking maternity leave and her job duties upon returning to work both involved data input; the difference being that instead of responsibility for data entry of AIDC purchase orders and driving records, she was assigned data entry responsibilities for employment applications. Pl.’s Depo. at 56; Pennington Aff. ¶ 16. That being so, plaintiff cannot establish a tangible job detriment. A
*673
transfer that does not involve a demotion in form or substance and involves only minor changes in working conditions, with no reduction in pay or benefits, will not constitute an adverse employment action,, “[otherwise every trivial personnel action that an irritable ... employee did not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.”
Ledergerber v. Stangler,
3.
The Court also rejects plaintiffs claim that she was effectively denied access to grievance procedures that would otherwise have been available to victims of sexual harassment. Plaintiff merely states that from her “perspective,” it “appeared very unlikely that any good would come from pursuing a grievance,” and that “it was natural for her to conclude that invoking the grievance procedure would be futile and perhaps worse.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Clinton’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 40-41, 47. As the Court has previously noted, however, plaintiff acknowledges that she was never threatened with adverse employment action if she did not submit to the Governor’s alleged advances, but that she was only “reading] between the lines.” Pl.’s Depo. at 75-76. Such subjective perceptions and beliefs regarding the efficacy of invoking any grievance procedures are nothing more than “speculation and conjecture” and do not constitute a tangible job detriment.
Splunge, 874
F.Supp. at 1271.
See also Cram,
4.
Finally, the Court rejects plaintiffs claim that sbe was subjected to hostile treatment having tangible effects when she was isolated' physically, made to sit in a location from which she was constantly watched, made to sit at her workstation with no work to do, and singled'out as the only female employee not to be given flowers on Secretary’s Day. Plaintiff may well have perceived hostihty and animus on the part of her supervisors,
18
but these perceptions are merely conclusory in nature and do not, without more, constitute a tangible job detriment. Absent evidence of some more tangible change in duties or working conditions that constitute a material employment disadvantage, of which the Court has already determined does not exist, general allegations of hostility and personal animus are not sufficient to demonstrate any adverse employment action that constitutes the sort of ultimate decision intended to be actionable under Title VII.
Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
Similarly, plaintiffs allegations regarding her work station being moved so that she had to sit directly outside Pennington’s office and, at times, not' having work to 'do,
19
describe nothing more than minor or
de min-imis
personnel matters which, again without more, are insufficient to constitute a tangible
*674
job detriment or adverse employment action.
Cf. Hicks v. Brown,
Although it is not clear why plaintiff failed to receive flowers on Secretary’s Day in 1992, such an omission does not give rise to a federal cause of action in the absence of evidence of some more tangible change in duties or working conditions that constitute a material employment disadvantage.
See Manning,
iii.
In sum, the Court finds that a showing of a tangible job detriment or adverse employment action is an essential element of plaintiff’s § 1983 quid pro quo sexual harassment claim and that plaintiff has not demonstrated any tangible job detriment or adverse employment action for her refusal to submit to the Governor’s alleged advances. The President is therefore entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment.
b.
The Court now turns to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim. Unlike
quid pro quo
sexual harassment, hostile work environment harassment arises when “sexual conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work peiformanee or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”
Cram,
The President essentially argues that aside from the alleged incident at the Excelsior Hotel, plaintiff alleges only two other contacts with him, alleges only a few additional contacts with Ferguson, and contains conclu-sory claims that plaintiffs supervisors were rude. He argues that taken individually or as a whole, these contacts do not in any way constitute the kind of pervasive, intimidating, abusive conduct that courts require to establish a hostile work environment claim. The Court agrees.
In assessing the hostility of an environment, a court must look to the totality of the circumstances.
Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages,
First, the Court finds plaintiffs reliance on her assertions of tangible job detriments as establishing a hostile work environ
*675
ment,
see
Pi’s Opp’n to Def. Clinton’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 51, to be misplaced. In its August 22 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court noted that although the President’s argument for outright dismissal of plaintiffs hostile work environment claim had “some force,” further development of the record was nevertheless necessary.
Jones,
Plaintiff certainly has not shown under the totality of the circumstances that the alleged incident in the hotel and her additional encounters with Ferguson and the Governor were so severe or pervasive that it created an abusive working environment.
Callanan,
While the alleged incident in the hotel, if true, was certainly boorish and offensive, the Court has already found that the Governor’s alleged conduct does not constitute sexual assault.
See
Section 11(B),
supra.
This is thus not one of those exceptional cases in which a single incident of sexual harassment, such as an assault, was deemed sufficient to state a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment.
Cf. Crisonino v. New York City Housing Auth.,
Considering the totality of the circumstances, it simply cannot be said that the conduct to which plaintiff was allegedly subjected was frequent, severe, or physically threatening, and the Court finds that defendants’ actions as shown by the record do not constitute the kind of sustained and nontrivial conduct necessary for a claim of hostile work environment.
Cf. Lam v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo.,
In sum, the Court finds that the record does not demonstrate conduct that was so severe or pervasive that it can be said to have altered the conditions of plaintiffs employment and created an abusive working environment. Accordingly, the President is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment.
2.
The Court now turns to plaintiffs § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. In order to prove the existence of a civil rights conspiracy under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must prove, among other things, that another person was injured in his person or property or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen in the United States.
Larson v. Miller,
Plaintiff does not have a viable § 1985(3) claim in this case as the Court has determined that her § 1983
quid pro quo
and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims are without merit and warrant a grant of summary judgment. Absent an underlying violation of federal law, there can be no actionable claim alleging a conspiracy to achieve that end.
See Larson,
3.
Finally, the Court addresses plaintiffs state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage.
20
Arkansas recognizes a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on sexual harassment.
Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., Inc.,
The President argues that the alleged conduct of which plaintiff complains was brief and isolated; did not result in any physical harm or objective symptoms of the requisite severe distress; did not result in distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; and he had no knowledge of any special condition of plaintiff that would render her particularly susceptible to distress. He argues that plaintiff has failed to identify the kind of clear cut proof that Arkansas courts require for a claim of outrage and that he is therefore entitled to summary judgment. The Court agrees. 21
One is subject to liability for the tort of outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress if he or she wilfully or wantonly causes severe emotional distress to another by extreme and outrageous conduct.
Sterling Drug Inc. v. Oxford,
Plaintiff seems to base her claim of outrage on her erroneous belief that the allegations she has presented are sufficient to constitute criminal sexual assault. She states that “Mr. Clinton’s outrageous conduct includes offensive language, an offensive proposition, offensive touching (constituting sexual assault under both federal and state definitions), and actual exposure of an intimate private body part,” and that “[t]here are few more outrageous acts than a criminal sexual assault followed by unwanted exposure, coupled with a demand for oral sex by the most powerful man in the state against a very young, low-level employee.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Clinton’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 66 (emphasis in original).
While the Court will certainly agree that plaintiffs allegations describe offensive conduct, the Court, as previously -noted, has found that the Governor’s alleged conduct does not constitute sexual assault. Rather, the conduct as alleged by plaintiff describes a mere sexual proposition or encounter, albeit an odious one, that was relatively brief in duration, did not involve any coercion or threats of reprisal, and was abandoned as soon as plaintiff made clear that the advance was not welcome. The Court is not aware of any authority holding that such a sexual encounter or proposition of the type alleged in this case, without more, gives rise to a claim of outrage.
Cf. Croom,
Moreover, notwithstanding the offensive nature of the Governor’s alleged conduct, plaintiff admits that she never missed a day of work following the alleged incident, she continued to work at AIDC another nineteen months (leaving only because of her husband’s job transfer), she continued to go on a daily basis to the Governor’s Office to deliver items and never asked to be relieved of that duty, she never filed a formal complaint or told her supervisors of the incident while at AIDC, she never consulted a psychiatrist, psychologist, or incurred medical bills as a result of the alleged incident, and she acknowledges that her two subsequent contacts with the Governor involved comments made “in a light vein” and nonsexual contact that was done iii a “friendly fashion.” Further, despite earlier claiming that she suffered marital discord and humiliation, plaintiff stated in her deposition that she was not claiming damages to her marriage as a result of the Governor’s alleged conduct,
see
Pl.’s Depo. at 122, and she acknowledged the request to drop her claim of injury to reputation by stating, “I didn’t really care if it was dropped or not personally.”
Id.
at 261-62. Plaintiffs actions and statements in this case do not portray someone who experienced emotional distress so severe in nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
Cf. Hamaker,
Nevertheless, plaintiff submits a declaration from a purported expert with a Ph.D. in education and counseling, Patrick J. Carnes, who, after a 3.5 hour meeting with plaintiff and her husband a mere four days prior to the filing of President Clinton’s motion for summary judgment, opines that her alleged encounter with Governor Clinton in 1991, “and the ensuing events,” have caused plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress and “consequent sexual aversion.” The Court does not credit this declaration.
In
Angle v. Alexander,
Aside from other deficiencies with the Carnes’ declaration (including the fact that the substance of this declaration apparently was not disclosed in accordance with rules governing pre-trial discovery), the opinions stated therein are vague and conclusory and, as in
Angle,
do not suffice to overcome plaintiff’s failure of proof on her claim of outrage.
Cf. Crenshaw v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
In sum, plaintiffs allegations fall far short of the rigorous standards for establishing, a claim of outrage under Arkansas law and the Court therefore grants the President’s mqr tion for summary judgment on this claim.
III.
One final matter concerns alleged suppression of pattern and practice evidence. Whatever relevance such evidence may have to prove other elements of plaintiff’s case, it does not have anything to do with the issues presented by the President’s and Ferguson’s motions for summary judgment, i.e., whether plaintiff herself was the victim of alleged quid pro quo or hostile work environment sexual harassment, whether the President *679 and Ferguson conspired to deprive her of her civil rights, or whether she suffered emotional distress so severe in nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Whether other women may have been subjected to workplace harassment, and whether such evidence has allegedly been suppressed, does not change the fact that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she has a case worthy of submitting to a jury. Reduced to its essence, the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party and the Court therefore finds that there are no genuine issues for trial in this case.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the President’s and Ferguson’s motions for summary judgment should both be and hereby are granted. There being no remaining issues, the Court will enter judgment dismissing this case.
Notes
. Among other things, the Court allowed plaintiff to drop her remaining defamation claim against Ferguson and allowed her to drop her remaining loss-of-reputation claims. The Court also allowed plaintiff to clarify her constitutional and civil rights claims and conform them more fully to the facts previously pled, but only to the extent that plaintiff was not thereby asserting new causes of action or attempting to add Ferguson as a defendant on any cause of action where he was not previously considered a defendant.
. All other pending motions in this case, including the motion filed on Saturday, March 28, 1998, in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, have no bearing on the issues raised by the President’s and Ferguson’s motions for summary judgment and are therefore not addressed.
. In addressing the issues in this case, the Court has viewed the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff and given her the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences, which is required at this stage of the proceedings.
See Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hotels,
. .Ferguson states that plaintiff informed him that she .would like to meet the Governor, remarking that she thought the Governor "was good-looking [and] had sexy hair,” Ferguson Depo. at 50, while plaintiff states that Ferguson asked her if she would like to meet the Governor and that she was "excited” about the possibility, Pl.’s Depo. at 101.
.In her amended complaint, plaintiff states that the Governor • "put his hand on [her] leg and started sliding it toward the hem of [her] culottes, apparently attempting to reach [her] pelvic area." Am. Compl. ¶ 20. In her original complaint, plaintiff states that the Governor "put his hand on [her] leg and started sliding it toward the hem of [her] culottes," with no reference to her "pelvic area.” Compl. ¶ 20.
. Plaintiff states in her amended complaint that the Governor “asked” her to "kiss it” rather than telling her to do so. Am. Compl. ¶21. She states in her deposition that the Governor's specific words to her were, "Would you kiss it for me?” Pl.’s Depo. at 108.
. Plaintiff's allegation that the Governor momentarily "detained” her was not included in either her original or amended complaint.
.These provisions state that an "offense of sexual assault” includes a crime under the law of a state that involved "contact/ without consent, between any part of the defendant’s body or an object and the genitals or anus of another person,” “contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the defendant and any part of another person’s body,” or "an attempt or conspiracy to engage in” such conduct.
. Under Ark.Code Ann. § 5-14 — 108(a)(1), a person commits sexual abuse in the first degree if "[h]e engages in sexual contact with another person by forcible compulsion.”
. Plaintiff also cites
West v. State,
. This is not to say that the standards under both § 1983 and Title VII are exactly the same. Among other things, a plaintiff under § 1983 must demonstrate that the defendant was acting under color of state law while Title VII requires no such showing. Thus, contrary to plaintiff's suggestion that her burden of proof under § 1983 is something less than what would be required of her under Title VII, a plaintiff's burden under § 1983
exceeds
that under Title VII in most cases.
See, e.g., Guy v. State of Illinois,
. Plaintiff’s contention that she is not required to show a tangible job detriment is at odds with her representation made in her opposition to the President’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (filed July 29, 1997), that sexual harassment occurs when, among other things, “rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions.” See PI. Opp’n to Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 26 (citing Title VII cases and guidelines promulgated by the EEOC). Indeed, the primary basis of plaintiff's original and amended complaint is her contention that she suffered reprisals for her rejection of the Governor’s alleged advances.
. For this reason, had plaintiff demonstrated a tangible job detriment or adverse employment action, which she has not, the Court would not find the Governor’s alleged statements to be sufficient evidence of a causal link between that harm and any alleged
quid pro quo
demands.
Cf Cram,
. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the holding of Jansen will survive review by the Supreme Court.
. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating “against any individual with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” on the basis of sex, or from limiting, segregating, or classifying employees on the basis of sex "in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) — (2). The concept of "tangible job detriment” as used in
quid pro quo
cases and the concept of "adverse employment action” as used in retaliation cases both derive from the basic prohibition of employment discrimination set forth in § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2),
see Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
. Plaintiff originally claimed that the job' in which she was placed called for a higher grade and pay, but that she was not paid more money than she received in her previous position and never received a raise beyond a cost of living increase, even though other employees received merit increases. Am. Compl. ¶ 39. That claim apparently has been abandoned as it is not mentioned in plaintiff's response to the President’s motion for summary judgment. The Court notes that plaintiff apparently never reviewed her employment records at AIDC prior to filing suit in May 1994 and had not done so prior to her deposition. Pl.’s Depo. at 33, 76.
. Plaintiff offers no evidence that her previous position conferred some type of status or prestige not conferred in her subsequent position, and she offers no evidence that the change in her duties impaired her ability to advance in her career.
. Plaintiff states "there was a lot of hostility it seemed like between Cherry Duckett and I,” and that Pennington was “not as friendly as she used to have been.” Pl.’s Depo. at 35, 45.
.Plaintiff makes this allegation even though she testified that following her return from matemily leave, she input data pursuant to her new responsibilities "all day long.” Pi’s Depo. at 56.
. Under Arkansas law, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the tort of outrage are essentially the same causes of action and are governed by the same standards.
See, e.g., Hamaker v. Ivy,
. In denying the President's motion for judgment on die pleadings on this claim, the Court noted that the totality of the alleged conduct on which plaintiff based her lawsuit, including her claim that her rejection of the President’s alleged advances caused her to suffer adverse employment action, could, if true, be regarded as sufficient to state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See Jones,