Jones v. Casualty Co.Jones v. Casualty Co.
аfter stating the case: The policy, section 4, contains a definite stipulation for indemnity at $5 per week, not to exceed 26 weeks, in case of disability arising from certain specified diseases, blood poisoning being one еxpressly named. This disease being evidently the direct and controlling cause of the disability, as a matter of first impression, the right of the plaintiff to recover would seem to be clear. The policy, however, having given this assurance оf indemnity, then takes up the matter of provisos by way of restriction and! stipulates further: 1. That this policy shall not apply to any *264 illness or disease whatever еxcept those named. 2. That it shall not apply to any disease which is complicated with, or results from any disease not herein named, etc. 3. Nor to any disease or illness which results from injury, etc. 4. Nor in effect to any disease which develops or results from those diseases that are named, etc.
There are many other limitations and restrictions in the policy, for as my
Lord Coke
would say, the “etc.” meaneth much; but those set out are enough to show that if these provisos can prevail, blood poisoning is entirely withdrawn from the operation of thе policy, and any and all stipulation for indemnity concerning it effectually removed. So far as we are informed, blood poisoning is not considered as one of the primary or idiopathic diseases. It is a toxic condition of the blood caused either from or through a surface wound or some internаl lesion, or from the breaking down of tissue incident to an existent or precеdent disease, and thereby producing suppuration. As to this disease, therefore, these provisos remove every possible condition where the disеase can occur, and, if upheld, would, as stated, entirely set aside the dеfinite contract for indemnity contained in a former clause of the policy. Such a result cannot be permitted and is not sustained by authority. It is established dоctrine in construing these policies that doubts shall be resolved in favor of the insured. As stated in Vance on Insurance, p. 592: “Probably the most important general rule guiding the courts in the construction of insurance policies is that all doubt or uncertainty, as to the meaning of the contract, shall be resolved in favor of the insured.” And speaking of certain kinds of special insurance, this author furthеr says: “This rule, it is well settled, applies in full force to those contracts of sрecial insurance which, unfortunately for both insurers and insured, are often filled with numerous conditions, the legal significance and economic purposе of which are alike uncertain.” In
Kendrick v. Insurance Co.,
Another principle applicable to the case before us, and equally well established, is that while clauses in a contract apparently repugnant must be rеconciled if it can be done by any reasonable construction, yet, а proviso which is utterly repugnant to. the body of the contract and irrecоncilable with it, will be rejected; likewise, a subsequent clause irreconcilаble with a former clause and repugnant to the general purpose and intent of the contract, will be set aside. Hawkins v. Lumber Co., at this term; Bishop on Contracts, seсs. 386 and 387; Devlin on Deeds, sec. 838; Beach on Modern Law of Contracts, sec. 718.
Our сonclusion is that, as to blood poisoning, the various restrictive provisos аre entirely repugnant to the definite stipulation of indemnity contained in the main body of the contract, and are contrary to the general intent and purpose of the policy, and cannot avail to defeat the plaintiff’s recovery.
Judgment Affirmed.