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Jones v. Bailey
99 S.E.2d 768
N.C.
1957
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DenNY, J.

Thе defendant’s first assignment of error is based on an exception to the admission of cеrtain testimony in the trial below over the defendant’s objection. The plaintiff was permittеd to testify that after the accident he heard a conversation between the defendant, Mrs. *601 Bailey, and an officer, at the hospital. The testimony of the plaintiff, to which оbjection was made and exception entered, was as follows: “Q. What did Mrs. Bailey say? A. As we walked in the hospital, Mrs. Bailey and Mrs. Patton were sitting there and she asked the officer if she had the right of way and the officer said she didn’t.” Defendant objected and moved to strike thе answer. The objection was overruled and ‍‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍the defendant excepted. “Q. Anything else? A. The officer told her she didn’t have the right of way and she also said, T usually wear my glasses and I didn’t have my glasses on at that time.’ I believe that was all she said.” Defendant moved to strike that pоrtion of the purported statement to the effect that the officer said she didn’t havе the right of way. The objection was overruled and the defendant excepted.

This evidence was inadmissible on two grounds. In the first place, it was hearsay evidence to the extent that its value or truthfulness depended in part upon the veracity and competency of some other person. 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, section 451, page 400; Teague v. Wilson, 220 N.C. 241, 17 S.E. 2d 9; Greene v. Carroll, 205 N.C. 459, 171 S.E. 627; S. v. Blakeney, 194 N.C. 651, 140 S.E. 433; S. v. Lassiter, 191 N.C. 210, 131 S.E. 577; S. v. Springs, 184 N.C. 768, 114 S.E. 851; Chandler v. Jones, 173 N.C. 427, 92 S.E. 145; King v. Bynum, 137 N.C. 491, 49 S.E. 955. Moreover, it is quite clear that the officer to whom the witness referred was not at the time and is not now a party to the action. Neither ‍‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍was he an agent of the defendant. Furthermore, the purрorted statement is not of such character as to make it a part of the res gestae or tо bring it within the rule of a dying declaration or other exception to the hearsay rule. S. v. Blakeney, supra.

In the case of S. v. Blakeney, supra, оne W. S. Coursey was permitted to testify over obj ection with respect to the defendant’s alleged shortage based on a report ‍‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍given to him by Mr. Latham, chief bank examiner. In grаnting a new trial based on the admission of the hearsay evidence, Stacy, C. J., in speaking for the Court,'said: “True the defendant, when he came to testify, was asked about the report of the State bank examiner, and two of the directors of the bank also gave evidencе in regard to it, but this did not cure the original error, as the testimony of W. S. Coursey was the keystone in the arch of the State’s case.”

In the second place, the purported statement of the officer was inadmissible because it was a declaration of an opinion or conclusion which he would not have ‍‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍been permitted to state as a witness. 20 Am. Jur., Evidеnce, section 548, page 462. We think this evidence clearly invaded the province оf the jury. Broom v. Bottling Co., 200 N.C. 55, 156 S.E. 152; Cheek v. Brokerage Co., 209 N.C. 569, 183 S.E. 729; Trust Co. v. Store Co., 193 N.C. 122, 136 S.E. 289; In re Craig, 192 N.C. 656, 135 S.E. 798; Marshall v. Telephone Co., 181 N.C. 292, 106 S.E. 818.

*602 Whether the plaintiff or the defendant had the right of way at the time they entered the intеrsection of Park and State Streets was the crucial question to be resolved by the jury from the evidence before they could correctly and properly answer the issues submitted to them.

The appellee contends, however, that when the defendant went upon the stand and denied that she made any inquiry of the officer as to whether or not she had the right of way at the time of the accident and called the officer as a witness in hеr behalf, who testified ‍‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‍that he had no recollection of having said anything to Mrs. Bailey at the hospital, that their testimony made the testimony of the plaintiff competent for the рurpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the defendant and her witness, citing Hopkins v. Colonial Stores, 224 N.C. 137, 29 S.E. 2d 455.

Consequently, the appellee contends that when the defendant offered еvidence to contradict his testimony, she lost the benefit of her exception to the admission of such evidence. We do not concur in this view. Moreover, any statement in thе opinion of Hopkins v. Colonial Stores, supra, that may be inferred to be in conflict with this opinion, on this particular pоint, is disapproved. It is the well established rule with us that when incompetent evidence is admittеd over obj ection, but the same evidence has theretofore or thereaftеr been admitted without objection, the benefit of the objection is ordinarily lost, but as stated by Brogden, J., in Shelton v. R. R., 193 N.C. 670, 139 S.E. 232: “The rule does not mean that the adverse party may not, on cross-examination, еxplain the evidence, or destroy its probative value, or even contradict it with оther evidence, upon peril of losing the benefit of his exception.” S. v. Godwin, 224 N.C. 846, 32 S.E. 2d 609; S. v. Tew, 234 N.C. 612, 68 S.E. 2d 291.

The defendant is entitled to a new trial and it is so ordered.

New trial.

Case Details

Case Name: Jones v. Bailey
Court Name: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Date Published: Sep 18, 1957
Citation: 99 S.E.2d 768
Docket Number: 30
Court Abbreviation: N.C.
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