Opinion by
In this declaratory judgment action concerning underinsured motorist benefits, plaintiffs, Chestеr and Audrey Jones, appeal from a judgment entered in favor of defendant, AIU Insurаnce Company. We affirm.
Plaintiffs’ son was killed in a one-vehicle accident in which the driver was underin-sured. Plaintiffs sought underinsured motorist benefits under their policy with defendant fоr the wrongful death of their son. Defendant denied plaintiffs’ claim because their son did not reside with them and was not an insured under the terms of the policy.
Plaintiffs instituted the prеsent action, seeking a declaration that they were entitled to recоver underinsured motorist benefits from defendant. The trial court, however, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the terms of the policy neither authorized recovery nor violated public policy.
On appeal, plaintiffs concede that they are not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under the terms of the policy, which limited recovery to “bodily injury ... sustained by the insured.” They contend only that this limitation in the scope of coverage is more restrictive than that required by statute and, consequently, is void as against public policy. We disagree.
We review de novo a trial court’s order granting summary judgment.
Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Board,
*1045
An insurance contract may be void as against public policy if it dilutes, conditions, or limits statutorily mandated coverage.
Cruz v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
Underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage is provided as part of uninsured motorist (UM) coverage pursuant to § 10-4-609, C.R.S. 2001. See § 10^-609(2), C.R.S.2001 (“under-insured motorist coverage is included in the term ‘uninsured motorist coverage’ ”); § 10-4-609(4), C.R.S.2001 (“Uninsured motorist coverage shall include covеrage for damage for bodily injury or death which an insured is legally entitled to collеct from the owner or driver of an underinsured motor vehicle.”).
The General Assembly requires insurers to offer underinsured motorist coverage
to the same extent
as uninsured motorist coverage.
See Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Thompson,
In
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Chacon,
We agree with the decision in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Chacon, supra, and because the General Assembly makes no distinction between UM and UIM coverage, likewise conclude that § 10-4-609 does not require UIM coverage for the wrongful deаth of a person who is not an insured under a claimant’s policy.
Plaintiffs contend otherwise, arguing that the UIM provision is broader in scope than the UM provision basеd upon a comparative difference in statutory language. Compare § 10-4-609(l)(a) (protеcting “persons insured ... who are legally entitled to recover damages from оwners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sicknеss, or disease, including death”)(emphasis added), with § 10-4^609(4) (providing insured with underinsured motorist “coverage for damage for bodily injury or death”)(emphasis added).
However, § 10-4-609 must be read and considered as a whole and construed to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts.
See Sandoval v. Archdiocese of Denver,
Reading the UIM provisiоn as broadly as plaintiffs suggest would, contrary to common sense, allow recovery of UIM benefits for the death of an individual who was not insured under claimant’s insurancе policy, who did not reside in claimant’s household, and who, if he or she had survived, would nоt have had any right of recovery under claimant’s policy.
See Temple v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,
Further, plaintiffs’ construсtion of the statute would create the anomalous situation where benefits for the wrongful death of an uninsured person were not required if the motorist causing deаth was uninsured, but required if the motorist was underinsured.
For these reasons, we reject plаintiffs’ construction of § 10-4-609. Instead, we conclude that limiting UIM benefits to bodily injuries or death sustained by a person insured by the policy does not violate § 10-4-609 and, consequently, is not void as against public policy.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.