18 Tenn. 59 | Tenn. | 1836
delivered the opinion of ihe court.
The first and principal question to be considered in this case is, as to the constitutionality of the act of the legislature, under which the defendants claim title. The act of 1825, o 154 enacted upon the application of the guardians of the complainants, authorised said guardians to sell the tract of land in controversy for the purpose of raising a fund to pay the debts of complainant’s ancestor. In pursuance of its provisions they proceeded to sell the land on the 18th day of May, 1826, to David and Thomas Steel, to whom a conveyance was made. The Steels sold to James Perry, who took possession of the premises and who has since sold to James W. Wheeler. The bill prays that the deed to the Steels may be delivered up to be cancelled, that the possession of the land may be delivered to complainants, and that defendants account for the rents and profits of the land since they have had possession of it.
It is contended this act of assembly is unconstitutional. 1st. Because it is an exercise, of judicial authority, and 2d, because it deprives the complainants of their property without the judgment of their peers, or the operation of the law of the land. It is clear that the legislature of this State cannot rightfully exercise a judicial power. By the constitution (at th#time this act was passed,) it is provided in art. 5, § 1, “that the judicial power of the State shall be vested in such superior and inferior courts of law and equity, as the legislature shall from time to time direct and establish.” Here the whole of the judicial power of the State having been vested in the courts, the assumption of any such power by the legislature would encroach upon the jurisdiction of another co-ordinate department of the government, would transcend the powers entrusted to it, and would consequently be unconstitutional, and the act would be void. The question then recurs, is the act under consideration of a judicial character? It does not partake oí the character of a law, for it forms no rule of action of that permanent, uniform and universal character which Blackstono in his commentaries, vol. 3, page 1, says constitute the fundamental principles of municipal law. What is it then but a iudioial decree? It was enacted upon the avowed
The legislature cannot sit in judgment, try causes and apply the rules of law to them, make decrees, and much less can they make decrees in the exercise of an arbitrary power, independent of and in opposition to the rules of law. It is difficult to perceive how an act which determines that the property of a party is liable for a given debt, and that it bo sold for the payment of that debt, is not a judicial act; and yet in substance that is the case before us. It is true, the sale is authorised for the payment of debts generally, but that can make no difference as to its judicial character. It is the same thing in principle whether there be ten creditors or only one. We are aware that the supreme court of the United States, in the case of Wilkinson vs. Leland, 2 Peters’ R. 627, and the supreme court of Massachusetts in the case of Rice vs. Parkman, 16 Mass. R. 326, in deciding upon acts somewhat similar, determined that those acts were no encroachment upon the judicial power. But it is to bo observed as to the case of Wilkinson vs. Leland, that the law whose constitutionality was involved, was an act of the legislature of Rhode Island. This State has no constitution, hut is'governed altogether by the-charter of Charles IT. in the argument of the case, Mr. Wirt put the power upon the ground that there was no constitutional restriction to legislative action. “Is it necessary,” said he, “to show the authority? The authority is that of ihe people.” Judge Story, who delivered the opinion of the court, enters into no reasoning upon the subject. Ho says: “We do not think that the act is to bo considered as a judicial act, but as an exercise oflegislation. It purports to boa legislative resolution and not a decree.” Now if this is the best reason which can be given why it was not a judicial act, with deference to the able judge who advances it, the opinion ought to have very bub- weight. If 1.» making an a.-t of this
We are next to consider whether this act of assembly is the “law of the land.” By the eighth section of the hill of rights it is declared “that no freeman shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of bis life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the Jaw of the land.” Lord Coke in his commentary upon Magna Charta, 2 Institute, 51, in defining the meaning of the phrase “law of the land, ” says: “That the law might extend to all, il-is said per legem lerrae, by' the law of the land,” By this court, in many cases these terms “law of the land,” are defined to mean a general and public law, operating equally upon every member of the community.
It is however contended, that this provision of the constitution was not intended to apply to a case like the present, but was intended to prevent majorities in times of high political excitement from passing partial laws, whereby to create forfeitures of estates and otherwise to destroy obnoxious individuals. It is true no doubt, but that the primary object of the framers of the constitution was to protect individuals in
The only means by which the legislature can be kept within the bounds of the constitution in times of high political excitement, is to accustom its members to the restraints it imposes and to check their assumption of an excess of power promptly, whenever the case occurs. If when the public mind is quiet, and public opinion sustains the courts in the dispassionate and impartial exercise of its supervisory power, precedents of constitutional violations shall not be permitted to take effect, we may hope that each departmentof the government, accustomed to move in its legitimate sphere, with uniformity and harmony, will not readily run into excess, even in times of excitement and parly strife. Public opinion too, accustomed to yield to the authority of judicial decisions, and to sustain the courts, even when they arrest the operation of a legislative act, will acquire a wholesome morality and a firm tone by which the courts will feel sustained and encouraged in the discharge of their duty, should the time ever come when the-sanctuary of justice will be the last hope of the oppressed. Every case, therefore, where the constitutionality of a legislative act is drawn in question, is a grave and important matter, and while on the one hand the courts ought to entertain for the legislature the highest respect, and to decide against their acts only from the clearest convictions of duty; on the other hand, where they are clearly satisfied the consitution is violated, they have no alternative but to declare that such act of assembly is not law.
The act of assembly under consideration is attempted to be sustained upon'two grounds, 1st. that the complainants whose estate was sold were infants, and that the legislature in passing the act were in the exercise of a guardianship over them, and 2nd, that the sale was necessary to pay the debts of the ancestor.
The same opinion (page 331,) advances another palpable political fallacy to sustain this power. The judge sa3rs, speaking of the relative powers of the courts and of the legislature, “The constituent, when he has delegated an authority without an interest, may do the act himself which he has authorised another to do, and especially when that constituent is the legislature.” This assumption places the legislature above the judiciary and constitutes it the sovereign. It is wholly inconsistent with the theory of our government. Sovereignty resides in the people, and having delegated to the legislature, to the judiciary and to the executive, the exercise of that portion of it as co-ordinate departments which they have considered most fitting to be exercised by each, they retain themselves the exclusive paramount sovereignty. So far then from the legislature being the constituent of the courts, the people are the only constituents, and all the officers of the government in all the departments are their agents.
The f^pt chat the constitution may prescribe that the mode of appointing the judges shall be by the legislature, does not constitute the legislature the constituent. If so, the electors of president and vice president of the United F tales would be the only constituents of those functionaries. And as in some of the States, judges are appointed by the governor, in others by the legislature, and in others by the people directly, the constituency in each of these cases varying, the judges would be alternately at the feet of the legislature, the govern- or and the people. But no such absurdity exists, and the statement of the proposition must have resulted from inattention to the form of our state and federal governments.
It follows from this view of the subject, that the legislature is not sovereign, that it is not the constituent of the courts, nor are they its agents; and that any assumption by the legislature of powers conferrred by the constitution upon the judiciary, is as destitute of authority as it would be in the courts, were they instead of adjudging what the law is, to undertake
The other ground upon which the competency of the legislature to pass such laws is maintained is, that the sale was necessary in order to raise a fund to pay the debts of the ancestor. It is upon this ground that the supreme court of the United States puts the case of Wilkinson vs. Leland, 2 Peters 658. Butin that case, the'court declares that the devisee took the land, subject to the lien of creditors; that the act divested no rights “except in favour of existing liens of paramount obligation,” and that it was “remedial in nature to give effect to existing rights.” This construction of the laws of Rhode Island places the case upon a principle wholly inapplicable to the case now before the court, It is settled law in this State, that the debts of the ancestor constitute no lien upon the lands descended, in the hands of the heir. The creditors of the ancestor had established no right to have satisfaction of their debts by the sale of this land. This act could not therefore be “remedial in its nature to give effect to existing rights.” When to this striking discrepency between the two cases, we take into consideration the fact that Rhode Island has no constitution containi lg restrictions upon the exercise of legislative power, it is manifest that this case has no application to the present one.
We will next notice the two cases from Kentucky, 4 Monroe’s Rep. 91, and 6 Mon. Rep. 592, cited by Judge Hickey in the opinion delivered by him in the case of Bedford’s guardian exparte, (Am. Ju. vol. 10, p. 297, The acts in both these cases were sustained upon the ground that the lands were appropriated to the payment of debts. Their application to this particular object, is the sole reason which the court (manifestly struggling to sustain them,) can give wherefore they were constitutional. This reason is clearly falacious. If it be lawful to sell by special act of assembly, the land of heirs for the payment of the debts of the ancestor, what reason can be given why with equal propriety the land of any citizen might not be subjected in the same way to the payment
Since the case of the Bank vs. Cooper, 2 Yer. 599, several cases have occurred and have been decided by this court, upon the principles of that case, In that case it was decided.
Several cases have been referred to, where special laws have been declared constitutional by this court; such as the case of Williams vs. Norris, 12 Wheaton: Ann Hope vs. Johnson, 2 Yer. 123, and Vanzant vs. Waddle, (2 Yer. 260. These cases were all determined upon the principle, that they deprived no one of a right, but were enacted to advance the remedy of a party, whose right already existed. If they were susceptible of that construction, and we think
In the case of Fisher’s negroes, 6 Yer. 119, we have an illustration of the difference between these two principles, involved in special acts of assembly. Fisher’s negroes had been emancipated by his will, but in order to the enjoyment of their freedom, it was necessary, by the act of 1801, c 27, that a petition be presented to the county court, and upon its judgment, that their emancipation would be consistent with the interest and policy of the state; a bond and security were required to reimburse the county any damages it might sustain by the emancipation, in 1829, an act was passed, allowing slaves, who were emancipated by will, in case the executor should refuse to file the petition, and give the security required by the act of 1801, to file their bill in equity, and if the court should be of opinion, that said slaves ought of right to be free, it was required so to order. Fishers ne-groes filed their bill under this act, and while it was in progress, the legislature passed the act of 1831, c 101, declaring that the act of 1829 should not be construed, so as to extend to any case existing before the passage of the act, but that in &11 such cases, where bills should be pending under said act, it should be the duty of the chancellor, at the first term of his court, to have the same stricken from his docket. The chancellor refused to dismiss the bill as directed, upon the ground that the first act gave the negroes rights which the legislature had no authority by the second one to take away. It is true these acts, although probably intended for a particular case, are in form general laws. They nevertheless illustrate the principle upon which legislation may properly proceed m such cases. The chancellor’s decree in this case was affirmed in this court. In the opinion of the court, as between master and slave, the will gave to the ne-groes a right to their freedom, and nothing was wanting to their enjoyment of that right but the consent of the government. This consent the legislature might give direct1)', by an act applying to the particular case, or they might%y law vest the judicial tribunals with power to give it. No right was
3d. It is insisted that these infants were instrumental in procuring the passage of this act of assembly, whereby the defendants wrere induced to advance their money for this land, and that it is a fraud in them now to take advantage of a want of power in the legislatnre to pass the law, and so to defeat the defendants title. Upon an examination of the proof, it does not appear that they had any agency in obtaining the passage of the act. One witness only speaks upon the subject, and he in answer to a leading question, indicates that the subject was spoken about in the family, without pretending that the children had any agency in getting up the petition to the legislature. But if they had *done so, wo are unable to perceive upon what ground they could be charged with iraud. If an infant sell his estate, making the most solemn promises to confirm the title when of age, Ills subsequent disaffirmance of it would be no fraud. A sale under .a legislative act, procured at his instance, would surely be no.more obligatory on him than one made by himself without such act. The same want of discretion which renders him unfit to be trusted in the sale of his property, would exist to the same extent in the other case, and incapacitate him from a discreet exercise of judgment as to the proposed application to the legislature. If this argument could prevail, no infant would be safe in his possessions. It would be easy for the party wishing to purchase his estate to induce him to apply to the legislature for the passage of an act, authorizing its sale; and after the sale would be effected, he would be told, that al
4th. We next como to consider the question, whether the statutes of limitations operates in the cause, as to either complainant, and to what extent.
The possession was taken by Perry, the 1st January, 1827; but it is contended that there is no evidence that there was a continued possession for seven years. The proof of witnesses is unsatisfactory upon this subject. But there is no necessity for resorting to witnesses, as the pleadings sufficiently show how the facts are. The bill alledges that there was no such continued possession for the length of time necessary to form the bar, and seeks a discovery of the defendants upon this subject by interrogatories, requiring them to state how the fact is. The answer of Perry states, that he took possession of the land about 1st January, 1827, by his overseer and negroes, and moved to it, and took possession by himself and family in August of the same year, and remained on it till the month of May, 1831. He then moved his white family to Pulaski, and remained in Pulaski until 1st day of January, 1834, when he moved his family and again settled on said land, during all which time he had peaceable possession by his overseer and ne-groes. The complainants, by seeking a discovery of the defendant, have made him a witness upon this subject, and they cannot object to his testimony, when it makes against them.
5th. The possession having been proved, the next question is, how and 'against whom does it operate. The deed executed by the Jones’ to the Steels, was dated the 23rd of May, 1826, and registered 25th of February, 1S29. This suit was commenced the 24th day of February, 1835. Seven years did not elapse from the time the deed was registered, up to the time of the commencement of the suit. Whether, therefore, the first section of the act of limitations of 1819, c 28, will'operate to bar the complainants’ claim, is a question of some doubt, and which it is not necessary to decide,
The complainants’ counsel insists, that as the defendants possession is only protected by virtue of the second section of the act of 1819, it can operate in his favor only to the extent of his actual inclosuies. In support of this position the case of Dyche vs. Gass’ lessee, 3 Yer. 397, is cited and and relied on. That case does not support the position contended for. That was a caso of naked possession, unaccompanied by title, legal or equitable, valid or invalid. It is true, Dycbe, after he had bean some years in possession, procured an informal deed, covering his possession; but from the dato of that deed, seven years had not elapsed before the suit was brought. The case therefore was decided, as though the deed had never existed; and there appearing nothing in the case by which to determino the extent of the possession, save the enclosures actually made, the court determined that the possession must be restricted to such enclosures. In the opinion of the court, it is true it is said, “It is most difficult to distinguish between a defendant, in some appearance of claim, evidenced by writing of no v&lidity in law or equity, and one holding as a trespasser, without excuse.” These remarks doubtless misled his honor, the chancellor, and in? duced him to place this case upon the foot of a naked possession, It may be observed here, that the remarks above quoted were not called for by the facts of the case, and do not constitute a decision of the question, indicated by them. But if it be true, that one who is in possession, holding under an informal writing of no validity, either in law or equity,
.6. The next question is, as to the jurisdiction of this court. The defendants claim title to the lam! in controversy, by virtue of a void deed, and the complainants seek to have said deed delivered up to be cancelled. It is settled in this state and elsewhere, that a court of equity has the power to order a deed, bond, or other instrument, to he delivered up to be cancelled, if the same be void, whether its .character as such appear from the face of the instrument or otherwise. Hamilton vs. Cummings, 1 John. Ch. Rep. 517: Bromley vs. Holland, 7 Ves. 19: 1 Hovenden’s Sup. 17: see also Johnson vs. Cooper, 1 Yer. 524, 530, and Richmond vs. McMinn, 6 Yer. Rep. Having obtained jurisdiction of the cause for this purpose, the court will retain it, until the whole matter is disposed of, and the rights of the parties settled.
7th. The complainants pray that the defendants be compelled to account for the rents and profits since they have had possession of the premises.
They are unquestionably entitled to an account as prayed
The decree of the chancellor will be reversed and reform-ed according to the principles of this opinion.
Decree reversed-.