Case Information
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IN THE NINTH COURT OF ABPEALS
RECEIVED IN
ON AppEAL From The
District Court of Orange County, Texas TRiN CAUSE No. BO90617-R Appelant's Motion For Discretionary ReVieWled in To The Honorable Chief Justice: Abel Acosta, Clerk Comes now Calvin Jones Jr, In the above entitled and numbered cause will demonstrate to the courts how it has Jurisdiction over his appeal and in support would show the Court the following:
Ground For Review Number One Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ms. Karla J. Rogers, Attorney at LaW, 235 N. Main St, Vidor, Texas 17662 completely ignored her professional duties. Her representation was deficient. Ms. Rogers deficient performance affected (prejudiced) the outcome of my case. When the Judge asked the District Attorney, it s there anything on the table here. See Page No. 10, Line 12-20 of the
*2 Reporter's Record Volume 2083. Ms. Rogers stood by motion less as though she was "inconerent and incompetent." See Strickland V. Washington, U66 U.S. 659, 104 S.CT. 2052 (1994), AND Butler V. State 716 S.W. 2049 (Tex. Crim App. 1996) See U.S. V. Chronic, 466 U.S. 649, 659, 104 S.CT. 2039, 2046, soI Ed. 20.65766 (1994). Inaddition. Ms. Rogers ErRed-"Made Error." See Thomas V. State, 9 S.W. 3D. 309, 912, 913 (Tex. Crim App. 1999).
Ground For Review Number Two IndictmENT
The state failed to list all prior convictions on indictment for "enhancement purposes" which lead to unlawful sentence See Indictment. Thomson V. State 992 S.W. 20.9 CPP 21.03
Ground For Review Number Three Vigation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Ex parte Harris, 596 S.W. 20. 993 (Tex. Crim App. 1990). Mr. Jones "guilty place" was involuntary because Ms. Rogers was ineffective. Ms. Rogers did not consult with defendant, did not inquire as to any defense, gave no advice to defendant and did not attempt to determine if defendant was guilty; instead the, Ms. Rogers, where, stood as Mr. Jones plead guilty.
Ground For Review Number Four Plea Bargain Agreement
*3 Ex parte Diaz, 410 S.W. 20765 (Tex. Crim App. 1991). MR. Jones AEA Bagain Agreement was "involuntary" based on the fact his "Gvicty Plea" was "involuntary" since his attorney. Ms. Rogers was ineffective. Ms. Rogers was essentially just a "CQp-Act man who was present with MR. Jones when he pleaded out to a "none pre-ARRajghed" deal between him and the state. Note dissenting opinion citing Ex parte Harris 596 S.W. 20993 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990 and Ex parte Bratchett, 513 S.W. 20951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)
Ground For Review Number Five Insufficient Evidence
In the Court Reporters Record Volume I, Page 6, Lines 16-1140- 25, the Court stated and MR. Jones Attorney, Ms. Rogers asked if the Court was gebmonding anything in for about Alen Parish, Louis iana? The court agreed, but when looking at the "Jogement adjusting Guilt on record from the County Clerks Office MR. Jones, the defendant was charged with possession of a con trolled substance, to wit: "Apprazolam in an amount by aggregate weight including "Adulterants and Dilutants," of less than 28 grams, on or about February 19, 2013, in Orange County, Texas. This is absolute ly false. See Jackson V. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,99 S.CT. 2791 (1979). Hurtado V. Tucker, 90 F. Supp. 20118 (Mass. 1999)
Ground For Review Number Six I NEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL Appeal Attorney-CHRISTINE Brown-Zeto
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Ms. Christine Brown-Zeto, Attorney at Law, not Green Ave., Orange, Texas 7630 and Appeal Attorney for Mr. Calvin Jones Jr., Appellant was ineffective and chose to withdraw and abandon appellant and relinquish or give up with the intention of never again reclaiming appellant rights or interest. Though it was Ms. Brown-Zeto's right to decide whether it continue to represent Mr. Jones, Ms. Brown-Zeto still had the option to file a motion for a "rehearing" which she did not exhaust all remedies on behalf of Mr. Jones. See Rule 49.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellant Procedures. What Ms. Brown-Zeto chose to do instead is remove these for reasonable "personal pain" by promoting her service through correspondence to Mr. Jones.
PRAY
Wherefore, appellant, Mr. Calvin Jones Jr., prays that the Court Grant his motion for Discretionary Review tordeced on appeal.
Tmmate Declaration
I., Calvin Jones Jr., am the appellant and being presently in carcerated in the Texas department of criminal justice. Decide under penalty of prestury that according to my belief the facts in the above motion to proceed in Discretionary Review on appeal are true and correct.
*5 Signed on Octoberal, 2015. Cablin Yonus in. Calvin Jones Jr. PRO-SE TOCT-IO#OI961419 Stringfelon Unit 1200 EM 655 RosHARON TEXAS 71593
*6 In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-14-00460-CR
CALVIN JONES JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 163rd District Court Orange County, Texas Trial Cause No. B080617-R
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, appellant Calvin Jones Jr. (Jones) pleaded guilty to the offense of felony possession of a controlled substance, enhanced by a prior felony conviction. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.117(a), (e) (West 2010); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(c)(1) (West Supp.
*7 2014). [1] The trial court found the evidence sufficient to find Jones guilty, but deferred further proceedings and placed Jones on community supervision for ten years and assessed a fine. The State subsequently filed its First Amended Motion to Impose Guilt, to revoke Jones's unadjudicated community supervision. Jones pleaded "true" to certain alleged violations of the conditions of his community supervision. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Jones violated the conditions of his community supervision, found Jones guilty of possession of a controlled substance, and assessed punishment at fifteen years in prison.
Jones's appellate counsel filed a brief that presents counsel's professional evaluation of the record and concludes the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). On March 3, 2015, and June 15, 2015, we granted an extension of time for Jones to file a pro se brief. Jones filed a pro se Brief. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that an appellate court may determine that (1) "the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it has reviewed the record and finds no reversible error"; or (2) "arguable grounds for appeal exist and
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remand the cause to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief the issues." Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
We have reviewed the entire appellate record, as well as all briefs, and we agree with counsel's conclusion that no arguable issues support an appeal. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the appeal. Compare Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We affirm the trial court's judgment. [2]
AFFIRMED.
LEANNE JOHNSON Justice
Submitted on June 4, 2015 Opinion Delivered July 29, 2015 Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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NOTES
We cite to the current version of the statute as the subsequent amendments do not affect the outcome of this appeal.
Jones may challenge our decision in this case by filing a petition for discretionary review. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.