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Jonathan Savidge v. Jaylon Fincannon
836 F.2d 898
5th Cir.
1988
Check Treatment

*2 WISDOM, Before GEE, *, and KING Judges. Circuit WISDOM, Judge: Circuit appeal This presents questions. two first involves the eligibility to recover attorney’s fees under U.S.C. 1988 for legal performed work on an *3 aspect of their case that became moot be- reaching fore judgment and arguably was barred res judicata. ques- The second tion concerns qualified official immunity doctrine. reviewing After path tortuous brought parties these us, before we conclude in denying attorney’s fees hearing, without a and in granting immunity to the individual defend- ants, the district court erred. We there- fore remand proceed- the case for further ings opinion. consistent with this

I. BACKGROUND A. The Complaint Savidge plaintiffs The in this case are Jonathan parents, and his Wilbur and Felicia Savidge. time, At this pro- is a Jonathan foundly fifteen-year-old boy.1 retarded September From 1980 until May Jon- athan lived at the Fort Worth State School (FWSS) for the Worth, retarded in Forth Texas. In January plaintiffs Texas, sued Department the Texas of Men- tal Health and Mental Retardation (DMHMR), and four employees individual plaintiffs FWSS. The sought com- pensation damages allegedly arising past from continuing violations of Jon- athan’s rights. According Savidges’ complaint, liv- ing conditions at FWSS “oppres- were sive, inappropriate, unhealthy, filthy, abu- Ferleger, David Hoffman, Barbara Phila- sive and restrictive”. Among allega- other delphia, Pa., for plaintiffs-appellants. tions, plaintiffs allege building Jonathan lived in “permeated was McCollom, Leslie L. Hunter, Toni Asst. stench”; that Jonathan and other residents Attys. Gen., Mattox, Gen., Jim Atty. Aus- were left play “to feces”; each other’s tin, Tex., for defendants-appellees. that Jonathan’s medications poorly

monitored; that Jonathan repeatedly residents; bitten other and that * Formerly Carolyn Dineen According record, reports Randall Jonathan can spoon, feed himself with a he but cannot dress or peek-a-boo. undress. He play likes to (it Emergency so small was the B. The Motion he used was

wheelchair FWSS) he entered original one he had when In September eight months after (sco- spinal condition that it worsened complaint, filed had short, liosis) afflicts him. thé com- petitioned the district court for an “emer- case describes an environment plaint gency” injunctive requiring order the de- unhealthy physically threatened so place community- fendants to Jonathan in a Savidge.2 parties engaged based residence. The plaintiffs contend that conditions discovery several months of on the issue of Jonathan’s constitution- the FWSS violated right Jonathan’s relief. On reasonably safe institutional al January the district court severed he arrived until the time care from the time injunction the motion for an from the rest episode in the winter of 1980- he left. One and scheduled the motion for seriousness of their claim. 81 illustrates the trial. that the defendants maintain hearing injunction lasted for four Jonathan, assigned a child known to have a days. Contrary suggestion to a the de- *4 infection, special susceptibility to to ward made, fendants have often the district high “dangerously with a the FWSS judge relating did not hear evidence direct- staphlococcus of infectious bac- level [sic] ly damages. claim for arrival, A few months after his teria”. expert testimony The focused on harms suffered a fever and “infected Jonathan future, might that befall Jonathan in the By early the boils had en- boils”. already not those he had suffered.4 There fever climbed as larged and Jonathan’s great conflicting was a deal evidence high 105.8° Farenheit. Jonathan devel- potential transferring about cost of swelling oped a hand-sized on the side residence; community-based Jonathan to ribcage. of his As it is described defendants, the conduct of the individual complaint, the treatment that the individu- contrast, by was never mentioned. On ally-named provided for Jona- March the district court took the inadequate. As a di- shockingly than was “emergency” motion for relief conduct, rect result of the defendants’ under advisement. plaintiffs allege, Savidge required Jonathan surgery partially paralyzed. him that left Litigation C. The Lelsz complaint explains relationship

The between each individual defendant and Jon- difficulty and much of the Some Savidge. alleges athan It further that: a result of Jonathan delay in this case are

Defendants knew or should have known Savidge’s participation in a class action that their actions and inactions which Texas against the FWSS and two similar plaintiffs] resulted harms to were action, [the Ka institutions. That class Lelsz v. illegal plaintiffs’ rights and a violation of vanaugk, began in 1974 in the Eastern under federal and state law.3 plaintiffs District Texas. The al Lelsz leged provided institutional care that plaintiffs The state that violations of their by violated both state and the defendants under constitutional are actionable Roughly speaking, Lelsz federal law. In prayer U.S.C. 1983. sought therapy, smaller resi damages declaratory class more they request and dences, surroundings. cleaner judgment, injunction. and but no Gant, addition, plaintiffs leading expert allege plaintiffs the de- 4.Dr. Sue that prop- provide hearing injunction, fendants’ failure to Jonathan with made clear "regression” therapy in his er contributed to a had not reviewed Jonathan's "historical she level of behavior. past Similarly, defi- both sides treated record”. irrelevant, the FWSS as even when ciencies at plaintiffs allege 3. The also that the *‘[d]efendants hygiene they serious matters of involved malice, gross have acted with indifference with responsible for some of Jona- could have been needs, plaintiffs’ rights gross to disregard with damages. than’s violating plain- of whether rights”. tiffs’ constitutional and other litigation Lelsz seemingly settled a ment in a environment”, “least restrictive mid-1983, consent decree several months the Court denied that the Lelsz class en- filing after the complaint the initial joyed rights. such The Court then conclud- Savidge, and several months before the ed that:

“emergency” motion was filed. [tjhere being no paragraphs in the agree- [the settlement The Lelsz decree established de- ment invoked the plaintiffs], the dis- provide “habilitation”, fendants would trict court’s decree purporting to enforce individualized therapy, to each member of them not rest on authority plaintiff class. It stated also is unauthorized.7 provide will each member of “[defendants plaintiff class with the least restrictive words, In other only did the Court living possible conditions consistent vacate the district court’s enforcement or- person’s particular der, circumstances ...” it also upon cast doubt underlying In return for these promises, and other consent doubt, This decree.8 as we shall including Savidge— see, complicates the judicata effect of agreed to a provi- statement that Savidge. “[t]hese sions include a final resolution of the de- D. post-trial history of Savidge fendants’ obligations towards the members When we left Savidge, the district court class and of the issues had bifurcated the case and had tried the raised litigation”. plaintiffs’ motion for injunction. In February in an effort to correct years next two saw the following develop- what viewed as unnecessary foot- 1) ments: the case was transferred from dragging by state, the Lelsz *5 the Northern to the Eastern District of filed a “Motion for Community Placement”. Texas, then the exclusive forum for the hearing, After a granted district court litigation;9 2) Lelsz the case was transfer- part, motion in and ordered that 279 red back District; 3) the Northern members of the Lelsz class transferred case was prejudice dismissed without to the community centers on or Septem- before plaintiffs’ right to refile in the Eastern 1, ber 1986. District; and, 4) the dismissal was reversed appeal,

On panel appeal.10 this Court ruled point, At this in early May of that the district court was jurisdic- without with the Northern finally District es- tion to key enforce sections consent tablished proper as the forum for the decree.5 Court, relying on Penn- and with a plaintiffs’ decision on the motion hurst,6 reasoned that insofar as the con- apparently imminent, the defendants trans- sent decree upon was based state law it ferred Jonathan to a community-based resi- was entered in violation of the Eleventh agreed dence and to furnish proper him a Amendment. And to the extent the con- wheelchair. gave This effectively sent decree rested federal plaintiffs constitu- injunctive all the relief had tional place- “habilitation” and sought.11 ever 5. Kavanaugh, (5th v. Lelsz 807 F.2d 1243 Kavanaugh, Cir. some does”. (5th Cir.), v. Lelsz 1987). dismissed, U.S. -, 97 L.Ed.2d 821 6. Halderman, Pennhurst State School v. McKaskle, Johnson v. 727 F.2d 498 1984). Cir. Kavanaugh, (footnote Lelsz 807 F.2d at 1251 omitted). Fincannon, Savidge 784 F.2d 186 denying 8. In plaintiffs rehearing, Lelsz en majority banc of this Court noted that the panel portions plaintiffs' decision "nullified" 11. The Judgment, of the 1983 Motion for filed consent Kavanaugh, shortly transfer, decree. after acknowledges Lelsz Jonathan’s (5th Cir.1987). recently, Savidge has, More “Jonathan now at least on a August panel basis, temporary different of this Court program plan an individual observed that “[a]lthough may be unclear how which community includes the individualized ..., much life remains in the consent sought decree treatment years he has for three in this

9Q3 Nonetheless, plain- a few weeks later the Amendment necessarily precluded “all Judgment tiffs filed a for “Motion on Per- damages monetary sought”. Four of the Injunction Discovery manent and for defendants had been sued private as indi- Trial Damage Schedule on viduals, Portion of however, and on February plaintiffs sought “Judgment Case”. The order, the court clarified its stating that it incorporating placement ... the new did intend its October 1986 Order allowing appropriate for professional pro- deny damage all Plaintiffs’ claims gram proposed modifications”. In a order against the Defendants their individu- motion, appendix attached as an to the capacities al because Plaintiffs failed to plaintiffs suggested be awarded light state a federal claim of Defend- attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. qualified ants’ immunity defense.14 opposed The defendants this motion and In form merely this order denied a motion asked the court to rule on their motion— filed plaintiffs, but in effect it left September filed on summary 1983—for parties nothing litigate.15 left to damages portion timely filed a appeal. case. present E. The appeal making On October without reference are seeking any now possible problem, mootness the dis- injunctive relief for Savidge. finally trict court denied plaintiffs’ They concede that the Eleventh Amend- “emergency” motion for injunctive relief. ment bars their claim damages against for The court ruled that a member of the “[a]s Texas, DMHMR, the State of and the class which was afforded individual defendants sued in capacity their settlement, is barred as hand, state officials. On the other receiving from extraordinary relief from concede that the Eleventh this Court the doctrine judica- of res protect Amendment does not the four indi- ”.12 ta The court then plaintiffs’ denied the vidual defendants from against claims request indirect attorney’s fees with them in capacity private persons observation that “this lawsuit did not acting under color of impetus serve as an state law.16 The place- for the eventual de- agree small, ment of Jonathan fendants also damages por- in a com- munity setting ... ”. tion of the precluded case is not *6 litigation. the Lelsz

The district court plain- also denied the damages. tiffs’ claim for Relying upon In appeal, plaintiffs the their object the first Supreme Court’s decision in Edelman v. to the denial of attorney’s fees. The dis- Jordan,13 the court held that the Eleventh discretion, trict court abused they its ar- litigation”. year In more than a since his trans- sufficiency When a federal court reviews the fer par- complaint, there has been no reception any indication from of a the before the admissions, ties group that Jonathan has evidence either lost his affidavit or its home placement. necessarily task is a limited one. The issue is prevail, ultimately not whether a will but whether the claimant is entitled to offer 12. At the time the district court issued this or- Moreover, support evidence to the claims.... der, course, partial the nullification of the that, passing it is well on a established dismiss, yet place. decree had not taken allegations motion to of the ... complaint favorably to should be construed 13. 415 U.S. 94 S.Ct. 39 L.Ed.2d 662 pleader. (1974). 232, 236, Rhodes, Scheuer v. 416 U.S. 94 S.Ct. 1683, (1974). 40 L.Ed.2d 90 Notwithstanding 14. pending the defendants' mo- summary judgment, regard tion for we the dis- concede, agree, 15. The defendants and we order, clarified, judgment trict court's as as a on jurisdiction plain- this Court has to decide the pleadings. Since the bifurcation of their appeal tiffs’ under U.S.C. § 28 case in pursued any have not discovery claim, damages on their Graham, 159, 166-67, and no evi- Kentucky v. 473 U.S. damages appears dence directed 3099, 3106, (1985); 105 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Rhodes, record. We are therefore bound the Su- Scheuer v. 416 U.S. 94 S.Ct. preme (1974). Court’s admonition that: 40 L.Ed.2d 90 gue, by ruling against them without allow- thus presumptively be entitled to fees—in a briefs, ing discovery, hearing or a on the settled, case that otherwise becomes question whether lawsuit fact led moot, reaching judgment before on the Second, plain- to Jonathan’s transfer. merits.19 We view this as such a case: as challenge tiffs the district court’s determi- transfer, soon as Jonathan received his nation that individual defendants in this promise wheelchair, plaintiffs’ of a qualified case are entitled to official immu- injunctive motion for relief became moot.20 nity. Because mootness removes a federal authority court’s adjudicate, the district II. ATTORNEY’S FEES deciding court erred mo- 42 U.S.C. a cause of establishes tion.21 parties’ consent is no substi- Savidges’ for the action law subject tute for jurisdiction matter over an Congress provided has that in claims. sec- issue. cases, discretion, tion 1983 “the court in its prevailing party allow the ... a rea- In Leatherbury Williams v. we attorney’s part fee as of the sonable held that judgment absence of a gloss In language on this costs”.17 based party may prevail “if its ends are accom legislative history, Supreme plished litigation”.22 of the a result has held that when a Court section 1983 cases where the defendant unilaterally plaintiff prevails, “fees should be awarded suit, however, moots the deny we will at special ‘unless circumstances would render torney’s if fees the defendant can show unjust’ such an award ”.18 The district that his wholly gratuitous conduct was “a finding court in spe- this case made no response to an action that was itself friv circumstances; cial the denial of fees was groundless”.23 olous or In this implicit based determination that qualify as prevailing parties, “prevailed”. the plaintiffs had not 1) must show: have received firmly

It is now part established that a substantial rights plaintiff may “prevail” civil defendants, sought 2) from the as a —and added). (emphasis 17. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 unconstitutionally tion” that Jonathan will be returned FWSS. United States v. W.T. Graham, Kentucky v. Co., 629, 633, 894, 897, Grant 345 U.S. (quoting S.Rep. S.Ct. p. at 3104 No. 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1976), reprinted Cong. in 1976 U.S.Code & Ad- min.News Jafco, 21. See Liner 306 n. Robinson, 992, 1006, S.Ct. 394 n. Smith 11 L.Ed.2d 347 Be- 3457, 3465, (1984); ruling 82 L.Ed.2d 746 Maher cause we vacate the district court’s 2570, 2575, Gagne, judicata, pass judgment upon need (1980) (”[n]othing in the lan suggestion plaintiff may Third Circuit’s that “a guage §of 1988 conditions the District Court’s prevailing party though even power litigation to award fees on full awarded in favor of the defendant”. Institution- *7 judicial issues or on a plaintiffs that the determination Secretary Welfare, Juveniles v. alized Public of rights violated"). have been The 897, (3d Cir.1985). 758 F.2d 912 attorney’s Court’s most recent decision on fees contrary. is not to the Hewitt v. Helms involved 549, (1982). 22. 672 F.2d 550 litigation brought plaintiffs any that had not — U.S. -, benefit material at all. 107 S.Ct. Hennigan Id. at Accord v. Ouachita 2672, (1987). 96 L.Ed.2d 654 Board, 1148, (5th Parish 749 F.2d School 1153 Cir.1985) (“a plaintiff brings who an that action 312, Odegaard, 317, 20. See DeFunis v. colorable, reasonable, has no or even likelihood 40 L.Ed.2d 164 Be- of success merits is not to on the entitled recov ruling plaintiffs’ a cause required on the motion was not fees’’); Guerra, attorney’s er Garcia v. 744 F.2d eligibility to establish their for attor- 1159, (5th Cir.1984), denied, fees, cert. ney's 1163 judgment the district court’s does not 2139, (1985) S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d consequences” within 105 497 come the “collateral ex- ception (plaintiffs “arguably supported must be generally mootness claim doctrine. L. See Tribe, law”). statutory by American case or The Constitutional Law defendant bears (1978). Similarly, showing we conclude the basis of the burden of that the suit is frivolous. the record expecta- Hennigan, that there is no “reasonable F.2d at 1153. litigation. If this result of this burden is established on the basis of properly devel- it remains for the defendants to oped record, preclude met estab- would an award of Savidges’ lish that claims were friv- attorney’s fees this case. olous, obviously judicata. barred hand, On the it is possible other also plaintiffs’ requirements, Of the two present significant suit was factor beyond any dispute.24 the first is met The behind Jonathan’s transfer. The chronolo- second, causation, requirement of is events, gy though of by no means conclu- vigorously parties. contested The sive, is consistent with this possibility. third district court found that “this lawsuit did Moreover, the transcript injunction impetus not serve as an for the eventual hearing contains suggesting references small, placement paid “special attention” community setting .. .”.25 We affirm find to Jonathan “because of his involvement in erroneous, ings clearly fact unless litigation”. The should be dispute the existence of causation in a over given opportunity develop an attorney’s exception.26 fees is no In this present evidence on this issue. case, however, procedure we hold that the The grant decision whether to attorney’s leading to the district court’s determination rights plaintiff fees to a civil great carries inadequate. importance society as a whole. In its appendix motion report on the version of 42 U.S.C. arguably placed attorney’s the issue of fees is at issue in this the Senate Nonetheless, before the district court. Judiciary Committee observed that a fee deciding conclude the court erred shifting necessary rule is our civil “[i]f “intensely factual” issue of causation rights laws are not to become mere hollow evidentiary hearing.27 pos- without It is pronouncements average which the citizen sible that the defendants transferred Jona- legal cannot pro- enforce”.28 The services comply than to with consent decree plaintiff vigorously prose- vided to the in a Lelsz. possible, It is also as the defendants may many cuted civil case cost thou- contend, themselves the decision to Summary disposition sands of dollars. transfer Jonathan was “based plaintiff’s petition for fees such a professionals of the trained eval- generally acceptable.29 case is not uating monitoring his situation” inde-

pendent of any pending litigation. Savidges spent years Either more than two transfer, explanations pursuing of these if a court order that would transfer 24. Because the Brown, Savidges virtually have received Heath Cir. court, they sought emergency inquiry all of the relief in their framed the district motion, i.e., explore we need impetus the issue of how whether the lawsuit served as an plaintiff losing "pre transfer, little a can obtain without appears comport for Jonathan’s Eckerhart, vailing party” Hensley status. See plaintiffs action need not be our rule that the 439 n. 1942 n. only influences the defendant. factor that (1983) (suggesting 76 L.Ed.2d 40 that a dis (3d Ayoob, 627 F.2d Morrison v. trict court make a “limited fee award" denied, Cir.1980), "minor”). when the relief obtained is But see ([w]here (1981) there is Miller, Cobb v. cause, prevail more than one 1987) (plaintiff "prevailf must ] central ing party if the action was a material factor in by acquiring primary sought”). action”). bringing the defendant’s about Note, generally Attorneys’ See Fees: How Much Partially Prevailing Can a Plaintiff Recover in 26. Heath Brown, 807 F.2d at 1234. Actions?, Rights Civil 59 Tul.L.Rev. 473 27. Posada v. Lamb County, 716 F.2d 25. We have no objection to the standard em- *8 (5th Cir. ployed by the district To establish court. causa- circuit, plaintiff seeking attorney’s tion in this a 28. (1976), S.Rep. p. reprinted No. 6 fees must show that his lawsuit was “a substan- Cong. & 1976 U.S.Code Admin.News 5913. significant catalyst motivating tial factor or a the defendants to end their unconstitutional be- Kimbrough, Secretary havior”. Robinson v. v. 652 F.2d Juveniles Institutionalized of (5th Cir.1981) added); (emphasis Welfare, 466 accord 758 F.2d at 910 n. 22. Public 906 attorneys

Jonathan from the FWSS. Their late court given cannot be judicata ef- fect.33 represented through them limited dis- covery, witnesses, expert a trial with sever- In this Savidges case the sought to en- motions, post-trial appeal.

al and an Final- force Jonathan’s individual due process ly, on right the eve of a decision from the district to treatment a less restrictive set- ting than court, expert the FWSS. The the defendants transferred witnesses and the Texas DMHMR employees who acceptable community-based to an resi- injunction testified at the agreed trial that dence. appropriate It seems to us for the community-based home was profes- district hearing court to conduct a sionally-indicated residence for Jonathan. causation, especially of view of the In Clark v. Cohen the Court of Appeals for of the Lelsz history litigation.30 upheld Third Circuit a district court finding that: Turning requirement to the final Clark’s confinement at Pennsylvania [a status, prevailing party we hold that institution for the since at least retarded] motion for 1976 in profession- the face of unanimous was not frivolous. Before the most recent opinion al placed that she should be in a Lelsz developments in the litigation, far less restrictive environment violated Savidges’ motion was arguably not —but liberty right her substantive appropri- necessarily by judicata the res ef —barred ate treatment.34 fect of the consent decree.31 We now Similarly, Dr. Gant’s of recommendation know, however, parts that of that decree program that rectify would she harms Specifically, invalid. this nulli court being believed were by done to Jonathan fied decree to the extent it was residence in the broadly FWSS is analo- upon generalized process based right due gous to the “discrete recommendation” “to receive treatment in the least restric that was Thomas S. Mor- out in carried v. 35 setting”.32 tive alternative A decree that row. the Lelsz Significantly, panel dis- has appel- been vacated or nullified an by tinguished Clark and Thomas S. cases remand, 30. On the district court should consid- relief that within the is of the de- Lelsz allowing discovery er McKaskle, limited cree. See v. Johnson 727 F.2d at 501. the issue of Depending causation. on the na- conflict, ture of evidence in the district court Kavanaugh, 807 F.2d at Lelsz may hearing consider whether to hold a witnesses. Sager, (11th Quarles 33. See 687 F.2d 346 Cir.1982); generally Wright, see 18 C. Miller A. In Johnson v. McKaskle we reaffirmed the Cooper, & E. Federal Practice and Procedure principle judicata that "the doctrine of res (1981). To the extent that a "nullified” [does] not “bar a suit based on acts of the de- distinguishable order order, from a vacated subsequent fendant have occurred Bronner, we note that Bradford final asserted as a bar’ ”. 727 F.2d at (5th Cir.1982) F.2d and Stevenson v. Greenville, (quoting 500 365, City Blair v. 649 F.2d Co., Paper International (5th Cir.1981)). important It is 1975) repudiate gave the earlier rule that judicata remember that res is measured preclusive effect district court orders entered underlying issue, transactions or occurrences at subject jurisdiction. without words, matter other seeking. relief that the if the even decree once had “life” as Lebz injuries In this most of the to Jonathan adjudication Savidge’s right live injunction hearing discussed at the occurred setting, least restrictive alternative because the filing See, consent decree. Lelsz after subject juris court lacked district Lelsz matter e.g., Transcript Injunction Hearing at 48 determination, diction to make as we im (12/7/83: "scratches on back and shoul- plicitly held decree der”; Lelsz "long scraped 12/12/83: red area on left cannot bind now on this issue. ...”; upper arm 12/13/83: "scratches on left neck”). side relationship between these (3d Cir.), denied, 34. 794 F.2d cert. injuries and dozens of similar events U.S. -, gave 93 L.Ed.2d litigation presents rise to the Lelsz questions series of difficult need not opinion. denied, merely Cir.), address in this We 35. 781 note that F.2d Savidge’s membership in the class does not, itself, seeking injunctive bar him from

9Q7 involving responsible retardates.36 individual for personal Jonathan’s medical care. We do not doubt that these Savidges’ injunctive The motion for scope defendants come within the quali- only would have affected Jonathan. We immunity fied official doctrine.39 The main need not decide whether the motion was question decide, then, must meritorious;37 ultimately conclude, whether we do conduct, however, alleged Savidges’ was not “frivolous or complaint, groundless”.38 clearly established “violate[d] statutory or rights of which summarize, To have person a reasonable would have known”.40 they sought achieved what when filed their motion for relief. We have The argument defendants’ in support of determined that their claim to this relief the dismissal contains two distinct strands. frivolous, judica- not or barred was First, the defendants maintain that Finally, ta. we reverse the district court’s complaint properly allege does not ruling this on causation and remand Jonathan’s constitutional were vio- discovery, briefing, finding and a on Second, lated.41 the defendants assert that pendency whether the mo- even if their conduct violated Jonathan’s significant tion was a factor in the defend- rights, years covered the com- year last ants’ decision to transfer Jona- plaint governing “clearly law not group than to a home. If the established”. nexus, plaintiffs can this establish causal prevailing parties presump- are The argu defendants’ first line of tively attorney’s entitled to fees under 42 complaint ment is without merit. The al 1988. U.S.C. leges that the defendants’ conduct violated right reasonably Jonathan’s to a physi safe QUALIFIED III. IMMUNITY cal Youngberg environment.42 In v. Ro meo, Supreme recognized Court that an We now turn to the district court’s deci- person institutionalized Savidges’ sion to dismiss retarded has a lib claim for dam- erty ages against “personal security” interest in the four individual defend- as well Jaylon bodily ants. as a to “freedom super- Fincannon is a former from res interests, intendent of the FWSS. Defendants Bu- traint”.43 These are the Court chanan, Read, added, involuntary pro Chavez are former “that commitment ceedings extinguish”.44 plain- FWSS doctors who were at various times do not argument 36. 807 F.2d at 1249 n. 9. 41. This boils down to an assertion have not stated a claim Guerra, 37. See Garcia v. 744 F.2d at 1166 course, granted. any which relief can be Of J., (Randall, concurring). plaintiffs’ right justified ground. dismissal on can Fed. injunction depend upon credibility to an would 12(b)(6). defending R.Civ.P. We note that in position issues that we are in no to resolve. appeal party favorable is not limited to the rationale used the district accompanying 38. See note 23 and the text. court. Southwestern Natural Gas Co. v. Pontch might question At one time we have faced the Materials, Inc., artrain 711 F.2d 1251 responsibilities whether the defendants’ sufficiently "discretionary" to warrant the full protection See, qualified immunity doctrine. 307, 327, Romeo, Youngberg 800, 818, e.g., Fitzgerald, Harlow v. 2452, 2464, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 2727, 2738, (1982) (immu have a medical or even a not offered nity applies "government performing officials justification health-threatening financial for the functions”). discretionary Supreme But complaint. conditions described in the recently unwillingness Court has announced its complicate qualified immunity analysis by “to 102 S.Ct. at 2458. making immunity or extent of turn on precise nature of various officials’ duties language plainly suggests that Sa- Id. This — U.S. -, - Creighton, ...”. Anderson v. vidge liberty though has interests even he was -, 107 S.Ct. (1987). 97 L.Ed.2d through institutionalized formal commit- proceedings. ment See A.R.C. North Dakota Olson, (D.N.D.1982), Fitzgerald, F.Supp. 40. Harlow v. 457 U.S. at grounds, S.Ct. at 2738. on other F.2d 1384 modified *10 908 as far as Rouse v. in- alleged that each traced back Cameron.48 adequately

tiffs have knowingly deprived Jon- circuit, right defendant civilly dividual the of In this commit- adequate minimally right of his to athan to “such ted retardates individual treat- medical care.45 shelter and help them to be cured or ment as will ... improve mental condition” is at to [their] possible entitle The defendants’ 49 Wyatt v. Aderholt. In least as old as immunity presents a some to official ment Ultimately, plaintiffs’ how the question. that case we also affirmed what closer ever, grudging interpreta reject presumably right to a “humane” and safe development of constitutional the Lelsz; tion of Wyatt survives environment.50 At a national safeguards for the retarded. certainly good early 1980’s was law right the to af true that level it damage plain- that when most of the by described firmative “habilitation” place.51 allege in this case took tiffs Youngberg v. was, Romeo in Third Circuit Wyatt, The defendants contend that un recently, spectre “the a at least until Youngberg, depends reasoning like its law ... ”.46 Yet twilight developing of area participation the state’s a formal opinion in its endorsed Supreme Court proceeding.52 This obser civil commitment observation, made in 1980 at about FWSS, vation, correct, though arguably must not that time first entered minimally right to ade “a constitutional to obscure the fact that as a be allowed longer is no a quate care and treatment ... general duty provide to institu matter proposition”.47 novel constitutionally tionalized retardates with adequate firmly established care was courts, concept of In a the circuit any ap reject 1980.53 We right treatment can be this circuit 1974), grounds, Cir.1983). U.S. that if "volun- vacated on other 422 The Olson court noted tarily” retardates had no fourteenth committed rights, defendants in the amendment as the insist, arguably present the state case "then Wyatt, 503 F.2d at 1313. to their beds and could chain confined residents beatings physical without vi- administer wanton least, very plaintiffs’ 51. At the fact, Savidge’s olating the constitution". Id. minimally reasonably safe and "humane” envi no more “volun- confinement at the FWSS was ronment remains unaffected We are Lelsz. tary” at Pennhurst. than Romeo’s confinement unpersuaded use the defendants’ effort to Injunction Hearing Compare Transcript of the Donaldson, O’Connor v. Youngberg, at n. at 309 354-56 with upon the 45 L.Bd.2d to "cast doubt” reject We the defendants’ 102 S.Ct. at 2455 n. 2. precedential Wyatt. value of We note distinguish Youngberg from the efforts to Wyatt approvingly was cited in Justice Black- grounds. present case on “voluntariness” Romeo, Youngberg concurrence in v. mun’s (Black n. 102 S.Ct. at 2463 n. 1 U.S. at 325 clear, sufficiently complaint 45. As the makes mun, J., concurring). are not based on section 1983 claims liability. negligence respondeat superior certainly "quid pro quo” 52. This is true of the (3d rationale, 1312; Youngberg, Wyatt F.2d clear 46. Romeo v. at it is less Cir.1980) (en banc). Although Supreme partiae” respect “parens Id. rationale. Cohen, open, now Court left the issue some observers generally at See Clark v. among J., (Becker, see consensus lower courts in favor concurring). Cohen, “right to habilitation”. Clark J., (Becker, concurring). F.2d at 93 Supreme Creighton Court In Anderson “clearly is that whether a rule estab observed Romeo, Youngberg at immunity purposes "depends for official lished” S.Ct. at 2459. generality substantially upon the level of ‘legal relevant rule’ is to be identi which the (D.C.Cir.1966). Rouse held 48. 373 F.2d 451 at -, 107 S.Ct. at fied". patient con- that an institutionalized mental rejected a at 530. The Anderson case L.Ed.2d stitutionally which is ade- entitled to “treatment police of the duties of a officer that formulation knowledge”. quate light present Id. at 456. case, by general. present In the con was too suggest in this We the defendants do not trast, interpreted defendants have the con directly by Rouse. case were bound trolling way case law in this circuit in a particularized (5th Cir.1974). and narrow. Like the too See also 49. 503 F.2d course, Court, O’Connor, we seek to maintain Anderson F.2d 507 Donaldson v. proach immunity doctrine requires speedier progress toward a final resolu- imagine us to saying tion dispute of this than the last three themselves, safely give “We can years have seen. Savidge inadequate treatment; he was not committed to the through FWSS formal GEE, Judge, Circuit concurring in

judicial proceedings and so the rationale in part and, part, in dissenting: Wyatt may apply to him”.54 We simply Concurring in the remainder of the do not envision reasonable and doctors ad opinion, Court’s I find myself join unable to calibrating ministrators their responsibility in sweeping its and preemptive treatment to each child on the basis of such narrow the qualified chief immunity issue allegations If distinctions.55 the presented. notes, As the Court ques the plaintiffs’ complaint true, are and they tion is whether the alleged defendant’s con accepted true, must be as the individual duct clearly established “violate[d] statu defendants should have known that tory or rights constitutional of which a treating were Savidge Jonathan in an un person reasonable would have known.” constitutional manner. Harlow Fitzgerald, 800, 818, 2727, 2738, 73 102 S.Ct. (1982).1 L.Ed.2d 396

IV. CONCLUSION And as notes, the Court likewise it was “in We conclude that the have ade- early the 1980’s when most of damage the quately against stated a claim the individu- the allege in case took .this al under 42 defendants U.S.C. 1983. We place.” Op. at fact, at 908. In as also find that the defendants are not enti- opinion the plain, makes most of the dam tled immunity. to official We therefore age had by “early occurred Op. 1981.” at REVERSE the district court’s decision to 1502, at 901. dismiss the damages, claim for REMAND Yet the case it was not until Youngberg v. Ro- for further meo, proceedings opinion. consistent with U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed. longer depends Because the case no 2d any in was year handed down a and some 28_ way upon the location or the outcome of months later in June rights the litigation, we trust par- the which the defendants are claimed to have ties cooperate will with the district court “clearly violated became established.” a ... between January “balance the interests in competent vindica- a teacher knew or rights tion citizens’ pub- constitutional and in grade should have known that to tie a second performance lic officials’ effective of their day student to a chair for an entire school Scherer, 183, 195, Davis v. duties". S.Ct. portion for a day, substantial of a second as 82 L.Ed.2d 139 exercise educational ... was constitution- ally impermissible. immunity 54. The doctrine is not divorced from 817 F.2d at pointed common sense. At least one court has out "it is unrealistic to assume that officials Robinson, Sourbeer v. 1103- at likely are reasoning even aware legal resolving 04. In immunity the official applicable precedents”. behind Robinson, Sourbeer v. inmate, brought by case an unsentenced (3d Cir.1986), rejected Sourbeer denied, -, attempt court defendants’ distinguish protecting a line of cases charged L.Ed.2d 779 ing We are with decid procedural rights legal obligations of sentenced whether ran inmates. The from were court that: so concluded be, effect, "unsettled” as to unenforceable. reasonable official "[a] should not re- fail to recent case of Ysleta Inde spect Jefferson person’s rights because pendent immunity School District we denied establishing behind the rationale cases pupils school teacher who had tied one her rights faulty”. those (5th Cir.1987). to a Despite chair. 817 F.2d 303 Id. at 1104. by Ingraham difficult issues left unresolved Wright, 51 L.Ed. course, Op. at at Of the factual (1977), 2d acknowledged and the absence of any guilty issue whether defendant was of such precedent factually "a which is fours all charged open conduct remains as bar", Judge quite the case at properly Politz remand ordered the court. ruled that: knowledge defined that of their existence is under the Fourteenth rights arise Those and, Young commonplace among majority educated and a Amendment observed, recognize implies consider here failure to them their wil- berg “[w]e rights of invol disregard. Clearly rights time the substantive ful these first under Four untarily persons committed I Youngberg, not such before there- to the Constitution.” teenth Amendment respectfully fore dissent. 314, 102 457 U.S. at Youngberg, added). Indeed, ques (emphasis rights existed so tion whether such injuries

entirely at the time of the unsettled

alleged here that it was not even clear asserted for Jonathan

whether the Fourteenth Amendment

arose under *12 Eighth; and the trial court

under the having in Youngberg was reversed BEERS, Captain Ann Everette T. Et Ux Amendment jury Eighth on an structed Beers, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Wynne liability 457 U.S. at standard. Cross-Appellants, I such a at 2463. Nor do see how (then) extension of Due Process novel INC., LINES, NORTH AMERICAN VAN one, recog rights which had been as (a/k/a Forwarding, American North degree one or another in some nized to Inc.), Defendants-Appellants, Cross- others, fairly not at all in can circuits and Appellees. “clearly said to have been established” be Supreme even Court had con before No. 86-4641. sidered it for the first time. Appeals, Court of United States injured very Succour to the well Fifth Circuit. well; something is due also to the but administrator, perhaps seeking harried Feb. little,

do much are we—to unable—as absolutes,

deal in sometimes constrained to doing

limit himself to no more than what

the law he lacks re- demands because

sources to do more. These defendants people; meager

have been such record say.

does say they Nor does it not; I

were think the Court acts un-

justly holding which, them to a standard hindsight, majority now calls “clear-

ly established.” It is not so: where even provenance rights of the claimed

not settled —let alone their allegedly

reach—at the time vio- defendants,

lated these cannot fair-

ly clearly be characterized established.2

I meaning “clearly concede that the es- established; yet clearly

tablished” is not ring phrase “clearly

but the of the whole established ... of which a reason- person imports

able would have known”— legal rights clearly

to me so settled and most, me, eventually damages may found that accrued 2. At it seems to the issue should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to Youngberg final. after became proportional determine the amount of whatever

Case Details

Case Name: Jonathan Savidge v. Jaylon Fincannon
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Mar 17, 1988
Citation: 836 F.2d 898
Docket Number: 86-1841
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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