*2 WISDOM, Before GEE, *, and KING Judges. Circuit WISDOM, Judge: Circuit appeal This presents questions. two first involves the eligibility to recover attorney’s fees under U.S.C. 1988 for legal performed work on an *3 aspect of their case that became moot be- reaching fore judgment and arguably was barred res judicata. ques- The second tion concerns qualified official immunity doctrine. reviewing After path tortuous brought parties these us, before we conclude in denying attorney’s fees hearing, without a and in granting immunity to the individual defend- ants, the district court erred. We there- fore remand proceed- the case for further ings opinion. consistent with this
I. BACKGROUND A. The Complaint Savidge plaintiffs The in this case are Jonathan parents, and his Wilbur and Felicia Savidge. time, At this pro- is a Jonathan foundly fifteen-year-old boy.1 retarded September From 1980 until May Jon- athan lived at the Fort Worth State School (FWSS) for the Worth, retarded in Forth Texas. In January plaintiffs Texas, sued Department the Texas of Men- tal Health and Mental Retardation (DMHMR), and four employees individual plaintiffs FWSS. The sought com- pensation damages allegedly arising past from continuing violations of Jon- athan’s rights. According Savidges’ complaint, liv- ing conditions at FWSS “oppres- were sive, inappropriate, unhealthy, filthy, abu- Ferleger, David Hoffman, Barbara Phila- sive and restrictive”. Among allega- other delphia, Pa., for plaintiffs-appellants. tions, plaintiffs allege building Jonathan lived in “permeated was McCollom, Leslie L. Hunter, Toni Asst. stench”; that Jonathan and other residents Attys. Gen., Mattox, Gen., Jim Atty. Aus- were left play “to feces”; each other’s tin, Tex., for defendants-appellees. that Jonathan’s medications poorly
monitored; that Jonathan repeatedly residents; bitten other and that * Formerly Carolyn Dineen According record, reports Randall Jonathan can spoon, feed himself with a he but cannot dress or peek-a-boo. undress. He play likes to (it Emergency so small was the B. The Motion he used was
wheelchair FWSS) he entered original one he had when In September eight months after (sco- spinal condition that it worsened complaint, filed had short, liosis) afflicts him. thé com- petitioned the district court for an “emer- case describes an environment plaint gency” injunctive requiring order the de- unhealthy physically threatened so place community- fendants to Jonathan in a Savidge.2 parties engaged based residence. The plaintiffs contend that conditions discovery several months of on the issue of Jonathan’s constitution- the FWSS violated right Jonathan’s relief. On reasonably safe institutional al January the district court severed he arrived until the time care from the time injunction the motion for an from the rest episode in the winter of 1980- he left. One and scheduled the motion for seriousness of their claim. 81 illustrates the trial. that the defendants maintain hearing injunction lasted for four Jonathan, assigned a child known to have a days. Contrary suggestion to a the de- *4 infection, special susceptibility to to ward made, fendants have often the district high “dangerously with a the FWSS judge relating did not hear evidence direct- staphlococcus of infectious bac- level [sic] ly damages. claim for arrival, A few months after his teria”. expert testimony The focused on harms suffered a fever and “infected Jonathan future, might that befall Jonathan in the By early the boils had en- boils”. already not those he had suffered.4 There fever climbed as larged and Jonathan’s great conflicting was a deal evidence high 105.8° Farenheit. Jonathan devel- potential transferring about cost of swelling oped a hand-sized on the side residence; community-based Jonathan to ribcage. of his As it is described defendants, the conduct of the individual complaint, the treatment that the individu- contrast, by was never mentioned. On ally-named provided for Jona- March the district court took the inadequate. As a di- shockingly than was “emergency” motion for relief conduct, rect result of the defendants’ under advisement. plaintiffs allege, Savidge required Jonathan surgery partially paralyzed. him that left Litigation C. The Lelsz complaint explains relationship
The between each individual defendant and Jon- difficulty and much of the Some Savidge. alleges athan It further that: a result of Jonathan delay in this case are
Defendants knew or should have known Savidge’s participation in a class action that their actions and inactions which Texas against the FWSS and two similar plaintiffs] resulted harms to were action, [the Ka institutions. That class Lelsz v. illegal plaintiffs’ rights and a violation of vanaugk, began in 1974 in the Eastern under federal and state law.3 plaintiffs District Texas. The al Lelsz leged provided institutional care that plaintiffs The state that violations of their by violated both state and the defendants under constitutional are actionable Roughly speaking, Lelsz federal law. In prayer U.S.C. 1983. sought therapy, smaller resi damages declaratory class more they request and dences, surroundings. cleaner judgment, injunction. and but no Gant, addition, plaintiffs leading expert allege plaintiffs the de- 4.Dr. Sue that prop- provide hearing injunction, fendants’ failure to Jonathan with made clear "regression” therapy in his er contributed to a had not reviewed Jonathan's "historical she level of behavior. past Similarly, defi- both sides treated record”. irrelevant, the FWSS as even when ciencies at plaintiffs allege 3. The also that the *‘[d]efendants hygiene they serious matters of involved malice, gross have acted with indifference with responsible for some of Jona- could have been needs, plaintiffs’ rights gross to disregard with damages. than’s violating plain- of whether rights”. tiffs’ constitutional and other litigation Lelsz seemingly settled a ment in a environment”, “least restrictive mid-1983, consent decree several months the Court denied that the Lelsz class en- filing after the complaint the initial joyed rights. such The Court then conclud- Savidge, and several months before the ed that:
“emergency” motion was filed. [tjhere being no paragraphs in the agree- [the settlement The Lelsz decree established de- ment invoked the plaintiffs], the dis- provide “habilitation”, fendants would trict court’s decree purporting to enforce individualized therapy, to each member of them not rest on authority plaintiff class. It stated also is unauthorized.7 provide will each member of “[defendants plaintiff class with the least restrictive words, In other only did the Court living possible conditions consistent vacate the district court’s enforcement or- person’s particular der, circumstances ...” it also upon cast doubt underlying In return for these promises, and other consent doubt, This decree.8 as we shall including Savidge— see, complicates the judicata effect of agreed to a provi- statement that Savidge. “[t]hese sions include a final resolution of the de- D. post-trial history of Savidge fendants’ obligations towards the members When we left Savidge, the district court class and of the issues had bifurcated the case and had tried the raised litigation”. plaintiffs’ motion for injunction. In February in an effort to correct years next two saw the following develop- what viewed as unnecessary foot- 1) ments: the case was transferred from dragging by state, the Lelsz *5 the Northern to the Eastern District of filed a “Motion for Community Placement”. Texas, then the exclusive forum for the hearing, After a granted district court litigation;9 2) Lelsz the case was transfer- part, motion in and ordered that 279 red back District; 3) the Northern members of the Lelsz class transferred case was prejudice dismissed without to the community centers on or Septem- before plaintiffs’ right to refile in the Eastern 1, ber 1986. District; and, 4) the dismissal was reversed appeal,
On
panel
appeal.10
this Court ruled
point,
At this
in early May of
that the district court was
jurisdic-
without
with the Northern
finally
District
es-
tion to
key
enforce
sections
consent
tablished
proper
as the
forum for the
decree.5
Court, relying
on Penn-
and with a
plaintiffs’
decision on the
motion
hurst,6 reasoned that insofar as the con-
apparently imminent, the defendants trans-
sent decree
upon
was based
state law it
ferred Jonathan to a community-based resi-
was entered in violation of the Eleventh
agreed
dence and
to furnish
proper
him a
Amendment. And to the extent the con- wheelchair.
gave
This effectively
sent decree
rested
federal
plaintiffs
constitu-
injunctive
all the
relief
had
tional
place-
“habilitation” and
sought.11
ever
5.
Kavanaugh,
(5th
v.
Lelsz
9Q3 Nonetheless, plain- a few weeks later the Amendment necessarily precluded “all Judgment tiffs filed a for “Motion on Per- damages monetary sought”. Four of the Injunction Discovery manent and for defendants had been sued private as indi- Trial Damage Schedule on viduals, Portion of however, and on February plaintiffs sought “Judgment Case”. The order, the court clarified its stating that it incorporating placement ... the new did intend its October 1986 Order allowing appropriate for professional pro- deny damage all Plaintiffs’ claims gram proposed modifications”. In a order against the Defendants their individu- motion, appendix attached as an to the capacities al because Plaintiffs failed to plaintiffs suggested be awarded light state a federal claim of Defend- attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. qualified ants’ immunity defense.14 opposed The defendants this motion and In form merely this order denied a motion asked the court to rule on their motion— filed plaintiffs, but in effect it left September filed on summary 1983—for parties nothing litigate.15 left to damages portion timely filed a appeal. case. present E. The appeal making On October without reference are seeking any now possible problem, mootness the dis- injunctive relief for Savidge. finally trict court denied plaintiffs’ They concede that the Eleventh Amend- “emergency” motion for injunctive relief. ment bars their claim damages against for The court ruled that a member of the “[a]s Texas, DMHMR, the State of and the class which was afforded individual defendants sued in capacity their settlement, is barred as hand, state officials. On the other receiving from extraordinary relief from concede that the Eleventh this Court the doctrine judica- of res protect Amendment does not the four indi- ”.12 ta The court then plaintiffs’ denied the vidual defendants from against claims request indirect attorney’s fees with them in capacity private persons observation that “this lawsuit did not acting under color of impetus serve as an state law.16 The place- for the eventual de- agree small, ment of Jonathan fendants also damages por- in a com- munity setting ... ”. tion of the precluded case is not *6 litigation. the Lelsz
The district court
plain-
also denied the
damages.
tiffs’ claim for
Relying upon
In
appeal,
plaintiffs
the
their
object
the
first
Supreme Court’s decision in Edelman v.
to the denial of attorney’s fees. The dis-
Jordan,13 the court held that the Eleventh
discretion,
trict court abused
they
its
ar-
litigation”.
year
In more than a
since his trans-
sufficiency
When a federal court reviews the
fer
par-
complaint,
there has been no
reception
any
indication from
of a
the
before the
admissions,
ties
group
that Jonathan has
evidence either
lost his
affidavit or
its
home
placement.
necessarily
task is
a limited one. The issue is
prevail,
ultimately
not whether a
will
but whether the claimant is entitled to offer
12. At the time the district court issued this or-
Moreover,
support
evidence to
the claims....
der,
course,
partial
the
nullification of the
that,
passing
it is well
on a
established
dismiss,
yet
place.
decree had not
taken
allegations
motion to
of the
...
complaint
favorably to
should be construed
13. 415 U.S.
94 S.Ct.
It is now
part
established that a
substantial
rights plaintiff may “prevail”
civil
defendants,
sought
2)
from the
as a
—and
added).
(emphasis
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1988
unconstitutionally
tion” that Jonathan will be
returned
FWSS.
United States v. W.T.
Graham,
Kentucky
v.
Co.,
629, 633,
894, 897,
Grant
345 U.S.
(quoting S.Rep.
S.Ct.
p.
at 3104
No.
pendent of any pending litigation.
Savidges spent
years
Either
more than two
transfer,
explanations
pursuing
of these
if
a court order that would transfer
24. Because the
Brown,
Savidges
virtually
have received
Heath
Cir.
court,
they sought
emergency
inquiry
all of the relief
in their
framed
the district
motion,
i.e.,
explore
we need
impetus
the issue of how
whether the lawsuit served as an
plaintiff
losing "pre
transfer,
little a
can obtain without
appears
comport
for Jonathan’s
Eckerhart,
vailing party”
Hensley
status. See
plaintiffs action need not be
our rule that the
439 n.
1942 n.
only
influences the defendant.
factor that
(1983) (suggesting
Jonathan from the FWSS. Their late court given cannot be judicata ef- fect.33 represented through them limited dis- covery, witnesses, expert a trial with sever- In this Savidges case the sought to en- motions, post-trial appeal.
al
and an
Final-
force Jonathan’s
individual due process
ly, on
right
the eve of a decision from the district
to
treatment
a less restrictive set-
ting than
court,
expert
the FWSS. The
the defendants transferred
witnesses
and the Texas DMHMR employees who
acceptable community-based
to an
resi-
injunction
testified at the
agreed
trial
that
dence.
appropriate
It seems to us
for the
community-based
home was
profes-
district
hearing
court to conduct a
sionally-indicated residence for Jonathan.
causation, especially
of
view of the
In Clark v. Cohen the Court of Appeals for
of the Lelsz
history
litigation.30
upheld
Third Circuit
a district court
finding that:
Turning
requirement
to the final
Clark’s confinement at
Pennsylvania
[a
status,
prevailing
party
we hold that
institution for the
since at least
retarded]
motion for
1976 in
profession-
the face of unanimous
was not frivolous. Before the most recent
opinion
al
placed
that she should be
in a
Lelsz
developments in the
litigation,
far less restrictive environment violated
Savidges’ motion was arguably
not
—but
liberty right
her substantive
appropri-
necessarily
by
judicata
the res
ef
—barred
ate treatment.34
fect of the consent decree.31 We now Similarly, Dr. Gant’s
of
recommendation
know, however,
parts
that
of that decree
program that
rectify
would
she
harms
Specifically,
invalid.
this
nulli
court
being
believed were
by
done to Jonathan
fied
decree to
the extent
it was
residence in the
broadly
FWSS is
analo-
upon generalized
process
based
right
due
gous to the “discrete recommendation”
“to receive treatment
in the least restric
that was
Thomas S. Mor-
out in
carried
v.
35
setting”.32
tive alternative
A decree that
row.
the Lelsz
Significantly,
panel
dis-
has
appel-
been vacated or nullified
an
by
tinguished Clark and Thomas S.
cases
remand,
30. On
the district court should
consid-
relief that within the
is
of the
de-
Lelsz
allowing
discovery
er
McKaskle,
limited
cree. See
v.
Johnson
9Q7
involving
responsible
retardates.36
individual
for
personal
Jonathan’s
medical care. We do not doubt that these
Savidges’
injunctive
The
motion for
scope
defendants come within the
quali-
only
would have affected
Jonathan. We
immunity
fied official
doctrine.39 The main
need not decide whether the motion was
question
decide, then,
must
meritorious;37
ultimately
conclude,
whether
we do
conduct,
however,
alleged
Savidges’
was not “frivolous or
complaint,
groundless”.38
clearly established
“violate[d]
statutory or
rights
of which
summarize,
To
have
person
a reasonable
would have known”.40
they sought
achieved what
when
filed
their motion for
relief. We have
The
argument
defendants’
in support of
determined that their claim to this relief
the dismissal contains two distinct strands.
frivolous,
judica-
not
or barred
was
First,
the defendants maintain that
Finally,
ta.
we reverse the district court’s
complaint
properly allege
does not
ruling
this
on causation and remand
Jonathan’s constitutional
were vio-
discovery, briefing,
finding
and a
on
Second,
lated.41
the defendants assert that
pendency
whether the
mo- even if their conduct violated Jonathan’s
significant
tion was a
factor in the defend-
rights,
years
covered
the com-
year
last
ants’ decision
to transfer Jona- plaint
governing
“clearly
law
not
group
than
to a
home.
If the
established”.
nexus,
plaintiffs can
this
establish
causal
prevailing parties
presump-
are
The
argu
defendants’ first line of
tively
attorney’s
entitled to
fees under 42
complaint
ment is without merit. The
al
1988.
U.S.C.
leges
that the defendants’ conduct violated
right
reasonably
Jonathan’s
to a
physi
safe
QUALIFIED
III.
IMMUNITY
cal
Youngberg
environment.42 In
v. Ro
meo,
Supreme
recognized
Court
that an
We now turn to the district court’s deci-
person
institutionalized
Savidges’
sion to dismiss
retarded
has a lib
claim for dam-
erty
ages against
“personal security”
interest in
the four individual defend-
as well
Jaylon
bodily
ants.
as a
to “freedom
super-
Fincannon is a former
from
res
interests,
intendent of the FWSS. Defendants Bu-
traint”.43 These are
the Court
chanan, Read,
added,
involuntary
pro
Chavez are former
“that
commitment
ceedings
extinguish”.44
plain-
FWSS doctors who were at various times
do not
argument
36.
tiffs have
knowingly deprived Jon-
circuit,
right
defendant
civilly
dividual
the
of
In this
commit-
adequate
minimally
right
of his
to
athan
to “such
ted retardates
individual
treat-
medical care.45
shelter and
help
them to be cured or
ment as will
...
improve
mental condition” is at
to
[their]
possible
entitle
The defendants’
49
Wyatt
v. Aderholt.
In
least as old as
immunity presents a some
to official
ment
Ultimately,
plaintiffs’
how
the
question.
that case we also affirmed
what closer
ever,
grudging interpreta
reject
presumably
right
to a “humane” and
safe
development of constitutional
the
Lelsz;
tion of
Wyatt survives
environment.50
At a national
safeguards
for the retarded.
certainly good
early
1980’s
was
law
right
the
to af
true that
level it
damage
plain-
that
when most of the
by
described
firmative
“habilitation”
place.51
allege in this case took
tiffs
Youngberg
v.
was,
Romeo
in
Third
Circuit
Wyatt,
The defendants
contend that
un
recently,
spectre
“the
a
at
least until
Youngberg,
depends
reasoning
like
its
law ... ”.46 Yet
twilight
developing
of
area
participation
the state’s
a formal
opinion
in its
endorsed
Supreme Court
proceeding.52 This obser
civil commitment
observation,
made in 1980 at about
FWSS,
vation,
correct,
though arguably
must not
that
time
first entered
minimally
right
to
ade
“a constitutional
to obscure the fact
that as a
be allowed
longer
is no
a
quate care and treatment
...
general
duty
provide
to
institu
matter
proposition”.47
novel
constitutionally
tionalized retardates with
adequate
firmly established
care was
courts,
concept of
In
a
the circuit
any ap
reject
1980.53 We
right
treatment
can be
this circuit
1974),
grounds,
Cir.1983).
U.S.
that if "volun-
vacated on other
422
The Olson court noted
tarily”
retardates had no fourteenth
committed
rights,
defendants in the
amendment
as the
insist,
arguably
present
the state
case
"then
Wyatt,
judicial proceedings and so the rationale in part and, part, in dissenting: Wyatt may apply to him”.54 We simply Concurring in the remainder of the do not envision reasonable and doctors ad opinion, Court’s I find myself join unable to calibrating ministrators their responsibility in sweeping its and preemptive treatment to each child on the basis of such narrow the qualified chief immunity issue allegations If distinctions.55 the presented. notes, As the Court ques the plaintiffs’ complaint true, are and they tion is whether the alleged defendant’s con accepted true, must be as the individual duct clearly established “violate[d] statu defendants should have known that tory or rights constitutional of which a treating were Savidge Jonathan in an un person reasonable would have known.” constitutional manner. Harlow Fitzgerald, 800, 818, 2727, 2738, 73 102 S.Ct. (1982).1 L.Ed.2d 396
IV. CONCLUSION
And as
notes,
the Court likewise
it was “in
We
conclude that the
have ade-
early
the
1980’s when most of
damage
the
quately
against
stated a claim
the individu-
the
allege in
case took
.this
al
under 42
defendants
U.S.C.
1983. We
place.”
Op. at
fact,
at 908.
In
as
also find that
the defendants are not enti-
opinion
the
plain,
makes
most of the dam
tled
immunity.
to official
We therefore
age had
by “early
occurred
Op.
1981.”
at
REVERSE the district court’s decision to
1502, at 901.
dismiss the
damages,
claim for
REMAND
Yet
the case
it was
not until Youngberg v. Ro-
for further
meo,
proceedings
opinion.
consistent with
U.S.
S.Ct.
L.Ed.
longer depends
Because the case no
2d
any
in
was
year
handed down a
and some
28_
way upon the
location or the outcome of months later in June
rights
the litigation,
we trust
par-
the
which the defendants are claimed to have
ties
cooperate
will
with the
district court
“clearly
violated
became
established.”
a
... between
January
“balance
the interests in
competent
vindica-
a
teacher knew or
rights
tion
citizens’
pub-
constitutional
and in
grade
should have known that to tie a second
performance
lic officials’ effective
of their
day
student to a chair for an entire school
Scherer,
183, 195,
Davis v.
duties".
S.Ct.
portion
for a
day,
substantial
of a second
as
82 L.Ed.2d 139
exercise
educational
... was constitution-
ally impermissible.
immunity
54. The
doctrine is not divorced from
817 F.2d
at
pointed
common sense. At least one court has
out
"it is
unrealistic to assume that officials
Robinson,
Sourbeer v.
1103-
at
likely
are
reasoning
even aware
legal
resolving
04. In
immunity
the official
applicable precedents”.
behind
Robinson,
Sourbeer v.
inmate,
brought by
case
an unsentenced
(3d Cir.1986),
rejected
Sourbeer
denied,
-,
attempt
court
defendants’
distinguish
protecting
a line of cases
charged
L.Ed.2d 779
ing
We are
with decid
procedural
rights
legal obligations
of sentenced
whether
ran
inmates. The
from
were
court
that:
so
concluded
be,
effect,
"unsettled” as to
unenforceable.
reasonable official
"[a]
should not
re-
fail to
recent
case of
Ysleta
Inde
spect
Jefferson
person’s
rights
because
pendent
immunity
School District we denied
establishing
behind the
rationale
cases
pupils
school teacher who had tied
one
her
rights
faulty”.
those
(5th Cir.1987).
to a
Despite
chair.
entirely at the time of the unsettled
alleged here that it was not even clear asserted for Jonathan
whether the Fourteenth Amendment
arose under *12 Eighth; and the trial court
under the having in Youngberg was reversed BEERS, Captain Ann Everette T. Et Ux Amendment jury Eighth on an structed Beers, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Wynne liability 457 U.S. at standard. Cross-Appellants, I such a at 2463. Nor do see how (then) extension of Due Process novel INC., LINES, NORTH AMERICAN VAN one, recog rights which had been as (a/k/a Forwarding, American North degree one or another in some nized to Inc.), Defendants-Appellants, Cross- others, fairly not at all in can circuits and Appellees. “clearly said to have been established” be Supreme even Court had con before No. 86-4641. sidered it for the first time. Appeals, Court of United States injured very Succour to the well Fifth Circuit. well; something is due also to the but administrator, perhaps seeking harried Feb. little,
do much are we—to unable—as absolutes,
deal in sometimes constrained to doing
limit himself to no more than what
the law he lacks re- demands because
sources to do more. These defendants people; meager
have been such record say.
does say they Nor does it not; I
were think the Court acts un-
justly holding which, them to a standard hindsight, majority now calls “clear-
ly established.” It is not so: where even provenance rights of the claimed
not settled —let alone their allegedly
reach—at the time vio- defendants,
lated these cannot fair-
ly clearly be characterized established.2
I meaning “clearly concede that the es- established; yet clearly
tablished” is not ring phrase “clearly
but the of the whole established ... of which a reason- person imports
able would have known”— legal rights clearly
to me so settled and most, me, eventually damages may found that accrued 2. At it seems to the issue should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to Youngberg final. after became proportional determine the amount of whatever
