98 Tenn. 440 | Tenn. | 1897
In November, 1892, complainant and defendant entered into a written contract, by which
The insistence of complainant is that the Chancellor, in his order of reference, by the use of the term “market” — “market value” — placed an unwarranted limitation upon his right of recovery; that the real measure of damages in such a case, and the one which shoulci have been embodied in the order of reference, is the difference between the contract price and the actual or rental value of the term.
Where the lessor wrongfully refuses to give possession to the lessee of the leased premises, the authorities agree that the measure of damages is the same as in a case where the vendor, without excuse,
It is true, no doubt, as Mr. (Sedgwick says in Sec.' 243 of his work, already referred to, that “wherever the measure of damages involves the question of value, however much the market may be resorted to to determine what the value is, this resort is had, not as a conclusive test, but to aid in getting at that real value to which the plaintiff is entitled.” But the purpose of the law is to give the party complaining as near complete compensation for the loss of his bargain as possible — that is, to place him in as good a position as he would have been in if he had obtained what he bargained for, so that if the thing contracted for had been dealt
So difficult a matter, however, is it to separate the ideas of ‘ ‘ value ’ ’ and ‘ ‘ market value ’ ’ that it will be found text writers and the Courts have frequently used these terms as interchangeable, and both as being the equivalents of “actual value,” “salable value, ’ ’ and in proper cases ‘ ‘ rental value. ’ ’ Mr. Sutherland, in his. work on Damages, Yol. III., Sec. 864, says: “The difference between the ‘rent to be paid and the actual value of the premises at the time’ of the lessor’s breach, ‘is the natural and approximate damage’ sustained by the lessee, and ‘this is ordinarily measured by the amount the lessee would be compelled to pay for other premises, equally well adapted to his business. ’ ’ ’
Mr. Sedgwick, when he comes to deal specifically with the loss resulting from a breach of a covenant to convey, says ‘ ‘ the general rule in this class of cases is the difference between the contract price and the market value of the land when the contract should have been performed” (Yol. III., Sec. 1018), while, in speaking of the action of the disappointed lessee, who wrongfully fails of his contract, he says the standard of value is the ‘ ‘ rental value ’ ’ of the leasehold, although he has just said, the same principle — so far as the measure of damages is concerned — underlies these two actions. Yol. III., Sec. 1022. It will also be found that this author em
While it is thus seen the terms ‘‘ value, ” “ market value,” and “rental value” have been used somewhat indiscriminately, yet we think there is a distinction between them, at least in cases where the matters or things contracted for have not been bought and sold in the market so as to have established a “market value.” With regard to those subjects of contract which are freely dealt in, and which command ready buyers in the marts of trade, there is usually no harm done in referring to the market to fix the standard of value; but even in such cases this is not the final 'or “conclusive test of value.” 1 Sedg., Sec. 245. But where the article or thing in question is so unusual in its character as that there is little or no demand for it, its value must be ascertained in some other way, and from such elements as are attainable (1 Sedg., Sec. 495); in such cases it is evident that to refer to the market as the sole standard of value may work serious injury to the party complainant. In the case at bar it is shown that the house which the defendant, Noel, intended to build for the use of complainants was one of unprecedented proportions for the city of Nashville, which no one save com
The result is there is no reversible error and the decree is affirmed. Defendant will pay all costs.