Jonaitis v. State

if cient, probation purposes, revocation finds that hearing, JONAITIS, Appellant after a judge,

the trial Hoffa; (Defendant Below), occurred. Shu unlawful conduct Therefore, case, this if there was maker. v. preponder proof to establish sufficient Indiana, Appellee STATE of Jaynes of the that committed ance evidence (Plaintiff Below). on probation, another crime while probation of his court’s revocation 3-781A179. No. affirmed. Indiana, Appeals Court of ques sufficiency We determine District. Third here as we other tion the same do 12, 1982. July that sufficiency only We consider question. 19, 1982. Aug. state, Denied Rehearing to to the evidence most favorable flow gether with all reasonable inferences if, therefrom, vantage

ing and from that

point, there is substantial evidence

supports judgment, the trial court’s not be Monroe v. will disturbed.

State, (1981) N.E.2d 831.

trial reasons for court’s statement its such supporting

revocation and the evidence clearly establishes sufficient

determination support

evidence to court’s had of theft

Jaynes offense probation. Particularly on is that

while by the

true when that evidence is measured Further, re standard. our

preponderance the revo presented

view of evidence at supports the court’s de hearing

cation was suffi

termination. Since evidence

cient to sustain the trial court’s determina on

tion that committed theft while Jaynes

probation, justified court was in revok

ing probation.3 his

Judgment affirmed. JJ., ROBERTSON,

NEAL concur. and agree revoked for violations of conditions 3. We there was no evidence to charge alleged petition petition proved probation alleged at of arson in the However, probation. hearing. revoke theft was al- of the addi- Since the commission leged proved, probation, is sufficient alone vio- crime of while on tional theft grounds probation alleged revocation. probation, lation of the terms may proved, on be sustained We revocation also alluded to note that the trial court ground Consequently, the state- alone. several not in at the revoca- matters concerning petition hearing such other rea- ments and not evidence, sons, grounds surplusage. revoke as for revocation of not in are additional probation. improper. This was Probation Pearson, Gen., E. Linley Atty. Stephan E. Wolter, Gen., Deputy Atty. Indianapolis, for appellee.

HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge. appeal waiving is an from an order This juvenile jurisdiction over Jonaitis. Juvenile Following County the Porter jurisdiction, pled Court’s waiver of Jonaitis dealing marijuana, a class D guilty exchange agreement an felony,1 charges dealing to dismiss two two-year phencyclidine.2 She received suspended sentence which was with certain conditions. by Jonaitis have been

The issues raised restated as follows: combined and (1) charged whether Jonaitis was with an part repetitive pat- act that was of a acts; tern of (2) rehabili- whether juvenile justice sys- under the tation tem; (3) whether there was sufficient evidence court’s that it was in the best interests of the trial as community that Jonaitis stand adult; an (4) Amendment whether Jonaitis’ Sixth confrontation denied right of into when the trial court admitted on the laboratory reports to an substances delivered police undercover officer. 1971, (Burns Ed.) pro- 31-6-2-4 Code IC vides: refers to an

“(a) jurisdiction Waiver of court that waives order juris- to a court that would have case anby diction had the act been charged Waiver is for the offense adult. offenses. and all included “(b) prosecutor Upon motion of hearing, the investigation full after if it jurisdiction waive finds that: Hoehner, Valparaiso, appel- John F. (1) an act:

lant. the child is with 1971, 1971, (1981 Supp.). (1981 Supp.). Burns 35 -48 4-10 2. IC 35—48—4-2 IC Burns Ind.App. 342 N.E.2d 897. with aggravated, heinous or (A) that is “delinquent definition of accept To Jonaitis’ weight given to acts greater requiring the State to act” would mean against proper- than to acts person adjudication delinquency, first obtain ty; or criminal standard of required with the (B) repetitive pat- part that is a by preponder- in order to establish proof, acts, though even tern of hearing in the waiver ance of the evidence serious; less committed. This a act was (14) (2) years fourteen of the child was have been intended clearly result could not charged when the act was age or older contrary, the To the Legislature. the by committed; allegedly “delinquent act” in IC Legislature defined (3) cause to believe probable there is must establish 1971, The State 31-6-4-1. act; the that the child committed of the evidence preponderance a by only rehabilitation (4) beyond the child is committed acts the child has justice juvenile system; under the in by an adult be crimes if committed would (5) best interests of it is in the trial court’s waiver. support to order welfare of safety and the Indiana Additionally, this Court and an adult.” that he stand trial as waiv- have held that a Supreme Court both against Jonaitis involved charges delinquency. adjudication not an of er is 1, 18, March drug transactions on March would mean that an ad- To hold otherwise time, 24, 1980. Prior to this April judi- would be res judication of juve- no contact with the Jonaitis had had subsequent any cata in the criminal trial justice system. basically nile Jonaitis con- waiver, grave double not to mention trial court could find tends that before the would be created jeopardy problems which repetitive pattern that there was a of delin- reasoning. by such acts, have been evidence quent there should 8, 349 (1976),265 Ind. Walker v. See State juvenile of of to the prior referrals 943, den., 97 161, N.E.2d cert. U.S. court. 313; 363, 50 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 1971, 31-6-4—1(a)(1) (1980 Burns IC 1153 and (1979), Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d commits a delin- Supp.) provides: “A child the cases therein. if, birthday, quent eighteenth his before charged with two a (1) he: commits an act that would be III con dealing of in a Schedule counts an adult....” by crime if committed dealing one count of trolled substance and fact-finding statute for a provide does marijuana separate a result of three as merely defines hearing judgment. It sepa on three transactions which occurred It is this definition which “delinquent act.” rate occasions. All three were acts which applied hearings. in waiver if committed would be offenses trial court did not err in find adult.3 The 1971, provide IC 31-6-4-14 does charged with acts which ing Jonaitis was judgment in a fact-finding hearing of repetitive pattern and constituted juvenile In such delinquency proceeding. delinquent acts. cases, prove beyond must a rea State sonable doubt that contends that the trial Jonaitis also of acts. Matter Ort beyond was reha- erred in that she 407 N.E.2d 1162. This is not justice system. under the bilitation however. We are con delinquency hearing insufficient evi- alleges that there was She juris cerned here with the waiver of finding and that such a dence diction court. In waiver beyond that she was the trial court found cases, pre justice sys- only prove by need under the State rehabilitation eighteen years ponderance prereq simply the evidence that the tem because she of age. uisites to the waiver exist. Imel v. 1971, IC 35-48-4-2 and 35-48-4-10. IC states, pertinent point, “A. At this I don’t know if I could

The waiver order absolute on that. part: make an But from the circumstances I repititive “4. The acts as are know of and all the information that I pattern and constitute a of delin- [sic] believe, no, have, any I quent occurring separate acts on three don’t juveniles, regarding child is rehabilitation institutions dates. Said institutions, homes, juvenile justice system under the inas- state I don’t group she has now much as since turned that would believe there are be years age, should she found delin- appropriate. juvenile system,

quent most “Q. only alter- would be the Then what available disposition restrictive to the Kathy if that would be left for native or, ‘probation’ would be that of Court juvenile sys- she were to remain placing supervision the child under the tem? Department, the Probation should [sic] testimony, “A. in earlier I stated my As probation such in be violated [sic] I recom- that I don’t think that would juvenile, there would be no more re- probation only possible but the mend juve- available to the disposition strictive un- probation, alternative would be nile Court.” [sic] circumstances, regarding the der those Record 31. at ease needs of the which in this abuse, simply drug The that judge possibly did not find could be substance thing. of eighteen years age counseling, type Jonaitis was of abuse that because juve- my she was That would be concern and under beyond rehabilitation Instead, if she was justice recognized juvenile jurisdiction nile he system. at the time that a options disposition placed probation the limited for available on to her would juvenile system probation to him in the due violation that options made, those we have no alterna- age, and determined that would could not adequate point. were not for Jonaitis and there- tives at She fore was under is no clout as far as the beyond she rehabilitation have—there juvenile justice possibility using of state institutions system. that, like anything like or Girls’ School question then becomes whether possible there would be no other beyond reha finding that Jonaitis was actually probation alternatives. So juvenile justice system bilitation under the useless, say. would would be I supported by sufficient evidence. It “Q. light of all the you Do think that was. Kathy is testimony your opinion, and in reviewing waiving In an order rehabilitation good candidate for jurisdiction, appellate court does juvenile system? within the evidence, weigh looks to that but “A. No. evidence which the trial court’s supports “Q. is recommendation your What judgment. The record of the waiver hear in this case? disposition ing may supplement be used to the reasons earlier, from all the “A. I stated As judge. for waiver as stated I have and all the informa- indications 385 N.E.2d v. State have, lean toward and tion I it would 1153. court. suggest a waiver to adult Swinehart, Martin Juvenile Probation Of- sug- “Q. saying you would you Are County, ficer for Porter testified as follows: gest that? Swinehart, “Q. right, All Mr. is there “A. Yes.” juvenile system any placement Record at 160-163. you appropriate think would be Jonaitis? trial court to necessary It for the is not ¤ # # # sk ^[*] recount all possible alternative juvenile dis- GARRARD,J., concluding concurs. to it before available positions is The court appropriate. that none are STATON, J., opinion. dissents with resources. Strosnider aware of its The trial (1981),Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d STATON, dissenting. Judge, could have concluded court in this instance dispo- that the produced Assembly pro- from the evidence I has dissent. General juvenile justice sitions within available juvenile, whose re- vided that recidivist particular in this system inadequate delinquent commission of acts dem- peated finding error in case. There was no exemp- incorrigibility, onstrate forfeits rehabilitation in the beyond juvenile system which the has afforded juvenile justice system. justice system. Ind. him from the criminal provides that a Code 31-6-2-^ Likewise, trial court did not err jurisdiction waive its if the child interests that it was in the best part with an act that is is that Jonaitis stand trial community pattern delinquent acts. repetitive involved in a as an adult. Because she was Assembly clear is that the General Equally acts and repetitive pattern rehabilitation un no shall suffer the provided because she was system, it was in the juvenile justice judicial finding der the stigma attached to best that Jonai- interests proving without the be- Being beyond tis stand trial as an adult.4 the commission of yond a reasonable doubt juvenile system, rehabilitation in the had 31-6-7—13(a). act. Ind.Code adult, Jonaitis not stood trial as an there Indeed, Assembly further the General has prohib either would have been no means of delinquency can provided that a iting making her actions or her accountable only hearing in which the be made after a Therefore, for it was in illegal her conduct. process child is entitled to certain due the best interests of the rights. Ind.Code 31-6-3-1. Jonaitis stand trial as an adult order to Majority holds that these wéll drug dealing community. inhibit rights naught Kathy defined are for Jo- that her Finally, argues naitis’s case. While Jonaitis has never been right Sixth Amendment of confrontation rights by these mandated the Gen- afforded was denied when the trial court admitted stigmatized by Assembly, eral she has been reports into the on the laboratory allegation the mere that she by substances delivered Jonaitis to the un delinquent justifying acts the pattern police dercover officer. She claims that the jurisdiction. The juvenile court’s waiver of reports hearsay they were evidence in that the court’s fail- Majority condones prepared by someone other than an statutorily required make the find- ure to in-court witness. ings showing of fact1 the re- previously This issue was addressed lapse supporting its waiver order (1974), this Court Clemons v. State 162 through sophistry an abracadabra reminis- 50, 317 N.E.2d 859. At that time Ind.App. days wizardly cent of the when alchemists we held that fundamental fairness does not they gold. reasoned that could turn dirt into require hearsay the exclusion of evidence in Majority confuses the two standards of juvenile jurisdiction hearing. waiver 31-6-7-13(a). proof defined in Ind.Code Jonaitis has demonstrated no reversible provides statute that the commission That Therefore, error. the of the trial only can be found after court is affirmed. beyond a reasona- proof the has made State doubt; however, findings, Affirmed. ble for all other 31-6-2—4(h) (1977), requires Redding that the waiv- See 1. Ind.Code findings specific of fact to er order include N.E.2d 397. support the order. Ind., N.E.2d 1156. I can- only preponder- meet the State the must State believe, Majori- does, Majority ance of the evidence standard. The not as the that the then, ty, concludes that the standard of Assembly depart General intended to from the proof statute is an invitation to turn wisdom of such a time honored reason- the by allowing waiver statute on its head ing protecting allega- citizens from mere only required beyond to avoid not State tions of behavior criminal or standard, but also reasonable doubt judicial without evidence of a determina- the waiver very purpose clear and terms of delinquency proven or criminality statute. beyond a reasonable doubt. the habitual By drawing analogy Majority may believe that it While statute, deliberate Majority’s offender society’s fight has struck in our paydirt the real swept away and obfuscation can be abuse, against drug especially among young juvenile waiver hear- issue addressed. The We are not free people, I think otherwise. offender ing analogous is habitual of the purpose to thwart and frustrate hearing. Both serve to determine whether statutory artifice of Juvenile Code enhancing the justify the criteria exist to inspire respect can construction. Courts sentencing dispositional alternatives for themselves demon- they law when incorrigible, recidivist offenders. Just as spirit the letter and respect strate finding requires habitual offender evi- Certainly, law. this is so in the convictions, prior, felony dence of unrelated system young where citizens have their finding requires so a waiver evidence of their last—brush hopefully first—and prior, delinquency judgments unrelated We against the law. should rush to collectively provide which the criteria for State, in rescue the when the its own proceedings, the waiver. In both the acts rush to with a criminal jeopardize constituting sentencing the criteria for en- ignores statutory itself imprimatur, distinct, procedur- hancement process rights alleged due of an to, ally brought unrelated the act which has offender. offender, before the court. again, once brought the offender The act has triggers

again before court also

sentencing proceeding. enhancement and com-

Majority deliberately confuses with the underlying

bines the criteria acts triggering pending action

the offender. In neither the waiv- proceedings er nor the habitual offender CORPORATION, GENERAL DISCOUNT jeopardy judicata are double or res issues Below), (Plaintiff Appellant present. Majority’s reference v. nothing decoy more than a Walker is CORPORATION, MACHINERY WEISS manipula- mask the Houdini-like Majority’s Inc., Leasing, and Ed- Weiss Sales tion of the terms of the Juve- unambiguous Weiss, (Defendants Appellees Be- ward nile Code. low). Again, I that the State cannot emphasize resting on mere on acts

rely allegations No. 2-282A51. judicially which never have deter- been Indiana, Appeals Court of delinquent. mined to be This wisdom Third District. deter- allowing only judicially evidence of evidentiary appears mined acts in Indiana’s July defining rules witness impeachment of impeached by can be credibility. Witnesses judi- of bad acts reduced to a

cially determined conviction. v. Chambers

Case Details

Case Name: Jonaitis v. State

Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals

Date Published: Jul 12, 1982

Citation: 437 N.E.2d 140

Docket Number: 3-781A179

Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.